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NEW ZEALAND POLICE
Ngā Pirihimana o Aotearoa

Tactical Response Model: Evaluation Report

EVIDENCE BASED POLICING CENTRE

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Contents

Document control

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Glossary of terms

Common Incident/Task codes

An Event Code is assigned when Police are dispatched to a job ('Event'). These are the codes for common Incident and Task Events (Offences have a different code system).

1C Car/Person Acting Suspiciously

1K Drunk Custody / Detox Centre

1M Mental Health

1R Breach of the Peace

1U Traffic Incident

1V Vehicle Collision

1X Threatens/Attempts Suicide

2W Warrant to Arrest

3T Traffic Stop / Stop Car

4U Custody Duties

4X Search Warrant

4Q Enquiry / Investigation

5F Family Harm

5K Bail Check

6D Bail Breach

6E Electronic Bail Alarm

Event resolution codes

Once an Event that Police have attended has finished, it is assigned a resolution code.

K1 No further Police action required (attendance sufficient).

K3 No Offence disclosed (for Incident initially reported as an Offence).

K6 Reported Offence (no offender located)

K9 Arrest made.

Other terms and acronyms

AFCO Aim, Factors, Course, Outline Plan

AOS Armed Offenders Squad

APNT Advanced Police Negotiation Team

ART Armed Response Teams

BAS Body Armour System

BAU Business as usual

BCP Business Continuity Plan

CARD Computer Aided Radio Dispatch system used by Police to manage and record jobs

CDEMA Civil Defence Emergency Management

CHIS Covert Human Intelligence Source (informant)

CIA Community Impact Assessments

CIB Criminal Investigations Branch

CILOs Critical Incident Liaison officers

CITS Controlled Interrupted Time Series analysis

CIU Combined Investigation Unit

CRT Clearance and Rescue Tactics

DaS Deployment and Safety App

DCC District Command Centre

DIB Daily Intelligence Brief

DLT District Leadership Team

DMI District Manager of Intelligence

DPT Dog Patrol Team

DSSB Daily Staff Safety Briefing

DPT Dog Patrol Teams

EASC Enhanced Access to Specialist Capability

EBPC Evidence Based Policing Centre

ECC Emergency Communications Centre

EOC Emergency Operations Centre

EOD End of Deployment, used in reference to End of Deployment forms

FIO Field Intelligence Officer

FLINT Frontline Intelligence Product

FRISK Frontline Risk Product

FSEC Frontline Skills Enhancement Course

FSED Frontline Skills Enhancement in District

FSIP Frontline Safety Improvement Programme

GBH Grievous Bodily Harm

GSME Ground Situation Mission Execution

GSMEAC Ground Situation Mission Execution Admin Command—Type of Briefing

GunSafe RIOD Firearms Event Log.

HRO High-Risk Offenders

HROM High-Risk Offender Management

HROT&C High-Risk Offenders Tasking and Coordination Meeting

HRPPSW High-risk pre-planned search warrants

HRVS High-Risk Vehicle Stop

IMT Investigation Management Tool or Incident Management Team

IPT Investigation Prevention Team

MOC Major Operations Centre

NCCC National Command and Coordination Centre

NCMC or **NEMA** National Crisis Management Centre

NCO non-commissioned offers

NIA National Intelligence Application

NZCVS New Zealand Crime Victim Survey

OC Officer in Charge

OSA Officer Safety Alarms

OSL Optimal Staffing Numbers

PARA-CARD Planned Activity Risk Assessment

PCA Perceived Cumulative Assessment

PITT Police Integrated Tactical Training

PTT Precision Targeting Team

PNT Police Negotiation Team

POI Person of Interest

PoC Proof of Concept

PoC Lead an inspector level role responsible for the **PoC** in each district

PPSW Pre-planned search warrant

PROP Police Register of Property

PS/CP Protection Services/Close Protection

PST Public Safety Team

RAT Resource Allocation Target

RP Road Policing

RIOD Realtime Intelligence for Operational Deployment

RNZPC Royal New Zealand Police College

RTA Required to Arrest

SAM Situational Awareness Map

SEB Stress-Eyesup-Breathe

SFP Safe Forward Point

SID Serious Incident Database

SME Subject Matter Expert

SSPOI Staff Safety Persons of Interest tool

SST&C Staff Safety Tasking and Coordination

STG Special Tactics Group

TCC Training and Coaching Culture

TCU Tactical Crime Unit

TDT Tactical Dog Team, a Dog handler accompanied by tactical operator

TENR Threat Exposure Necessity Response—Police threat assessment methodology/tool

TOC: A S/Sgt level leadership and coordination position for the TRM.

TOIL Time off in Lieu

TOM: A Commissioned officer level leadership position for the TRM.

TOR Tactical Operations Report

TPT Tactical Prevention Team, 1 Team Leader plus 3 AOS operators

TRM Tactical Response Model

TRO Tactical Rescue Options

TSC Tactical Safety Coach

TT Tactical Teams

WFM Work Force Management

WTA Warrant to Arrest

Executive summary

Purpose

This report provides an evaluation of the implementation, impacts and outcomes of the Tactical Response Model during the first six months of the model's implementation in proof of concept (PoC) districts. The report examines whether the trial was implemented as intended, and whether it had the impacts and outcomes anticipated. The report is intended to allow Police to discuss the Tactical Response Model (TRM) with our communities, and to provide evidence to decision-makers who will determine if the Tactical Response Model should now be rolled out nationally. Additionally, the report draws out learnings that can be considered by Police to improve the model further should it be rolled out nationally.

Introduction

The Tactical Response Model (TRM) is a safety system designed to make police staff, and the communities they serve, safer and feel safer. The TRM was developed against a backdrop of Police staff repeatedly reporting decreased feelings of safety, while keeping policing by consent at the heart of enhancing safety. Although there was already groundwork happening to improve frontline safety, the trigger for the TRM was the fatal shooting and serious injury of two constables on duty in 2020.

The TRM is an integrated model that has been designed to raise Police's overall capability to better understand, prevent and/or respond to high-risk and critical incidents. A trial of the TRM was implemented in four PoC districts (Counties Manukau, Waikato, Central and Northland) from 30 November 2021.

The TRM intends to achieve the following three **outcomes**:

1. Frontline staff feel safer and more confident in their day-to-day duties;
2. Frontline staff are safer in their day-to-day duties; and
3. Communities are safer.

These outcomes were to be achieved through three 'pillars' of the model: (1) four days of additional tactical safety training (referred to herein as Frontline Skills Enhancement in District—FSED training), (2) the creation of tactical dog teams (TDTs) and tactical prevention teams (TPTs), and (3) new risk-based deployment processes (Tactical Intelligence, Tasking and Coordination, 24/7 DCC, coverage and double crewing post 2100). Although the TRM is made up of individual components, it is a system where all components working together are expected to best achieve its intended safety outcomes.

The evaluation

The Evidence Based Policing Centre (EBPC) provides expertise in the development and application of evidence-based practice to drive improvements in policing. It was tasked with providing an independent evaluation of the TRM trial. The evaluation ran from January 1, 2022, to June 30, 2022. The evaluation focused on quantifying, where possible, the actual and perceived impact of the TRM on frontline safety, while also assessing the implementation of the TRM within the PoC districts.

The evaluation adopted a mixed-method approach, drawing upon a range of quantitative and qualitative data. This method of utilising multiple information sources allows for 'triangulation'. Triangulation enables us to understand if results are consistent across multiple data sources, providing greater confidence that we are reliably interpreting information in forming conclusions.

The core methods used include:

- A national survey of frontline staff focusing on the perceived safety and wellbeing of those on the frontline, run at baseline before the implementation of the TRM and again after the PoC period to compare changes in PoC and non-PoC district staff's safety and wellbeing.
- Analysis of deployment data across districts and incidents responded to using unique 'end of deployment' (EOD) forms.
- Development and analysis of impact and outcome measures using existing administrative data for both evaluative purposes, and for ongoing monitoring of the TRM.
- Thematic analysis of interviews and focus groups with TRM and frontline staff from PoC districts providing perceptions and impacts of the trial within the operating environment, at two time periods.
- Post-FSED training reaction surveys, FSED training observations, and FSED coach focus groups.

Key findings and insights

The evaluation's key findings trace the pathways from the implementation of TRM **activities** (e.g., training), to pillar level impacts and outcomes (e.g., improved decision-making), to **system** wide outcomes (e.g., improved safety).

Implementation

The Tactical Response Model was largely implemented as intended.

Overall, each component of the TRM was largely **implemented well, and as intended,** by the end of the evaluation period. Importantly, the components have been implemented in a way that should lead to a mitigation of the threat, harm and risk posed by High-Risk Offenders (HROs) in the community and a safer operating environment in the long term.

Frontline Skills Enhancement in District (FSED) **training was implemented as intended**. Two of the four days were implemented during the evaluation period. Districts varied the lesson plans and execution of the training days based on district heterogeneity.

Tactical prevention teams (TPTs) were implemented as intended with a focus on high-risk prevention activities. About 75 percent of TPT deployments were pre-planned preventative activities to proactively manage the risk to staff and community in the environment. These activities appear to have been **prioritised to HROs who pose the greatest threat** to police officers and are causing harm in the community.

Tactical dog teams (TDTs) largely fulfilled a response function for frontline staff as intended, much the same as a regular Patrol Dog would, albeit with increased tactical capability.

Tactical Intelligence (TacInt) teams were stood up in all PoC districts, supporting Tasking and Coordination (T&C) processes as intended. **TacInt assessed the risk of hundreds of potential HROs and nominated those assessed as higher risk through the T&C process** for assignment of risk management to frontline staff. Findings for TPTs above can be read as evidence of successful implementation of these risk-based processes that inform their deployment. These processes were supported by the implementation of new TRM leadership roles in the form of Tactical Operations Managers and Tactical Operations Coordinators.

24/7 DCC was only a change to BAU in two of the PoC districts and double crewing after 2100 in three. These components appear to have operated as intended, though the evaluation highlighted that **the benefits of DCC support are not as visible to rural staff as urban, and odd numbers of staff on shift can be a barrier to double crewing**.

Pillar impacts and outcomes

Training

The FSED training increased feelings of safety and confidence and may have improved officers' decision-making and safety in use of force contexts.

FSED training was overwhelmingly positively received by frontline staff who had attended one or both of the training days implemented during the PoC period. It is having important impacts on staff feelings of safety and, likely, actual safety.

Trainees reported feeling more confident and safer as a result of the training. They felt this way primarily because they have gained more skills in approaching their jobs safely, and they are now regularly working in teams with others who have received the same training.

Training appears to have **increased competency with tactical options and improved decision-making**. In the PoC districts (though primarily driven by Counties Manukau), **Use of Force Events reduced** compared to what would be expected had the TRM not been implemented. This result is likely driven, at least in part, through the pathway of skills and knowledge enhancement gained in FSED training rather than by TPT activities.

Complaints about uses of force (by Police) also reduced in the PoC districts compared to what we would expect in the PoC districts had the TRM not been implemented. Fewer complaints may mean that the public perceive police tactics as legitimate.

Consistent with this evidence of improved use of force decision-making, analysis of assaults of and injuries to police suggests that these have reduced in the context of tactical options Events—indicating **improved safety in use of force situations**.

TPTs

TPTs' proactive focus on the highest risk offenders reduced demand for AOS and likely led to a reduction in use of firearms against police.

TPT staff reported that there was an **increase in feelings of safety** of officers they supported when working with frontline and Criminal Investigation Branch (CIB), and that they **reduced risk for PSTs** by completing risky warrants and other activities that PSTs would have previously. TPTs have also **reduced Armed Offender Squad (AOS) deployments**. Deployment reports indicate that 14% of TPT deployments would have ordinarily been escalated to AOS call-outs.

TPTs' proactive activities have likely led to **fewer firearms on the streets.** There was an increase in the rate of Events where police locate firearms, relative to the number of

relevant Events attended. There was also evidence of increased firearms seizures in some districts.

Importantly, the TRM has likely **reduced the rare but serious events of firearms use at police** through this pillar. These events were lower in all PoCs compared to what we would expect had the TRM not been implemented. There were reductions in some firearms victimisations categories compared to expected without the TRM, suggesting increased community safety.

TDTs

TDTs supported frontline and improved safety for dog handlers.

TDTs provided a response function as intended, but were able to undertake more targeted proactive work as well. **Consistently pairing operators and handlers led to increased feelings of safety and increased productivity** in terms of being able to undertake more, and higher risk, activities with a second person.

Risk-based deployment

TacInt's risk assessments flowed through Tasking and Coordination into TPT deployments to achieve the TPTs' impacts and outcomes.

The impacts and outcomes linked to TPTs described above are also a function of the risk-based deployment components that drive TPTs' pre-planned work. The **findings for TPTs above can be read as evidence of successful TacInt and T&C processes** that inform their deployment. TacInt is highly appreciated and analysts are perceived as extremely helpful by those who have worked with them.

The uplift in **DCC capability to support frontline safety** was perceived as associated with positive change overall, particularly for urban staff. Double crewing after 2100 appears to enhance feelings of confidence and safety, and this initiative is widely supported.

System level outcomes

Do frontline feel safer as a result of the TRM?

Increased feelings of safety are the outcome most clearly seen—and heard—in the qualitative data at this time. These increases were not seen strongly in quantitative data across all police teams, with **increased feelings of safety seen more for urban staff and those in roles most directly affected by the TRM**. Given the operational context in New Zealand (section 4) and the literature (section 5), feelings of safety are an important focus for Police. There are indications the TRM will move staff to a greater sense of safety when the model is more widely embedded and its intent better understood.

Are frontline safer as a result of the TRM?

There was not a single use of a firearm at police offence in any PoC district during the TRM trial. The TRM, through TPTs and risk deployment pathways, has likely reduced the rare but serious Events of firearms use at police. These events were lower in all PoCs compared to what we would expect had the TRM not been implemented This outcome

is consistent with an initial TRM focus on the offenders at the very highest risk of using firearms at police and links to the successful workings of the risk-based deployment of TPTs. Other staff safety outcomes are less apparent at this time, but it seems likely that more will be seen as the TRM is embedded nationally.

Are communities safer and do they feel safer as a result of the TRM?

There is currently insufficient evidence to draw firm conclusions about the TRM's effects on community safety and feelings of safety. Promisingly there is **no evidence of any unintended consequences**, and several indicators of potential emerging benefits to the community.

There were **fewer complaints about use of force,** likely due to enhanced training, by Police than we would expect if the TRM had not been implemented suggests that the public were more likely to perceive police tactics as legitimate. The TRM may thereby improve public perceptions of and trust and confidence in Police.

Similarly, the TRM may increase community feelings of safety through **reduced presence of armed AOS in the community**. Although we do not have evidence of community sentiment, we do know AOS deployments reduced in districts with the TRM, which may have a positive impact on community feelings of safety.

There were also, through risk-deployment and TPT pathways, **reductions in some firearms victimisation categories** compared to what we would expect had the TRM not been implemented, suggesting increased community safety. This outcome is likely through the pathway of TPT activity focusing on the removal of illegal firearms and high-risk offenders from the environment. In the long run, the TRM should more tangibly affect community safety and feelings of safety for the better as high-risk offenders, drugs and weapons are increasingly removed from the environment. Ongoing monitoring of both TRM activity and community sentiment is required to see if this expectation proves correct.

Optimisation considerations

Opportunities for optimising the TRM focus on resourcing and equity of access to TRM components.

The trial allowed Police to test the model, which showed success in a number of areas as outlined in this report. The results indicate that **the TRM is a feasible approach to achieving the outcomes it intends**. However, no pilot intervention is implemented perfectly, particularly one of this complexity, and the TRM is no exception.

The findings suggest that full implementation of the TRM—with all components working together—would lead to more complete safety outcomes than so far detected. Implementation of the TRM could be optimised two main ways:

The initial model of implementation relied on taking frontline staff for TRM roles without backfilling, creating difficulties that are further explored in this report. **A fully-resourced and realised model rollout will resolve most of these issues**.

It is critical to **identify which groups feel they are not benefiting equitably** from the TRM (e.g., rural) and consider options for improving their feelings of safety.

1. Introduction

1. New Zealand Police (hereafter: Police) trialled a multifaceted staff safety system—known as the Tactical Response Model (TRM)—in four proof of concept (PoC) districts (Northland, Counties Manukau, Waikato and Central) from 30 November 2021. The TRM aims to achieve the following three specific **outcomes**:

    1. Frontline staff feel safer and more confident in their day-to-day duties,

    2. Frontline staff are safer in their day-to-day duties and,

    3. Communities feel and are safer.

2. The TRM intends to achieve these outcomes through a range of new initiatives, including adding four days of tactical safety training for frontline (Frontline Skills Enhancement in District—FSED), creating tactical prevention teams (TPTs) and tactical dog teams (TDTs), and increasing risk assessment and deployment to risk capability. Although the TRM is made up of many individual components, it is a system where all components working together are expected to best achieve against intended outcomes.

Background to the TRM

3. Policing by Consent is the core of New Zealand Police's philosophy. Derived from the "Peelian principles", the set of ideas developed by Sir Robert Peel in 1829 when founding London's Metropolitan Police (University of Washington, 2022) policing by consent encompasses the principles of trust and confidence and a social agreement between police and the communities they serve. This agreement is based on the broad public support for Police's operating model and perceived legitimacy for the actions Police undertake to maintain and protect public safety.

4. The Tactical Response Model was developed in response to, and informed by, a series of events that loom large in both the recent history of New Zealand Police, and of the community. 2019 was a particularly challenging year in which 51 New Zealanders were tragically killed, and another 40 injured, during the March 15 Mosque attacks. In response to this tragic event, the then Commissioner of Police wanted to pilot a model to enhance tactical capability and improve the safety, of Police and communities. In October of the same year a pilot of Armed Response Teams (ARTs) was implemented in three Police districts (Counties Manukau, Waikato, and Canterbury). The ARTs were teams of specialist police personnel—generally armed, in specially fitted and distinctive vehicles, and able to self-deploy—immediately ready to deploy to critical or high-risk incidents, to support our frontline staff where they needed enhanced tactical capabilities.

5. The ARTs pilot ran until it was halted in April 2020, when the incoming Police Commissioner Andrew Coster announced that ARTs would not be part of the New Zealand policing model of the future. While it was clear from the evaluation of ARTs that frontline staff wanted a system of tactical support to be available (Taylor, 2020), community feedback indicated that ARTs did not represent the philosophy of policing by consent, by not aligning with the style of policing that New Zealanders expect.

6. On 19 June 2020 Constable Matthew Hunt was shot and murdered and his partner Constable David Goldfinch shot and seriously injured, in the street in Massey, Tāmaki Makaurau after engaging in a vehicle stop. This tragedy sent a shockwave through every corner of New Zealand Police, and communities across New Zealand. A rapid debrief of the incident was undertaken, which included feedback from hundreds of

frontline officers. The themes were clear: the need for training and equipment[1] and overwhelmingly the feeling that ART needed to be reinstated.

7. To ensure that the principles of policing by consent were adhered to, the TRM and its trial were designed and implemented following extensive consultation with communities. Public consultation over a four-week engagement was undertaken to ensure people understood how the TRM would keep them and their communities safe. Police engaged with Māori, Pacific and Ethnic community leaders, and took on board feedback. Following this community consultation, engagement with a wide internal audience, and research into tactical settings options (New Zealand Police, 2021a), further informed the development of the Tactical Response Model.

8. The TRM is a system designed to leverage increased training, specialist tactical capability and risk-based deployment processes to mitigate risk for police and communities, while keeping New Zealand Police generally unarmed. Importantly, in response to community feedback and lessons learned from the ART trial, specialist tactical teams would wear blue uniforms, drive standard Police vehicles, not self-deploy, and are not routinely armed in the course of their normal duties.

Background to the evaluation

9. Police's Frontline Safety Improvement Programme (FSIP), which governs the TRM, invited the Evidence Based Policing Centre (EBPC) to independently evaluate the implementation, impacts and outcomes of the TRM trial. The EBPC provides expertise in the development and application of evidence based practice to drive improvements in policing.

10. Although part of Police, the EBPC have largely maintained independence around the evaluation, taking the lead on developing the evaluation approach and methods used. That said, decisions about the feasibility of methods—given the burden some methods place on participants—were governed by FSIP. The evaluators also regularly consulted with the PoC Project Manager and PoC Change Lead, and the wider TRM PoC team, to help understand the intentions and operation of the TRM, and to interpret and contextualise the evaluation results. Although the EBPC undertook the majority of the evaluation work, the Universities of Waikato and Victoria (Wellington) were commissioned to complete parts of the research.

The evaluation report

11. This document reports on the evaluation of the TRM in the PoC districts during the evaluation period, which ran from 1 January 2022 to 30 June 2022. The report first summarises the TRM before describing the evaluation questions, the operational and research context, the evaluation method, and the findings of the evaluation on the implementation, impacts and outcomes of the TRM. The report concludes by summarising the key considerations for the TRM moving forward.

[1] All New Zealand Police officers receive firearms training during recruit courses and frontline responders are required to undertake annual firearms training. Although New Zealand Police is a generally unarmed police service, its officers have immediate access to firearms in their patrol vehicles, however, they do not routinely carry them.

Understanding this report

The TRM is a large-scale intervention, introduced into an ever-changing operational environment. Given this, it was not possible to run an experiment controlling for all influences, outside whether a district implemented TRM, to definitively quantify the effect of the model. Instead, we highlight in this report the most plausible 'active ingredients' of the TRM to be leading to impacts and outcomes in PoC districts, and emphasise that the TRM is a safety system designed to achieve safety outcomes through all its elements operating together.

When reading this evaluation report, it is important to recognise that the implementation, impact, and outcome measures are assessed using a combination of data sources. It is rare there is a single data source that gives a definitive answer to an evaluation question, but when triangulated with other data sources we can draw firmer conclusions. Our conclusions are based on the totality of the evidence, rather than single measures of safety, or feelings of safety.

2. The Tactical Response Model (TRM)

12. The environment in which frontline police (defined here as public safety teams—PSTs—and road policing) operate is increasingly complex and the safety of staff is at the forefront of Police's strategic and operational decision-making. The Tactical Response Model (TRM) is a safety system designed, with the officers and the communities they serve in mind, to ensure frontline police are trained, equipped, and supported to keep themselves and communities safer. There are three pillars to the model: enhanced tactical training, improving frontline access to specialist capability, and a risk-based and intelligence-led framework to plan safer deployments, and to enable safer decisions when on deployment.

TRM aim and elements

13. Under three individual pillars of the TRM a range of components work collectively to support the overarching outcomes, as depicted in **Table 2.1**

Table 2.1 Summary of the TRM pillars and components

TRM pillars		
Enhanced frontline training	Improved frontline access to specialist capability	Strengthened risk-based deployment
Components of each pillar		
Four days of skills enhancement training	Tactical prevention teams Tactical Dog Teams	Tactical intelligence Tasking and Coordination Enhanced 24/7 DCC and rural deployment support Double crewing at night

The TRM as a safety system

14. The TRM is a safety system that provides the structure, capability, training and assurance required to deliver improved safety outcomes. No one pillar, or component is intended nor expected to achieve the overarching outcomes. The TRM is intentionally designed as a **safety system** whereby each of the pillars and components support one another and work collectively to achieve the outcomes. If individual pillars of the TRM are not performing effectively or communication between pillars is failing, there is a flow on effect that may undermine the extent to which the model could positively affect staff safety.

Pillars and components of the TRM

Tactical safety training

15. Enhanced frontline training enables staff to respond appropriately to critical incidents. Within the TRM, the enhanced training involves specific tactical training—Frontline Skills Enhancement in District (FESD). FSED is an additional four days of tactical training for frontline staff. This scenario-based training focuses on appropriate tactical response and de-escalation techniques in specific situations. The training intends to improve participants' understanding of how to manage the cognitive load of high-risk situations, in

turn improving their risk assessment, decision-making, and communication through cognitive conditioning and decision-making tools such as TENR (a police threat assessment tool; Threat Exposure Necessity Response) and communication guide GSMEAC (a guide to delivering team operational briefings; Ground Situation Mission Execution Admin Command).

16. As a pillar of the safety system FSED feeds into increased safety and feelings of safety for frontline police, by enhancing their skills and leading to increased capability, confidence and readiness to respond to high-risk situations. These improved skills and behaviours should better reflect the needs of the operational environment and enhance community trust and confidence in frontline officers. As the training is delivered by current AOS operators and will be guided by deployment insights, it will continue to have relevance to the operation environment.

17. FSED is additional to the standard 3.5 days of police integrated tactical training (PITT) and is modelled on an existing tactical training course focusing on frontline policing (FSEC). FSED is delivered by current AOS operators (referred to herein as tactical safety coaches: TSCs). This aspect was a deliberate decision to provide credibility to the teaching element through instructors who are current and active tactical option specialists. Frontline staff train collectively as a section (i.e., in their PST or RP teams), and the training aims to improve decision-making and competency with tactical options, including de-escalation and cognitive conditioning techniques. The training does not include a pass or fail element, focusing on improving confidence and performance rather than assessment.

18. The four training days cover high-risk vehicle stops, tactical medicine, clearance and rescue tactics, and active armed offender scenarios. Within these scenarios, risk appreciation, cognitive training, and tactical options competency are covered.

19. FSED training was one of two elements of the TRM that were included in the PoC trial but had already been approved for full rollout in 2022. Nonetheless, it was important to include FSED in the evaluation to inform decision-making during the rollout.

Increased Specialist Capability

20. This pillar addresses gaps in frontline response capability by providing more options for the frontline to access staff with a higher level of tactical training. These options include two new tactical teams: Tactical Prevention Teams and Tactical Dog Teams. Tactical prevention teams and tactical dog teams focus on pre-planned activities, supported through new risk-based deployment processes, that are prevention based, whilst also supporting the frontline with managing high-risk offenders and situations.

21. This pillar of the system is led by the capability of the risk-based deployment function and feeds directly into enhancing staff and community safety. Being risk focused and intelligence-led in their activities, specialist capability is enabled to proactively de-escalate risks before they become a threat to the community by providing additional tactical options.

22. **Tactical Prevention Teams (TPTs):** TPTs are intelligence-led, and support existing investigative work to apprehend priority high-risk offenders, and to execute high-risk search warrants. This work is done primarily in pre-planned deployments. TPTs are also available to respond to emergency calls for service when authorised to do so. TPTs are focused on higher risk taskings including organised crime, high-risk offenders, firearms offending, and methamphetamine.

23. TPTs consist of three tactical operators and one team leader, all of whom are trained to an AOS operator level. Unlike the Armed Response Teams previously trialled by New Zealand Police, TPTs wear blue uniforms, drive standard Police vehicles and are not routinely armed in the course of their normal duties. They cannot self-deploy or patrol between jobs.

24. TPTs have advanced training, tactics, and equipment available to them. TPTs work shifts that align with investigations and prevention groups and are tasked to deploy to pre-planned activities such as search and arrest warrants. They aim to remove and de-escalate risks before they can become a threat to the frontline and community. Where required, TPTs have the ability to quickly redeploy to emergency calls for service, however redeployment can only be authorised through the District Command Centre (DCC) or the Emergency Communications Centre (ECC) inspector. This approach retains the model of New Zealand Police being a generally unarmed Policing service unless responding to assessed risk.

25. **Tactical dog teams (TDT):** TDTs are a frontline resource, deployed as first to high-risk incidents. The TDT consists of a dog handler and a tactical operator. The tactical operator is trained to the level of AOS and as such has additional tactics and equipment available to them. TDTs work on shift, with the operator providing enhanced safety for the handler and increased capability to respond to a wider range of scenarios. Tactical dog teams (TDTs) provide specialist tactical capability to support the frontline response and enhance the safety and capability of dog handlers.

Risk-based deployment

26. An intelligence-led and integrated response is prioritised in the TRM when deploying resources. Informed intelligence assessments identify persons who pose the most risk to staff safety, with prevention resources then focused toward mitigating the risk from them. Tasking and Coordination (T&C) is the process by which these intelligence assessments are turned into operational activity, ensuring that tactical teams are focused on prevention based planned activities and deployments. To assist with the facilitation and operationalising of these processes in districts, two new roles were introduced: tactical operations manager (TOM) and tactical operations coordinator (TOC). Additionally, DCCs now have an enhanced role in enabling and supporting the districts' 'real-time' frontline deployment and management of risk under the TRM; deploying the tactical teams to support the frontline with managing high-risk offenders and situations when appropriate. A final component of the risk-based deployment model is the implementation of double crewing at high-risk times (**Figure 2.1**).

27. The risk-based deployment pillar of the safety system begins with intelligence-led situational awareness, which flows through leadership and tasking and co-ordination, to deployment of the new specialist capability for high-risk safety-focused preventative tasks. These tasks are focused on the individuals putting police most at risk and aim to enhance the safety of the operating environment. This pillar is further enabled by 24/7 DCC operations to oversee deployment of tactical teams and manage staffing levels and rural call-outs, and compliance with night shift double crewing and safety procedures (e.g., Officer Safety Alarm and Deployment and Safety app usage).

28. **Tactical intelligence analysts (TacInt):** TacInt provides an additional intelligence capability beyond existing police Intelligence functions within the TRM's intelligence-led, risk-based deployment model. TacInt analysts within districts support operational planning, risk understanding, and decisions pertaining to staff safety. TacInt analysts identify, analyse, and prioritise high-risk offenders (HROs) who likely pose a risk to staff safety, with particular priority given to individuals linked to firearms, organised crime, and methamphetamine. TacInt adds the greatest value to the tasking and coordination process by ensuring the organisation takes a proactive, prevention-focused approach to scanning for, and identifying, high-risk persons of interest who pose a risk of physical harm to Police, and the communities they serve. TacInt analysts also provide situational awareness and real-time intelligence support for TPTs primarily, on occasion they also support AOS, and STG deployment planning where capacity allows.

29. TacInt analysts undergo specific training to support tactical teams with their intelligence requirements and have a variety of tools available to them to identify and prioritise risks to staff safety. TacInt supports the wider district in risk awareness through intelligence products and staff safety alerts, and their intelligence contributes directly to weekly Staff Safety Tasking and Coordination.

30. TacInt is the second element of the TRM that was included in the PoC trial but had already been approved for full rollout in 2022. The evaluation of this component nonetheless provides insights to inform decision-making during the national rollout.

31. **Tasking and Coordination:** A weekly Tasking and Coordination (T&C) meeting was established in each of the PoC districts. The purpose of T&C was to turn the work of the TacInt staff into actionable tasks for assignment to tactical teams or other workgroups, based on the risk assessment of activity from TacInt.

32. The Tasking and Coordination (T&C) meeting sits at the heart of the risk-based deployment pillar. T&Cs are led by the Tactical Operations Manager (TOM) or Tactical Operations Coordinator (TOC), with TacInt identifying individuals that pose a risk to staff and communities' physical safety. The T&C process ensures that there is an opportunity to preventively remove or reduce the risk of these individuals/groups by prioritising High-Risk Offenders (HROs) and deciding on appropriate actions and activities for staff—including TPTs and TDTs—across the district.

33. **TRM leadership roles:** The TOM's role is to ensure that the district has the leadership, culture, people, and organisational capability to deliver the TRM. They report to the district commander and provide strategic leadership to the district's tactical teams and take a lead role in the Staff Safety Tasking and Coordination and tactical decision-making within the district.

34. The TOC role is responsible for implementing training and deployment standards across specialist capability within the district. They are specifically responsible for rostering across the TRM (specifically TSCs, TPTs, and TDTs), TPT deployment, and approving tactical plans—considering the level of risk and the level of tactical response required to mitigate risk contributing to operational planning for pre-planned and emergency deployments

35. **24/7 District Command Centre coverage:** The District Command Centre (DCC) operating model supports a whole of district approach to real-time deployment. DCCs were enhanced under the Tactical Response Model by being enabled to deploy increased tactical support in district 24/7.

36. Under the TRM the DCCs focus on maintaining optimum staffing levels (OSL), actively monitoring the situational awareness map (SAM) showing the locations of staff on duty, and checking deployment and safety app (DaS) and officer safety alarms (OSA) logon and compliance. The DCC is also responsible for approving the re-deployment of TPTs to unplanned critical or high-risk incidents to support safe frontline tactical deployment, and for authorising exceptions to double crewing when there are staffing limitations. The DCC also work with the TOM, and/or TOC, to support their oversight of tactical activities, and review Planned Activity Risk Assessments from all workgroups, including Tactical Prevention Teams (TPTs).

37. A further function of the DCC within the TRM aims to support rural deployment decisions by monitoring and managing rural deployments with a focus on safety of rural officers. The aim of the DCC is to ensure staff are as safe as possible by maintaining situational awareness across the district, factoring in planned events, and coordinating response (i.e., appropriate re/deployment) to unplanned events such as pursuits, critical incidents and serious crime that abstract staff.

38. **Double crewing:** Under the TRM model, staff members operate with a partner in the patrol car ("double crewing") during nightshift after 2100 hours.

Figure 2.1: The interdependency of the pillars incorporating the TRM system



3. Evaluation aim and questions

39. The TRM was implemented in four proof of concept (PoC) districts: Counties Manukau, Northland, Waikato, and Central. The PoC districts (or 'PoCs') gave Police the opportunity to see whether the TRM as designed on paper works in reality on the ground—to inform decisions about a national rollout. The evaluation therefore had two objectives: (1) to assess the extent to which the TRM was implemented and operated as intended (process evaluation) and (2) to evaluate the effectiveness of the TRM (outcome evaluation). In addressing these objectives, the evaluation aimed to:

    - explain, where relevant, the contribution of each TRM component to TRM outcomes;
    - identify factors that impacted the delivery of intended outcomes through the TRM;
    - identify opportunities for improvements to the TRM to deliver intended outcomes; and
    - identify any unintended effects of the TRM model.

Evaluation questions

40. The evaluation aimed to answer three overarching questions, supplemented by specific questions relevant to different pillars and components of the TRM. Although the evaluation considered the pillars in isolation, the impacts and outcomes of each pillar speak to the system as whole due to the interrelatedness of the pillars and the reliance on all the pillars functioning together to achieve the wider safety outcomes.

41. **Table 3.1** sets out the overarching questions relating to the outcome and process evaluation objectives.

Table 3.1: Overarching evaluation questions

TRM Pillars		
Enhanced frontline training	**Improving frontline access to specialist capability**	**Strengthening risk-based deployment and technology**
Overarching Process Evaluation Question		
To what extent is the TRM operating as intended?		
Overarching Outcome Evaluation Questions		
Do frontline staff feel safer and more confident in their day-to-day duties as a result of the TRM?		
Are frontline staff safer in their day-to-day duties as a result of the TRM?		
Are communities safer as a result of the TRM?		

Implications of real time evaluation

42. The evaluation was undertaken in real time alongside the implementation of the TRM, which meant changes to the way the TRM was implemented occurred as the evaluation progressed. For example, in April Waikato District moved from operating three TPTs in three different areas, to one centralised and investigation oriented/supported TPT team, and at the same time, introduced TDTs.

43. As a result, the evaluation plan remained dynamic throughout to enable adjustments of methodology, when necessary and appropriate, in response to changes in implementation within districts. The objectives of the initial framework have been fulfilled despite real world changes throughout the evaluation.

4. Operational context

44. The Tactical Response Model does not operate in a vacuum. The environment in which police operate is different across districts and ever changing. This section discusses a range of aspects of the operational context of the initiative that impact on the evaluation. Specifically, we describe how the TRM, the risk environment, and operational priorities evolved over the PoC period, and highlight implementation differences between PoC districts (as well as their implications for the evaluation).

The TRM as an interdependent, evolving system

45. The TRM relies on a three-pillared system approach for delivering improvements to staff safety. No one pillar is expected, nor relied upon, to independently 'shift the dial' on staff safety. Although individual interventions may have localised effects, single interventions may not cause effects to the wider district, or organisation, or be sustainable. It is through all three pillars working in parallel, that effects on staff and community safety at a larger scale are expected to occur.

46. The visibility of the components will also impact the results. Although staff may perceive benefits from specific interventions, two of the interventions (TacInt and TPTs) are likely not visible to all staff but are intended to indirectly affect frontline safety.

47. How well each pillar and component works relies on many interdependencies within the model, and within the broader Police organisation. Districts are differently equipped and resourced, meaning components differed across districts, as did the impacts and outcomes of these components. For example, districts that could implement more TDTs were likely to see greater effects attributable to TDTs. In geographically large districts, small numbers of TDTs may result in staff being unable to see and interact with TDTs, potentially reducing the real and/or perceived benefit from TDTs.

48. The evaluation should be read in the context of the levels at which the pillars are operating in the districts and what can realistically be achieved within the evaluation time frame for these initiatives. Changes were made in some districts during the PoC period such that the TRM is best considered an evolving, rather than stable, intervention over this time. Further, even if fully implemented in every PoC district, six months would be a short period to measure staff safety outcomes from the TRM.

Evolving risks to police safety

49. Over the last decade police staff have witnessed a changing operational environment, with associated increasing safety risks and decreasing feelings of staff safety. Recorded increases in firearm victimisations alongside increasing rates of police assaults, in the context of the Linwood Mosque terrorist attack and a fatality on the frontline, has put safety top of mind for New Zealand Police.

50. Data shows the number of assaults against police has increased over the last five years, including those that resulted in officers being hospitalised. In 2017, 447 officers reported being assaulted; this grew to 620 in 2021 (Owen, 2022; figure 4.1). In the Police Association's 2021 member survey, 38% of members reported having been attacked by an offender, while 17% reported having been assaulted "in a manner that resulted in an injury" (Owen, 2022). **Figure 4.1** shows the rate of assaults on police has increased relative to the number of potential assault Events that police attend (see **Technical Appendix D** for details of this data).

Figure 4.1: Rate of assault on police offence Events per 10,000 relevant Events attended (2018 to June 2022)



51. Data also show the risk to staff specifically from firearms has increased over recent years. **Figure 4.2** shows the rate of firearms victimisations has increased even factoring in population growth; the greater the threat to the public in the form of firearms victimisations, the greater the threat to police in responding to these Events. **Figure 4.3** shows that, accordingly, the use of firearms against police appears to have become more frequent, though these Events remain rare. See **Technical Appendix D** for details of these measures.

Figure 4.2: Rate of firearm victimisations per 10,000 population (2018 to June 2022)



Figure 4.3: Number of firearm use at police offence Events (2018 to June 2022)



52. The fatal shooting of an officer on duty is what Martin Innes refers to as a 'signal crime'—a crime that sends a message that all is not well and flags up to people that things might get worse—shifting people's perceptions of the environment (Innes, 2014). It is clear from the initial frontline staff safety survey findings that officers have received this signal, and do not always feel safe (see section 8: System level outcomes). Research into New Zealand's approach to tactical settings (including arming of police) provides further evidence of officers' heightened perceptions of risk (New Zealand Police, 2021a), and the evaluation of the ART (Armed Response Team) trial highlighted that frontline officers wanted better support from AOS or specially trained officers (Taylor, 2020).

53. Clearly, the TRM has been implemented at a time of increasing concern for frontline staff regarding their safety. Although the TRM components *can* have an immediate effect on staff safety, officer feelings of safety will largely be based on personal experience, media, and word of mouth (see section 5 Research context: police feelings of safety). Readers should consider the effects that these factors will have on perceptions of safety irrespective of TRM components.

54. Readers must also be aware that the TRM was implemented within this changing environment, and with risks to staff safety increasing over the past few years, we may not see an immediate perceived reduction of these risks. The TRM is primarily formed of activities that aim to improve safety of frontline in the long term through a risk-based, preventative approach. Increases in safety attributable to TRM elements might not be visible to all during the evaluation period due to the short (relatively speaking) PoC time-period and the likely influence of pre-existing perceptions of the high-risk environment (for more information, see the section on research context, below).

Evolving operational priorities

55. Police resources implemented for safety purposes are often used for a variety of operations and priorities. One of the difficulties of maintaining the focus of the TRM resources on intended outputs is the versatility of the staff and resourcing embedded within the model. For example, tactical operators (staff with access to and training in a wider range of tactical options) are a highly sought-after resource with their enhanced capability. Although the TRM components have intended parameters around deployment and products, the nature of policing means that these resources will often be used for other purposes to enhance safety through other means. This is not a criticism of the model, rather an acknowledgement of a pragmatic use of a flexible and capable resource, recognising that these resources can address staff safety in a variety of ways.

56. Police are often required to respond to the changing expectations of the public, which means the policing environment is always dynamic. This responsivity requirement is inherent within any policing or law enforcement agency. During the PoC period, numerous events required a shift in organisational focus that likely affected the evaluation data and PoC design at particular time points. We outline key examples below.

57. **Op Convoy**: The parliament protest resulted in significant abstractions across the entire organisation to respond to the public disorder involved, with 2309 Police staff intermittently deployed to police the protest (New Zealand Police Association, 2022). This operation resulted in TRM operators being abstracted from their roles to support the operation directly, or to account and backfill for positions that were temporarily vacant due to the operation.

58. **Gang tensions and Operation Cobalt:** During the PoC period Tāmaki Makaurau and Northland experienced spikes in gang activity and shootings. These occurred at different time points but required a significant investment from those districts in responding. A lot of that investment utilised existing AOS and CIB staff, as well as TRM operators. TRM components were temporarily shifted to support ongoing operations to resolve these tensions. Operation Cobalt, which commenced in June 2022, shifted a focus from both BAU and tactical assets within district to a focus on gang suppression and policing. Although this operation is strongly aligned with staff safety, it has likely altered TRM deployment somewhat to facilitate the national operation.

59. **COVID-19 pandemic:** The Omicron wave that occurred during the PoC period had significant impacts on both TRM components and staff, but also the wider business. It resulted in numerous abstractions, COVID-19 leave, isolation requirements, and difficulties in managing the workforce. These effects placed immense strain on the PoC districts and their ability to fully implement the model as it was intended. Delegates from across the country reporting at the New Zealand Police Association conference stated that frontline staff were being taken away from business as usual to staff special projects and COVID-19 checkpoints. At the same time, gangs were becoming more visible in the community. They noted that MIQ and border patrols were a huge drain on BAU, leading to fatigue and burnout among staff (New Zealand Police Association, 2021).

60. These effects for police were consistent with those seen internationally. In a UK study approximately one-third of police officers surveyed reported feeling less safe in their role during the pandemic, and nearly half suffered increased anxiety. The toll on wellbeing appears to be most acute for frontline officers (Newiss et al., 2022).

61. **Shooting by police:** During the PoC period, an individual was shot by police in one of the PoC districts (Central). This incident is still under investigation and therefore not reported on in this document.

Organisational constraints

62. Districts filled TRM roles by way of expressions of interest, which means the positions the successful applicants previously held are unable to be backfilled permanently. Until such time that TRM positions can be properly advertised and filled, all positions will create a deficit somewhere. This constraint undoubtably will have affected workgroups that lost members to fill the TRM roles or were disbanded entirely. For example, tactical safety coaches, tactical prevention team members, and tactical dog operators were drawn from existing AOS resources. Although it is clear every effort to support these workgroups was made, the displacement of staff has potential to leave others feeling hard done by, or less safe. This consequence is particularly apparent with the removal of highly qualified and capable staff such as AOS members from PSTs.

63. The evaluation findings must therefore be interpreted in the context of these abstractions from other policing functions. These abstractions contributed to a constant re-prioritisation model to respond to the

ever-changing environment and may have resulted in benefits for some staff at the real or perceived expense of others. It may only be due to the capability, resilience, adaptability, and capacity of existing AOS resources that the model was able to operate in its current form. This context was important for the evaluation to consider when measuring perceptions of staff who may have lost access to these highly capable staff within their traditional workgroup and/or not have had visibility of the contribution these staff made in their TRM roles to staff safety.

District differences

64. The PoC districts implemented the TRM differently in several respects, with only one PoC able to test all the components of the system. These differences made it harder to detect impacts or outcomes in the data to date. They also make it harder to tie the findings to individual pillars or components of the model. Note that these differences applied during the proof of concept and may no longer reflect how districts are operating after that period.

65. **Figure 4.4** summarises the district differences in implementation, including in the timing of implementing different TRM components. **Appendix A** provides visual depictions— 'models'—of the TRM system in each district, showing the key teams and roles and their relationships, based on evaluators' field observation visits at those times. The district differences are described briefly below.

66. **FSED training:** Although there were standard lesson plans for FSED, districts varied in the way the FSED days were constructed and administered, largely depending on available resourcing and equipment. Variations included the number of coaches, training venues, training equipment and number of participants. These factors were largely out of the control of districts but may have had impacts on the administration and subsequent learnings of the training.

67. **Tactical prevention teams:** Counties Manukau and Central were the only two districts to implement just one TPT team from the start of the trial. Northland initially started with two and reduced to one during the PoC period; Waikato initially operated with three TPTs, before changing to one centralised TPT in April. Districts also implemented varying levels of investigation support for the TPTs. These differences affected the TPTs' deployment model, as discussed later in the evaluation. The number of TPTs and their deployment model also has likely influenced perceptions of the team's availability within district.

68. At times, TPTs were able to conduct AOS deployments under the direction of the AOS commander. The position and relationship AOS commanders had with individuals, and components of the TRM, affected the number of AOS deployments to which the TPTs could contribute.

69. **Tactical dog teams:** Counties Manukau were the only district not to deploy TDTs due to the centralised model of the dog unit in Tāmaki Makaurau (which also covers Waitematā and Auckland Central Districts, who were not involved in the TRM trial). The number of TDTs varied within Central, Northland, and Waikato. In Central, at any one time they could have deployed 11 TDTs, whereas Northland could realistically deploy three. From April, Waikato were able to deploy four. These will likely affect TDTs' availability and coverage and the evaluation results should be interpreted accordingly. Like TPTs, their coverage and ability to deploy, will likely also have affected frontline perceptions of the TDTs and their own safety. Within Central, different areas rostered the TDTs and the operators differently, at different times throughout the PoC.

70. **TacInt:** All districts employed two TacInt analysts for the entirety of the PoC, however some districts experienced delays in filling both positions. At the start of the TRM trial TacInt was a new function for Police, leading to some variability in the role across districts. At times, analysts were replaced with new staff, which sometimes resulted in induction periods and delays arising from upskilling and training. Importantly, the demand for TacInt is not equal across the districts, and the focus of these analysts varied

in the way they were instructed and scoped to work. These differences could affect the way that the TPTs were tasked, and the quality and quantity of intelligence products.

71. **24/7 DCC and double crewing:** 24/7 DCC and double crewing post 2100 hours was only a significant change in Northland and Central. Waikato were already operating with a 24/7 DCC and double crewing in the evenings prior to the evaluation and Counties Manukau already had a 24/7 DCC capability as part of the Tāmaki Makaurau model. Perceptions regarding the 24/7 DCC and double crewing may be affected by whether this change was considered significant for that district.

Figure 4.4: Summary of differences between PoC districts in the TRM implementation



Data correct as at 30/6/22

v0.5 - 12/9/22

5. Research context: police feelings of safety

72. A major outcome intended by the TRM is increased feelings of safety for frontline police. This brief literature review looks at why feelings of safety are important for police and the role of the TRM to support improving feelings of safety for frontline officers.

Why police feel unsafe

73. Interviews and focus groups with sworn New Zealand Police staff have found that officers feel that their working environment is getting increasingly dangerous, with an increase in violent weapons on the street, and an increase in how often the media reports on it. This increase in perceived danger causes anxiety for both them and their families (Seals, 2022).

74. Although many other jobs are statistically more dangerous than policing, policing is unique in the potential for intentional assault that officers may face while performing their jobs (Johnson & Jaeckle, 2018). This fear that some police officers may hold of members of the public is a risk exaggerated and amplified through training and storytelling within the law enforcement community (Branch, 2021), and further amplified by media reporting. Moreover, anticipated emotional responses to future imagined events are relatively insensitive to probabilities (i.e., the likelihood of that event happening) (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003), so rationalisation of the low risk to officers on duty does not necessarily combat their levels of fear.

75. Police training may enhance fear with its focus on 'worst-case' scenarios. Focusing on these scenarios may provide trainees with a false sense of the prevalence of such situations eventuating, and promote an over-reliance on tactical skills that may not be appropriate in most circumstances (Anderson et al., 2019; Dayley, 2016; Emsing et al., 2020; Koerner & Staller, 2021; Zaiser & Staller, 2015). It has been suggested that the pre-occupation with the threat of violence and subsequent use of force may shape officers' perceptions such that they come to view all police-public encounters as potentially dangerous ones, and that this perception of the public as a threat may lead officers to interact with citizens in a way that promotes mutual apprehension, and possible escalation (Zaiser & Staller, 2015).

76. Many aspects of policing require a high level of diligence and vigilance from officers throughout their shifts (Johnson & Jaeckle, 2018). The consistent need to function at a peak performance level is physically and mentally exhausting. The basic job duties, though essential, often contribute to physical and emotional stress, which can compromise an officer's ability to effectively serve and protect in a procedurally just way.

The impact of fear and stress

77. Stress and/or emotion are among the key influences the quality of police decision-making in high-risk situations (Andersen & Gustafsberg, 2016; Brown & Daus, 2015; Harman et al., 2019; O'Hare & Beer, 2020; Ta et al., 2021). Unmanaged stress can lead to negative consequences for officers both personally—in the form of failed and struggling relationships, substance abuse, domestic violence, or anger/rage—and, and professionally—in the form of being written up, complaints, excessive use of force, accidents, or altercations (Johnson & Jaeckle, 2018). Fear and stress in police officers can lead to behaviours that undermine policing by consent, in which policing legitimacy relies on having the confidence of the public—a fundamental component of the New Zealand policing model.

78. Intense negative emotions can overpower deliberate and rational decision-making, with fear associated with judgements of uncertainty and lack of individual control (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, cited by Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). Crucially, these consequences can have adverse impacts on officer performance during high-risk situations, increasing the chances of detrimental outcomes (Jenkins et al., 2021). For example, accounts of officer-involved shootings suggest that these events can involve a stunning departure from normal psychological functioning (Grossman & Christensen, 2004 cited by (Correll et al., 2014). Shootings may trigger a state known as "hypervigilance", whereby participants frantically seek escape and/or engage in a variety of seemingly nonsensical behaviours (Correll et al., 2014). According to Olson (1998, p. 5), "officers experiencing hypervigilance might repeatedly pull the trigger of an empty weapon, misidentify innocuous items as weapons, or not see or hear innocent bystanders in the line of fire".

The role of the TRM in officer feelings of safety

79. Within this context, the job demands-resource model (Demerouti et al., 2001) explains what the TRM is trying to achieve regarding feelings of safety. Organisational psychology would characterise that the danger/fear/anxiety associated with police work is a 'demand of the job'. Other demands include workload and pressure, or other factors that challenge officers in their work environment. The 'job demands-resources model', proposed by Demerouti et al., (2001), suggests that the effects of demands on employees can be cushioned by the organisation providing resources—in the case of TRM specific tactical intelligence, new tactical teams, and training—to help deal with that demand. If there is an imbalance in demands and resources, you end up with reduced performance and burnout.

80. Another specific role of the TRM may be to directly impact the fear culture through training. Evidence suggests that the impact of immediate emotions on judgement and choice can be mitigated somewhat by mechanisms that prompt people to carefully appraise their environment before forming an opinion (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). Training focusing on stress management should provide officers with a repertoire of stress management skills and an opportunity to practise these skills under conditions that approximate the stresses experienced in the operational environment (Robson & Manacapilli, 2014). In real-world violent encounters, in which optimal conditions rarely apply, police are often fatigued and scared. Appropriate training may help (Correll et al., 2014). For example, intense video or live-action training simulations that induce higher levels of arousal may help officers develop the capacity to focus on relevant information (e.g., the nature of the object in a suspect's hand) in a real encounter, when stress is high. Training also provides an opportunity for reassurance messaging around the actual risk of the environment. Responses to anticipatory emotions (i.e., to an event in the future) can be dampened by the individual having better control over their environment (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003), which may be occurring through the upskilling of officers.

81. Double crewing is another area where there are both evidentially real safety benefits, as well as increased feelings of safety. The findings are based on analysis by the London School of Economics of data collected from the West Midlands Police after it made a major change in its response model in 2018 by restructuring its shift rosters to increase the number of double crewed patrol cars available at busy times (Kirchmaier et al., 2021). The study found that double crewing reduces the risk of an officer being injured, and considerably reduces the risk of serious injury. Teams instinctively double crew because they believe it to be safer, and the evidence confirms that double crewing reduces the likelihood of injury by around 20 per cent and the likelihood of serious injury by between 80 and 90 per cent. Supporting this finding, another UK study showed that officers that were single-crewed more frequently also experienced a range of violent victimisation more frequently (Houdmont et al., 2019).

82. Though some evidence suggests that single crewed officers are no more at risk than their double crewed counterparts, it is possible that the absence of a notable increase in risk may in fact reflect greater prudence and restraint on the part of the lone officer (Decker & Wagner, 1982; Elliott-Davies et al., 2016).

In the UK it was found 62% of officers that reported being frequently single crewed also reported low job satisfaction; 11 percent points higher than their colleagues who did not report being frequently single crewed. Also 50% of officers that reported being frequently single crewed also felt that their jobs were very or extremely stressful; 15 percent points higher than their colleagues who did not report being frequently single crewed (Police Federation of England and Wales, 2021).

83. Another benefit suggested by the literature (Kirchmaier et al., 2021), is that double crewing is also more productive. Dispatching double crewed response cars increases the likelihood of naming a suspect by 112% vs. single crewing. Having a named suspect is a pre-condition for the Criminal Justice System to work. When productivity is judged by what the officers achieve from responding to incidents, the improvement in identifying a suspect represents a considerable positive return on the cost of doubling crew size. In summary, research supports both hypotheses: double crewed units are more likely to engage with suspects, and they are also less likely to be injured if an incident becomes violent.

6. Evaluation method

84. This section describes the methodological approach to the evaluation and summarises the methods used to answer the evaluation questions. Detailed descriptions of the data collection and analysis methods are provided in the **Appendix B** and the accompanying **Technical Appendix**, along with caveats applying to how the results from each method should be interpreted.

Evaluation approach

85. A mixed-methods approach was necessary to answer the evaluation questions. Using different data collection methods to gather both quantitative data (e.g., police deployment statistics) and qualitative data (e.g., responses to interview questions) provides a more holistic view of the intervention and offsets the limitations of using different types of methods and data on their own. The validity and reliability of evaluation findings are reinforced through use of data triangulation, which involves drawing on multiple methods, sources, and perspectives.

86. Table 6.1 outlines the methods used to evaluate the TRM implementation, impacts of the TRM on decision-making and deployment and outcomes from the TRM. Not all methods were used to answer all evaluation questions, and some methods only elicit people's perceptions of impacts or outcomes. Below we provide an overview of how implementation, impacts on decision-making and deployment, and outcomes were measured in the TRM evaluation.

Table 6.1: Evaluation aspects addressed by each method

Method	Implementation	Impacts on decision-making & deployment	Outcomes	
			Be safer	Feel safer
Police administrative data:				
Existing national data	●	●	●●	–
TRM specific forms	●	●*	–	–
Interviews & focus groups:				
with staff involved or impacted by the TRM	●	●*	●*	●*
with FSED coaches	●	●*	–	–
Surveys:				
National frontline safety survey	●	–	–	●
FSED reaction and learning survey	●	●*	–	●*
Observations:				
of TRM in districts	●	–	–	–
of FSED training	●	–	–	–

● within Police; ● within the community; *people's perceptions of impacts or outcomes only.

Evaluating TRM implementation

87. In addition to examining the impacts and outcomes of the TRM, we also concurrently explored how these impacts and outcomes were enabled through the operation of the TRM in the proof of concept (PoC) districts and how the TRM was implemented. This process evaluation is important to establish what factors facilitated or presented barriers to implementation, informing improvements to TRM processes as the model is implemented nationally.

88. Implementation was assessed via a wide array of sources: administrative data, documents (e.g., policies and procedures, debrief forms, intelligence products), interviews and focus groups, surveys and observations of the TRM in practice. Existing administrative data were used to examine the implementation of tactical prevention teams (TPTs) and double crewing relative to the timing of risk to staff safety. Implementation was also assessed via quantitative and qualitative information recorded in TRM specific forms used by specialist capability teams and TacInt staff to track their activities. Extensive interviews and focus groups—with representatives from the many police workgroups involved in or affected by the implementation of the TRM—provided a vast amount of information about how different elements of the Model were implemented, and implementation facilitators and barriers. Two surveys

contributed further to examining the implementation of the TRM in general and the Frontline Skills Enhancement in District (FSED) training specifically. Field observations were limited to situations that did not pose risk to observers, such as observing FSED training sessions, DCC deployment processes, and intelligence processes.

Evaluating TRM impacts

89. The evaluation aimed to understand the more immediate impacts of the TRM on decision-making and deployment along the pathways to safety outcomes (see section 8 for a full explanation of pathways). Existing national data were used to measure changes in decision-making and risk-based deployment as indicated by officers' use of tactical options (use of force), arrests of high-risk 'persons of interest', and seizures of firearms and methamphetamine. Using national data enabled us to test statistically whether any changes were isolated to the districts and therefore more likely to be causally attributable to the TRM model. Additionally, police staff's perceptions of how decision-making and deployment had changed under the TRM Model—be it due to FSED training or other elements of the Model—were gathered through end of deployment (EoD) forms completed by TPTs and tactical dog teams (TDTs), interviews and focus groups, and the FSED Reaction and Learning Survey completed by training attendees.

Evaluating TRM outcomes

90. Lastly, the evaluation aimed to understand the less immediate effects of the TRM on staff and community safety, and feelings of safety. Existing national data were used to measure changes in indicators of staff safety such as assaults on police and the use of firearms at police, and indicators of community safety such as firearms victimisations and methamphetamine consumption. As with the impacts, using national data enabled us to test statistically whether any changes in these safety outcomes were isolated to the PoC districts and therefore more likely to be causally attributable to the TRM model. A national survey of frontline staff, conducted at the start and end of the PoC period, measured change in feelings of safety in the PoC districts relative to non-PoC districts—again helping to attribute any changes to the TRM Model. Additionally, police staff's perceptions of how the TRM, or components of, had affected safety outcomes were gathered through the interviews and focus groups, and the FSED Reaction and Learning Survey completed by training attendees. It was also hoped to use the New Zealand Crime and Victims Survey (NZCVS) to measure community feelings of safety. However, high levels of district variability at baseline meant that it was unfeasible to compare PoC districts with non-PoC districts to test for effects of the TRM intervention with this data.

91. Full details of all the data collection and analysis methods can be found in **Appendix B** and the **Technical Appendix** for this report.

7. Findings: implementation

92. A process or implementation evaluation determines whether program pillars have been implemented as *intended* in the PoC districts. Program implementation is about making a program work. It includes who, what, where, and how a program is set up and run. Police initiatives work within contexts that are complex and rapidly changing—all things that can work with or against a program's ability to achieve results.

93. Effective implementation is more than a contributing factor in setting initiatives up for success. Research shows that the quality of implementation is significant for achieving outcomes (Durlak, 2011). If a program is implemented poorly or even moderately well, its intended outcomes are unlikely to be achieved. Thus, in evaluating the TRM, we sought to understand how it was implemented in terms of the components, structure, and activities in each PoC district, the resources used to deliver it, the practical problems encountered, and the ways in which such problems were, or could be, resolved.

94. This section provides the process evaluation findings relating to the implementation of the TRM. The findings are structured by the TRM pillars. The focus here is on the implementation of individual pillars or activities that are expected to lead, via logical pathways, to the outcomes of the TRM. We consider both whether these activities were undertaken as designed and what factors facilitated or inhibited the delivery of these activities.

Implementation of FSED training

95. FSED training was implemented in PoC districts in December 2021, except for Counties Manukau who started in February 2022. FSED training was highly subscribed by those eligible (PSTs and road policing teams) and implemented within 10-week cycles. **Table 7.1** shows the numbers of eligible and FSED-trained staff for each PoC district, based on TRM weekly reports provided by PoC project leads.

Table 7.1: Number of eligible staff who received FSED training during the PoC period

District	Period from (until 3 July 2022)	FSED Day 1	FSED Day 2	FSED Day 3	Eligible staff
Northland	16 December 2021	186[2]	154	-	220
Counties Manukau	15 February 2022	339	344	-	354
Waikato	8 December 2021	266	264	21	344
Central	7 December 2021	331	306	20	399

96. To assess the implementation of FSED training, the EBPC conducted field observations and a survey of participants' reactions to the training, which included questions about its implementation. The results from these methods are described in turn in this section.

[2] Numbers taken from TRM PoC Weekly Report

Training observation findings

97. Two observers from the EBPC visited each PoC district to observe FSED days 1 and 2 training. **Table 7.2** shows the number of sessions, participants and coaches observed. This section summarises their findings about how the training was implemented, during the observation days.

Table 7.2: Number of coaches and participants per FSED Day 1 and Day 2 training sessions observed

District	Training	Number of sessions observed	Number of coaches	Number of participants	Other participants
Northland	FSED1	2 (catch-up sessions)	2 and 2	3 and 4	–
Northland	FSED2	2	3 and 3	5 and 6	–
Counties Manukau	FSED1	2	5 and 3	20 and 22	The FSED administrative coordinator, two TPTs and an officer (as a role-player) joined the second session.
Counties Manukau	FSED2	2	3 and 3	16 and 15	–
Waikato	FSED1	1	4	15	–
Waikato	FSED2	2	3 and 4	6 and 14	–
Central	FSED1	1 (catch-up session)	4	6	–
Central	FSED2	2	4 and 4	15 and 17	One participant preparing for AOS qualification joined the second half of the first session.

98. **Training material:** Districts were provided with a standardised training day structure, PowerPoint slides and lesson plans. Tactical safety coaches (TSCs) attended a train the trainers week aimed at standardising training delivery. Coaches were pragmatic and altered the delivery and their style based on time constraints, venue, weather, participant number and level of skill.

99. **Coaches:** All TSCs appeared knowledgeable and familiar with the material. They used practical examples participants related to mixed with humour, jokes and media to energise and engage. For each training day observed the table above shows the number of coaches and participants. The ratio of coach to participant varied.

100. **Equipment:** FSED training demands a significant amount of equipment. Participants each require a training kit including training holster, weapons, radio, tourniquet, pepper spray, and safety glasses.

101. **Venue:** Districts do not have purpose-built training venues for FSED and some venues are more appropriate than others. TSCs told EBPC observers that training is adapted based on venue. TSCs told EBPC observers that when choosing properties or preparing scenarios room layout, hallways, and positions of entry needed to be considered.

102. **Timing:** The training day structure set out a six and a half hour training day, but this timeframe was varied by coaches if needed.

103. **Overall:** Although coaches took a different and flexible approach to how lessons were conducted (often as necessitated by venue and participants), as far as was observed the intent of the training and training content was adhered to across districts.

Reaction survey findings about implementation

104. The FSED Day 1 training survey was answered by 328 officers who attended. The perceptions of trainees of FSED Day 1 training indicate that this training was well implemented (**Table 7.3**).

Table 7.3: Percent of answers to statements focusing on coaches, specific components of training, training in general and relevance to work in the FSED Day 1 survey per scale-point

FSED Day 1 statements	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree
Coaches			
Coaches created a safe learning environment	98.5%	0.3%	1.2%
Coaches had understanding of the content	98.2%	0.9%	0.9%
Coaches provided helpful feedback	97.9%	1.2%	0.9%
Coaches empowered me	91.2%	7.0%	1.8%
Specific components of training			
Scenarios were suitable to environment	95.4%	2.1%	2.4%
Reflections and debrief aided learning	95.1%	4.0%	0.9%
Scenarios made me feel better prepared	93.6%	4.0%	2.4%
Reference scenarios improved skills	89.6%	7.0%	3.4%
Recording performance helped learning	75.9%	18.3%	5.8%
Training in general			
I would recommend this training to others	98.5%	0.3%	1.2%
The training method was effective	98.2%	0.6%	1.2%
The training was engaging	97.6%	1.5%	0.9%
Attending the training was a good use of time	97.6%	1.2%	1.2%
The training objectives were clearly defined	97.3%	0.9%	1.8%
The pace of the training was appropriate	96.6%	1.2%	2.1%
Lessons were at the right level	96.6%	0.6%	2.7%
Training culture reflected Police values	96.0%	3.0%	0.9%
Training duration was appropriate	92.4%	4.0%	3.7%
Relevance to work			
The training is valuable to duties as a police officer	97.9%	0.9%	1.2%
The training content can be applied to work	97.3%	1.8%	0.9%

[a] 'Strongly agree' and 'agree' were grouped under 'agree'.

[b] 'Strongly disagree' and 'disagree' were grouped under 'disagree'.

105. **Table 7.3** shows that participants overwhelmingly agreed that coaches created a safe learning environment (98.5%), had a good understanding of the content (98.2%), provided helpful feedback (97.9%), and empowered trainees (91.2%). Although participants primarily agreed that tactical safety coaches (TSCs) had empowered them, 7.0% of participants neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement. The absolute majority of participants agreed that scenarios were suitable to the environment (95.4%), and made them feel better prepared (93.6%), and that reflections and debrief aided learning (95.1%).

106. The majority of participants agreed that reference scenarios improved their skills (89.6%) and recording performance helped learning (75.9%), although 7.0% and 18.3% of participants, respectively, neither agreed nor disagreed with these statements. It was noted during FSED training observations that trainee performance was not recorded during reference scenarios in one of the PoC districts. This observation note suggests that lower ratings of this statement might be connected to trainee performance not being recorded in some of the FSED Day 1 training sessions provided, or that this part of the training was dropped by trainers due to the perception it was not effective.

107. Participants overwhelmingly agreed that FSED Day 1 training was well-run. The percentage of participants who agreed with statements related to how the training was generally run varied from 98.5% (*I would recommend this training to others*) to 92.4% (*Training duration was appropriate*). Lastly, the absolute majority of participants agreed that FSED training was valuable (97.9%) and could be applied to work (97.3%).

108. The FSED Day 2 training survey was answered by 268 officers who attended. Responses to this survey were largely consistent with the overwhelmingly positive trend observed in the FSED Day 1 survey.

109. shows that again the absolute majority of participants agreed that coaches created a safe learning environment (98.5%), had a good understanding of the content (98.1%), provided helpful feedback (97.8%) and empowered trainees (95.5%). The vast majority of participants also agreed that in Day 2 FSED training, reflections and debrief aided learning (95.1%) and scenarios were suitable to the environment (94.4%) and made them feel better prepared (93.3%). This training was also considered to be well-run and relevant to work. The percentage of participants who agreed with the statements related to FSED Day 2 training varied from 98.5% (Coaches created a safe learning environment and I would recommend this training to others) to 93.3% (Scenarios made me feel better prepared and Training duration was appropriate).

Table 7.4: Percent of answers to statements focusing on coaches, specific components of training, training in general and relevance to work in the FSED Day 2 survey per scale point

FSED Day 2 statements	Agree[a]	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree[b]
Coaches			
Coaches created a safe learning environment	98.5%	0.4%	1.1%
Coaches had understanding of the content	98.1%	0.7%	1.1%
Coaches provided helpful feedback	97.8%	1.1%	1.1%
Coaches empowered me	95.5%	3.4%	1.1%
Specific components of training			
Reflections and debrief aided learning	95.1%	3.7%	1.1%
Scenarios were suitable to environment	94.4%	3.0%	2.6%
Scenarios made me feel better prepared	93.3%	4.9%	1.9%
Training in general			
I would recommend this training to others	98.5%	0.4%	1.1%
Attending the training was a good use of time	98.1%	0.7%	1.1%
The training method was effective	98.1%	0.7%	1.1%
The training objectives were clearly defined	98.1%	0.4%	1.5%
The training was engaging	97.8%	1.1%	1.1%
Training culture reflected Police values	96.3%	2.6%	1.1%
Lessons were at the right level	96.3%	2.2%	1.5%
The pace of the training was appropriate	94.4%	3.7%	1.9%
Training duration was appropriate	93.3%	3.0%	3.7%
Relevance to work			
The training is valuable to duties as a police officer	96.3%	2.6%	1.1%
The training content can be applied to work	95.1%	3.4%	1.5%

[a] 'Strongly agree' and 'agree' were grouped under 'agree'.

[b] 'Strongly disagree' and 'disagree' were grouped under 'disagree'.

110. Participants reported in both FSED Day 1 and Day 2 surveys' free text that they particularly liked the use of practical scenarios in the training and felt there was a level of realism from conducting these under some stress. However not all participants felt the scenarios reflected their working environment, particularly those who work in smaller stations or work on their own on a regular basis. Although most participants acknowledged that it is not possible to teach everyone all possible scenarios, there were a number of suggestions to increase the realism and applicability to their standard working environment.

Implementation of increased Specialist Capability

111. TPTs and TDTs were implemented in December 2021 but were not fully operational until January due to staff leave commitments. TPT and TDT activities were quantified using PoC-specific data sources such as End of Deployment (EoD) forms, and Computer Aided Radio Dispatch (CARD[3]) records (see **Appendix B** for further detail). Here we present findings for tactical team activity measures for the PoC districts during the evaluation period, focusing on how often and in what ways the tactical teams were deployed.

Tactical Prevention Teams

112. At an aggregate level, the data indicates that TPTs were implemented as intended, in terms of the number and type of events they attended, and the role they played at those events. The findings here speak also to the successful functioning of components of the risk-based deployment pillar of the TRM system, which supported TPTs' focus on pre-planned activities—in particular to remove HROs, firearms, methamphetamine, and organised crime from communities. The risk-based deployment pillar also functioned to ensure that redeployment of TPTs to emergency events was appropriately risk assessed and managed by the DCC.

Number of events TPTs attended

113. There were no pre-set expectations for the number of attended events, which reflects district demand and capacity to deploy teams. **Table 7.5** shows that Waikato TPTs attended the largest number of Events, concentrated in the first half of the evaluation period. This result is likely due to the presence of 3 TPTs during this period, whereas Waikato operated a single TPT from April. All districts saw a decrease in CARD Event attendance in April. Anecdotal reports suggest that this decrease was largely due to COVID-19, and the impact of both school and public holidays. Northland TPTs attended the second largest number of Events, likely due to them operating two TPTs for a portion of the trial.

Table 7.5: Number of CARD Events attended by TPTs per month (counting once per CARD Event)

Month	Northland (n = 422)	Counties Manukau (n=235)	Waikato (n=562)	Central (n = 311)	All PoCs (n=1,530)
January	111	17	165	61	354
February	88	47	94	44	272
March	71	42	147	61	322
April	30	35	48	43	156
May	81	52	63	34	230
June	41	42	45	68	196

TPT deployments were largely pre-planned as intended

114. The focus of the TPTs should be on high-risk prevention activities prioritised to HROs who are a threat to officers and are causing harm in the community. A benchmark of 70% proactive/pre-planned work was mentioned during evaluation planning, and although it was not a formal requirement, this estimate was supported by the data. Across the PoCs combined, 75% of CARD Events were categorised as proactive and 76% of EoD forms indicated pre-planned deployments, indicating that the TPTs were largely conducting pre-planned/proactive work rather than responsive/reactive work (see **Table 7.6** and **Table 7.7**). Counties Manukau TPT did more proactive/pre-planned work but there was little variation between

[3] The database used by Police to manage and record Police's response to calls for service, and pro-active activities such as conducting bail checks, traffic stops and warrants.

the other PoC districts. Self-reports from interviews and focus groups indicate that TPTs also perceived themselves to be largely doing pre-planned work.

Table 7.6: Percent of TPT attended CARD Events attended that were proactive[a] versus reactive[b]

Event Type	Northland (n=422)	Counties Manukau (n=235)	Waikato (n=562)	Central (n=311)	All PoCs (n=1,530)
Proactive	82%	91%	65%	69%	75%
Reactive	18%	9%	35%	31%	25%

[a] Proactive Events: Dispatch Event Type = 3–(Prevention Activities) or 4–(Other Duties) or 2O/2S/2T/2U/2W (Warrants/Summons) or Call Source = POLICE or OFFICER or RADIO or STA.

[b] Reactive Events: Dispatch Event Type = All others not listed.

Table 7.7: Percent of TPT deployments (EoD forms) that were pre-planned versus emergency

Deployment type	Northland (n=183)	Counties Manukau (n=213)	Waikato (n=215)	Central (n=192)	All PoCs (n=803)
Pre-planned	76%	88%	72%	69%	76%
Emergency	24%	12%	28%	31%	24%

115. Attendance at Priority 1 (P1) Events is a further indicator of the relative levels of pre-planned versus emergency work. P1 Events require an immediate police response (0 to 10 minutes). P1 Events involve an actual threat to life or property happening now, violence being used or threatened, serious offence/incident in progression, offenders present or leaving the scene, or serious vehicle crashes (persons trapped/serious injury). P1 Events can include active offences such as assaults and homicides, but also non-criminal emergency situations like serious car crashes or flooding events.

116. If TPTs were primarily doing pre-planned rather than emergency response work they should only be attending a small number of P1 Events relative to other priority level Events. P1 Events where TPTs would be required would likely involve a greater risk to victims, the public, and staff safety than ordinary P1s. Only 15% of TPT-attended Events were P1 (**Table 7.8**), providing further support that the teams were largely pre-planned and not a response-based district resource.

Table 7.8: Percent of TPT-attended CARD Events per highest priority at Event Closure

Priority 1 Events	Northland (n=38)	Counties Manukau (n=17)	Waikato (n=119)	Central (n=51)	All PoCs (n=225)
1	9%	7%	21%	16%	15%
2	66%	74%	68%	75%	70%
3	25%	19%	10%	8%	15%
Other	<1%	0%	<1%	1%	<1%

Priority 1 Events attended

117. Overall, TPTs attended 225 P1 Events during the evaluation period (**Table 7.8**). The largest number of these were within Waikato, and there were very few in Counties Manukau. Although CARD codes do not provide great insight into the circumstances of an Event, a P1 Event reflects an imminent and/or immediate threat to the public. Behind these codes, there is likely the presence of weapons, violent offenders, and circumstances that cause communication staff to believe an emergency response—i.e., the presence of a TPT—is necessary.

118. **Table 7.9** and **Table 7.10** show that although family harm Events only made up 6% of Events attended by TPTs, of P1 Events, family harm was the most frequent Event Type attended across every district. Although family harm Events are not specifically within the intended remit of TPTs, the large proportion within P1 Events indicates that the perpetrators were likely armed with some form of weapon, and/or posed a significant risk to staff and public safety. The low proportion of family harm out of all priority codes further supports this explanation. Variation across districts in other P1 Event Types may simply reflect differences in the types of P1 Events that occur in these districts, rather than differences in decisions to deploy TPTs in response to these emergencies.

Table 7.9: Percent of TPT-attended P1 Events per Event Type (top 10 most common Event Types; ordered by most to least common across all PoC districts combined)

Priority 1 Events	Northland (n=38)	Counties Manukau (n=17)	Waikato (n=119)	Central (n=51)	All PoCs (n=225)
5F Family Harm	26%	24%	34%	29%	31%
FLEE Fleeing Driver	3%	24%	10%	16%	11%
6820 Firearms	26%	12%	5%	6%	9%
1510 Serious Assaults	5%	0%	7%	4%	5%
3530 Disorder	3%	0%	6%	4%	4%
1710 Intimidation/ Threats	0%	12%	3%	2%	3%
4211 Car Conversion	0%	0%	3%	8%	3%
1C Car/ Person Acting Suspicously	5%	18%	1%	2%	3%
1310 Robbery	0%	0%	3%	4%	3%
1X Threatens/ Attempt Suicide	0%	0%	3%	2%	2%

TPTs focused on HROs, firearms, methamphetamine and organised crime as intended

119. The focus of TPTs is to improve the safety of the police operating environment, largely through a focus on preventative activities prioritising HROs, drugs, and weapons. Deployment data indicate that TPTs' pre-planned activities were largely focused on high-risk offenders (HROs), firearms, and drugs. This focus is also supported by the TacInt findings in the next section.

120. TPT members recounted through interviews and focus groups some changes to their deployment model whereby they noted shifts to a more preventative deployment model. This shift, and support from investigation teams, improved the efficacy of the teams. The link to a supportive and dedicated investigation group was mentioned as a key part of the deployment model that increased the capability of the team.

"We've obviously changed to have, a complete investigative team so, for us, that's worked really well by providing a lot of work and targets that are up to date that we can turn up on the day and have a list of people that are ready to be door knocked, if you like."

Table 7.10: Percent of TPT-attended Events per Event Type (top 10 most common Event Types; ordered by most to least common across all PoC districts combined)

Event Type	Northland (n=422)	Counties Manukau (n=235)	Waikato (n=562)	Central (n=311)	All PoCs (n=1,530)
2W Arrest Warrant	16%	27%	27%	41%	27%
4X Execute Search Warrant	9%	38%	7%	6%	12%
4Q Enquiry	21%	14%	6%	5%	12%
3T Vehicle Turnover	12%	3%	8%	4%	8%
5F Family Harm	3%	2%	9%	7%	6%
5K Bail Check	10%	1%	1%	2%	4%
1C Car/ Person Acting Suspiciously	1%	2%	2%	6%	3%
6820 Firearms	3%	2%	2%	2%	2%
2I Information	1%	1%	2%	5%	2%
FLEE Fleeing Driver	<1%	2%	2%	3%	2%

121. The most common Event Types attended by TPTs were arrest warrants, search warrants and enquiries (**Table 7.10**). These Event Types indicate a focus on locating and taking action in relation to HROs, as intended by the model.

"I think it's been really good. A lot of these higher end offenders just weren't being targeted as well by anyone. There was nobody owning them or anything. So now we've got our squad actually goes and hunts these people. And it's been mentioned that they've noticed there's a bit of a difference amongst it. I think overall it's really good, especially the TST [TSC] side as well, the training I think that's gold getting that training into those because obviously we can't be everywhere. We're not gonna be the ones dealing with the 3Ts. So absolutely. I think overall it's very much heading in the right direction. It'll take a little bit of evolving and it'll probably have to evolve individually across different districts."

122. District variation indicates not all TPTs were as prescriptive with their deployments. In Counties Manukau 79% of TPT-attended Events were 2Ws, 4Xs, and 4Qs whereas other districts' TPTs attended more of other Event Types. Central had the largest proportion of 2Ws, but the lowest proportions of 4Xs and 4Qs (likely due to reduced investigations support). Northland had the greatest variation in Events, often involved in bail checks, whereas other districts had little attendance at 5Ks (bail check). Generally speaking, it appears Counties Manukau had a tighter deployment model, with more focus in deployment. It is plausible that, being part of the centralised Tāmaki Makaurau function, they had access to greater resources to support pre-planned search warrants.

123. Overall, 22% of the 2W (Arrest Warrant) Events resulted in an arrest, though multiple 2W Events recorded in CARD can be related to one arrestee, which can inflate the arrest rate as a proportion of Events. In many instances, 2W Events can result in a door knock or approach to an address where the subject is not located for a number of reasons. For example, the address information could be out of date, or the subject may just not be present at the address at the time. We do not know the proportion of 2W Events TPTs attended that had the support of tactical intelligence, so we cannot make any claim as to the impact of tactical intelligence on the arrest rate of TPTs.

124. The second and third most attended Events by TPTs were 4Xs and 4Qs. Of all Events attended by TPTs, these equated to 12% and 11% respectively. This finding indicates that teams had a frequent focus on preventative work, executing search warrants and conducting enquiries for offenders and investigations. 4Xs were more frequent within Counties Manukau (38%) of all Events, with the next most frequent 4X district being Northland at 9%. Northland had the largest proportion of 4Qs of any district at 21% followed by Counties Manukau at 14%.

125. 4Xs and 4Qs are largely associated with investigation work and tend to be strongly attached to existing investigation groups. Therefore, differences across districts could reflect the integration of TPTs with existing investigation groups. For context, qualitative data show that when TPTs lacked adequate investigation support (Central District and Waikato until April) they had a larger focus on the HROs who presented the least risk to staff safety and had adequate intelligence (i.e., in less need of further investigation support).

> *"So, we are really just picking off the lower risk, less sophisticated offenders who are very overt in their offending and easy to catch. The covert high, high-risk ones, they just sit on our books for... Some have been on there for months."*

126. Offences reported in EoD forms provide further insight into the focus of the teams. The Offences listed may reflect the reason for deployment (what offences police were aware of when they were deployed) or the outcome of deployment (what offences police established had occurred, once they arrived, or that occurred after police arrival). Offences can be listed regardless of whether the offender was located/arrested, or what they were charged with.

127. Reported Offences indicate the teams were largely focused on breaches/justice (people focused), firearms, and violent offending (**Table 7.11**). These offences indicate that at an aggregate level breaches/justice, firearms, and violence were the key reasons for deployments. Counties Manukau, similarly, to the CARD Event codes, had a more specific focus on these offences than other districts. Central had the largest proportion of breaches/justice offences, which coupled with their CARD Events being predominately 2Ws, suggests an overwhelming focus on HROs rather than investigation warrants. This result is likely due to a lack of investigations support in Central District. Waikato and Northland had much more diversity in offences reported, suggesting a greater variety in the types of deployments they carried out.

Table 7.11: Percent of TPT deployments (EoD forms) per Offence Group (ordered by most to least common across all PoC districts combined)

Offence Group	Northland (n=210)	Counties Manukau (n=273)	Waikato (n=262)	Central (n=233)	All PoCs (n=978)
Breaches / Justice	7%	29%	18%	54%	27%
Firearms	30%	38%	13%	10%	23%
Violence	25%	14%	33%	10%	20%
Dishonesty	7%	5%	13%	9%	9%
Drugs / Cannabis	10%	5%	5%	1%	5%
Drugs / Not Cannabis	8%	5%	2%	6%	5%
Traffic	6%	0%	8%	3%	4%
Family Offences	3%	3%	3%	2%	3%
Disorder	2%	0%	2%	3%	2%
Other Offences not Groupe	1%	1%	1%	2%	1%
Mental Health	1%	0%	2%	0%	1%

128. Although generally unarmed is the default position of the TPTs, they exhibited a high rate of firearm carriage, as would be expected, reflecting attendance at very high-risk events such as those involving firearms. Arming decisions are made by the TENR (police threat assessment methodology) of the team, which determines if arming is required. Overall, EoD forms indicated TPTs carried firearms at 91% of deployments, though this proportion varied between 80 and 100% across the districts (**Table 7.12**). Although firearm carriage at these high-risk deployments is expected, TPTs were not armed between deployments (which would constitute routine arming).

129. When on shift for planned prevention duties, the TPT is available to be redeployed to support frontline incident response on the approval of the DCC Coordinator. The purpose of this approval process is to

ensure that deployment of this tactical resource is appropriately considered and because the primary purpose of the TPT is to focus on preventative policing activity. The incidents TPTs are redeployed to are not random, and must meet a certain risk threshold, i.e.,

- the incident involves or is believed to involve a firearm or other lethal weapon, and
- the actions or informed risk assessment of the offender have indicated their propensity to use the firearm or lethal weapon when committing an offence.

130. Such incidents necessitate a high level of arming.

Table 7.12: Percent of TPT deployments (EoD forms) where TPTs were armed versus not armed

Team armed	Northland (n=183)	Counties Manukau (n=213)	Waikato (n=215)	Central (n=192)	All PoCs (n=803)
No	9%	0%	7%	20%	9%
Yes	91%	100%	93%	80%	91%

Have TPT deployments largely supported existing investigation work as intended?

131. EoD forms indicated investigation support as the most frequent deployment method (70% of deployments; see **Table 7.13**). This result is consistent with the high frequency of 2Ws, 4Xs, 4Qs among the CARD Events attended by TPTs, which are outputs of or involve investigative work.

Table 7.13: Percent of TPT deployments (EoD forms) per deployment method[a]

Deployment method	Northland (n=183)	Counties Manukau (n=213)	Waikato (n=215)	Central (n=192)	All PoCs (n=803)
Investigation support	64%	90%	68%	65%	72%
Redeployment	20%	10%	24%	26%	20%
Officer discovered	16%	0%	7%	9%	8%

[a] Assist AOS has been grouped under investigation support.

TPTs provided tactical support upon deployments as intended

132. EoD forms indicate 'tactical support' was the most frequent TPT deployment role (89% of deployments, **Table 7.14**), though this is a rather broad term. Tactical support could range from making entry to an address and tactically resolving of an event, to being present in a supportive manner for investigation teams or frontline units. It was very rare for TPTs to hold a command-and-control role, though this role was more common in Waikato than other districts.

Table 7.14: Percent of TPT deployments (EoD forms) per deployment role

Deployment role	Northland (n=183)	Counties Manukau (n=213)	Waikato (n=215)	Central (n=192)	All PoCs (n=803)
Tactical support	87%	93%	82%	94%	89%
Command/ Control	<1%	7%	16%	0%	6%
Other	13%	0%	2%	6%	4%

133. Most events where an offender was located required some form of tactics to resolve, indicating that the teams and their capability were well utilised and required on deployments. Offenders were not located at 41% of deployments—to be expected as the likelihood of an offender being at a location at the time

police arrive is uncertain. As shown in **Table 7.15**, overall, 30% of deployments were resolved through tactical options only, though this does not mean that negotiation/communication was not utilised at all (see **Table 7.15** notes). All operators are trained to utilise communication and de-escalation first and foremost before employing tactical options. 'Tactical only' means that the primary or ultimate method of resolution was tactical. Advanced tactics (including in combination with negotiation) were used to resolve almost half of the events, suggesting the deployment of an advanced tactical team at these Events was matched to the level of risk involved.

Table 7.15: Percent of TPT deployments (EoD forms) per resolution method[a]

Method of resolution	Northland (n=181)	Counties Manukau (n=213)	Waikato (n=211)	Central (n=192)	All PoCs (n=797)
Offender not contacted/ located	38%	48%	43%	35%	41%
Tactical only	25%	39%	24%	31%	30%
Combined negotiation/ tactical	12%	6%	15%	23%	14%
Negotiation only	18%	6%	13%	7%	11%
Prior to negotiation	8%	0%	5%	4%	4%

[a] **Offender not contacted/ located:** Staff did not contact or locate the offender. **Tactical only:** Staff did not employ negotiation as the key tactic for resolution of the Event. The Event was resolved through a tactical manner/option. This may not necessarily be an overt/explicit tactical option (e.g., presentation of a weapon) but staff may have engaged in tactics such as urban terrain approaches and room clearance tactics to resolve the Event. **Combined negotiation/ tactical:** Staff utilised both negotiation and tactical options or a tactical manner to resolve the Event. This could be through coordinated tactics to clear/surround an address or through the more explicit use of a tactical option (shields/ 40mm, presentation of tactical options etc). **Negotiation only:** Staff did not utilise a tactical approach or option to resolve an Event other than communication/negotiation techniques, i.e., tactical options/methods may have been present/ prepared but not utilised or played a pivotal role in the resolution of the Event. **Prior to negotiation:** Event resolved prior to tactical team involvement.

TPTs provided support to AOS

134. EoD forms showed TPTs supported AOS in 32 instances. The largest number of AOS operations TPTs reported to be involved in through EoD forms was Counties Manukau (16), followed by Northland (8). Waikato and Central TPTs both reported assisting AOS four times during the evaluation period. Qualitative data support that TPT staff perceived their tactical capability as highly valuable in resolving emergency and emerging risky events, particularly events that would have ultimately reached an AOS threshold. At times, TPTs held scenes prior to AOS arrival, which was seen as a good use of the tactical resource. Occasionally TPTs mentioned in EoD forms that they could escalate their deployment to an AOS deployment (via approval from AOS command) or fold into an existing or emerging AOS deployment as operators. This ability was seen as positive, as it was quick and immediate. At times, TPTs were folded into the AOS deployment or maintained cordons for AOS.

Barriers to implementation

135. TPT availability has been impacted by resourcing. Many of the recommendations and other issues relating to the PoC reported in interviews and focus groups by the TPTs were dependent on people resourcing and capability. Members acknowledged that resourcing would always be an issue for a model of this size and complexity. The key resourcing issue raised by all TPT groups was staffing numbers. TPTs felt they needed a large enough squad to ensure they could manage abstractions for court, leave, medical, training etc. Lack of adequate staffing meant that the TPTs were unable to deploy at times. More generally, TPTs acknowledged the strain the TRM placed on AOS. This strain was particularly apparent within the centralised AOS model within Tāmaki Makaurau. Once filling TDT and TSC positions, there is little leftover of available AOS to staff the TPT.

"Last couple of months have been really hard, really hard on us. About just trying to manage our abstractions, but we have a team of four, so it's a team leader and three. We have to operate with those numbers under the, under the model. So, if one of us takes leave, we have to back fill that. It's been really hard to manage over the last couple of months."

Tactical Dog Teams

136. The data largely confirms that TDTs were implemented as intended, in terms of the number and type of events they attended, and the role they played at those events. The number of TDTs varied widely between PoC districts. At any one time, Central could have deployed 11 TDTs, whereas Northland could deploy a total of three. Waikato initially did not deploy TDTs until April when they were able to deploy four. Due to the centralised Tāmaki Makaurau model, Counties Manukau did not have TDTs.

137. Although TDT are the specialist capability directly available to the frontline to increase their safety, the TRM system has changed the demand for dog handlers. As the risk-based deployment pillar has enabled notably more pre-planned search and arrest warrants to be done by the tactical teams, there is a much greater demand for TDTs to be part of that planning and activity. This demand on TDTs means a compared to previously, dog handlers are now having a greater focus on proactive work to enhance the safety of the operating environment in the long term.

Number of events attended by TDTs

138. TDTs attended a total of 5,451 Events in the evaluation period (**Table 7.16**). Central attended by far the largest number of TDT CARD Events during the evaluation period. Of all the districts, they had the largest number of TDTs and were operational for the longest time. Waikato introduced TDTs in April, explaining their lack of attendance in the previous months. These numbers largely reflect district demand, the number of teams in district, and their availability and rostering, rather than the intention of teams to proactively deploy.

Table 7.16: Number of TDT-attended CARD Events per month[a]

Month	Northland (n=429)	Waikato (n=373)	Central (n=4,649)	All PoCs (n=5,451)
January	52	-	912	964
February	48	-	682	730
March	49	-	543	592
April	96	78	864	1,038
May	95	207	807	1,109
June	89	88	841	1,018

[a] Events attended by more than one TDT are counted once.

TDTs filled a response role as intended

139. Emergency response is the first priority for TDTs. EoD forms indicate that the teams are deploying as intended with the majority of their work being response based as defined by themselves, with a smaller, but still noticeable portion being pre-planned (**Table 7.17**). However, handlers also reported in interviews and focus groups that since operating as a TDT, their deployments have changed. They undertook more pre-planned activities and focused deployments as a result of the TRM, when not required for response activities.

"See that's changed slightly too. Traditionally we'd be 70% response, but it's now probably gone down to 50:50 response to planned with regards to, because more warrants have been done or executed by the TPT, which we are following along behind to add support to them and yeah."

Table 7.17: Percent of TDT deployments that were response vs pre-planned

Deployment type	Northland (n=210)	Waikato (n=73)	Central (n=510)	All PoCs (n=793)
Response	74%	84%	70%	72%
Pre-planned	26%	16%	30%	28%

140. Offence groupings as reported within EoD forms indicate that the TDTs were largely focused on Dishonesty, Violence, Traffic, and Justice Offences (**Table 7.18**). Because most of their work was response based, these results simply reflect the nature of demand for TDT capability during the evaluation period.

Table 7.18: Percent of TDT deployments per Offence Group (ordered by most to least common across all PoC districts combined)

Offence Group	Northland (n=196)	Waikato (n=84)	Central (n=513)	All PoCs (n=793)
Dishonesty	20%	27%	16%	18%
Violence	11%	25%	17%	17%
Traffic	18%	11%	14%	15%
Justice	8%	7%	18%	14%
Family Offences	16%	10%	9%	11%
Firearms	6%	13%	8%	8%
Disorder	8%	0%	8%	7%
Mental Health	5%	5%	6%	5%
Other Offences not Grouped	3%	1%	4%	3%
Drugs / Not Cannabis	3%	1%	1%	1%
Drugs / Cannabis	4%	0%	1%	1%

TDT work was mostly proactive

141. Although emergency jobs remain the first priority for TDTs, under the TRM they are provided with a deployment plan where they can focus their attention rather than relying on self-deployment. This work can be classified as proactive in terms of CARD Events (e.g., 3T vehicle stops), albeit falling within the 'response' deployments described above. CARD Events indicate that at an aggregate level, much (72%) of TDTs' work was proactive (**Table 7.19**). However, Northland and Waikato had lower rates of proactive work and were nearer to a 50–50 split. Central, with a larger proportion of proactive work (and a much greater number of deployments) skew the aggregate proportions. As suggested in the literature around double crewing (see section 5), having a second person allows these teams to go to more proactive jobs than might otherwise have been able to, and, as noted, and they also had increased TacInt led deployment plans and focus as part of the TRM system.

Table 7.19: Percent of TDT-attended CARD Events that were proactive[a] versus reactive[b]

Event Type	Northland (n=429)	Waikato (n=373)	Central (n=4,649)	All PoCs (n=5,451)
Proactive	58%	50%	74%	72%
Reactive	42%	50%	26%	28%

[a] Proactive Events: Dispatch Event Type = 3–(Prevention Activities) or 4–(Other Duties) or 2O/2S/2T/2U/2W (Warrants/Summons) or Call Source = POLICE or OFFICER or RADIO or STA.

[b] Reactive Events: Dispatch Event Type = All others not listed.

142. Across all PoCs, the most common CARD Events attended were 5Ks, 3Ts, and 3Ms (**Table 7.20**). However, these (except for 3Ts) were largely driven by the greater numbers in Central. Northland and Waikato recorded very small proportions of 5Ks when compared to Central. TDTs showed much greater variation across the districts in relation to their attended Events. This variation is normal, because TDTs will respond to demand on the day, fulfilling the response function of the TRM model. Events that require a TDT response are varied, and the Event Type code provides little detail by which to assess why a TDT was deployed. Within Northland, two handlers were operating, so the results most likely reflect the behaviour and demand on these two handlers' than it does single dog teams in Northland more generally.

Table 7.20: Percent of TDT-attended Events per Event Type (top 10 most common Event Types; ordered by most to least common across all PoC districts combined)

Event Type	Northland (n=429)	Waikato (n=373)	Central (n=4,649)	All PoCs (n=5,451)
5K Bail Check	3%	1%	36%	31%
3T Vehicle Turnover	17%	22%	14%	15%
3M Directed Patrol	5%	<1%	10%	9%
5F Family Harm	9%	6%	5%	6%
1C Car / Person Acting Suspicously	6%	11%	5%	5%
3F Foot Patrol	5%	2%	3%	3%
2W Arrest Warrant	8%	4%	2%	3%
FLEE Fleeing Driver	2%	8%	2%	3%
3530 Disorder	4%	2%	2%	2%
1U Traffic Offending	5%	5%	2%	2%

The TDTs provided tactical support as intended

143. Overwhelmingly, TDTs provided tactical support upon deployment (**Table 7.21**), consistent with the intention of the teams. Command and Control was also frequent across districts, showing that the added tactical experience of the team may be useful in commanding events. Most of the 'other' grouping refers to 'officer discovered' where, as a result of being on active patrol, they might come across an event rather than being deployed to it by Emergency Communication Centres.

Table 7.21: Percent of TDT deployments per deployment role

Deployment role	Northland (n=210)	Waikato (n=73)	Central (n=510)	All PoCs (n=793)
Tactical support	80%	79%	86%	84%
Command/ Control	2%	10%	7%	6%
Advanced Trauma Support	0%	0%	1%	<1%
Other	18%	11%	6%	10%

144. Of TDT deployments, the most common resolution was offender not contacted/located (**Table 7.22**). This outcome is quite common in many types of events and should not be perceived as poor tracking/locating skills from the TDT. When an offender was located, negotiation was the primary means of resolution followed closely by tactical only. That said, negotiation and tactics are not mutually exclusive—they will likely always be used together. These codes represent the *primary* means of resolution: the final or concluding method when resolution was obtained.

Table 7.22: Percent of TDT deployments per method of resolution[a]

Method of resolution	Northland (n=179)	Waikato (n=70)	Central (n=454)	All PoCs (n=703)
Offender not contacted/ located	28%	20%	34%	31%
Negotiation only	49%	9%	25%	29%
Tactical only	9%	29%	22%	20%
Combined negotiation/ tactical	11%	40%	13%	15%
Prior to negotiation	3%	3%	6%	5%

[a] **Offender not contacted/ located:** Staff did not contact or locate the offender. **Tactical only:** Staff did not employ negotiation as the key tactic for resolution of the Event. The Event was resolved through a tactical manner/ option. This may not necessarily be an overt/ explicit tactical option (e.g., presentation of a weapon) but staff may have engaged in tactics such as urban terrain approaches and room clearance tactics to resolve the Event. **Combined negotiation/ tactical:** Staff utilised both negotiation and tactical options or a tactical manner to resolve the Event. This could be through coordinated tactics to clear/surround an address or through the more explicit use of a tactical option (shields/ 40mm, presentation of tactical options etc). **Negotiation only:** Staff did not utilise a tactical approach or option to resolve an Event other than communication/negotiation techniques, i.e., tactical options/methods may have been present/ prepared but not utilised or played a pivotal role in the resolution of the Event. **Prior to negotiation:** Event resolved prior to tactical team involvement.

145. Text from EoD forms shows that TDTs were able to cordon, contain, appreciate, and resolve risky events prior to an AOS deployment, or arrival. On occasion, TDTs were able to cordon scenes and, through correspondence with AOS command, determine whether a full deployment was necessary or whether it could be resolved by themselves. These activities often occurred when TDTs were deployed alongside TPTs. Infrequently, TDTs indicated in EoD forms that the deployment related to an AOS deployment. Most of these involved utilising TDTs in the AOS squad.

"AOS deployed, the Tactical Operator formed part of the clearance team. The scene was made safe and a loaded shotgun was located in the garage of the property"

TDT compared with dog patrol teams

146. Throughout the period of the PoC dog team handlers also operated as dog patrol teams (DPT) without an operator due to operational constraints, rostering, illness, and abstractions. This practice was expected and provided the evaluation with an opportunity to compare the activities of the handlers with and without an operator in the same time period and location.

147. TRM deployments in CARD are identified through a TRM exclusive callsign. A separate set of callsigns established through SME's have also been used by these handlers when not paired by a tactical operator. These callsigns are the inclusion criteria for CARD deployments relating to DPT activity. This data does not include activity where the handler operated outside of these callsigns, for example as part of an AOS squad, or under a separate callsign. Throughout the evaluation period where TDTs were active in the PoCs, 65% of the handlers' time was spent with a tactical operator (**Table 7.23**).

Table 7.23: Percent of CARD Events attended by TDT dog handlers by whether they were using their TDT or BAU (DPT) callsign (i.e., were accompanied by a tactical operator or not)

Deployment callsign	Northland (n=537)	Waikato (n=852)	Central (n=6,941)	All PoCs (n=8,330)
TRM	80%	44%	67%	65%
BAU	20%	56%	33%	35%

148. Throughout the evaluation period where TDTs were active in the PoCs, 65% of the handlers' Events were attended with a tactical operator[4]. This figure is largely driven by Central due to the sheer number of deployments both with, and without a tactical operator. Northland had the greatest proportion of Events attended with a tactical operator at 80%. Waikato had closer to a 50/50 split, and this is likely explained due to the emergence of TDTs, and the time taken for the district and workforce management to acclimatise to this new system.

149. When operating with an operator all PoC district dog handlers attended greater proportions of proactive CARD Events[5] (**Table 7.24**) than when they were unaccompanied. The largest proportional increase was seen in Northland at 11% followed by 10% in Central, and 9% in Waikato. This difference may indicate that TDTs are participating in more pre-planned CARD Events than when the handler lacks an operator. Each district saw an increase in their attendances at 3T Events when paired with a tactical operator (no data shown). This difference was particularly apparent within Waikato. Upon further interrogation of Waikato data, it does not appear that this increase has occurred at a particular time, as the proportion of night-time and daytime 3Ts is relatively similar. Northland saw a notable increase in their proportion of 2Ws with a tactical operator.

Table 7.24: Percent CARD Events attended by TDT dog handlers with TRM or BAU (DPT) callsigns that were proactive versus reactive

Deployment callsign	Northland (n=537)	Waikato (n=852)	Central (n=6,941)	All PoCs (n=8,330)
TRM	**80% (n=429)**	**44% (n=373)**	**67% (n=4,649)**	**65% (n=5,451)**
Proactive	58%	50%	74%	72%
Reactive	42%	50%	26%	28%
BAU	**20% (n=108)**	**56% (n=479)**	**33% (n=2,292)**	**35% (n=2,879)**
Proactive	47%	41%	64%	60%
Reactive	53%	59%	36%	40%

Implementation of risk-based deployment

150. Risk-based deployment processes had the longest lead in time with the last of the processes being daily staff safety briefing and rural deployments being implemented in February in Northland and Central District. Although all districts implemented Tasking and Coordination processes in December to support the deployment of the TPTs and TDTs there was a "bedding in" period of a couple of months for these to become fully operational.

Tactical intelligence

151. Tactical intelligence teams were implemented in PoC districts in December 2022 with interim roles being set up first and staff being appointed into permanent roles in early 2022. TacInt teams were stood up in each of the PoC districts with two analysts per district, reporting to a central supervisor. Their function was to scan intelligence sources to identify 'persons of interest' (POIs) that potentially pose a risk to police

[4] Data for Waikato only applies to the period post 15 April 2022 when TDTs became active in that district.

[5] Proactive Events: Dispatch Event Type = 3–(Prevention Activities) or 4–(Other Duties) or 2O/2S/2T/2U/2W (Warrants/Summons) or Call Source = POLICE or OFFICER or RADIO or STA. Reactive Events: Dispatch Event Type = All others not listed.

safety, to assess their risk and to prioritise POIs assessed as highest risk for tasking of TPTs. TacInt provided support to TPTs by way of various intelligence products that provided information about POIs, their risk, and other threats to safety that could be present at a given deployment. TacInt appears to have largely operated as intended in terms of these processes and products. This conclusion is also supported by the implementation findings for the TPTs, given their pre-planned activities are driven by those of TacInt.

Tactical intelligence team (TacInt) assessment of Persons of Interest (POIs)

152. Several tools were developed to support TacInt in assessing the risk of POIs. The Staff Safety Persons of Interest (SSPOI) tool applies a machine learning model to individuals in the National Intelligence Application (NIA) to predict their probability of harming police based on variables such as the number, frequency, and seriousness of charges against them recorded in NIA.

153. Supplementing the SSPOI, the EBPC created a risk prioritisation matrix at TacInt's request to provide a structured means to score POIs on a range of additional indicators. These indicators were designed to capture and predict POIs' capability, intent, and opportunity to commit harm against Police, such as serious assault, or use of firearms. The matrix included points such as whether there was credible intelligence that POIs had access to firearms, and whether they had committed specific types of relevant offences recently (e.g., assaulting police). TacInt used these tools and their professional judgment based on training and experience to determine which POIs to prioritise for TPT tasking.

154. TacInt identified and assessed the risk of a large number of POIs during the evaluation period. The numbers of POIs assessed (as recorded in the risk prioritisation matrix) in each PoC district were: Northland 242, Counties Manukau 217, Waikato 195, and Central 177 (total: 831). The numbers of recorded assessments in each district are likely to be underestimated due to data discrepancies (see **Appendix B** for further detail about this data). On average, each TacInt team assessed 30 to 40 POIs per month.

155. Qualitatively, TacInt were confident in their ability to identify risk and felt they were contributing to the district's perceptions of risk and subsequent decision-making.

> *"As far as identifying risk I think, yeah, we are way more over it than what we ever have been. And yeah, you've, I mean, nothing's ever perfect, but yeah, I, I think we, we've got quite high level of confidence in our ability to identify the risk and use the tools to do it."*

156. In interviews and focus groups TacInt reported that the assessment processes were mostly working, but that some tools they rely on to identify and assess risk may not be working as well as intended. The SSPOI was seen as needing improvement regarding its scope and reliability to use consistently moving forward. TacInt were also not always able to identify high-risk offenders' current addresses based on the information in NIA, indicating the need for improved feedback loops with frontline and investigations staff.

> *"For us though, I think our scope is just that little bit wider and, you know, we're looking at people that are also, just pose risks in other ways as well, which I think it [the SSPOI] doesn't quite capture. So, we have, there's obviously some overlap, but we are looking at probably a more larger pool of people that pose risk in other ways."*

TacInt intelligence products and tasking submissions

157. **Table 7.25** shows the number of Persons of Interest (POIs) actioned by TacInt in various ways, according to POI tracker data provided by TacInt (see **Appendix B** for further detail about this data). Some POIs were actioned in multiple ways during the PoC period. Given each TacInt team assessed around 200 POIs on average, the numbers actioned confirm that only a portion (about a quarter) of assessed POIs were assessed as high enough risk to action, given TPT capacity.

Table 7.25: Number of POIs actioned by TacInt by way of intelligence products and tasking submissions

Action	Northland	Counties Manukau	Waikato	Central	All PoCs
Daily briefing	70	24	73	73	272
Weekly T&C	91	65	66	50	169
Ground brief	37	46	53	33	187
Alternative tasking	67	34	43	43	240

158. TacInt reported in interviews and focus groups that their intelligence products are typically of high quality, which is supported by sentiment from TPTs.

TacInt support of intelligence led deployments

159. A lot of the value TacInt perceived they were providing was based on positive relationships and feedback, stressing the importance of feedback loops for the analysts and their work.

"Like your success in this role is, in my opinion, really built on the strength of your relationships. I think just having that, like initially having that additional access to information in those conversations with staff who have actually dealt with the offenders, that really helped informed my assessments about their demeanour and how they're likely to interact with staff. And most of the time that doesn't go into NIA, you actually have to get out and talk to people about that sort of thing…"

160. In the second set of interviews and focus groups with staff, TDTs who worked in areas with TPTs mentioned that they saw the benefits of TacInt through their relationships with TPTs.

161. Generally, TacInt spoke positively about their relationship with TPTs and desired co-location moving forward. Co-location of the analysts with TPTs was seen to enhance the relationship and value that TacInt could provide. Co-location of the analysts with the district intelligence team was also seen to have benefits in terms of their relationship. However, the latter were heavily outweighed by the benefits of sitting with the tactical team.

"Being able to have those immediate, short, sharp conversations. We can actually, I feel, add value even for really simple things, but for the guys that sorry, the operators, as they're walking out the door, they're kitting up and they're going to a job with, that they know nothing about, they don't have time to be looking up NIA or looking on maps or whatever. And it's the things that we can do to help them, even if it's just a minute or two of information that we can provide them so that they're better suited as they're walking out the door."

162. Good working relationships were seen as conducive to success within the TacInt role. Where there is a lack of visibility and understanding of TacInt it ultimately limits the value they can provide.

"Like your success in this role is, in my opinion, really built on the strength of your relationships. I think just having that, like initially having that additional access to information in those conversations with staff who have actually dealt with the offenders, that really helped informed my assessments about their demeanour and how they're likely to interact with staff. And most of the time that doesn't go into NIA, you actually have to get out and talk to people about that sort of thing…"

163. Most, but not all, TacInt analysts enjoyed their current role and many experienced increased feelings of gratification and value because of the way their work was received by TPTs and other workgroups.

"I feel positive about it. It's one of the best jobs that I've done in the police. I, I feel as if there's value placed on the work that we're doing and the work that you come, you come to work. I, I love it."

POIs TacInt assessed as higher risk were more likely to be actioned

164. To measure whether the assessed POIs who were actioned were indeed those of higher risk (in line with risk-based deployment), we analysed the relationship between a POI's risk score, and the likelihood that they would appear on the POI tracker as having been actioned. The results confirm that in almost all the PoC districts—with the exclusion of Central District—POIs assessed as higher risk were much more likely than those assessed as lower risk to be the subject of a daily briefing or put forward at the weekly T&C meeting (see Table B2 in **Appendix B** for detail).

165. In Central, risk matrix scores were not associated with a POI being actioned. Central's results likely reflect that they were using the POI tracker differently to the other districts. The Evaluation team were informed that their tracker was used to track not just staff safety risk POIs for TRM purposes but also general high-risk offenders, and it is possible that 'alternative taskings' included not only TPT taskings but taskings of low staff safety risk but high general risk offenders to other teams. The team were also informed that in Central, taskings were more focused on lower (but still high-risk) risk offenders who were easier to locate due to a lack of investigations support.

166. TacInt's role in risk-based deployment can also been seen through the data for TPTs. TacInt was designed to enable proactive deployment; their impact is clearly reflected in the high percentage of TPT deployments that were pre-planned (see **Table 7.7**). These findings about the links between TacInt and TPT deployments reinforce how the TRM operates as a system to deliver its intended outcomes.

Barriers to implementation

167. TacInt reported qualitatively in interviews and focus groups that they use a thorough risk assessment process to prioritise offenders. However, at times they were frustrated when they were instructed to prioritise individuals as high-risk offenders (HROs) when they did not meet the high-risk threshold based on their assessment tools. This issue may indicate that the information feedback loops that TacInt require are not always working as well as they should.

"….you know, someone who you put them through the process, they don't meet the threshold, but because someone higher up is saying they should be targeted. And then they end up going in anyway, kind of defeats the purpose, you know, like why, why have that whole A through Z process if it's who's being looked at is dictated by, by someone else anyway."

168. TacInt's effectiveness is contingent on accurate intelligence being accessible to them within police systems, and on there being investigative capability to fill identified intelligence gaps. TacInt's products are created with intelligence generated largely from police systems and therefore are reliant on accurate information submitted by officers during their BAU through intelligence feedback loops. At times, as reported in interviews and focus groups, there have been difficulties in locating HROs due to discrepancies between their recorded and actual location. TacInt are concerned that intelligence is not being recorded and they are therefore creating product based on out of date, or not credible, information. TacInt staff perceive that these instances hurt their credibility with parts of the business.

169. It was also clear from interviews and focus groups with staff that when TPTs lacked adequate investigation support they had a larger focus on lower risk offenders. This focus led analysts to feel frustrated for prioritising 'lower hanging fruit' and wasting resource.

"We're just picking up the low hanging fruit at the moment. The highest risk offenders are all still outstanding because we don't have the investigative resources to go and target them."

Tasking and Coordination

170. A weekly Tasking and Coordination (T&C) meeting was established in each of the PoC districts. Its purpose was to turn the work of the TacInt staff into actionable tasks for assignment to tactical teams or other workgroups, based on the risk assessments from TacInt.

171. EBPC staff had the opportunity to attend T&C meetings in three out of four districts while conducting district observations. The observation findings suggest the T&C processes were operating as intended, with the process typically proceeding as follows.

172. The meetings were typically chaired by the TOM (and in some cases the TOC) and included various stakeholders such as the TO/TOC, TacInt, and TPT Leader, as well as stakeholders that were likely to own further taskings, such as investigations managers and prevention managers. The meetings were intended to be cyclical in nature, with TacInt and TOC leading the presentation of HRO's. They first examine the previous week's plan and achievements to see what still needed to be actioned and considered, before moving on to newly identified risks and proposed actions. The risk assessed HROs and proposed activities were discussed with the group and once a decision was made, the HRO was allocated to an investigative team for follow-up (external to the T&C, once any further investigation was done, investigative teams could coordinate with the TOC for TPT resources to assist in actioning an HRO warrant). Once the presentation from TacInt was completed there was an opportunity, where relevant, for investigative staff to ask for TPT resource for other (non HRO) warrants where they felt additional assistance was needed. Separate from the T&C the TOC would draw up a deployment plan that outlined the planned activities for the coming week of tactical team activity (see TRM leadership roles below). Those plans were forwarded to the DCC so that they were aware of where tactical groups were operating.

173. Like other elements of the risk-based deployment pillar, T&C can be inferred to be functioning correctly based on both what was observed, and by the successful implementation of TPTs, whose (high level of) pre-planned activities were determined by this TRM component.

TRM leadership roles

174. No distinct evaluation was undertaken of the TOC and TOM roles; however, it was observed that there was variation in both the appointment, and intention, of these two positions across PoC districts. Not all PoC districts had staff fulfilling both TOM and TOC roles. Visits to districts, from EBPC staff, where both roles were filled allowed for additional insight as to the differences between the TOM and TOC, and how they work together.

175. The TOM role sits at commissioned officer level; it is a portfolio role undertaken along with other portfolio roles and the officer's regular duties. The TOM leads the strategy for the TRM team's future in the district, seeks buy-in, support and resourcing for all TRM teams from district leaders, and reports back about the team's ongoing work. The TOM is essentially a conduit between the Area Leadership Teams/District Leadership Teams/Police National Headquarters, decision-makers, and those in district with roles that relate to the TRM. The TOM often runs the weekly T&C process for the TRM.

176. The TOC is a senior sergeant level leadership and coordination role in the TRM. EBPC observed that the TOC works closely with the TOM, and is responsible for the short to medium term activities of the TRM specialist capability teams (TPT and TDT). Practically, the role covers all TPT tasking, and the occasions when TDTs carry out prevention work—which is coordinated with the dog team sergeant. The TOC organises the team priorities and deployment plan from tasks assigned at the T&C and requests from other teams for assistance (typically from investigative teams for assistance with warrants), and delivers team taskings. The TOC also runs the weekly T&C process for the TRM, in some cases, when the TOC isn't undertaking that role. The role is full-time, and involves a considerable amount of liaising between TacInt, TOM, TPTs, TDTs, dog team sergeants and investigations teams, among others.

177. Further, the TRM leadership roles have working relationships with numerous workgroups within district who all contribute to the overall implementation and operation of the model. Workgroups include (but are not limited to): dog section, the Royal New Zealand Police College (RNZPC), district intelligence, criminal investigations branch (CIB), prevention and AOS. These relationships allow for greater understanding of the importance of the TOM and TOC roles and of how best to implement these roles moving forward within different district settings and organisational structure.

24/7 DCC support and double crewing

178. 24/7 DCC and double crewing after 2100 were only a change to BAU in Northland and Central. Waikato were already operating with a 24/7 DCC and double crewing in the evenings prior to the evaluation. Counties Manukau already had a 24/7 DCC, but not double crewing, capability as part of the Tāmaki Makaurau model.

DCC and rural support

179. Under the TRM, DCC have an enhanced responsibility as decision-makers, as well as providing risk mitigation in rural deployments and high-risk deployments. Data indicate that the DCC have been acting in a way that will enhance safety for rural officers. Administrative data collected by TRM project staff for monitoring purposes show that 331 rural deployments (call-outs) were approved by DCC in the PoC period in Waikato, Central and Northland Districts (Counties Manukau do not have a rural area as defined by the TRM). Every deployment is risk assessed between the DCC and relevant staff. The outcomes of these assessments have included deploying a second member to attend double crewed and finding an alternative resource to manage the call for service. During this time 64 (19%) were correctly declined by DCC (as reported by TRM project staff), who generally found alternative ways to resolve the event. Declined deployments indicate a decision taken to prioritise the safety or wellbeing of the staff member being deployed, rather than a lack of action taken.

180. However, qualitative data highlight a disconnect between DCC and rural staff. DCC reported that they felt they were doing a good job of supporting rural staff, and attributed this improvement to the national guidelines of the TRM, but rural staff generally did not notice any changes in the support that was offered.

DCC and DaS/SAM compliance

181. The DCC coordinators were tasked with checking Deployment and Safety (DaS) log on compliance through a system called 'actual strength'. Results were recorded in each 24hr DCC report; these were provided to TRM project staff for monitoring purposes.

182. The Deployment and Safety (DaS) is a critical safety tool that provides the current GPS location of active officers—vital information, should they require assistance. DaS is an application on Police issued iPhones. When police officers commence duty and log onto the dispatch app, 'Responder', they are automatically logged onto DaS. The Situational Awareness Map (SAM) application uses DaS data to display logged on officers' current locations on a map, enabling rapid identification of nearby staff if needed. Recent upgrades also display the Event Type staff are deployed to and highlight higher risk activities such as vehicle stops. The DCC actively monitor and report on compliance of DaS logon and take corrective action as required.

183. DaS compliance statistics provided by TRM project staff show compliance varied between 40% and 75% with a mean of 60% for Waikato, Central District and Northland prior to the PoC. Counties Manukau had been monitoring DaS logon for approximately 3 years and already had a high compliance rate. Under the TRM DCCs were able to achieve 100% compliance from frontline units by notifying units that were not logged on. In February and March 2022 (excluding Counties) the DCC had to take action to achieve compliance in approximately 33% of the shifts. By May this had dropped to 12% of shifts. The need for intervention continued to decrease in the three districts.

DCC and optimum staffing levels

184. Optimum Staffing Levels (OSL) is a target number of staff that balances sufficient staff to tackle demand while managing abstractions. As part of the TRM, the DCCs were active in balancing staffing deficiencies to spread the risk across the district. Monitoring these numbers ensures no individual area in a district is managing staffing risks alone. The DCC is authorised to move on duty staff across the district to achieve this target number. According to figures provided by TRM project staff, at the commencement of the TRM 33% of shifts were deployed below OSL. Major operations and COVID-19 affected the districts' ability to maintain OSL during the TRM trial. Nonetheless, by May this had dropped to 17%, indicating some success of the DCCs in improving staffing levels to reduce risk (though we have no comparison data for other districts to firmly attribute this improvement to the PoC DCCs' activities).

Barriers to DCC implementation

185. Because TPTs cannot self-deploy, the mechanism for redeployment to emergency deployments sits with the DCC. Qualitative reporting from interviews and focus groups suggests that some TPT members did not understand rationale for the approval process for re-deployment sitting with the DCC and thought that it takes too much time and does not run smoothly. This belief was largely due to what TPTs perceived to be a lack of tactical experience in the DCC, inability to monitor all radio and job traffic, and the comparative tactical experience of the TOC and team leaders on squads. TPTs felt others who are either more tactically experienced, or have greater awareness of the jobs in district, may be better placed to make those decisions. Teams recommended the emergency communication centres, TOC, AOS incident commander, or the team leaders themselves.

"When you're trying to get to an emergency job, you don't want to take the time to try and contact people … but I've got a call directly from the senior sergeant on the ground and went direct to, and then asked for the permission after the fact. Cause trying to do it when you're there, on the way there and actually planning for it become quite time consuming and unnecessarily bureaucratic."

"I don't think [the DCC] quite know how to effectively utilise us. Or they're not sort of picking up the cues of when we may be required and what kind of jobs. Whether that's the lack of them actually listening to the radio or of lack of their knowledge. I, I don't know. There's definitely some that better than others, but there's still a lot of work that can be done there I believe."

186. Some staff also reported that the DCC lacked adequate communication as to whether backup was coming or not. On a different issue, poor visibility of the DCC led many rural officers to be unaware of any changes to DCC.

Double crewing and times of staff risk

187. Although the intent of the TPTs is for deployment to be largely pre-planned supported through tasking and coordination, TPTs can be redeployed through DCC for emergency response when added tactical capability is required. The evaluation therefore considered whether the double crewing times, *as well as* rostered TPT shifts corresponded to times of high-risk to staff.

188. This analysis showed nationally that double crewing times and the hours TPTs are rostered coincide with the hours in which roughly half of reactive/emergency Events that indicate risk to staff safety (assault on police, firearm use, or having resulted in AOS deployment), and three-quarters of Events where firearms were used against police (see **Appendix B** for methodological detail and full results). Assaults on police are much more concentrated on weekend nights than weeknights, but firearms Events are comparatively more evenly spread between weekdays and weekends and across the day. Although the purpose of TPTs is not primarily availability for these Events, and double crewing occurs during times of less backup availability, the current rosters do leave some higher risk gaps in rostering. However, TDTs who perform the largely response-based function can be rostered to bridge any gaps, and the impact on feelings of safety from double crewing at night is not quantifiable but likely significant.

To what extent is the TRM system operating as intended?

189. This section draws together our findings in relation to the above overarching evaluation question. Overall, despite model variations within the PoC districts, process data indicates the TRM was largely implemented and operated as intended.

190. In terms of training, the intention and lesson plans of FSED were largely implemented as intended. Districts varied in the way the FSED days were constructed and administered. This variation was mainly seen in terms of the number of coaches, training venues, training equipment and the number of participants at each session.

191. Regarding specialist capability, TPTs were implemented as intended with a focus on high-risk prevention activities including those HROs that are a threat to officers and are causing harm in the community. TPT deployments were mostly pre-planned (75%) and TPT deployment and TacInt data both point towards these activities centring on HROs with a focus on firearms, methamphetamine, and organised crime. Deployments tended to supported investigation work as intended by the model, with TPTs most frequently providing a tactical support role upon deployment.

192. The way the TRM was implemented was amended over the course of the trial, with adjustments often made to better deliver on the TRM's intent. As a case study, as Waikato embedded the TRM and more clearly understood it's intent, the District altered its model to better fit the prevention focus of the TPT. In April, Waikato went from trying to operate three TPTs in three different areas, to one centralised, and investigation oriented/supported, TPT. Appropriately, this change resulted in more proactive work, overall deployments (due to transitioning to 1 team) reduced but there were a larger proportion of proactive CARD Events each month, in line with the intent of the TRM (Figure 7.1). Not only did the streamlined approach with investigations support enable Waikato to operate as intended, but the Waikato team also perceived the change as a big improvement in terms of staffing/resourcing and investigative support.

Figure 7.1: Percent of Waikato TPT attended CARD Events that were proactive versus reactive



"Oh, a massive difference [co-location and having an investigation team]. Yep. It's really good having a focused investigation team behind us to keep us on top of the work. We were trying to do both at one point, trying to get the TPTs to do our own investigations, to find people and then actually plan the operations to, to go and get them. It's much better having the investigation team behind us, feeding us the information so all we have to focus on is going and arresting these targets"

193. TDT pairings occurred within Central, Northland, and Waikato and served a largely response-based function as intended. This role is much the same as a regular dog team, but with increased capability. There was more limited TDT coverage in Northland and Waikato. Central operated with significantly larger numbers of TDTs but initially during the PoC the pairings and rostering were run inconsistently across

areas within Central, which was met with frustration and difficulty at the time. Implementation differences have changed the focus of effort of each PoC district in its TDT activities.

194. Tactical Intelligence (TacInt) teams were stood up in all PoC districts, supporting Tasking and Coordination (T&C) processes as intended. TacInt assessed the risk of hundreds of potential HROs and nominated those assessed as higher risk through the T&C process. Findings for TPTs above can be read as evidence of successful implementation of these risk-based processes that inform their deployment. These processes were supported by the implementation of new TRM leadership roles in the form of Tactical Operations Managers and Tactical Operations Coordinators.

195. 24/7 DCC was only a change to BAU in two of the PoC districts and double crewing after 2100 hours in three. These components appear to have operated as intended, though the benefits of DCC support are not as visible to rural staff as urban.

8. Findings: pathways to safety

196. The evaluation assessed the success of the TRM in contributing to its intended outcomes by examining **HOW** each pillar of the TRM (e.g., training, TPTs), through specific pathways (causal mechanisms), may have led to staff and communities feeling safer and being safer. These pathways trace logically from TRM activities (e.g., training), to pillar level impacts and outcomes (e.g., improved decision-making), to system wide outcomes (e.g., improved safety). Evidence of these pathways supports our ability to attribute any improvement in outcomes in the PoC districts—at least in part—to the TRM, and to draw conclusions about likely outcomes where it is too early for the outcomes to show in the available data.

197. This section first describes, for each of the TRM pillars, how, and how well, they are moving toward the safety outcomes intended. In any areas where the pathway is not yet supported by evidence of implementation, we are unlikely to see that pathway lead to safety outcomes. For each pillar, considering both the implementation and impact/outcome findings, we also suggest ways to optimise the pillar to make the intended outcomes more likely. Although within the TRM system multiple pillars are designed to affect the same outcomes, we present findings according to the most plausible pathways operating at the point of evaluation, based on the data available at this point. As noted previously, although pillars are considered in isolation, their impacts and outcomes do speak on some level of the system functioning a whole, due to the interrelatedness of the pillars. We then present findings that speak to the TRM as a system—rather than any component in isolation.

Training

198. FSED training aimed to provide an uplift in frontline's skills, capability, and tactical decision-making leading to increased safety and feelings of safety for frontline through improved section cohesion, improved confidence, and better preparedness. Participants are taught how to understand the cognitive load of high-risk situations and strategies to make better tactical decisions while in a heightened state of arousal. As noted in the literature review (section 5), this content should provide officers with a repertoire of stress management skills and mitigate for the detrimental impacts of feeling unsafe (Robson & Manacapilli, 2014). In the long-term, better policing through training should improve community safety and feelings of safety.

> *"I believe it is the right thing for Police right now, it builds the capability of our frontline and has grown our ability to make better and safer decisions which of everything in TRM will keep our people the safest."*

199. Scenario-based training is argued to be one of the most effective training methodologies to promote officers' preparation to engage in high-risk, (potentially) dangerous encounters (Preddy, 2018). Such training is particularly important for use of force encounters, given the low rate at which use of force encounters occur in real life, allowing trainees to make mistakes and learn in a safe environment, and to reflect upon their performance (Bennell et al., 2021; Hine et al., 2018). Although rare events, frontline officers must be prepared to deal with situations in which the 'worst-case scenario' does eventuate, and relatively regular police activities, such as vehicle stops and domestic disputes, may escalate into a dangerous situation at any moment (Zimmerman, 2006).

200. Overall FSED was perceived as very good training, with FSED Day 2 being considered more enjoyable and practical. Coaches in the focus groups believed that FSED is transferrable to practice and effective in enhancing skills in trainees. They considered that the training was paying off and being used in practice by the trainees, and that officers were using skills learned, particularly during FSED Day 2, in both day-to-day and tactical jobs.

201. Coaches also considered the training effective in terms of skill progression witnessed in trainees. Skill progression areas included specific skills such as the Appreciation Process (AFCO—situational awareness) and Ground Situation Mission Execution briefings (GSME—ground briefings), and also awareness and use of different tactics that could be used depending on the situation, including flexibility in relation to these tactics.

Training improves feelings of confidence, competence and safety

202. Through the FSED reaction survey, staff attending the FSED training reported feeling more confident and safer as a result of the training. Further, participants in the second set of interviews and focus groups with staff involved in or impacted by the TRM indicated that most frontline staff feel safer and more confident than before the TRM. They feel this way because they have gained more skills in approaching their jobs safely through the training, and they are now regularly working on teams with others who have received the same training.

203. Some staff specifically indicated in the training survey open ended questions that they felt they were more confident in themselves and others, and able to reduce risk, through their attendance at FSED Day 1 and Day 2.

"Although role playing scenarios etc are very much out of my comfort zone, I recognise that running through the high-risk vehicle stop scenarios opened my mind up to how I can train my mind to think about TENR, safety and how to put some of my tactical training to work."

204. Quantitative data from the training reaction surveys backs up these assertions. **Table 8.1** shows that the great majority of participants perceived FSED Day 1 training to positively influence their understanding and competence in tactical safety skills, with agreement in participants varying from 95.1% (*Competence to execute tactical responses*) to 79.9% (*Improved feelings of safety*). Of note, 5.8% of participants disagreed and 14.3% neither agreed nor disagreed that FSED Day 1 training had improved their feelings of safety. Although this figure is not high, within the context of the other results it does appear anomalous. This finding speaks to FSED evaluation question 3—Does the FSED make frontline officers feel safer and more confident than officers who did not receive the FSED?

Table 8.1: Percent of answers to statements focusing on general perceived effects in the FSED Day 1 survey per scale-point

FSED Day 1 statements	Agree[a]	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree[b]
General perceived effects			
Competence to execute tactical responses	95.1%	3.4%	1.5%
Competence to plan tactical responses	94.2%	4.9%	0.9%
Understanding of how to keep others safe	93.9%	4.6%	1.5%
Improved tactical skills	93.3%	4.9%	1.8%
Competence when making decision under pressure	91.5%	6.4%	2.1%
Competence to make safer decisions at work	89.3%	9.1%	1.5%
Improved feelings of safety	79.9%	14.3%	5.8%

[a] 'Strongly agree' and 'agree' were grouped under 'agree'.

[b] 'Strongly disagree' and 'disagree' were grouped under 'disagree'.

205. The pattern of responses to the statements in the FSED Day 2 survey is similar to the pattern of responses to the statements in the FSED Day 1 survey. **Table 8.2** shows that the absolute majority of participants agreed that attending FSED Day 2 training positively influence their understanding and competence in tactical safety skills. The agreement in participants with statements related to the FSED Day 2 training varied from 98.1% (*Understanding of how to keep others safe*) to 84.0% (*Improved feelings of safety*). Similarly to the corresponding statement in relation to FSED Day 1 training, 3.0% of participants disagreed and 13.1% neither agreed nor disagreed that FSED Day 2 training had improved their feelings of safety.

Table 8.2: Percent of answers to statements focusing general perceived effects in the FSED Day 2 survey per scale-point

FSED Day 2 statements	Agree[a]	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree[b]
General perceived effects			
Understanding of how to keep others safe	98.1%	0.4%	1.5%
Improved tactical skills	97.4%	1.1%	1.5%
Competence to execute tactical responses	97.0%	1.9%	1.1%
Competence to plan tactical responses	96.3%	2.6%	1.1%
Competence to make safer decisions at work	92.9%	6.0%	1.1%
Competence when making decision under pressure	92.5%	6.0%	1.5%
Improved feelings of safety	84.0%	13.1%	3.0%

[a] 'Strongly agree' and 'agree' were grouped under 'agree'.

[b] 'Strongly disagree' and 'disagree' were grouped under 'disagree'.

206. The absolute majority of participants perceived that they were more confident when applying HRV (FSED Day 1), TRO (FSED Day 2) and CRT (FSED Day 2) skills after FSED training, with agreement with related statements varying from 97.4% (*Confidence in demonstrating a vehicle mounted TRO*) to 89.6% (*Competence to lead a building clearance*). Of note, a smaller percentage of participants (78.0%) agreed with the statement *Confidence in demonstrating arrest drills* (as per CRT lesson plan), with 19.4% of participants neither agreeing nor disagreeing with this statement. Most participants also agreed that they had increased their competence and confidence when addressing cognitively heavy situations (FSED Day 1), with agreement with related statements varying from 87.2% (*Confidence in demonstrating breathing techniques*) to 76.8% (*Confidence in explaining and discussing the SEB cycle*).

207. Considering confidence in conducting TENR and applying the GSMEAC tool and AFCO, the vast majority of participants agreed they had increased confidence in their skills, with agreement with related statements varying from 94.2% (*Confidence in applying TENR in loaded events* as per FSED Day 1 survey) to 84.0% (*Confidence in applying the GSMEAC tool* as per FSED Day 2 survey). Likewise, staff reported qualitatively in FSED surveys that the FSED training has resulted, or would result, in better decision-making.

208. The training was perceived as having the most benefit for routine events where staff are more able to put training into practice. In particular, there was a perceived enhancement in safety and skills for planned events.

209. Comparisons of the frontline safety survey responses by the level of training respondents had received provide further insight into how FSED impacts feelings of safety. Analysis showed that responses differed by level of training for eight of nine questions analysed. Comparisons between respondents who had received FSED training (Day 1, Day 2, or FSED Day 1 or 2 as well as FSEC training) and those who had not (PITT or FSEC only) generally showed FSED-trained staff to have more positive feelings of confidence and safety.

What do the numbers mean?

Dunn's pairwise z test statistic (Z)

This statistic indicates how different the responses of people who attended FSED training were to people who had not attended FSED training (e.g., PITT or FSEC only). The bigger the statistic, the bigger the difference between these groups.

P-values

P-values indicate the probability that we would see the result by chance, with small p-values indicating a low probability that the result is due to chance and high probability that the result is a real effect. P-values less than 0.05 are treated as statistically significant. All results reported here meet statistical significance of $p<0.05$.

210. In terms of **confidence**, people who had attended both FSEC and FSED Day 1 felt significantly more *confident performing their duties* than those who had attended PITT, FSEC, or FSED as standalone trainings ($Z=109.8$; 94.8; 155.4 (all $p<0.05$) respectively). People who had attended FSED Day 1, or both FSEC and FSED Day 2, were significantly more likely than those who only had PITT training to agree that their *tactical safety training made them feel confident in their duties* ($Z=107.0$; 166.0 (all $p<0.05$) respectively) and to *feel confident in a high risk 3T* ($Z=78.0$; 163.9 (all $p<0.05$) respectively). People who had attended both FSEC and FSED Day 1 were significantly more likely *to feel confident in a high risk 3T* than people who had attended PITT, FSEC, or FSED Day 2 as standalone trainings ($Z=210.5$; 100.7; 132.5, (all $p<0.05$) respectively).

211. In terms of feeling **enabled to make decisions that resulted in safe outcomes**, people who had attended FSED Day 2, or both FSEC and FSED Day 2, were significantly more likely than those who had only PITT to agree that *their tactical safety training made them feel enabled to make safe decisions* ($Z=114.1$; 171.9 (all $p<0.05$) respectively). People who had attended both FSEC and FSED Day 2 were also more likely than those who had only PITT to *feel enabled to make safe decisions in a high risk 3T* ($Z=151.6$, $p<0.05$) Similar to the confidence results, people who had attended both FSEC and FSED Day 1 were significantly more likely to *feel enabled to make safe decisions in a high risk 3T* than people who had attended FSED Day 1 or 2 only ($Z=22.0$; 125.2 (all $p<0.05$) respectively). The combination of FSED and FSEC therefore appears to be particularly helpful in relation to high-risk 3Ts.

212. In terms of **safety**, people who had attended both FSEC and FSED Day 1 were likewise significantly more likely to *feel safe during high risk 3Ts* than people who had attended PITT or FSED Day 2 ($Z=125.0$; 153.8, (all $p<0.05$) respectively). However, those who had attended FSED Day 1 or 2, or both FSEC and FSED Day 2 were **less** likely than those who had only received PITT to agree that *they felt safe in their duties in general* ($Z=55.1$; 90.0; 84.8 (all $p<0.05$) respectively). This result could mean that, as an unintended consequence, the FSED training highlighted some of the safety risks that staff may face, which may have a flow on effect to wellbeing for a few staff. The training surveys free text may support this, with a small number of participants indicating that after the training they did not feel that they, or those they work

with, would be confident enough to apply the training in a real-world situation. To some degree this indicated learning about the effects of stress in high pressure situations, which contributed to some feeling self-doubt that they could handle these situations in the way they might have previously expected to.

"(not) remembering your new skills in high pressure situations when your heart rate is up and you get tunnel vision"

213. This insight speaks to the literature review earlier in this report which notes that scenario-based training may make trainees think that the incidence of 'worst-case' situations is far more frequent than it is. However, the literature review also suggests that training can be used to improve wellbeing by emphasising stress management skills and reassurance messaging.

214. Overall, in the training survey free text, staff reported feeling more confident and safer having attended the course. Staff also indicated in the interviews and focus groups that they felt more confident in themselves and others, and able to reduce risk through their attendance at the training. However, there were some responses that indicated that the training may not have as strong an impact on feelings of safety during BAU operations.

215. Training participants identified two possible barriers to applying their learning in their BAU role. These were working with staff who have not yet completed the training and working with staff who had not been identified as the main audience for training. There were calls for the training to be expanded to include groups not currently receiving training to ensure training equivalence to improve safety and confidence.

"Those that are currently still not trained at the same level will halt further development"

"Not sure why CIB roles are not considered for this training as CIB attend the most high-risk search warrants"

216. In addition, in the FSED Day 2 survey, a number of participants also identified that there may, on occasion, be staff they work with that are not attending the training as they have not been identified as the main audience.

"Not everyone having been taught it. I think this training should be for all level 1 responders not just frontline, as quite often we have other workgroups helping fill gaps on frontline."

Training may improve officer decision-making and safety

217. Other evidence of training impacts on decision-making and outcomes for officer safety came through analysis of existing police administrative data. FSED training covered slow thinking and better risk assessment, cognitive reactions, and practice with tactical options to increase confidence in their use to enable a wider range of choices. Therefore, FSED training should reduce use of force (and complaints about use of force) through improving officers' decision-making and use of tactical options in situations posing a risk to their safety. In turn, these improvements in use of force decisions should reduce assaults on police in situations posing a risk to their safety.[6]

[6] In the long term the TRM should reduce assaults on police by improving proactively prioritising and reducing risk from offenders at high-risk of assaulting police, however at the point of evaluation the most plausible pathway to assault on police outcomes is through the FSED training element of the TRM.

218. Statistical analyses of several measures of use of force decision-making generally point towards positive effects of the TRM, though these effects were not seen in every PoC district for every measure. We place more weight on the results seen for all PoCs in combination than specific districts. In attributing effects to the TRM, we also place more weight on effects—differences between the trend line for the PoC districts and a prediction of what would have occurred without the TRM—that are consistent over the six months of the PoC period, rather than limited to one or two months of large fluctuations (see Figure B.4 in **Appendix B** for an illustration of this). See Table C.1 in **Appendix C** for the full results for all measures reported in this section, **Appendix B** for details of the methods used to produce and interpret these statistics, and **Technical Appendix D** for the measures' data dictionaries.

219. Considering all PoC districts combined, the rate of Use of Force Events[7] was estimated as 17% lower—on average—than what we would expect had the TRM not been implemented. The '95% credible interval' around this 'average estimated effect' was minus 28% to minus 5%, meaning that 95% of the estimates produced by the statistical analysis fell within this range. Further, there was an over 95% probability of an effect, meaning that over 95% of the time the estimated effect was a reduction. These statistics tell us that the rate of Use of Force Events very probably reduced relative to expected without the TRM, by somewhere between minus 5% and minus 28% (most likely about -17%). This reduction reflects the cumulative difference between what was observed in the PoC districts and what was predicted without the TRM, over the six-month PoC period.

220. Analysis of specific types of Events attended by Police suggests that the above overall reduction is driven by reduced use of force at reactive calls for service, rather than during activities Police proactively do like searches, warrants and 3Ts. When analysing only reactive call-for-service Events, the average estimated effect was a 17% reduction in the rate of Use of Force Events (95% credible interval -36% to -2% and over 95% probability of a reduction). There was no effect when analysing only proactive Events. This finding suggests that the

What do the numbers mean?

Average estimated effect

The average of the distribution of possible effect values, as estimated by the statistical method used to compare what happened in the PoC districts with what was predicted to happen without the TRM. This effect (difference to expected without the TRM) is cumulative across the 6 months of the PoC period.

95% credible interval

The range within which 95% of possible effect values fall. The interval is based on the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles, meaning 2.5% of the estimates fall below the lower limit of the interval, and 2.5% of the estimates fall above the upper limit of the interval. If the credible interval includes 0, we cannot rule out the possibility that there is no effect.

Probability of an effect (reduction/increase)

Probabilities closer to 100% indicate a high probability of an effect (i.e., a reduction, or an increase, rather than a zero effect) being present, similar to the concept of 'statistical significance' where small p-values indicate a high likelihood of an effect.

[7] Rate per 10,000 relevant Events attended. "TOR CARD Events" means CARD Events with one or more linked tactical options reports (TORs), indicating the reportable use of force by one or more officers. "Relevant Events" means CARD Event Types to which TOR reports have been linked in the past.

improvement in use of force decision-making is more likely caused through frontline training rather than TPTs, given TPTs are focused on proactive activities.

221. Again, considering all PoC districts combined, there were fewer complaints about use of force by police than we would expect if the TRM had not been implemented. The average estimate was a 29% decrease with a credible interval of -60% to +3%: and 95% probability of a reduction[8]. This finding suggests that the public were more likely to perceive police tactics as appropriate—another indication of improved decision-making.

222. However, when examining specific PoC districts and types of use of force, the results are not as clear cut: the above effects were not found for every district, nor for every type of use of force. Counties Manukau and Central Districts appear to be driving the use of force measure results (see Table C.1 in **Appendix C** for detail), which may be because these districts had the highest number of staff going through FSED training during the trial (see section 7 for further information). Reductions in Use of Force Events were also only seen for empty hand (physical force with no weapon) tactics (-42% to +7%; >90% probability of a reduction in the number but not rate of these Events) and 'other' tactics[9] (-85% to +3%; >95% probability of a reduction in the rate of these Events). Further, we found no effect of the TRM on the number of tactical options used (on average), which suggests that the decision-making improvement relates to whether to use any force, rather than the number of tactical options used in Events where at least one option was used.

223. Given the above complexities, we cannot say that FSED training (or the TRM in general) improves use of force decision-making for officers in all districts and in all circumstances. But in triangulating across the measures and analyses rather than focusing on individual results in isolation, the picture is generally positive and does not suggest any unintended consequences of FSED training occurring (i.e., more use of force—a plausible alternative result of increasing confidence with tactical options).

224. The results of analysis of assaults on police outcome measures are consistent with the suggested improvement in use of force decision-making. Overall, considering all PoC districts combined, we found no effect of the TRM on assaults on police in general as recorded in NIA (using specific assault on law enforcement officer Offence codes). Nor was there an effect on the number of assaults on police resulting in injury recorded via Incident Reports submitted to HR. However, the *proportion* of assaults on police reported to HR that resulted in injury likely reduced (between -45% and +7%; >90% probability of a reduction), suggesting that if police were assaulted, they were less likely to be injured than expected without the TRM. Further, the rate of use of force Events where the subject of the force injured a police officer[10] likely reduced (-95% to 17%; >90% probability of a reduction).

225. At this point in time, therefore, any safety improvements from training appear to be largely limited to the context of use of force. This finding is consistent with both potential use of force scenarios being the focus of the FSED training, and the PoC only including the first wave of training. As training saturation increases, these improvements may generalise to other potential assault contexts. When considering

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[8] The interval including 0 means we cannot rule out the possibility of no effect, but the 95% probability means it is highly unlikely there was no effect or an increase.

[9] Of the 'other' tactics, most are handcuffs/restraints with pain compliance; the remainder are baton, 'other', weapon of opportunity, sponge round and riot shield.

[10] Rate of Tactical Options Report (TOR) CARD Events where police were injured by a subject, per 100 TOR CARD Events. "Police injured by a subject" means at least one officer received an injury caused by a subject, rather than self or other officer, as recorded in the TOR for the Event. "TOR CARD Events" means CARD Events with one or more linked Tactical Options Reports (TORs), indicating the reportable use of force by one or more officers.

specific districts and more general measures of assaults, the analyses showed few, and mixed, results so we cannot yet say whether the TRM reduces assault risk outside of this context (see Table C.1 in **Appendix C** for the full results for all assault on police measures). That said, there is no strong evidence of any unintended consequences to suggest that the TRM trial should be stopped or significantly altered due to safety risks, such as an increase in violence toward officers.

226. Qualitatively, staff raised that training cannot always be put into practice in high pressure situations and that PSTs may not apply the skills learned in training when they know a specialist tactical team is on route. The skills taught at the course, although highly valuable, were also perceived as being focused on rare events, such as high-risk vehicle stops, particularly for Day 1. Trainees were concerned about lack of opportunity to use the skills in a real event and to have the time to practise and refresh their skills in other ways. Lastly, there was also the sense that some of the skills/scenarios taught are not always relevant for "real world". Specific criticism revolved around not including 1-up scenarios common in rural policing.

"The skills we learnt are not often used in day to day policing and by the time I need to use them I will have possibly become rusty or slow in performing the skills and applying the knowledge used."

Training solidifies and improves team working

227. Other positive impacts of the training related to team bonding and teamwork. Qualitatively within the FSED survey, frontline indicated they enjoy training as a section, which was seen as a means of improving teamwork. This finding is also supported through interviews and focus groups with staff and coaches. Coaches suggested that training as a section has positive add-on effects for trainees, including making trainees aware of the skills available in their own team.

228. Trainees engaged positively with the training as a result of the 'judgement free' training environment. Participants responding to the training surveys appreciated the opportunity to try things, make mistakes, get feedback, and not feel that they were going to face consequences for getting things wrong. Again, they emphasised the benefits of attending with their teams.

"It was a very safe environment in the way that I was comfortable enough to make mistakes and learn from them"

229. A key theme was that attendees found much benefit to the focus on communication, which was reinforced by participating in the scenarios in their usual work team. They also appreciated the fact that if everyone is trained the same way, it is easier to know how other staff—who they are not as familiar with—are going to work, and that they will speak the same language.

"Training with my team and being able to understand their strength and weakness along with my own"

"Same training for all staff—so we can join other staff at incidents with everyone doing the same and know what others will be doing, thinking and talking about"

230. Section supervisors also identified the benefits of being able to see the different skills across their team.

"As a supervisor doing this training with my team, it was good to be able to see the skills of my team members so I know what ability we will have responding to events."

231. Within teams, partners appear to be a key driver of perceived safety. Qualitative analysis of interviews and focus groups with staff suggests that partners' experience and level of training is perceived as more influential on feelings of safety than the training the officer themselves received.

232. The coaches participating in focus groups also noted that the lesson plans for FSED included advanced scenarios and did not account for a range of skill levels in the teams. Different skill levels within teams resulted in adjustments to the training to cater to these differences. Coaches reported that upon

identifying lower levels of competency they opted to adjust the training to develop skills equivalency before progressing to more complex tactical skills. This flexibility altered the consistency of delivery of the training and could theoretically lead to an unintended consequence of staff feeling more unsafe upon recognising a skills difference by others through the training. This perception and link to feeling unsafe was also supported through the survey qualitative analysis and may undermine positive effects of the training. There was also the concern that participants who struggled through difficult scenarios—for which they were underprepared—would feel less safe too.

"And then after lunch we throw them into, you know, a building with multiple doors and of sudden, you know, a lot of the time wheels kind of fall off a little … … And I think we're better off focusing on doing the basics right and getting those basics embedded in their learning than sometimes struggling into scenarios…."

Training optimisation opportunities

233. Overall, the training appears to be in high demand with many staff members who work in the frontline wanting an opportunity to take part.

"Yeah, same for me. I think it's a winning combination, FSED, I know that we've talked a lot about how we can improve it, but I don't want, I don't want that to detract from the fact that it's actually a really good product. I think more so that we are all firm believers in it in the fact that whatever little they take away from that day has gotta be good for them."

234. Optimisation opportunities largely relate to expanding, rather than changing, the training. For example, staff pointed to the need for more regular training or more ability to practise tactics and complex skills.

235. Police should also consider expanding the training to the frontline groups not currently participating, to increase skill equity across the frontline, as is apparently the intent of the TRM. An initial budget paper indicated that this wider frontline roll out of FSED is the long-term intent of Police. Likewise, early communications stated that *this [FSED] will initially be for PST and road policing staff and then expanded to other teams when capacity allows* (New Zealand Police, 2021b). If wider rollout is not possible in the short term, providing specific communication around who the training is for, and accessible to, would be optimal. Initially, however, addressing basic skills equivalency for those who do attend may be more important because differences in skill level across participants is impacting the content of the training and the pay-off of feelings of safety for participants.

236. If the training scenarios are to remain as implemented in the PoCs—with a focus on low frequency but high impact events that have the greatest consequences, trainees should be provided with a good understanding of the purpose of what they are being taught. As mentioned above, the scenarios include high pressure/unplanned events and events that are rare in the everyday working environment of those who attend, the immediate applicability of which is being missed.

237. Although not true for all areas, some coaches noted that the venues available were not appropriate to provide FSED as planned, and they had to adapt to the venue. There was a general need also for more equipment and resources to provide FSED as planned, and a need for additional staff to role-play scenarios, so that learnings are maximised.

"Only thing that would of been beneficial is completing CRT in a normal/statehouse type environment. The venue we completed our training in was fine but I don't think it represented the majority of houses that we enter."

238. Policing literature notes that high-risk situations requiring the use of tactical options are relatively rare. Officers may not have the opportunity to practise the execution of tactical options regularly in the field. Skills decay is commonplace for skills that are not used frequently, but there are practices that can aid skill

retention (Cloutman et al., 2021). Opportunities for regular quick review, review materials, and practice may thus be worth consideration. Further, as noted previously, an ongoing emphasis on stress management skills and reassurance messaging may counter the effect of the focus on highly dangerous, but rare events, and the negative impact this focus may have on some individuals.

239. A potential backfire effect to increased confidence—though not seen in this evaluation—is overconfidence. This potential was mentioned by training coaches and may be worth monitoring for, as the training becomes more embedded nationally. Although they perceived the training overwhelmingly positively, the coaches discussed how it may result in overconfidence in staff and their tactical abilities.

"I don't know. So yeah, if you're talking about safety, there's, there's it's a double-edged sword a little bit in some of these things. Some of it around, you know, supervision. Some it around the training and people thinking that they're now able to go and do things that they would never have done before. So we've just got to keep people safe and keep it, and I've talked to our trainers and they are stressing at training days that this isn't a building of capability in terms of dealing with riskier stuff. This is just giving you more skills to be able to be safer in your work, you know?"

Specialist Capability

240. In this section we present findings about the impacts and outcomes of the TPT and TDT specialist capability teams in turn. The impacts and outcomes linked to TPTs described below are also a function of the system of TacInt and Tasking and Coordination that drives TPTs' pre-planned work. The findings described in the section on TPTs should therefore also be read as findings in relation to the risk-based processes that inform their deployment.

TPTs

241. Tactical prevention teams aimed to increase safety and feelings of safety by proactively pursuing high-risk offenders (HROs), removing weapons and methamphetamine from the community, and providing reassurance, increased capability, and tactical expertise to PSTs. Overall, the TPTs were well regarded. TPT members understood the model and perceived the interventions as steps in the right direction. Although teams considered there to be room for improvement, they acknowledged that this was largely due to the nature of the PoC trial rather than inherent issues with the model's design.

"Oh, I love it. It's fantastic. Any opportunity to increase the overall capability of the police, increase frontline safety of our staff through training and extra technical support as well as resources that are coming in. No, it's bloody fantastic. It does feel a little bit like it was rushed."

TPTs reduce the highest risk from high-risk offenders, weapons, and methamphetamine

242. Prioritising people at high-risk of using firearms at police should increase (in the short term) the number of occasions where firearms are located and removed from the environment, and the proportion of wanted HROs arrested, through proactively deploying specialist capability to risk.[11] In turn, these impacts should lead to reduced use of firearms against police and the public. The ability of the TPTs to do this well relies on the roles of TacInt to provide the situational awareness needed, and of Tasking and Coordination to convert the knowledge of TacInt into activities for TPTs.

[11] In the long term, this pathway should lead to fewer occasions where firearms are located, but we were unlikely to see this effect in the short timeframe of the PoC period.

243. Statistical analyses of various measures of these impacts and outcomes suggest mixed effects of the TRM—though importantly, the evidence is most consistent in suggesting a reduction in use of firearms at police. In interpreting the results reported below, we place more weight on the results seen for all PoCs in combination than specific districts. In attributing effects to the TRM, we also place more weight on effects—differences between the trend line for the PoC districts and a prediction of what would have occurred without the TRM—that are consistent over the six months of the PoC period, rather than limited to one or two months of large fluctuations. See Tables C.2 and C.3 in **Appendix C** for the full results for all measures reported in this section, **Appendix B** for details of the methods used to produce and interpret these statistics, and **Technical Appendix D** for the measures' data dictionaries.

What do the numbers mean?

Average estimated effect

The average of the distribution of possible effect values, as estimated by the statistical method used to compare what happened in the PoC districts with what was predicted to happen without the TRM. This effect (difference to expected without the TRM) is cumulative across the 6 months of the PoC period.

95% credible interval

The range within which 95% of possible effect values fall. The interval is based on the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles, meaning 2.5% of the estimates fall below the lower limit of the interval, and 2.5% of the estimates fall above the upper limit of the interval. If the credible interval includes 0, we cannot rule out the possibility that there is no effect.

Probability of an effect (reduction/increase)

Probabilities closer to 100% indicate a high probability of an effect (i.e., a reduction, or an increase, rather than a zero effect) being present, similar to the concept of 'statistical significance' where small p-values indicate a high likelihood of an effect.

High-risk offenders

244. Contrary to expectation, considering the PoC districts combined, the percent of wanted HROs arrested within 30 days of being 'wanted'[12] was estimated as 9% lower—on average—than what we would expect had the TRM not been implemented. The '95% credible interval' around this 'average estimated effect' was minus 18% to 0%, meaning that 95% of the estimates produced by the statistical analysis fell within this range. Further, there was an over 95% probability of an effect, meaning that over 95% of the time the estimated effect was a reduction. These statistics tell us that the rate of HRO arrests very probably reduced relative to expected without the TRM, by somewhere between 0% and -18% (most likely about -9%). This reduction reflects the cumulative difference between what was observed in the PoC districts and what was predicted without the TRM, over the six-month PoC period. Though most PoC districts saw a decrease, it was largest in Waikato with an average estimated effect of -18% (95% credible interval -26% to -10%).

245. As illustrated by the number of TPT deployments and arrests presented in the implementation section, the TPTs are responsible for a very small number of arrests—around 1 to 10 percent of the hundreds of

[12] Number of wanted high-risk POIs who were arrested within 30 days (of being recorded as wanted). "Wanted high-risk POIs" means people with one or more NIA alerts indicating they were wanted to arrest or interview with risk indicators present in NIA (including certain alerts, past Offences, and gang membership; these indicators are a subset of the risk indicators used by TacInt when assessing risk). "Arrested within 30 days" means a custody Record was created with an arrest date within 30 days of the wanted alert.

wanted HRO arrests per district per month in each district. This context explains why we might not see an increase in wanted HRO arrests because of TPT activities but does not fully explain the observed decrease.

246. However other evidence from the evaluation shows TPTs and TDTs were resourced from existing staff—refocusing BAU resource from activities that would potentially lead to many of the BAU wanted HRO arrests, onto a smaller number of very high-risk offenders as TPTs and TDTs. The overall effect is fewer arrests, but greater safety outcomes from the arrests of those who would cause the most risk to staff. Waikato changed its TRM operating model during the trial from trying to resource three TPTs to having one centralised TPT, which likely affected the TRM's impacts over the PoC period in this district. However, it remains unknown, at this stage, if this contributed to Waikato's finding for this measure.

Firearms

247. Regarding firearms, the projected increase in locating firearms was seen in several districts. However, only Northland and Counties Manukau saw more Events involving Offences where firearms were located (rather than used) even relative to the number of relevant Events attended[13]. In Northland the rate of firearms located offence Events increased by an estimated 35% to 92%; in Counties Manukau there was an over 95% probability of an increase, with a credible interval of -1% to 59%.

248. These increases in locating firearms are consistent with the focus on firearms and search warrants in these districts, in contrast to Waikato and Central, where TPTs were more focused on offender arrests because of a lack of investigative TRM resource for the higher risk offenders (see implementation data). We have more confidence in these results, from the more reliably recorded NIA data, than results of the GunSafe measure (suggesting reductions in locating firearms in several districts and overall), given issues with under-reporting and fluctuation of recording in GunSafe. The increase in locating firearms in Counties Manukau is also supported by PROP data—a more complete dataset of firearms seizures.

249. Importantly, the number of firearms use at police offence Events reduced relative to what we would expect had the TRM not been implemented. For all PoC districts combined the average estimated effect was a 100% decrease with a 95% credible interval of the cumulative effect of minus 201% to 1% and >95% probability of a reduction. The interval including 0 means we cannot rule out the possibility of no effect, but the 95% probability means it is highly unlikely there was no effect or an increase. The rate at which these Events occur also likely reduced (-215% to +22%; >90% probability of a reduction).

250. Further, there were reductions in some firearms victimisation categories compared to what we would expect had the TRM not been implemented, though these were not consistent across the PoC districts. Aside from gang related activity spikes in robbery and 'other'[14] victimisation rates in Counties Manukau, reductions were seen in burglary/theft rates (per 10,000 residential population) in Northland (estimated effect of -190% to -13%; >95% probability of effect); robbery rates in Waikato (-148% to +3%; >95% probability of effect); and 'Other' firearm victimisation rates in Central (-102% to -4%).

Methamphetamine

251. TPTs were also prioritised to HROs involved in methamphetamine production and supply. This activity was expected to increase (in the short term) the number of occasions where methamphetamine was seized. In turn, this impact could be expected to lead to reduced methamphetamine consumption in the community by disrupting production and supply. We view methamphetamine consumption as a proxy measure for

[13] 'Relevant Events' are CARD Event Types that have involved firearms located offences in the past.

[14] 'Other' victimisations predominantly include presenting or discharging a firearm.

community safety, and as a TRM outcome, because methamphetamine use is known to cause harm to individuals, whānau, and communities in which use takes place (Evidence Based Policing Centre, 2021).

252. Contrary to expectation, considering the PoC districts combined, the number of cases where methamphetamine was seized[15] was estimated as 10% lower—on average—than what we would expect had the TRM not been implemented. This effect was driven by decreases in three PoC districts, with only Northland showing the anticipated increase (95% credible interval -2% to +60%; >95% probability of an increase). Northland's increase is consistent with the comparatively high number of search warrants executed by TPTs in Northland compared to other PoC districts (as described in section 7). Reductions in the other PoC districts may reflect staff abstractions during Omicron and Op Convoy reducing capacity for discretionary activities that could result in police locating methamphetamine (as opposed to specific searches for it).

253. Consistent with the seizure results, across the PoCs combined, there was no effect on consumption rates in the community evident from analysis of wastewater trends (to May 2022).[16] However, this outcome is only likely to be seen as a cumulative effect of the TRM in the longer term, due to the many other factors that have a greater impact on methamphetamine availability and consumption (see **Appendix B** for detail).

TPTs reduce demand on AOS

254. The evaluation also examined whether TPTs reduce demand for AOS, as a potential positive impact of TPTs for Police as an organisation. TPTs were expected to reduce the number of pre-planned deployments and AOS TOIL, through deploying TPTs to pre-planned Events that would otherwise be AOS deployments.[17]

255. There is strong evidence that TPTs reduce demand on AOS. TPT staff felt that their work was resulting in reduced AOS deployments, and this view was expressed by AOS commanders in their own qualitative feedback. They attributed this perceived reduction largely to the resolution of incidents by TPTs prior to these incidents becoming an AOS deployment.

> *"So, you know, with what we've got now with the, with the TPT, but, it's only on early shift, you've still got some great examples over the last six months where, you know, what would've been an AOS call-out is then dealt with, by, you know, a team of four and a Delta [Dog Team] with exceptional sets of skills supported by PST."*

256. Statistical analysis of AOS deployment data supports this finding. Considering all PoC districts combined, the number of pre-planned AOS deployments was estimated as 27% lower on average—than what we would expect had the TRM not been implemented. The '95% credible interval' around this 'average estimated effect' was minus 61% to plus 5%, meaning that 95% of the estimates produced by the statistical analysis fell within this range. Although this interval including 0 means we cannot rule out no effect, there was an over 90% probability of an effect, meaning that over 90% of the time the estimated effect was a reduction. These statistics tell us that the number of pre-planned AOS probably reduced

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[15] Cases recorded in PROP (a database of seized/located property) involving methamphetamine, amphetamine or precursors being seized by Police.

[16] The analysis showed an increase in methamphetamine consumption in Waikato, relative to expected without the TRM, but this increase was restricted to spikes in two months of the period and is not consistent with an effect of the TRM (see table C.2 in Appendix C).

[17] In the long term, the TRM should reduce the number of emergency AOS deployments through prioritising and reducing risk from HROs.

relative to expected without the TRM, by up to minus 61% (most likely about -27%). This reduction reflects the cumulative difference between what was observed in the PoC districts and what was predicted without the TRM, over the six-month PoC period.

257. Central District provided a more specific case study of AOS impacts because the TPT operated solely within one Area within the District (Palmerston North), with the other Areas providing more comparable potential 'control' locations for testing AOS impacts. Pre-planned AOS deployments reduced in Palmerston North Area (relative to expected without the TRM, based on Central's other Areas) by an estimated 55% over the course of the PoC period (95% credible interval -139% to -1%). Emergency AOS deployments also reduced in Palmerston North Area (between -140% and -12%), suggesting that TPTs had an additional benefit of reducing need for AOS in emergency events too. This result for emergency AOS deployments was not seen in any district-level analyses (i.e., Central District as a whole, the other PoCs, and all PoC districts combined), so should be taken as tentative—impacts on emergency deployments may be limited to the way the TRM was operating in Central District.

258. In 14% of TPT pre-planned deployment forms (submitted after 15 March when this item was added to the form), staff reported the deployment would have ordinarily been an AOS job (**Table 8.3**). Although this proportion may seem small, 68 events that would ordinarily have been an AOS job is significant within the operational context. This finding is indicative of good use of rostered tactical support, negating the need for AOS deployments and any potential delays. Analysis of AOS deployment hours provided by TRM project staff suggests that having the added capability of TRM teams on shift has saved nearly 2,000 AOS deployment hours.

Table 8.3: Percent of TPT deployments[a] reported to have ordinarily been an AOS deployment

AOS level job	Northland (n=108)	Counties Manukau (n=131)	Waikato (n=118)	Central (n=126)	All PoCs (n=483)
Pre-planned	**85% (n=92)**	**92% (n=120)**	**84% (n=99)**	**67% (n=85)**	**82% (n=396)**
Yes	20%	20%	12%	4%	14%
No	80%	80%	88%	96%	86%
Emergency	**15% (n=16)**	**8% (n=11)**	**16% (n=19)**	**33% (41)**	**18% (n=87)**
Yes	19%	64%	0%	2%	13%
No	81%	36%	100%	98%	87%

a From 15 March 2022 when the question 'Would this have ordinarily been an AOS level deployment?' was introduced.

259. Qualitative data corroborates that TPTs took on low level jobs that are, nevertheless, above the skillset of PSTs. AOS Commanders, when interviewed, praised the TPT model for covering mid severity events, allowing them to focus on higher threshold events. TPT members likewise believed they are influencing AOS deployments through both restraining HROs who would likely create AOS deployments, and deploying to jobs slightly below AOS level or low-risk blue role deployments.

"I mean, what would've been AOS blue role jobs is, are now often TPT jobs but I feel like we're probably picking up some that wouldn't have come to AOS so there's a gap there that investigative units would've been doing that were probably a bit of a stretch for them because they just don't have the training skills or equipment. So, I think overall it's probably made things safer and hopefully by targeting those frontline people, those dangerous people, that we are making it safer."

260. One AOS commander even reported improved wellbeing due to decreased demand for their services on call. This effect was attributed to having the reassurance of a tactical team on shift to resolve emerging

incidents and a team that could also communicate their assessments on the ground to the AOS commander.

"So, I suppose during the daylight hours, it gives you a greater sense of safety, and a greater sense that actually I've got a team that can get directly there. ..., you've got a direct line to your forward commander and real-time intelligence, real time information and a response that's far faster than we we've ever been able to provide."

TPTs support frontline and investigative teams

261. Deployment data show that most TPT work undertaken is what is intended by the model: supporting investigation work and carrying out pre-planned activities to support a safer police operating environment. TPT staff reported that they increase the feelings of safety of others when working with frontline and CIB as well as reducing risk for PSTs by completing risky warrants and events they would previously have done.

262. The preventative model is perceived by TPTs to have value and increase the safety of investigation teams while indirectly increasing frontline safety through HRO restraint. However, they noted that the current deployment model lacks tangible support for frontline units. This perceived lack is largely because their shift times align with investigation groups rather than frontline and they were focused on pre-planned rather than emergency deployment to assist frontline.

263. The alignment of TPTs with investigative teams, is as intended by the TRM, because the purpose of the TPTs is to undertake predominately pre-planned activities to make the operating environment safer. Although TPTs are available for emergency redeployment, unlike the Armed Response Teams they cannot self-deploy and they rely on the DCC to approve redeployment. This difference is important because it reflects TRM's intent to reduce harm levels in the community and not just to have more tactical staff to attend unplanned events. The TRM's approach will contribute more to demand management over time, ideally reducing the need for reactive responding that requires tactical capability.

264. However, even though this rostering is what is intended by the TRM, TPT members consequently believe they are not having a perceivable impact on frontline safety. They believe that frontline do not feel safer due to a lack of access to the TPTs and a lack of understanding around how the TPT could make them safer through HRO restraint in the long term.

"I think, yeah, you could argue that our work is keeping these people away from the frontline, they don't have to deal with them. But I think we're mainly keeping the investigation team safer by helping them out more often than not."

265. Many frontline staff reported that access to tactical teams made them feel safer. However, there was variation among staff depending on their perceived access to specialist capability (notably rural). Qualitative analysis also found that TPTs were constrained in their support due to challenges maintaining minimum numbers and dealing with abstractions and other duties.

TDTs

266. Tactical dog teams were intended to increase safety and feelings of safety by supporting frontline activity with tactical capability, and to increase dog handler safety and capability through the addition of a tactically trained operator to the dog unit.

TDTs support frontline

267. Frontline staff who interacted with the TDTs considered that the TDTs enhanced frontline safety and reduced risk. TDTs similarly felt they were positively affecting frontline safety through their capability,

leadership, and coaching. Frontline have also reported directly to the TDTs their increased feelings of safety and confidence attributed to the TDT model.

268. Overall, the TDTs were highly regarded by frontline who interacted with them and by the handlers and operators themselves who reported greater capability with the addition of a tactical operator.

> *"The actual concept as [name redacted] and [name redacted] have said, fantastic, this is a great concept. And it's the direction we should be heading. It works well for everybody involved that, you know, at the frontline, at the, as the handlers and the operators, it works really well and they're enjoying it and it's positive. And I understand that everybody, frontline staff, feel safer and more empowered when we are there."*

269. TDTs are regularly receiving reports from section about their impacts on frontline's feelings of safety.

> *"Our frontline staff. They do feel safer and they've said that on numerous occasions because when, when we roll up, they know what we've got. They know we've got the extra training, the extra tools at tool bag. And even just having us there makes them feel safer. If that offender does something we're gonna be able to respond accordingly."*

270. The additional operator provides aspects of leadership and command at events. Operators also allow opportunities for coaching and sharing of greater tactical experience upskill attending frontline units.

> *"We'll debrief things at the end as well, and then offer them almost constructive feedback. We'll go do some extra clearance techniques, show them a better way to do things, just to help them out in the future."*

TDTs improve safety for dog handlers

271. TDT members were overwhelmingly positive about the pairings, and the concept of an additional operator. Handlers reported increased feelings of safety and confidence alongside better motivation, wellbeing, and productivity, when paired with an operator. TDTs conducted more proactive policing activities, especially 3Ts, when paired with an operator than without—implying they felt safer to do so.

> *"So, I mean, safety wise for a handler it's been, been massive. As well as like obviously just the advantages of having two people, the other person's going to see things that you don't see. When we are tracking it provides the safety element as well as the assistance cause getting dogs over fences, etcetera and that. So, from a handler point of view, obviously those have been the biggest, biggest wins for us, I suppose."*

272. Handlers also reported that the addition of the operator increased their motivation and improved the wellbeing of themselves and their family.

> *"Oh, I suppose my wife and kid are happy and boy are happy that I've got someone with me, I suppose. So, I'm not out there in the middle of nowhere on my own all the time. So yeah, she expressed that it's good to have."*

273. Deployment forms frequently mentioned that an extra operator could assist with arrest drills and acquiring statements from and responding to multiple witnesses/victims. They also enabled handlers to clear buildings and use tactics that they previously would not be able to do.

> *"You feel confident being able to do more, especially when it comes to turning over cars and stuff. Having somebody next to you to have your back is always, you know, can't, can't be anything but reassuring I suppose."*

274. During tracking and events where the dog was deployed, the additional operator provided increased security to the handler and allowed them to focus solely on the deployment and control of the dog.

"Definitely having this tactical operator with me, I've noticed I feel a lot safer and just the ability to deal with, you know sort of every frontline situation that doesn't become an AOS job, I'm it, it's, I'm a lot more comfortable. I'm never left on my own".

275. Permanent pairings between tactical operators and handlers were particularly perceived as increasing handlers' feelings of safety. Handlers and operators alike recounted how vital consistent pairings were to the effectiveness, cohesion, and wellbeing of the TDTs. Inconsistent pairings caused large frustrations for staff because they did not allow for an embedding process in which TDTs could foster a good working relationship.

"Also having trust in your tactical operator is a huge deal and a biggie for us. So, if we are constantly rotating these people through, we are never gonna get that."

"So as a tactical operator, when I was with the same dog handler for the month, I got to know the dog's characteristics. So when the dog changed his behaviour, I knew that we were close to an offender. So I switched on as well. Well, switched on more. I, you know, you, you, your heightened sense of alertness and all that kind of stuff."

276. Further, the capability and calibre of that operator was viewed as vital to the TDT model.

"Yes, I am very positive about the tactical dog teams and the TPT. The reasons why in my experience as a handler, I've tracked numerous dangerous persons and been in numerous dangerous jobs. And on occasions I've had to use frontline, PST staff as company. But now having a, AOS member as my cover man on frontline jobs as a dog handler and so forth. … To me I think it's just best practice".

Specialist Capability optimisation opportunities

277. Optimisation opportunities for **TPTs** relate to their visibility and availability to frontline, resourcing, and deployment to risk. The TPT deployment model and rostering may inhibit TPTs' visibility, removing the pathway to increased feelings of safety for frontline. Qualitative analysis found that TPTs believed that the current rostering may not be conducive to supporting frontline during unplanned high-risk events, and that frontline do not see TPTs as available when they are more likely to be needed for emergency events. TPT staff expressed a desire to work a variety of different shifts where they perceived they would be more available to respond to emergency events that affect the frontline. Although understandable, this change would be beyond the scope of the TPTs' prevention focus as intended by the TRM.

278. Therefore, optimisation of the TPT component would include enhancing visibility of the TPTs and increasing communication to frontline around the design, intention, and deployment of TPTs. These changes would foster appropriate expectations around TPT impacts for frontline. Rural staff have limited visibility of and interaction with specialist capability, so such communications are unlikely to change their feelings of safety.

279. One potential unintended consequence was noted: when specialist teams show up to rural areas with which they are not familiar, the level of response may look like an excessive show of force, or could escalate a situation where only one additional backup officer may be needed. In interviews and focus groups, a number of rural staff noted a strain on community relationships after TPTs had been there. The organisation should continue to monitor the use of tactical teams in rural communities moving forward. Other suggestions are to conduct adequate community impact assessments for every deployment, and to train staff on methods for deploying and interacting with the community that are likely to mitigate risk of adverse community reactions.

280. Staff involved in tactical teams indicated they felt under-resourced in terms of both staffing and equipment, with negative impacts on wellbeing evident. The TPT requires a team makeup of a Team Leader plus 3 officers, but these numbers are impossible to maintain without some built-in cover for abstractions. Loss of operators to the TRM as implemented in the PoC was reported as making frontline staff feel less safe. Therefore, tactical teams need to be more fully staffed, where possible without impacting frontline negatively. To be appropriately deployed to risk, TPTs also need to be supported by adequately staffed investigation and TacInt teams to enable them to locate and restrain HROs. Investigation teams can conduct enquiries to gather up to date intelligence on HROs and provide investigative expertise that enhances the TPTs' outputs.

> *"Just bigger investigation teams. I think like CIB are under the pump. They've got so much work on that they've got so much other stuff they're doing. So yeah, if the workload was off a little bit on some of those detectives and that we'd probably be getting more success."*

281. Regarding staffing, all AOS commanders were concerned with the strain full TRM rollouts would place on them. Although they recognised district differences, they noted that most positions would require AOS qualification. One suggested way to manage the strain was to have a 'pool' of AOS operators into which staff would rotate (as opposed to the current ad hoc approach), to reduce burnout and maintain skill currency and credibility.

282. Any permanent roles within TPTs and the wider TRM ought to come with career progression opportunities and benefits that reflect the specialist nature of the roles. At present, there is little information as to possible or expected progression, which for some staff makes TPT and other TRM roles less attractive than working within CIB.

> *"Yeah. I guess if there were gonna be permanent positions, I guess you'd want some sort of future proofing in terms of your progression, if you're gonna give up your current role to, to take up a permanent position.*

At the moment when it's rotational, I think it's really good. Just rotating on, up-skilling then taking that back to your BAU role. Yeah, I'd have, if I was gonna give up my permanent position in CIB to come to TPT, I'd probably want to know that there is somewhere else I can go from there."

283. For **TDTs** specifically, optimisation opportunities relate to pairings and reporting lines. Handlers wanted capable and experienced operators to support them, seeing this as vital to the future rollout. Operators in turn wanted acknowledgement of the operator role as a specialist role, with specific remuneration regarding the role and deployment allowances. They felt that it was good progression for staff interested in working in dog section and utilising their AOS skills.

"It's, it's a very good role to be in as a, you know, as a young AOS operator or as someone who's interested in becoming a dog handler cause it's, it's just work experience for you."

284. With respect to PoC management, TDTs were largely positive. However, within Taranaki, New Plymouth, and Whanganui TDTs had frustrations at the way pairings were managed. This was exclusively discussed in reference to the inconsistency of pairings. As noted above, permanent, or semi-permanent operator pairings were associated with greater feelings of safety, so should be enabled as much as possible when pairing operators and handlers. Reporting lines for operators who were paired with a handler were perceived as confusing, suggesting clearer communication about the reporting lines and responsibilities of tactical operators is needed.

"I don't know for how long I've been asking for the same as everybody else, probably outside of New Plymouth, but having the continuity of having one operator or a pool of operators that we can have working with us. So you get the continuity of working with one person, creating a team and moving forward...."

Risk-based deployment

285. Given the interconnectedness of the TPTs and the risk-based deployment components that support and govern their deployment, this section emphasises the links between risk-based deployment and results previously reported, and highlights impacts specific to the components of the risk-based deployment pillar *additional* to those already described in relation to TPTs.

TacInt and T&C were integral to TPT deployment effects

286. Increased tactical intelligence capability within district operates to increase staff and community safety by identifying and prioritising high-risk offenders, identifying intelligence gaps and tasking investigative teams, and supporting the TPTs. These activities flow through to TPTs via the Tasking and Coordination and Tactical leadership, process as described in section 7 above.

287. Qualitatively, TacInt is highly appreciated: they are perceived as extremely helpful by those who have worked with them. TacInt staff had positive perceptions of the TRM as well. They understood their role regarding risk identification and how that, and the wider TRM and its components, contribute to staff safety.

"I think the risk is the same. Like they there's just as much risk as there always has with our police staff. But we are making it identifiable. Now we're identifying those risks. Whereas I think before they were going into it and there was a risk there, but now we've identified that."

288. TacInt teams felt that their risk identification was having a tangible effect through the TPTs and other means of enhancing frontline safety.

"I think we can, sometimes people will send warrants that they're gonna go to and ask for our assessment on them and we can do a bit of a deeper dive and find out a few more factors. In which one case <name

redacted>, it looked kind of low risk from the start, but he said that it was actually a high-risk from stuff we located. So, he thought that TPT should go and assist the teams that were going out. So, I guess we can, we add value by doing our deeper analysis."

289. When TacInt spoke about their relationships with other components of the risk-based deployment pillar, they spoke of these positively and thought the strength of these relationships were conducive to success.

"I mean, we sit in our Intel offices in our areas. Where I sit in district it's next to the DCC. So, we have regular coms with them. Plus, we're included in their morning briefings, regular contact with the TOC who, you know, really determines, we have conversations with him all the time around the work that we're doing and providing, but yeah, and we get real good guidance from him. The TOM the same, he's at our T&C meetings every week."

290. The quantified impacts and outcomes linked to TPTs described above are also a function of the system of TacInt and Tasking and Coordination that drives TPTs' pre-planned work. The impacts and outcomes described in the section on TPTs should therefore also be read as impacts and outcomes of the risk-based processes that inform their deployment. In other words, TPTs, TacInt and Tasking and Coordination are highly interrelated components of the TRM and the results described above are evidence of this interconnected system functioning.

"I think it's really positive. I personally really like the model compared to other models which were very one-dimensional I think the value in this model is that there's many components looking across different aspects of deployment, I guess. You know, you've got the command and control part with the TOCs and the TOMs. You've got the intelligence component, you've got the deployment component at DCC, you've got the tasking coordination component, you've got the tactical teams ... And I think all the components in my mind have fairly well landed are I don't see any of the components being unnecessary. I think they're all tied together and all integrate really well. So overall I think the model is excellent."

24/7 District Command Centres (DCCs) provide greater support

291. Qualitative analysis suggests that the uplift in DCC capability to support frontline safety was perceived as associated with positive change overall. Most staff in urban areas reported that their interactions with their respective DCCs had been very positive and that there had been a noticeable increase in support from the DCCs. DCC staff also felt the changes added greater support to frontline officers. However, other, predominately rural, staff had mixed views on the DCC changes (as noted in the implementation section), so there was little evidence of perceived safety outcomes for rural staff from the DCC.

Double crewing leads to increased feelings of safety

292. Double crewing after 2100 appears to enhance feelings of confidence and safety. Staff across all districts, and both urban and rural areas, recognised the safety benefits from double crewing after 2100 and supported the initiative. Staff perceived that the benefits of having a second person resulted from the capability and skills of that person. This finding aligns with the training results on partners previously mentioned.

293. As noted in the literature review, perceived risk may be quite different to actual risk for frontline officers, so even though double crewing does not cover all high-risk time periods (see *Implementation of risk-based deployment*), it provides a perception of safety and enhanced feelings of safety at a time when most people are at their most fearful.

Risk-based deployment optimisation opportunities

294. **TacInt** optimisation opportunities revolve around maximising lines of communication and resourcing. Analysts saw enough resourcing as vital to performing their role successfully. Having the right number of staff to match the demand of their district was important to ensure their work had adequate coverage and quality.

"I guess I would just love to reiterate that like for this to be successful in [redacted], I think some Intel support needs to be embedded with the operators and I think there needs to be more of us otherwise I honestly just do not see how this is gonna be feasible."

295. TacInt also raised the idea of upskilling other district intelligence colleagues who could cover in the event of sickness or abstraction.

"I think well, one, I think that it would be great if, and I know that that they will be looking at doing it, but if we could upskill other analysts in district Intel so <name redacted> and I, aren't the only ones that are relied on because, you know, I mean, we could be on leave and the other one could go sick and yeah, we've got no control over that sort of stuff."

296. To optimise the work of TacInt they should be adequately resourced to meet their demand, which varies from district to district. Adequate resourcing of analysts is important to maintain standards across districts' TacInt products. Consideration should also be given to how district demand informs the allocated investigative/inquiry resource available to TPTs and TacInt to support a focus on HROs and to prevent prioritisation of easily actioned but lower risk offenders. TPTs that lacked adequate investigation support had a larger focus on lower risk offenders. This focus caused analysts to express frustration at the prioritisation 'lower hanging fruit' and associated wasted resource.

297. The tools TacInt use also need to be fit for purpose. In this regard the scope and reliability of the SSPOI needs further development. TacInt also require strong feedback loops to enable correct and current information to be available to them.

298. TacInt analysts also frequently discussed workload. The POI identification and scanning process is time consuming for analysts. Some felt they were being tasked with too much work, which resulted in greater quantity, but reduced quality.

"Well, first of all, just having more than just the two of us would be good too [laughter]. As I said, a lot of our time is spent with that, that initial sort of stage of identification and assessment. And then there's a lot of extra sorts of work that goes in behind the scenes. And if we had extra capability or an extra team member or multiple team members to help do that sort of stuff, we as the [analysts] could maybe spend more time and do some quality work as opposed to trying to get quantity."

299. Ensuring that TPTs and TacInt collectively have investigation and inquiry support is critical to locating HROs and increasing the efficiency of planned risk management—a factor that should be prioritised to support the TRM system as a whole.

"I personally would like to be able to deep dive into some of our people a little bit more and whether that's from what we have the capability to do, or with an investigator that can bolster our efforts. I think that's probably the biggest thing that we're lacking in [redacted]. I think we are pretty good at identifying and assessing these people and their risk. But in terms of trying to pin down a firm location for them and those kinds of things I think that's where we're falling a bit short. We don't have the time to do that."

300. At certain time points and locations, TacInt indicated their reporting lines were complicated. There was difficulty in understanding TacInt's role within the TRM, where they sit within the command structure and

who they report to for operational needs, versus administrative/HR needs. Consideration should be given to the most appropriate and efficient reporting lines for TacInt staff.

"I'd say they have a lot to work on in terms of the reporting lines and the communication lines. It's not great at the moment. No one has oversight over the workload or just like the volume that's being pushed through, cause taskings come from so many different avenues."

301. TacInt expressed a desire to increase their own visibility and relationships with other workgroups within the organisation. They felt these relationships were important to their ability to create reliable and useable intelligence. TacInt spoke regularly about the need for feedback loops between themselves and the TPTs, the TOC/TOM and the T&C process to continuously improve their products to meet the needs of the business. Both TacInt and TPTs also strongly sought to be co-located, citing numerous benefits for intelligence sharing and relationship building. Consideration should be given to their co-location.

302. Optimisation opportunities for **DCC** relate to adequate and appropriate resourcing, and rural contexts. DCC staff reported that the move to 24/7 placed strains on rostering and their ability to deliver their service. Consideration should be given to whether current staffing levels in DCCs are optimal to maintain a 24/7 capability. Criticism of the TPT redeployment process indicates the need to ensure that those in the DCC have the relevant experience necessary to redeploy TPTs. DCCs need to be staffed with the right people, appropriately trained, with local knowledge and experience. Finally, there is need for a communications plan to inform rural staff of what is being done by the DCC to support them and for feedback loops to enable DCC and rural staff to partner to support rural needs.

303. Optimisation opportunities for **double crewing** relate to workforce logistics and planning. First, odd number sections often mean that the sergeant will end up working alone, which limits the jobs the sergeant can attend because staff safety is paramount. More communication should be disseminated as to the appropriate process (DCC approval) for double crewing with odd numbers. Second, night-time double crewing was perceived as important for staff feelings of safety, but does not cover all high-risk times. Rostering TDTs to the high-risk periods identified that are not covered by double crewing or TPT shifts may optimise staff safety.

System level TRM outcomes

304. The previous section on 'pathways' spoke to impacts and outcomes at pillar and component level, which feed into the overarching safety outcomes intended by the TRM. This section presents findings that likely reflect TRMs operation as a **safety system** and speak to the overarching research questions of this evaluation

Do frontline staff feel safer and more confident in their day-to-day duties as a result of the TRM?

305. Initial findings show promise, with frontline staff who have been exposed to the TRM feeling safer because of the model, and feelings toward the TRM have become more positive since the evaluation began. Frontline staff feel safer because they have gained more skills in approaching their day-to-day jobs safely through the training, and they are now regularly working on teams with others who have received the same training. They also generally have more access to tactical support (e.g., TPTs and TDTs), and the DCCs are now available 24/7 to provide extra support. Double crewing also enhances frontline staff feelings of safety by providing strength in numbers.

306. As is noted in the thematic analysis from the staff focus groups and interviews, the TRM has strong staff buy-in overall, particularly following the positive changes that have occurred during the trial (Seals, 2022, p.47). Staff overwhelmingly believe in this proof of concept for bringing increased safety to their jobs

(Seals, 2022). However, commentary in the free text of the frontline safety survey suggests that although many officers can see the benefits of the TRM "on paper" they do not believe in practice it has helped their operating environment, particularly in relation to spontaneous situations. The outcome of enhanced feelings of safety for frontline is therefore likely to be more fully realised as the TRM impacts the police operating environment.

307. Quantitative results from the frontline safety survey tell us more about TRM's effects on frontline's feelings of safety in PoC districts (see **Appendix B** for further detail about the data and analysis method). Based on baseline survey responses of 2158 frontline staff, and follow-up survey responses of 2035 frontline staff, positive effects were seen for some safety and confidence measures, in particular for urban staff in some PoC districts. However, most survey questions showed no observable effect of the TRM in PoC districts. Although these results indicate that there has not been much change specifically for frontline regarding safety and confidence, the outcomes of the TRM are expected to take time to be truly felt, especially by those without direct contact with the TRM pillars (likely many survey respondents, in contrast to the interview and focus group participants).

308. Because we don't know who responded to the survey pre and post the PoC period, it is possible that some individuals in each cohort differ. We therefore cannot be sure that the results seen here are due to the introduction of the TRM, rather than differences in who responded. With this caveat in mind, we report on the few significant findings next, across four domains related to safety and confidence as assessed in the survey.

Confidence questions

309. Across all PoC districts combined, 2 of the 21 confidence questions showed improvement in feelings of confidence relative to the non-PoC districts. Relative to non-PoC staff, PoC staff showed increases in agreement that their *current tactical training* (ORR 1.38, $p<0.01$) and their *access to specialist capability* (ORR 1.27, $p<0.05$), were *sufficient to feel confident in their duties*. Regarding individual teams, CIB felt more confident to undertake high-risk pre-planned search warrants (ORR 1.82, $p<0.05$).

310. Specifically, these results appear to be driven by urban staff in PoC districts, who showed increases in agreement that their *current tactical training* (ORR 1.35, $p<0.01$) and their *access to specialist capability* (ORR 1.41, <0.05), were *sufficient to feel confident in their duties*. Urban staff in PoC districts also showed an

What do the numbers mean?

Odds Ratio Ratios (ORRs)

An ORR above 1 means people in the PoC districts were a) more likely to select higher response options (e.g., agree or strongly agree) in the follow up survey than in the baseline survey, and b) that this increase was not seen to the same extent in the non-POC districts. We report these as increases, meaning an increase from baseline relative to the non-PoC districts. In this case, the higher the ORR, the bigger the potential effect of the TRM.

An ORR below 1 means people in the PoC districts were a) more likely to select lower response options (e.g., disagree or strongly disagree) in the follow up survey than the baseline survey, and b) that this decrease was not seen to the same extent in the non-POC districts. We report these as decreases, meaning a decrease from baseline relative to the non-PoC districts. In this case, the lower the ORR, the bigger the potential effect of the TRM.

P-values

P-values indicate the probability that we would see the result by chance, with small p-values indicating a low probability that the result is due to chance and high probability that the result is a real effect. P-values less than 0.05 are treated as statistically significant.

increase in agreement that their *equipment is appropriate for them to feel confident in their duties* (ORR 1.37, p<0.01). Rural staff showed no significant results for these statements. Rural staff in PoC districts instead showed **decreases** in agreement that their *access to timely backup was sufficient for them to feel confident* (ORR 0.55, p<0.05).

311. Dog handlers also showed decreases in confidence *undertaking pre-planned high-risk search warrants* (ORR 0.10, p<0.05) and *high-risk pre-planned search warrants* (ORR 0.11, p<0.05). High-risk search warrants are not something dog handlers would typically undertake, so it is understandable that they may not feel confident doing these—though this fact does not explain the decrease relative to non-PoC districts. Pre-planned search warrants, however, are increasingly being undertaken with support from TDTs, as the TRM has changed the nature of their deployment to more pre-planned work. It is difficult to tell whether this change explains the decrease in confidence because we do not know whether the survey respondents were TDT or solo dog handlers.

Safety questions

312. Across all PoC districts and teams combined, there were no significant improvements in feelings of safety relative to the non-PoC districts. However, significant improvements were seen for some specific police teams. PoC district CIB staff showed increases in *feeling safe during pre-planned search warrants* (ORR 2.17, p<0.05) and *high-risk pre-planned search warrants* (ORR 1.77, p<0.05.). This increase is likely due to the support of TPTs available to CIB for these scenarios in PoC districts. PoC district PSTs showed improvement in agreement that their *current tactical training enabled them to feel safe* (ORR 1.50, p<0.05), likely reflecting FSED training of PST staff. Rural staff in PoC districts showed **decreases** in *feeling safe during family harm incidents* (ORR 0.53, p<0.05) and *incidents involving a non-firearm weapon* (ORR 0.54, p<0.05).

Enablement questions

313. Of the few significant results for enablement questions for all PoC districts combined, most were positive. When examining all policing teams, PoC district staff showed an increase in agreement that their *tactical training enabled them to make decisions that would lead to safe outcomes,* (ORR 1.29, p<0.05). The result in this statement seems to be driven by urban staff (ORR 1.43, p<0.01). Further, PoC district urban staff (ORR 1.51, p<0.01) and community policing staff (ORR 2.56, p<0.05) showed increases in agreement that they *felt enabled to make decisions that would result in safe outcomes*. Consistent with the decreases in relation to other aspects of safety, PoC district rural staff showed a decrease in feeling *enabled to make decisions that would result in safe outcomes during drunk/disorderly incidents* (ORR 0.55, p<0.05).

Wellbeing questions

314. Across all PoC districts and teams combined, there was one statement with which agreement increased (relative to non-PoC districts), indicating a **decrease** in wellbeing. This was *I have found it difficult to carry out certain duties and responsibilities at work because I have been too stressed or anxious* (OR 1.30, p<0.05). Thus, despite the generally positive perception of the TRM seen qualitatively, there is evidence of a reduction in frontline wellbeing, particularly for PST and rural staff in PoC districts (detailed below). It is possible that this result is driven by resourcing, expectation, and burnout. Survey comments indicated there was a need for better support in the mental health space, particularly for those in frontline, or frontline adjacent roles. For frontline, staffing has been the most frequent problem mentioned throughout the PoC period. In addition, staff involved in tactical teams also reported they felt under-resourced in terms of staff and equipment. Although this sentiment did not come through in the safety survey, it could be a driver of the wellbeing difficulties that did.

315. Specifically, PoC district PST staff showed significant increases in their ratings for three of 12 statements about poor wellbeing. These were: *feelings of energy depletion or exhaustion from your work* (ORR 1.48, p<0.05)*, work stress has interfered with my family or social life* (ORR 1.49, p<0.05) and the statement: *I have found it difficult to carry out certain duties and responsibilities at work because I have been too*

stressed or anxious (ORR 1.71, p<0.01). On a positive note, PoC community policing staff decreased in agreement with the latter statement (ORR 0.39, p<0.05), suggesting some wellbeing improvement for this smaller group of staff. PoC Road Policing staff, however, showed an increase in *frequency of mental fatigue and mental absence from work* (ORR 2.20, p<0.05). For PSTs, the way the TRM trial was implemented is a likely driver of these effects on wellbeing, as it saw TRM roles filled from existing positions without backfilling, in some cases leaving frontline feeling less safe than previously. Despite having TDT and TPT back up at times, PSTs feel shorter staffed and therefore potentially less safe, particularly because experienced officers were recruited to TPT/TDT, so the PST staff felt that the remaining staff had less experience.

316. Rural staff in PoC districts showed significant increases in their ratings for four of 12 statements about poor wellbeing. These were: *frequency of experiencing low mood* (ORR 1.69, <0.05)*, feelings of energy depletion or exhaustion from your work* (ORR 1.83, p<0.05)*, feelings of reduced personal outputs and performance* (ORR 1.77, p<0.05)*,* and the statement: *I found it difficult to carry out certain duties and responsibilities at work because I have been too stressed or anxious* (ORR 2.07, p<0.01). For rural staff, the pressure of isolation and their lack of visibility of the support the TRM provides them (in particular through the DCC) has led them to perceive the TRM as based around urban models and therefore not directly relevant to them.

I don't have a lot of contact with the DCC down here that they, we, I mean, we work between two DCCs cause we, we work with Waikato as well. But yeah, in terms of the TRM, I've not noticed any, any discernible change with the DCC".

317. As noted previously, qualitative data highlight a disconnect between DCC and rural staff. DCC data indicate that DCC are in fact working to support rural safety, but rural staff generally did not notice any changes in support that was offered. Therefore, although DCC activities may lead to rural staff being safer, as yet they do not feel safer.

318. More specifically, rural staff continue to raise concerns directly and indirectly around their individual needs not being met by the current version of the TRM. Concerns included timeliness of response, relevance of training content, and a lack of feelings of safety when they are the only officer on duty. It is likely that DCC decisions made for rural safety are not visible for rural staff and that therefore these staff may be missing the information and feedback necessary to understand what is being done to support their safety through the implementation of the TRM. This lack of visibility, plus the expectations that rural staff may have had about the TRM, may explain the negative effects for rural staff in PoC districts described above. Also, consideration should be given to understanding if there are other groups who perceive they are not benefiting equitably from the TRM, and to developing additional means for improving their feelings of safety.

319. The operational context also likely has a role to play in findings of reduced wellbeing. With COVID-19 and protest abstractions adding strain, and gang tensions escalating—particularly impacting some of the PoC districts, wellbeing would likely be suffering for many frontline staff. We need to be just as cautious interpreting negative impacts as interpreting positive impacts as attributable to the TRM.

Overall perceptions of the TRM and feelings of safety

320. Despite these findings, overall, qualitatively, there was a sense of optimism about the role of the TRM in feelings of safety. For example, TDTs were overwhelmingly positive about the intent and design of the model within their districts, and their role in it. They understood the benefit logic of TPTs and FSED and reported positive impacts from these initiatives in both their perceived environment and the capability of frontline staff.

"The actual concept as [name redacted] and [name redacted] have said, fantastic, this is a great concept. And it's the direction we should be heading. It works well for everybody involved that, you know, at the

frontline, at the, as the handlers and the operators, it works really well and they're enjoying it and it's positive."

321. Qualitatively, the positive aspects of the TRM most commonly identified by staff were 1) FSED training, 2) TPTs, and 3) double crewing after 2100. Participants reported that these aspects enhance their confidence and feelings of safety while on the job.

322. In contrast, the top discussed perceived gaps in the TRM proof of concept include 1) needing more staff, 2) needing regular access to TPTs, 3) needing continued access to training, and 4) consideration of the context specific to each district and environment (urban/rural). Regarding the wish for access to TPTs, the TRM, by design, does not provide the day-to-day support that frontline expressed they had been hoping for. This gap was particularly evident for rural staff who have little interaction with TPTs or TDTs and limited visibility of DCC support. Thus, although staff understanding of and positivity toward the model have increased over the TRM PoC period, the payoff for frontline will more likely be seen in the future when the TRM is fully resourced and impacts the operating environment through the focus on firearms, drugs, and high-risk offenders.

Are frontline staff safer in their day-to-day duties as a result of the TRM?

323. Despite there being some very positive impacts and outcomes attributable to the individual pillars, it is too early to interpret most **system level** outcome results regarding the safety of frontline. To date, the data point towards some positive effects on the outcomes most directly linked to the TRM's pillars of training and risk-based deployment of specialist capability. Broader outcome measures (e.g., assaults on police, firearms offending and methamphetamine consumptions) show little evidence of change (see section 8). However, TRM cannot be expected to have a big effect on these safety outcome measures in the context of all other drivers of staff safety risk in the short PoC period. As outlined below, effects of the TRM are likely to be seen more clearly as the focus shifts from the initial prioritisation of very high-risk offenders to the next risk tier, and as more deployments are undertaken. A lack of effects of the TRM on safety outcomes at this point therefore should not be interpreted as a failure.

324. As seen earlier in the report, training may provide a pathway that is leading to a reduction in officer injuries and use of force. It also appears the TRM has reduced the rare but serious events of firearms use at police, which were lower in the PoC districts (combined) than what we would expect without the TRM. There was not a single use of a firearm at police in any PoC district during the TRM trial. GunSafe data also showed a reduction in use at police. These outcomes are, again, consistent with an initial TRM focus on the offenders at the very highest risk of using firearms at police, linked to the risk-based deployment pathway.

325. Although no PoC district has been unsuccessful, Counties Manukau has seen the most consistently positive outcomes so far, showing likely reductions in staff injuries and complaints about use force, and an increase in located firearms. Although the district is not achieving on all measures, these outcomes may reflect how Counties Manukau implemented the TRM, with a strict focus on pre-planned (88%) and investigation support work (90%) effectively reducing risk from HROs and firearms.

326. At this time an early focus on very high-risk offenders and the removal of these individuals from the operating environment seems to be the driving force of the TRM's outcomes during the trial period. This focus is likely why we saw a reduction in firearms use at police in the PoC districts, but not in lower-level offences, and a reduction in the broader pool of wanted HROs arrested within 30 days of being 'wanted', compared to expected without the TRM. As described previously, for the PoC, TPTs and TDTs were focused on a small number of very high-risk offenders. Because these very high-risk individuals—those likely to prove the most dangerous to police and the community, so the most important to prioritise—are

rare, once they have been prioritised the focus will naturally begin to shift to the next 'tier' of risk, which is when we will likely start to see a shift in broader measures of staff risk and safety.

Are communities safer and do they feel safer as a result of the TRM?

327. In the long run, it is to be hoped that the TRM will begin to impact community safety and feelings of safety for the better as high-risk offenders, drugs and weapons are increasingly removed from the environment. This is outcome may be likely since enhanced risk management from police is being undertaken without resorting to the general arming and self-deployment that was seen in the ART teams, and opposed by many members of the public. Community understanding of the TRM system functioning (such as DCCs role in emergency response) may help support this outcome. Ongoing monitoring of both TRM activity and community sentiment is required to see if this expectation proves correct.

328. There is currently insufficient evidence to draw conclusions about the TRM's effects on community safety and feelings of safety, though promisingly there is no evidence of any unintended consequences. It is likely that as the focus of the risk-based deployment pillar shifts from those presenting the clearest and most significant danger to police, to the next tier of high-risk offenders, we might expect to see reductions in the wider set of community harms for which this (larger) cohort accounts.

329. In terms of community safety outcomes, firearms victimisation results were mixed, depending on victimisation type. Gang tensions and violence escalated during the PoC period, resulting in a spike in firearms victimisations in Counties Manukau (see **Appendix B** for results). Because the TRM is not aimed specifically at reducing gang conflict, a short-term spike in these does not imply the TRM is not working. Consistent with a lack of impacts with regard to methamphetamine seizure, there was no apparent effect of the TRM on methamphetamine consumption, based on wastewater results (see **Appendix B** for results). However, this result is to be expected given the short time frame of the evaluation period. Effects of the TRM on these measures are likely to take considerable time to come to be seen in the data.

330. Positively, there were fewer complaints about uses of force (by police) in the PoC districts than we would expect without the TRM, suggesting that the public were more likely to perceive police tactics as appropriate. This result may be an indication of improved decision-making by police, most likely through FSED training, and may lead to increased feelings of safety in the community.

331. The TRM may also increase community feelings of safety through reduced presence of armed police in the form of AOS in the community. Although we do not have evidence of this outcome yet (having been unable to measure community perceptions directly), we do know AOS deployments reduced in districts with the TRM, which may have positively impacted community feelings of safety. However, anecdotal reports suggest that at times, the use of tactical teams in rural areas can disrupt relationships with rural police and upset the community policing model. Strong leadership (such as a TOM role focus on community impact) is needed to manage the community impact of tactical teams and to mitigate risks to community feelings of safety and trust in police (especially in rural environments).

9. Conclusion

332. The TRM is focused on safety. As such, the key conclusion that can be drawn is that the TRM is achieving in most of the pathways that will eventually lead to safety outcomes. Some outcomes of staff feelings of safety, and actual safety, are already beginning to be seen, and it seems likely that more will be seen as the TRM is embedded nationally. Importantly, there is nothing that indicates that the TRM should not be continued. Overall, the proof of concept was successful in proving the feasibility and potential of the Tactical Response Model.

333. However, no pilot intervention is implemented perfectly and the TRM is no exception. The findings suggest that full implementation of the TRM—with all components working together—would lead to more complete safety outcomes than so far detected. Therefore, the following key considerations for optimising the TRM going forward are suggested.

334. **Resourcing:** Filling TRM roles from existing positions without backfilling, in some cases left frontline feeling less safe than previously. Staff involved in tactical teams indicated they felt under-resourced in terms of both staffing and equipment, with negative impacts on wellbeing evident. Working towards fully staffing roles is important for staff safety: ensuring that those with the right skills and training are put in the right TRM roles as far as possible will ensure the system works cohesively. Provision of necessary equipment will improve feelings of safety across the board and build on the safety impacts and outcomes of the TRM. To further optimise the impact of the TRM, consideration could be given to ensuring there is a leadership role that has oversight of the TRM as a system approach.

335. **Investigations and TacInt support for TPTs:** TPTs need to be supported by adequately staffed investigation and TacInt teams to enable them to locate and restrain HROs. Investigation teams that can gather intelligence and evidence and provide investigative expertise will likely enhance the outcomes of the TPTs going forward. Well-staffed and well-informed TacInt may increase efficiency in locating HROs.

336. **Co-location of TPTs and TacInt:** Co-location of the TacInt analysts with TPTs was seen by both to enhance the relationship and value that TacInt could provide.

337. **Visibility and communication of the model:** The visibility of the TRM components will also impact the results. Although staff may perceive benefits from specific interventions, two of the interventions (TacInt and TPTs) are likely not visible to all staff but are intended to indirectly affect frontline safety. Rural staff in particular have little visibility of the TRM and what is being done to support their safety. Where there is a lack of visibility and understanding of components it ultimately limits the value they can provide in regard to feelings of safety. Enhancing visibility of the TRM and the work they are doing for frontline is an opportunity to support feelings of safety. Communication to frontline staff around the design and intent of the TRM—especially regarding the role and deployment of TPTs—would also support appropriate expectations about the TRM.

338. **Full training roll-out:** Police should investigate expanding the training to the frontline groups not currently participating, to increase skill equity across the frontline, and enhance the safety benefits of training, as was the original intent of the TRM.

339. **Addressing skills equivalency:** Addressing skills equivalency for those who attend training is highly important because skill differences in participants is impacting the content of the training and the pay-off of feelings of safety for participants.

340. **Ensuring FSED supports wellbeing:** The focus of FSED training on highly dangerous, but rare, events may have a negative impact on the wellbeing of some individuals. An ongoing emphasis on stress management skills in FSED training—which support officers to develop the capacity to focus on relevant information in a high-stress situation—may help counter this. This emphasis is particularly important

because anticipated emotional responses to future imagined events are relatively insensitive to probabilities (i.e., the likelihood of that event happening, Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003) so rationalisation of the low risk to officers on duty does not necessarily combat their levels of fear.

341. **Equity of access to feelings of safety:** Consideration should be given to monitoring whether there are other groups, like rural staff, who perceive they are not benefiting equitably from the TRM in regard to feelings of safety, and to developing options for improving their feelings of safety. Further analysis of the Frontline Staff Safety Surveys may support this understanding.

342. Given the extended time horizon for seeing all the intended outcomes of the TRM, it will also be important to monitor these beyond the PoC evaluation period. A performance monitoring framework with accompanying dashboards has been developed by the EBPC to enable Police to monitor impacts and outcomes as the pathways to safety are embedded in the PoC districts and beyond.

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Appendix A. TRM PoC models

The following diagrams display the models formulated from EBPC evaluators' observations of the TRM in operation in the PoC districts. See **Appendix B** for details of the observation method and caveats applying to the models' interpretation.

Counties Manukau District: The APU Model, 13-14 April 2022

Requests: DCC serves TM covering all three districts. DCC responsible for emerging TPT deployment. TPT is at times deployed outside of CMD and into the other TM Districts. When this happens TPT change roles, call-sign and become AOS, when they leave CMD.

Relationship: Different rostering patterns mean there is not a lot of time for individuals in DCC and TPT to get to know each other.

Requests None

Relationship: Tac Intel maintain relationships with their TM real time intel counterparts. This is also their administrative reporting line

TRM: closely together. Tac Intel prioritises *actionable POIs* via area Intel nominations and their own intel gathering for APU's to focus on with TPT. TPT proactive work is overseen by TOM via T&C and other team requests. TST backfill TPT when staff are needed, and also provide FSED for the frontline.

Relationship is primarily proactive and focusses on warrants and thus works a shift typically from 6am-2pm Monday to Friday. TPT informs DCC each morning their whereabouts in case any response calls come in. TPT also monitor calls and ask DCC if they can respond.



Requests: Would be made through DCC. Verbal assistance for PST is available via PST Sergeants or the DCC. Eagle and Delta are also available.

Relationship: Due to the limited roster time of TPT, PST don't often request TPT assistance.

Requests:
Investigations and PTT conduct their own enquires into their own POIs. They request the help of TPT (via TOM) to execute pre-planned warrants on their POIs.

Relationship: Strong relationship executing pre-planned early morning warrants.

Requests: CMD TPT primary role is to work with Area Prevention Units to identify and execute pre-planned warrants. Tac Intel prioritises *actionable SSPOIs* via Area Intel nominations and their own intel gathering for APU's to focus on with TPT.

Relationship: There isn't always the capacity in the APU to investigate POI's current whereabouts. This results in some frustration.

KEY:
- Primary support
- Secondary support
- Intelligence flow
- Intelligence real time
- Primary requests
- Secondary requests
- Backfill staff
- Management flow

Northland District: The Tactical Pool Model, 12-13 May 2022

Role & Relationships: The TOM is in charge of all tactical roles in the district. This includes three TRM teams and AOS.

The 'pooling' of these resources allows for easy rotation of staff and prioritisation when individuals might be sick, on leave, or otherwise away.

TOM leads district T&C and allocates SSPOI's to investigative and prevention teams. The TOM is the strategic lead for the teams.

The TOC is the operational lead for the teams and manages scheduling and requests for TPT assistance.

The TST role provides FSED training for the frontline.

The TDT role is primarily response and to a lesser extent prevention. Their relationships with PST are stronger.

The TPT role is primarily prevention with Mon-Fri day shifts, and to a lesser extent response. Therefore relationships with investigations and APU are stronger.

Role: TacIntel sit within the Intel team and provide SSPOI's for the T&C process based on risk.
Relationship: They also take suggestions for SSPOI's from staff throughout the district via a 'suggestion box'.



Role: DCC task TPT outside of planned operations. They also have oversight of staff shortages and move resources around the district appropriately.

Relationships: Frontline's response support comes mainly from TDT's, as TPT works a Monday to Friday day shift.
FSED trainers also aim to uplift capability beyond training days for those frontline staff who are less confident.

Role: Investigations teams are given responsibility for SSPOI's at T&C.
Relationship: Investigations co-ordinate with the TOC when they will need TPT for SSPOI warrants. The teams are also able to request TPT and/or TDT help via TOC with non-SSPOI jobs if it is believed the situation may be risky.

Role: APU's conduct prevention visits with previous offenders.
Relationship: TPT's do prevention visits for APU's where SSPOI's or potential SSPOI's have nothing actionable. E.g. visit new 501's where Australian intel is poor and SS risk is unknown.

Role: ILO's create and sustain relationships with local Iwi and Hapu.
Relationship: ILO's use their community relationships to assist investigations locating SSPOI's, and to support ex-offenders coming back into the community e.g. 501's.

KEY:
- Primary support
- Secondary support
- Intelligence flow
- Intelligence real time
- Primary requests
- Secondary requests
- Backfill staff
- Management flow

Central District: Main TRM Relationships, 9-11 May 2022

Role: The **TOC** runs T&C meetings, connects teams, and arrange cover etc. They direct the work and make key decisions, such as which POI's should stay on the list. **D Seniors** have oversight of the POI's in their area and attend T&C's. The **DMD** act as a **TOM**, but it's not their official role, they take a District and Governance level view and help with capacity and other high level issues.

Relationships: The **TOC** plays a key role in communicating with teams and have practical day to day oversight of TRM. **D Seniors** and the **DMD** have oversight and are less hands on'.

Role: Provide frontline training. Most coaches are based in Manawatu, with additional coaches in the other two areas. Part-timers are released for training as required.

Relationships: Backfill TPT in Manawatu. They report to the TOC.

Role: Based in Manawatu, rostered, but not 24/7. Assigned 2-3 Manawatu POI's with some work arising from weekend incidents, also do emergency deployments.

Relationships: Require DCC approval to attend emergency jobs. Coordinate with Tac Intel/TOC/TOM and D Seniors in T&Cs. Get cover from TDTs and TSTs when practical or run as a PSU. Lack investigative support which creates extra work and limits potential POI's.

Role: Emergency response to priority jobs. Can be used for supporting HR POI taskings.

Relationships: Manawatu TDTs can support TPT when there's capacity. Supports TPT and PSTs at incidents. Dog handlers report to Dog Sergeants. Oversight of Tactical Operators a grey area in Manawatu, a mix of the TOC and the Dog Sergeant. Tac Ops in Whanganui and Taranaki report to Dog Sergeants. TDTs don't need DCC oversight.



Role: Review multiple intel sources to identify HR POI's, which are then shared with the TOC and DMD in the preT&C. Decide which groups are assigned which POI. At T&C, POI's are discussed with the D Seniors from each area who make decisions for their areas and coordinate with TPT (Palmerston North), TDTs and local PST. Tac Intel support inclusion of information POI in the PSR.

Relationships: Report to Intel, tasked by the TOC, they communicate with TOC, DMD, TDTs, TPT, and PST. They are a key link between staff to support informed decisions about POI's and what intel is shared to the DCC and Area Deployment Managers in the HRO.

Role: Attend FSED training with TST. Coordinate with TPT on pre-planned events, and help with cordoning. They provide up to date information to Tac Intel. They get support from and work with TDTs through comms.

Relationships: Can request TPT and TDT support through DCC Supposed to interact with DCC before interacting with a POI on the PSR to plan.

Role: Deploy staff across the district and provide strategic intel (planned and real time) on a 24/7 basis. The TRM gives the DCC focus and authority. Their work is focused on staff safety. Struggle with staffing Senior Sergeants to supervise the DCC. Have satellite staff in Whanganui and Taranaki.

Relationships: TRM has improved connections with staff, including rural. Have real time relationship with all teams to ensure there is appropriate cover in all areas and utilise area knowledge (Section Sergeant).

KEY:

- Primary support
- Secondary support
- Intelligence flow
- Intelligence real time
- Primary requests
- Secondary requests
- Backfill staff
- Management flow

Waikato District: TRM Relationships

Role: Central station Mon-Fri Day roster. TPT are assigned POIs on weekly through T&C. POIs may came up during the week from TacIntel or referrals. Attend emergency deployments via requests direct to DCC.
Relationships: TPT proactively contact DCC for approval or be deployed. TPT coordinate with Tac Intel/TOC/TOM. TDTs provide cover when practical. Request to AOS commander can turn a job from TPT to AOS blue role. IPT team supports TPT. TacIntel Analyst sits with TPT. TPT support frontline through emergency redeployment. Frontline learn: decision making, appropriate/safe use of tactics etc from TPT .

Role: Emergency response to jobs in or around their area. Currently have Tactical Operator - Handler pairs. TDT and AOS work closely with TPT when required.
Relationships: Supports TPT and PST at incidents when called. Attend jobs on own. Don't need DCC oversight. Tactical Options oversight provided by Dog Sergeant and Tac Intel support.

Role: Conducts risk assessment and advises TOC level of tactical support required.
Relationships: Work with TOC AOS commander and TPT Team Leader.

Role: Oversight of pre-planned deployment plans for TPT, work with TacIntel to assign weekly POIs.
Relationships: Works closely with TPT Team Leaders, IPT Sergeant, Area C, Area Snrs, TST, TacIntel.
and District AOS Planner on situations arising that may require TPT/TDT/AOS support.

Role: Strategic oversight of TRM. Holds Lead portfolio. Leads POTAC (T&C for all priority offenders)
Relationships: District Commander, DLT, TOC.

Role: Suggest weekly Persons of Interest to TOC for TPT pre-planned deployment. Assists with intel for situations arising that require TPT/TDT support. Keep a list of actionable POIs and a list for monitoring.
Relationships: Work closely with TOC on pre-planned deployment plans for TPT. Rotate weekly to sit with TPT and IPT to offer real-time support. Suggest POI targets to TOC on adhoc basis. Line Manager is DMI.

Role: Link in with Area staff. Coordinates transfer of intelligence around SSPOIs
Relationships: Work with Area frontline to coordinate intelligence transfer. POI nominations to TacIntel and IPT for intelligence cycle.

Role: Provide FSED training for the frontline. TSTs are active AOS officers.
Relationships: Report to the TOC, require minimal oversight.

Frontline raise a current situation/incident with DCC for consideration for TPT redeployment.

Role: Oversight, monitoring and checking decisions made are suitable. 24/7. Business as usual admin in Day/Late shift. Recode jobs, charging considerations. Provide permission for TPT to redeploy to emergency via TPT request redeployment. Post deployment approvals occur.
Relationships: Work closely with PST.

Role: Provide investigative support to TPT for a POI. Proactive work conducted on high risk prevention targets.
Relationships: TPT and TacIntel



Appendix B. Evaluation methods

New Zealand Police administrative data

Both existing police administrative data and administrative forms created especially for the TRM were used to investigate how the TRM was implemented and impacts and outcomes from the TRM[18]:. More specifically, administrative data contributed to answering the following evaluation questions:

1. How were TPTs and tactical dog teams (TDTs) being deployed?
2. Were tactical prevention team (TPT) shifts and double crewing implemented at times when staff are less safe?
3. How many persons of interest (POIs) did the tactical intelligence team (TacInt) identify and assess to determine their risk to staff safety?
4. How many POIs did TacInt action by way of intelligence products and tasking submissions?
5. Were POIs TacInt assessed as higher risk more likely to be actioned, in line with risk-based deployment?
6. How did the TRM impact armed offender squad (AOS) deployment?
7. How did the TRM impact use of force decision-making?
8. How did the TRM impact risk-based deployment?
9. Are frontline staff safer in their day-to-day duties as a result of the TRM?
10. Are communities safer as a result of the TRM?

The first five questions address how the TRM was being implemented; questions six to eight address impacts of the TRM; and the last two questions address outcomes of the TRM.

The primary police information sources used to investigate the questions were NIA and CARD. End of deployment (EOD) forms were used to investigate how TPTs and TDTs were being deployed. Data on the assessment and actioning of POIs through the tactical intelligence and tasking and coordination cycle came from the risk prioritisation matrix and POI tracker spreadsheets which were maintained during the PoC period by district TacInt teams. Some other existing databases within other teams at New Zealand Police (e.g., GunSafe and PROP) were used to assess the impact and outcomes of the TRM evaluation.

The use of secondary administrative data does not involve collecting primary data from participants. Therefore, informed consent is not required. However, considerations of confidentiality still apply. Police data containing personal information used in the TRM evaluation were kept on New Zealand Police servers and all results were reported in aggregate form so there is no risk of identification of any individual.

[18] Impacts (e.g., improved decision-making) are effects upstream of outcomes (e.g., improved safety), closer to the activities involved in an intervention (e.g., training).

The following sections describe the implementation and impact and outcome measures based on police administrative data, and how they were analysed and interpreted in the TRM evaluation.

Implementation questions

Included: how TPTs and TDTs were deployed; whether TPT shifts and double crewing were implemented at times when staff were less safe; how many POIs were identified and assessed as a risk to safety by TacInt; how many POIs were actioned by way of intelligence products and tasking submissions by TacInt; and whether POIs assessed as higher risk by TacInt were more likely to be actioned were all implementation questions addressed using police administrative data.

TPT and TDT deployment data were also used to investigate whether any undesirable outputs or unintended consequences stemmed from the deployment of TPTs and TDTs. Administrative data from the different PoC districts also enabled us to investigate differences in TPT and TDT deployment between PoC districts. However, when findings were too dependent on context, descriptive data was reported as a proportion of the district rather than a numerical count to discourage district comparisons based on raw numbers, which are highly district dependent.

The next subsections describe the measures and analyses used to better understand TPT and TDT deployment, TPT and double crewing schedule during the TRM, and how POIs were identified and assessed by TacInt and then actioned by New Zealand Police.

TPT and TDT deployment

To evaluate how TPTs and TDTs were being deployed, both qualitative and quantitative administrative data were considered. More specifically, quantitative deployment CARD data pertaining to the response of TPTs and TDTs to Incidents across PoC districts; and quantitative and qualitative data from EoD forms completed by TPTs and TDTs were considered. The use of both deployment data from CARD and data collected via EoD forms enabled us to base the evaluation both on an accurate representation of the teams' activities and a rich and detailed account of activities attended by these teams[19].

Police's CARD database provided deployment data pertaining to the activities of both TPTs and TDTs through the linking of their callsign. The key set of indicators relevant to the evaluation included the number of Events dispatched to, proportion of Event Types, Event priority, time of Event, and proportion of pre-planned/ emergency response deployments. Much of the deployment data was inherently duplicated through the self-reported EoD forms. This was by design, in an attempt to triangulate data sources and subsequent insights. Deployment measures are described in more depth in **Technical Appendix A**.

The EoD form was designed to collect basic information pertaining to the activities of TPTs and TDTs. In the instance of a TPT tactical deployment, a form is required to be filled out by a team member in every instance. TDTs are required only to fill out an EoD form when they feel the added capability of the tactical operator has been utilised upon a deployment. The form's content has been designed to closely resemble that of the AOS deployment reports and tactical options reports (TORs) for familiarity purposes. The amount of detail required to be filled out in an EoD depends upon the deployment and capacity in which the team was deployed. Accordingly, the EoD form collates operational information that ordinarily would not be captured by existing data sources outside of an AOS deployment report. This information is crucial in understanding the demand, the capacity, and the role that TPTs and TDTs have at events (as described by themselves). To further facilitate data collection the EOD form could be accessed via the Checkpoint

[19] Only a subset of EoD forms were considered in the evaluation. These were selected based on their availability and reliability.

App, which can be installed on all police mobile devices. EoD forms were completed by an individual, and subject to their individual assessment at the time.

EoD forms could be filled out on the day of the incident, or several days after so considerations must be paid to the accuracy of some EoD forms with respect to a participant's recollection of an event. TPT and TDT EoD form examples are presented in **Technical Appendix B**. The compliance rate for EoD forms was regularly checked to mitigate lack of compliance. The TRM implementation team updated the evaluation team about any upcoming changes to the EoD form. Measures derived from the EoD are described in more depth in **Technical Appendix C**.

Deployment and EoD data was acquired through Excel spreadsheets, and then analysed with specific counting rules per indicator. Both sets of data were cleaned in collaboration with the TRM implementation team before analyses. This included removing repeated entries and filtering the data to include Incidents that fit the evaluation criteria. Data was reported in an aggregate manner to remove the risk of identification of individuals.

No inferential statistical testing was undertaken for the purposes of investigating how TPTs and TDTs were deployed (i.e., testing for significant differences between districts). Analyses were descriptive and should be interpreted within the context of the operating environment of each district.

TPT shifts and double crewing schedule

A range of impact and outcome measures were developed to answer evaluation questions using police administrative data. Several of the outcome measures were also used to address the implementation question 'Were TPT shifts and double crewing implemented at times when staff are less safe?'.

More specifically, to answer this question, we analysed the timing of four measures of staff safety: assaults on police offence Events, firearm offence Events, firearm use at police offence Events, and AOS deployments. Date and time information was available for each of these measures, enabling us to count the number of Events/deployments that occurred in each hour of each weekday, then calculate the percentage of Events/deployments that occurred in hours covered by TPT shifts and double crewing. We used only reactive Events[20] and emergency AOS deployments to capture timing of public calls for service that present risk to staff safety, for the three-year period from July 2019 to June 2022.[21]. **Table B.1** shows the full results from this analysis, which are summarised in the main body of the report.

[20] Reactive Events are reports from the public to which police respond, being all Events not classed as proactive. Proactive Events are Events that are pre-planned or officer discovered/ field Events, being where Dispatch Event Type = 3–(Prevention Activities) or 4–(Other Duties) or 2O/2S/2T/2U/2W (Warrants/Summons) or Call Source = POLICE or OFFICER or RADIO or STA.

[21] As a robustness check, we also analysed one-year and five-year periods (to June 2022). The results showed the same pattern as for 3 years.

Table B.1: Percent of reactive CARD Events (for measures of officer safety) and emergency AOS Deployments covered by TPT shifts, double crewing, or both

Measure	5 years (July 2017 – June 2022)			3 years (July 2019 – June 2022)			1 year (July 2021 – June 2022)		
	TPT	Double crew	Both	TPT	Double crew	Both	TPT	Double crew	Both
Assault on police offence Events	21	32	53	23	30	53	22	30	52
Firearms offence Events (data from August 2017 only)	33	21	53	33	21	54	33	20	53
Firearms use at police offence Events	30	43	74	29	50	79	12	62	75
AOS deployments (data from January 2019 only)	N/A	N/A	N/A	35	21	56	35	20	56

POI identification, assessment and actioning

Data on the assessment and actioning of POIs through the tactical intelligence and tasking and coordination cycle came from the risk prioritisation matrix and POI tracker spreadsheets maintained during the PoC period by TacInt teams. the risk prioritisation matrix was created by the EBPC at TacInt's request to provide a structured means, supplementing the Staff Safety Persons of Interest (SSPOI) tool, to score POIs on a range of indicators identified as likely to predict their risk of using firearms against or seriously assaulting police. The POI tracker was created by TacInt to record what actions, if any, were taken in relation to identified POIs (i.e., included in a daily briefing, submitted to weekly tasking and coordination for TPT deployment, the subject of a ground brief, or alternatively tasked).

The prioritisation matrix spreadsheet—containing all assessed POIs—and the POI tracker spreadsheet for each PoC district were provided by the TacInt teams to the EBPC. The district files were merged into a combined file for each source (matrix, tracker). Each file contained a unique reference number for each POI but whether this was a person id (PID) or prison record number (PRN) was not consistent. The PIDs for all POIs with either a PID or PRN in the source file were identified using Business Objects, and the two files were then joined using PIDs. A handful of POIs were named in the tracker with no unique reference number but were included in the analysis. Tracker entries relating to multiple named POIs were separated so there was one entry per POI. Tracker entries where there were no named POIs but groups of POIs referred to as a group (e.g., using an operation name) were not included in this analysis (there were very few of these). Some POIs appeared in the data multiple times having been assessed or entered in the tracker multiple times, but in the analyses we only counted each POI once.

To answer the implementation questions about the number of POIs assessed and actioned[22], we simply counted the number of unique POIs with matrix scores (either in the matrix or the tracker) and with 'Yes' in the relevant action column in the tracker, respectively. To answer the implementation question about the association between risk and actions[23], we only included POIs with matrix scores. For each action, we

[22]'How many POIs did TacInt identify and assess to determine their risk to staff safety?' and 'How many POIs did TacInt action by way of intelligence products and tasking submissions?'

[23] 'Were POIs TacInt assessed as higher risk more likely to be actioned, in line with risk-based deployment?'

used binomial logistic regression to calculate how much more likely a POI was to be actioned ('yes' in the column for that action versus 'no' or blank), for each increase of 1 point in their matrix score (a weighted average across all risk indicators on a scale between 0 and 2). If POIs had more than one matrix score, we used their highest score. All analyses were run separately for each PoC district, and for all PoC districts combined. **Table B.2** shows the full results from this analysis, which are summarised in the main body of the report.

Table B.2: Odds Ratios and 95% Confidence Intervals for statistically significant associations between POI risk matrix scores and actions taken: how many times more likely was a POI to be actioned for each increase of 1 point in their risk matrix score (on a scale between 0 and 2)

Action	Northland	Counties Manukau	Waikato	Central	All PoCs
Daily briefing	2774.5*** (419.2 - 23552.9)	24.8*** (5.8 - 116.1)	45.4*** (8.2 - 289.8)	-	24.9*** (12.5 - 50.9)
Weekly T&C	1759.3*** (274.2 - 14276.5)	199.4*** (18 - 2898.4)	181*** (25.7 - 1606.9)	-	16.2*** (7.8 - 34.6)
Ground brief	416.9*** (76.1 - 2738.6)	7.1* (1.6 - 32.8)	69.6*** (10 - 586)	-	19.5*** (9.6 - 40.4)
Alternative tasking	10** (2.2 - 47.3)	-	-	-	-

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

The TacInt data were not collected for research purposes, and there were no strict quality assurance processes to ensure consistent use across analysts and teams. Some POIs had matrix scores entered in the POI tracker but were not in the matrix data, indicating that the received matrix data were not a complete record of every POI assessed. Margins of error therefore apply to the reported numbers of POIs and actions, which are likely to underestimate the true number, and differences between districts are likely to be at least partially due to differences in recording practice. For example, one district used the POI tracker to track not just staff safety risk POIs but high-risk offenders in general—meaning that they included many low staff safety risk offenders in the tracker whereas other districts only included POIs that they had assessed as high in terms of risk to staff safety. This recording difference at least partly explains why we found no association in one of the districts between assessed staff safety risk and actions tracked in the POI tracker.

As part of a continuous improvement process, the risk prioritisation matrix scoring system was changed several times during the PoC period. a POI's average score across all the risk indicators could therefore indicate a slightly different risk depending on what version of the matrix was in use at the time they were scored. This will have introduced some error into the analysis of associations between risk scores and actions, so more weight should be placed on the general pattern of results than the exact statistics when interpreting the results.

The next section describes the impact and outcome measures based on police administrative data, and how they were analysed and interpreted in the TRM evaluation.

Impact and outcome questions

Impact and outcome questions addressed using police administrative data were: how the TRM impacted AOS deployment; how the TRM impacted use of force decision-making; how the TRM impacted risk-based deployment; whether frontline staff were safer in their day-to-day duties as a result of the TRM; and whether communities were safer as a result of the TRM.

Within the TRM evaluation, police data on crime and victimisation was used to provide more reliable answers to impact and outcome (i.e., causal) questions than eliciting people's perceptions of the TRM's effects (i.e., whether they think it worked), which are subject to perceptual and cognitive biases that affect people's judgements of how often things occur and of causal links between events.

We also included national police administrative data (instead of only data from PoC districts) when assessing impacts and outcomes of the TRM to compare PoC and non-PoC districts, being able to more reliably attribute any changes in measures to the TRM. Where possible we employed measures from multiple data sources relevant to each impact or outcome, to enable firmer conclusions if multiple measures pointed to the same conclusion.

To develop impact and outcome measures, the evidence based policing centre (EBPC) consulted widely with TRM subject matter experts (SMEs) within the frontline safety improvement programme (FSIP), and data and operational SMEs in other workgroups. This consultation and quality assurance process ensured that the measures:

- had a clear rationale for how they should or could be affected by the TRM; and
- were calculated in a robust way that is clearly communicated through detailed Data Dictionaries.

Table B.3 sets out the impact and outcome measures and their data sources, showing the most likely pathways from impacts on decision-making and deployment to outcomes of staff and community safety during the PoC period. In addition, AOS impact measures (addressing the question 'How did the TRM impact AOS deployment?') were: pre-planned deployments, emergency deployments, and TOIL instances. We expected the TRM to reduce the number of AOS pre-planned deployments and TOIL instances through TPTs picking up some deployments that would otherwise have been AOS. We did not expect emergency AOS deployments to be affected in the short term but in the longer term there may be a reduction in emergency AOS deployments through the mechanism of prioritising high-risk offenders whose offending could result in an emergency AOS deployment.

Table B.3: Police data based 'be safe' impact and outcome measures (and their data sources)

	FSED[24] training	Risk-based deployment of specialist capability [a]	
Impacts	**Better Decision-making** Measured by: • Use of force Events (TOR) • Use of force Complaints (Police Professional Conduct)	**Reduced firearms risk** Measured by: • Firearms located or seized (PROP, GunSafe, NIA) • High-risk offenders arrested (NIA) • Use of force Events (TOR) • Use of force Complaints (Police Professional Conduct)	**Reduced Methamphetamine supply** Measured by: • Methamphetamine seized (PROP)
Outcomes	**Fewer assaults on police** Measured by: • Offences (NIA) • Incident Reports (My Police) • Injuries by use of force subjects (TOR)	**Fewer firearms Offences** Measured by: • Firearm use Offences (NIA) • Victimisations (NIA) • Use at police (GunSafe, NIA)	**Reduced methamphetamine consumption** Measured by: • Wastewater Analysis (NDIB, ESR)

a Including prioritising high-risk firearms and methamphetamine offenders.

In the longer term, we expect to see more crossover between these pathways from impacts and outcomes. For example, after initially prioritising offenders at greatest risk of the highest harm (i.e., potentially lethal use of firearms against police), we would expect the risk-based deployment process to prioritise offenders at risk of other harms (e.g., serious assaults on police), which would result in cumulative effects on measures that 'tap into' the offending of these offenders (e.g., assaults on police). The EBPC has therefore developed dashboards for ongoing monitoring of 'be safe' impact and outcome measures beyond the PoC period covered in this Evaluation.

Where possible, each measure was analysed both as a count (e.g., number of assault on police offence Events) and as a rate or percentage relative to the underlying risk of that Event occurring (e.g., number of assault on police offence Events per 10,000 relevant Events attended; number of firearms victimisations per 10,000 residential population). Reporting both counts and rates is important to understand and account for differences between locations and over time in the underlying opportunity for these Events to occur. For example, two districts might have the same number of assault on police offence Events but if one district attends fewer Events at which there is potential for assault, then that district has a higher rate of assault on police offence Events, meaning its staff are more at risk of being assaulted at any given Event they attend. Detailed data dictionaries for all police data impact and outcome measures are provided in **Technical Appendix D**.

To test for effects of the TRM on the police data-based impact and outcome measures, we used controlled interrupted time series analysis: CITS (Lopez Bernal et al., 2018). CITS compares the 'time series' (e.g., monthly counts) before and during the PoC period between the PoC districts and matched control

[24] Frontline Skills Enhancement in District

districts, which are non-PoC districts that best resemble PoC districts before the intervention. The logic underlying CITS is that the intervention—TRM—will 'interrupt' the time series in the PoC districts, which will then be different to the control districts during the PoC period. CITS is a more robust method for testing whether an intervention has worked than simply comparing a single—arbitrary—period before the intervention with the period of the intervention (e.g., six months pre versus six months post intervention) because it uses more time points thereby considering the entire time series and controls for seasonality. CITS has previously been used for evaluating policing interventions (Curtis-Ham et al., 2022; Ratcliffe et al., 2017).

We used a matching process (Larsen, 2016) to select control non-PoC districts that, when combined, were best matched in time series to the PoC districts leading up to the PoC/TRM intervention period. These control districts provide a more reliable indication of what could have happened in the PoC districts without the TRM, than simply using all the non-PoC districts. The CITS analysis uses the control districts, and any past seasonal patterns, to predict what would have happened in the PoC districts, during the PoC period, without the TRM. It then compares this predicted trend with the actual trend in the PoC districts during the PoC period and estimates the probability of an 'effect' (meaning, a difference to what was predicted without the TRM) and the size of that effect (meaning, how much of a difference). Probabilities closer to 1 indicate a high probability of an effect being present. High probabilities in CITS are similar to the concept of 'statistical significance' where small p-values indicate a high likelihood of an effect. We treat probabilities of an effect over 0.95 as 'statistically significant'[25], and those between 0.90 and 0.95 as indicating a high probability an effect of a given size from which we draw more tentative conclusions.

In interpreting the CITS results, we considered not only these outputs but whether the trend in the PoC districts was consistently above or below the predicted trend line over the six-month PoC period. Given the nature of the TRM intervention, any effects should be consistent, or gradually emerging, over the course of the six-month PoC period. If, however, the CITS estimated a high probability of an effect because of a single month that spiked or dipped steeply above/ below the predicted trend line, this result is more likely to have been caused by events in the criminal environment outside of the TRM. For example, Counties Manukau District saw a spike in firearms offending due to gang conflicts in May 2022. **Figure B.1** illustrates the CITS analysis and our interpretation approach. CITS analyses were run for each impact and outcome measure for all PoC districts combined and each individual PoC district.

The pre-PoC period depended on the availability of data, commencing in January 2019 for NIA and CARD-based measures[26]; January 2021 for MyPolice Incident Report-based measures; March 2019 for GunSafe-based measures; and November 2021 for TOR-based measures. The time series were monthly except for TOR-based measures which were weekly, to provide eight weekly data points pre-PoC for the matching process (two monthly data points were not sufficient for matching). **Technical Appendix E** describes in more depth the steps taken using R packages to conduct controlled interrupted time series (CITS) analyses.

When interpreting impact and outcome results, we considered the specificity of the measure—how much it could be affected by the TRM versus other factors. The EBPC has implemented a Performance Monitoring Framework to track impact and outcome measures beyond the PoC period. In interpreting results, we also consulted with SMEs about potential non-TRM related explanations for the results and examined whether the time series trend in the PoC period was consistent with an effect of the TRM or of external factors (e.g., spikes in crime), as illustrated in **Figure B.1**. Ultimately, we cannot make definitive conclusions attributing effects to the TRM. Finally, when interpreting results from CITS, we triangulated findings with those of other methods (i.e., interviews, focus groups, surveys, observations) used during the

[25] We use this term loosely to reflect the adoption of a cut-off equivalent to a p-value of <0.05.

[26] Preliminary analyses comparing three and five year pre-PoC periods showed that three years yielded control district trend lines that were closer to the PoC districts' trend lines, and thus better matched controls.

TRM evaluation to infer the most plausible pathways from activities to impacts to outcomes during the PoC period.

Figure B.1: Illustration of the police data-based impact and outcome measure analysis approach

Example 1: No high probability effect



Example 2: High probability effect, consistent with an effect of TRM



Example 3: High probability effect, not consistent with an effect of TRM



Interviews and focus groups

We conducted interviews and focus groups with police staff involved in or who could be impacted by the TRM and tactical safety coaches (TSCs) and FSED administrative staff who coached/organised FSED training during the TRM evaluation.

The primary focus of interviews and focus groups with police staff was to answer two implementation and impact evaluation questions:

1. To what extent is the TRM model operating as intended?
2. Do frontline staff feel safer and more confident in their day-to-day duties as a result of the TRM?

Focus groups with TSCs and FSED training administrative staff focused on how FSED Day 1 and Day 2 sessions were being implemented and changed over time, and on external factors that may have impacted the way the training was implemented.

As interviews and focus groups included the collection and audio recording of primary data, informed consent from participants was required. Before starting interviews and focus groups sessions EBPC staff ensured the information sheet was understood by participants and they consented their participation in the interviews/ focus group. This ensured the session went ahead as planned given receipt of the signed consent forms sent prior to the session to participants could be delayed or last-minute participant changes could occur due to leave or operational requirements[27]. Participation in interviews and focus groups was voluntary and the confidentiality of participants was safeguarded through the use of audio recordings (instead of video recordings), de-identification of transcripts, report of aggregated data, and file protection.

The following sections describe the method used to conduct interviews and focus groups with both police staff involved in or impacted by the TRM and TSCs and FSED training administrative staff based in PoC districts.

Interviews and focus groups with staff involved in or impacted by the TRM

The EBPC engaged with each of the four PoC districts trialling the TRM to inform the evaluation of the TRM through interviews and focus groups with police staff involved in or who could be impacted by the TRM. Interviews and focus groups took place at two different timepoints, partway through the TRM implementation and toward the end of the trial. Each data collection period was intended to last one month. Interviews and focus groups were part of a continuous feedback loop to inform the evaluation, with findings from interviews and focus groups informing other evaluation work and other evaluation work informing questions asked during interviews and focus groups.

Procedure and participants

District schedules and staff rosters informed the timing of interviews and focus groups. Scheduling of multiple interviews and focus groups in each district maximised participation of staff and supplied flexibility with operational requirements as these were prioritised over involvement in the evaluation. The EBPC communicated with district TRM points of contact to schedule focus groups and interviews. The

[27] Written consent was required prior to recordings being sent for transcription. In a few cases officer emails outlining consent to participate were accepted.

EBPC sent a follow up meeting invite to participants for either an interview or focus group via WebEx. An information sheet and a consent form were attached to the invitations.

Focus groups were conducted with members of teams with similar or complementary roles. Individual interviews were conducted with staff in specific roles. Participants initially invited to participate in focus groups included TPTs, tactical operators (partnered with dog handlers) and frontline officers. As staff members were not always available to take part in focus groups, a convenience sample of those who satisfied the criterion for participation was included in this part of the evaluation.

Individual interviews were held with, among others, district tactical operations managers, district tactical operations coordinators, dog section supervisors, AOS commanders, tactical intelligence analysts, tactical dog team members and members of the DCC. Members of other teams (e.g., manager of the criminal investigation branch) identified during the evaluation to be involved in or potentially impacted by the TRM were also invited to participate in focus groups and interviews.

The number of staff interviewed in PoC districts varied as roles differed between districts depending on what parts of the TRM the district was trialling and the EBPC relied on district TRM points of contact to identify other manager roles that would be worthwhile interviewing. Staff who took part in the first set and second set of interviews and focus groups were not necessarily the same, but were more likely to be the same in interviews than in focus groups and if staff continued to have the same role during the second set of interviews that they had during the first set of interviews.

The EBPC originally intended to hold in-person interviews and focus groups. However, staff safety considerations due to rising numbers of the COVID-19 'Omicron' infections resulted in an online approach for the first set of interviews and focus groups. For methodological consistency the second set of interviews and focus groups was also conducted online. WebEx was used to conduct interviews and focus groups online as it is the main tool used by and available to police staff to communicate in the online environment. All sessions were audio recorded via WebEx for the purpose of transcription and analysis.

Employees from across the EBPC participated in focus groups as both facilitators and note takers. External services were utilised for transcription and thematic analysis. EBPC staff who facilitated the sessions had prior experience with interviews and/ or focus groups. The EBPC provided a half-day refresher training to standardise the approach used during interviews and focus groups. EBPC facilitators completed daily diaries to both report any problems that occurred during the session (e.g., WebEx issues), and anything that could be relayed to the FSIP team as potential 'quick wins' or problems that could be addressed quickly. Note takers made notes during each session as a backup in case there were problems with the WebEx technology or recording quality.

- Interviews and focus groups were designed to inform the understanding of a range of topics:
- staff perspectives of intelligence reliability, timeliness, and access;
- frontline perspectives on additional specialist capability;
- intelligence perspectives on process and products;
- frontline perspectives on their wellbeing (specific to the impacts of the TRM);
- perspectives of safety;
- perspectives of enabled decision-making;
- perspectives of confidence;
- perspectives of burnout, shift patterns/ demand and management; and
- frontline perspectives of FSED training.

At the beginning of each focus group or interview, we collected relevant participant information such as participants' current roles and tenure. Interview and focus group question scripts were semi-structed and revolved around activities that were part of participants' roles to facilitate conversation. Participants were invited to say opening and closing karakia (prayers), or have them said by the member during focus group sessions.

Below, we describe methodological aspects specific to the first and second set of interviews and focus groups conducted with police staff involved in or impacted by the TRM.

First set of interviews and focus groups

The first set of interviews and focus groups was conducted in the four weeks from 8 February to 4 March 2022, with the first two weeks focused on Counties Manukau and Waikato, and second two weeks on Northland and Central Districts. Additional interviews and focus groups with staff who had not been available to be interviewed due to illness or operational demands were conducted up to two weeks after the period detailed above.

The first set of focus groups and interviews had the main purpose of understanding how staff felt at that point about the TRM, and what impacts they had noticed from the implementation of the TRM. Focus groups and interviews during the first consultation with staff were scheduled to last up to 60 minutes. **Technical Appendix F** depicts interview/ focus group prompts/ questions used during the first set of interviews and focus groups per job title of police staff consulted with (e.g., TPT member). **Table B.4** describes the number of interviews, focus groups and staff who participated in focus groups or interviews per PoC district during the first set of interviews and focus groups.

Table B.4: First set of interviews and focus groups: Number of interviews, focus groups, and participants by district

District	N. Interviews	N. Focus Groups	N. of participants
Northland	10	5	27
Counties Manukau	8	4	21
Waikato	13	4	33
Central	13	10	48
Total	**44**	**23**	**129**

Second set of interviews and focus groups

The second set of interviews and focus groups was conducted in the six weeks from 2 May to 10 June 2022, with the first two weeks focused on Counties Manukau, the next two weeks on Northland and Central Districts, and the final two weeks on Waikato District. The order in which staff from different districts was interviewed varied between the first and second set of interviews and focus groups to allow Waikato District to stabilise the implementation of TDTs, which were implemented at the time in which staff from this district was expected to be interviewed during the second set of interviews and focus groups. One additional day—23 June 2022—was scheduled as the final day for interviews and focus groups with staff who had not been interviewed to that date.

The second set of focus group and interviews had the main purpose of understanding how the trial worked in relation to its intended purpose (outcome). The key topic focused during this second interaction with staff was feelings of safety since the TRM began. We also gathered recommendations of possible changes before the national rollout. Focus groups and interviews were scheduled to last up to 90 minutes. Interviews and focus groups were scheduled to last longer during the second consultation period as they included more questions and prompts than those conducted during the first consultation

period. **Technical Appendix G** depicts interview/ focus group prompts/ questions used during the second set of interviews and focus groups per job title of police staff consulted with. **Table B.5** describes the number of interviews, focus groups and staff who participated in focus groups or interviews per PoC district during the second set of interviews and focus groups.

Table B.5: Second set of interviews and focus groups: Number of interviews, focus groups, and participants by district

District	N. Interviews	N. Focus Groups	N. of participants
Northland	8	7	25
Counties Manukau	10	7	30
Waikato	14	4	30
Central	9	9	47
Total	**41**	**27**	**132**

Analysis process

The EBPC contracted the transcription, coding, and analysis of interviews and focus groups to University of Waikato, and Victoria University of Wellington. This allowed the EBPC to focus on the prompts/ questions and fieldwork for the two sets of interviews and focus groups, also allowing for analyses to be completed by an independent researcher.

Transcription was completed by the University of Waikato. Audio files were uploaded to a secure Google Drive folder by EBPC staff, then used by Waikato researchers to create transcriptions in Microsoft Word. The transcriptions were then uploaded back into the Google Drive folder by Waikato researchers for Victoria University researchers to code.

Research assistants from the Te Herenga Waka Victoria University of Wellington thematically coded the transcriptions with input from the EBPC. A 'coding framework'[28] was created for the team to use. Codes or themes were derived from the data itself, rather than being based on a pre-determined schema. Due to the sheer amount of data, and for the purposes of the report, the analysis focused only on the codes or themes that answered evaluation questions. Inter-coder reliability was assessed using Cohen's Kappa, with coding of one transcript by an expert coder being compared to the coding of the same transcript by the remaining five coders taking part in the project (McHugh, 2012). The resulting averaged Kappa coefficient for comparison pairs was 0.932 (very high). Overall 250 codes and over 50,000 instances of thematic coding were created during the first and second sets of consultation. The software package NVivo was used to store, code, and analyse the data.

An EBPC evaluator conducted further analysis within specific focus groups and interviews (i.e., with TDT, TPT, AOS Commanders and TacInt staff) to better understand some of the operational nuances within this data, 'what works' from an organisational perspective and how processes as perceived by staff could be optimised.

[28] A list of codes with their definitions, also referred to as a 'codebook'.

Focus groups with FSED coaches

As part of the TRM evaluation, perceptions, impacts and outcomes of the Frontline Skills Enhancement in District (FSED) training were investigated. In addition, the EBPC also investigated how the FSED was being implemented and changed over time, and external factors (if any) that may have impacted the way the training was implemented. Investigating how the training was being implemented served the purposes of contextualising other findings from the TRM evaluation, visualising how training was being implemented in different PoC districts and visualising barriers to the implementation of FSED training.

To understand how FSED Day 1 and Day 2[29] training were being implemented, the EBPC conducted focus groups with tactical safety coaches (TSCs) and FSED administrative staff. Below we describe the method for these focus groups.

Procedure and participants

EBPC staff conducted four focus groups—one per PoC district—with TSCs and administrative staff in charge of organising the training in districts. Focus groups included questions focusing on how FSED Day 1 and Day 2 were implemented and changed over time, and on external factors that may have impacted the way the training was implemented. One prompt also focused on the extent to which the FSED training was effective in terms of skill progression in trainees, applicability to practise and factors supporting and hindering training transfer in practice. **Technical Appendix H** depicts the semi-structured prompt and question script for the focus group with TSCs and FSED training administrative staff.

Focus group sessions were booked by EBPC staff. Groups were conducted in April and May 2022, lasted between 60 and 81 minutes, and included between two and six participants, depending on TSC availability. Focus groups were conducted online and audio recorded using WebEx with one EBPC evaluator facilitating the session and another taking notes of the session (in case audio recordings of the session were compromised). Before the sessions, the focus group script was discussed with facilitators and note takers as to clarify the process to be adopted during focus groups and the prompt and question script to use. Facilitators completed daily diaries to report any problems that occurred during the session (e.g., WebEx issues).

At the beginning of each focus group, we collected relevant participant information such as participants' prior roles, time working with FSED and tenure at New Zealand Police. Participants were invited to say opening and closing karakia (prayers), or have them said by EBPC staff during focus group sessions.

Because focus groups were conducted at a specific time of FSED training implementation (in April and May 2022), findings from these refer to how district staff providing the FSED perceived the training then. PoC districts started to provide FSED Day 1 and Day 2 training at different times, so at the time of the focus groups, one of the PoC districts had not started yet to provide FSED Day 2 training, one had just started to provide FSED Day 2 training (two weeks prior) and two had been providing FSED Day 2 training for over a month at the time of the focus group.

Analysis process

The EBPC contracted the transcription and coding of the four focus group sessions to University of Waikato, and Victoria University of Wellington. Audio recordings were transcribed by the University of Waikato. Audio files were uploaded to a secure Google Drive folder by EBPC staff, then used by Waikato researchers to create transcriptions in Microsoft Word. The transcriptions were then uploaded back into the Google Drive folder by Waikato researchers for Victoria University researchers to code. Research assistants from the Victoria University of Wellington thematically coded the transcriptions. The software package NVivo was used to store, code, and analyse the data. After coding was finalised by Victoria

[29] Only FSED Day 1 and Day 2 training were implemented during the PoC period.

University, one EBPC staff member thematically coded NVivo files in more depth as to provide further insights on TSC perception of the FSED training. Finally, thematic codes were compiled and summarised by EBPC staff and insights from these were incorporated to the TRM evaluation report.

Surveys

The TRM evaluation includes findings from two different surveys. These surveys were implemented especially for the TRM evaluation and were answered by police operational staff (i.e., national frontline safety survey and Day 1 and Day 2[30] FSED reaction and learning surveys).

The national frontline safety survey focused on perceptions of, and attitudes of, staff towards the TRM. Additionally, the survey looked at staff feelings of safety, confidence, enablement and wellbeing, providing insights into the context in which the TRM was implemented. The survey also focused on answering the evaluation outcome question 'Do frontline feel safer and more confident in their day-to-day duties as a result of the TRM?'.

The FSED reaction and learning surveys focused on how trainees perceived FSED Day 1 and Day 2 training. More specifically, the surveys focused on the extent to which trainees agreed that different aspects of FSED Day 1 and Day 2 training had been implemented; and that FSED Day 1 and Day 2 training had impacted their skills, competence and confidence, enabling them to make safer decisions and feel safer at work. The surveys also focused on the extent to which trainees agreed that FSED training teachings were applicable to their work.

Both the national frontline safety survey and FSED reaction and learning surveys were conducted online using SurveyMonkey and included an initial information sheet which explained that the surveys were voluntary and anonymous and that data from the surveys would be analysed as to make sure participants were not identifiable. Participants were also informed that once they submitted the surveys, they could not alter their responses. The following sections describe the methods for the national frontline safety survey, then the FSED reaction and learning surveys in more detail.

National frontline safety survey

The national frontline safety survey contributed to answering evaluation questions about the implementation and outcomes of the TRM. Regarding implementation, the survey asked open-ended questions about staff's perceptions of, and attitudes towards, the TRM specifically, and their feelings of safety, confidence, enablement and wellbeing generally, which could provide insight into the context in which the TRM was implemented. Free text responses to these questions were thematically coded. Regarding outcomes, the survey asked staff to rate their feelings of safety, confidence and wellbeing across a range of scenarios, enabling us to quantitatively address the evaluation question 'Do frontline feel safer and more confident in their day-to-day duties as a result of the TRM?'. This question was addressed in two ways:

- Comparisons of changes in survey responses across PoC and non-PoC districts tested whether the TRM as a system had affected feelings of safety, confidence, enablement and wellbeing.
- Comparisons of FSED-trained and not yet trained staff within PoC districts tested whether FSED training specifically made a difference to feelings of safety, confidence and enablement.

This section describes the design and dissemination of the survey, then details the methods used in each of the analyses summarised above.

[30] Only FSED Day 1 and Day 2 training days were implemented during the PoC period.

Design and dissemination

The survey was developed in consultation with the TRM implementation team, frontline staff, and Māori, Pacific and Ethnic Services (MPES). It was submitted to the New Zealand Police Survey Panel for approval[31] and then reviewed by the National Strategic Tasking and Coordination Governance Group for final approval. The link to the survey was sent to all operational staff (approximately 9,843 individuals in total and 8,528 individuals excluding PNHQ staff[32]) by the communications team. The survey invite was accompanied by national and district level communications. The survey was conducted at two time points: Time 1 was before the PoC period, from 17 November to 14 December 2021; Time 2 was after the PoC period, from August 1 to August 15 2022. At Time 1, 2,158 responses from all areas (excluding PNHQ staff), or 25.3% of operational staff, were received. At Time 2, 2,035 responses were received (22.6% of operational staff employed by New Zealand Police at Time 2, again excluding PNHQ staff).

Questions with the purpose of investigating outcomes of the TRM evaluation were answered using Likert-type scales and focused on *feelings of safety* (21 statements, rated for example from 'strongly disagree' to 'strongly agree' or 'very unsafe' to 'very safe'), *confidence* (21 statements, rated for example from 'strongly disagree' to 'strongly agree' or 'not at all confident' to 'very confident'), *enablement* (21 statements, rated for example from 'strongly disagree' to 'strongly agree' or 'not at all enabled' to 'very enabled'), and *wellbeing* (12 statements, rated for example from 'strongly disagree' to 'strongly agree' or 'rarely' to 'always'). The Time 1 national frontline safety survey is described in **Technical Appendix I.** Two open-ended questions asked participants in Time 2 for additional views on both the TRM, as well as on their safety, confidence, decision-making, and wellbeing as a police officer.

To investigate difference in survey responses between different groups of staff, multiple demographic questions were asked. These covered gender, ethnicity, age, length of service, training level, team, district, and operating environment (urban or rural). Some demographic questions provided participants with the opportunity to 'tick all options that apply'. When participants 'ticked' more than one option in their answers, they were assigned to specific demographic groups in analyses. Answers to questions focusing on training level and team were considered in analyses as described next.

Training level: We grouped participants based on the highest level of training they had previously received. Armed offender squad (AOS) or special tactics group (STG) training were considered as the most comprehensive types of training followed by protection services/ close protection (PS/CP) training; military training prior to joining New Zealand Police; Frontline Skills Enhancement in District (FSED) or Frontline Skills Enhancement Courses (FSEC) training; and no additional training beyond police integrated tactical training (PITT). However, as training level-specific analyses aimed to compare FSED-trained and not yet trained staff within PoC districts, those with AOS or STG training or PS/CP training or military training prior to joining New Zealand Police were excluded from analyses. Moreover, those with FSEC or FSED training were grouped in analyses in smaller groups based on the total amount of training they had received: FSEC Training; FSEC and FSED days 1 and 2 training; FSEC and FSED Day 1 training; FSED days 1 and 2 training; and FSED Day 1 training. Participants with no additional training beyond PITT followed these groups, being the group with the least comprehensive training in analyses.

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[31] All surveys including answers from police staff or conducted by New Zealand Police must be approved by the New Zealand Police Survey Panel (https://tenone.police.govt.nz/page/support-service-resources/internal-and-external-communication/surveys), which includes key research and business subject matter experts (SMEs) within the organisation who assess the survey to ensure it aligns with business needs and priorities, does not over-burden staff, and is conducted ethically.

[32] Many staff members based at Police National Headquarters (PNHQ) do not have duties expected to be impacted by the TRM. These staff members were not invited to complete the survey, to make sure their answers do not skew survey data, suggesting there is no effect of the TRM on outcome measures when in reality there is an effect.

Team: Members of the tactical prevention team (TPT) and tactical dog team (TDT) and tactical safety coaches (TSCs) were grouped under the 'TRM team', which was considered as the most central group to the TRM followed by the groups including dog handlers; AOS or STG; criminal investigation branch (CIB); public safety team (PST); road policing; and youth aid or community staff. In the analyses, TRM teams were grouped with other tactical capability teams—AOS and STG. Therefore, team-specific analyses included the groups dog handlers; AOS or STG or TRM team; criminal investigation branch (CIB); public safety team (PST); road policing; youth aid or community staff; and 'other'[33].

A preliminary review of Time 1 survey results highlighted a small number of changes that could be implemented to the survey to provide more insightful results on the TRM. These changes are outlined in **Technical Appendix J**. The changes included adding questions and response options specific to the TRM and other changes that do not affect evaluation analyses such as enquiring staff who reported to be based rurally to indicate why they consider their operating environment rural; extending the banded options for age and length of service[34]; and extending the list of types of Events attended in the past 12 months. Pairwise deletion[35] of missing cases was employed in analyses including quantitative data from closed-ended questions.

Analysis

Perceptions of the TRM's implementation and its operational context

To analyse the free text responses to the two open-ended questions included in the Time 2 survey, data was uploaded into NVivo software and coded using Thematic Analysis. One EBPC evaluator coded answers to each of the questions. We used Grounded Thematic Analysis, where themes are created from content without any preconceived ideas or schema, to draft codes.

A total of 146 staff provided a response to the TRM-specific question 'Is there anything else you would like to add related to the Tactical Response Model?'. The six main themes identified through responses were: *General positive or negative sentiment toward the model*; *Implementation*; *FSED training*; *Tactical prevention teams (TPTs)*; *Tactical dog teams (TDTs)*; and *Suggestions for improvement*.

In relation to the broader context of the TRM, 795 participants entered some text when answering the question 'Is there anything else you would like to tell us about your safety, confidence, decision-making, and wellbeing as a police officer?'. However, only 771 of these responses directly answered the question (not including, for instance, 'thank you', 'god bless' or providing feedback on survey questions). The seven main themes identified through responses were: *Staffing*; *Training*; *Firearms (use of)*; *Equipment*; *Leadership*; *Feelings of risk*; and *Wellbeing*.

Respondents' comments could be broken up into multiple themes, and one sentence could be coded to more than one theme. Therefore, the themes could overlap. For example, the first five operational context themes relate to the last two: feelings of risk and wellbeing. For both questions, themes were then broken down further into subthemes. Minor themes (those which did not fit into the seven main themes) all had less than 50 pieces of data coded to them. The analysis also examined the demographics of the participants to these questions, where there was sufficient data, for which purpose the data was uploaded into Microsoft Excel and manipulated using pivot tables.

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[33] Teams grouped under the 'other' category included staff from the capability, crime prevention, District Command Centre (DCC), deployment, firearms, operations, prevention, specialist (e.g., maritime or dive squad) and training teams.

[34] In the evaluation analysis the additional options were collapsed into the Time 1 options.

[35] Pairwise deletion omits cases based on the variables included in the analysis. In this sense, answers from a given participant are considered whenever they are not missing.

Effects of the TRM on ratings of safety, confidence, enablement and wellbeing

We compared participants' ratings over the two survey time points to see whether any changes in answers prior to the TRM and after the TRM was implemented depended upon whether an individual operated in a PoC or a non-PoC district. This 'difference in difference' analysis helps us to attribute any change in ratings from Time 1 to Time 2 in the PoC districts, to being involved in the TRM trial. The non-PoC districts therefore act as a 'control group': Our best indication of what would have happened in PoC districts had they not implemented the TRM.

Whether changes in ratings from before the PoC to after the PoC differed between the PoC and non-PoC districts was tested by conducting ordinal regressions using the ordinal package available in R software. For each regression, the outcome variable was the question's rating scale, and the variable of interest was the interaction between survey time (Time 1 or Time 2) and district (PoC or non-PoC).[36] A 'statistically significant' result for this interaction (p-value less than 0.05) indicates that there was a change between Time 1 and Time 2 ratings contingent on being in a PoC district that was highly unlikely to be found by chance (less than 0.05 probability).

We examined whether there were overall TRM effects considering all PoC districts combined, but also ran regressions separately for each PoC district—as with other quantitative analyses for the evaluation—to see if effects were limited to or more pronounced in specific PoC districts. We were also interested in whether TRM effects were different for different teams and working environments (i.e., urban versus rural). Analysing teams separately enabled us to begin to isolate effects of different elements of the TRM: For example, effects specific to dog handlers would most likely be caused by the TDT element of the TRM; effects specific to AOS/STG/TRM teams would most likely be caused by the TPT element of the TRM. Analysing urban and rural staff separately enabled us to corroborate findings from other methods exploring how the TRM had differentially affected urban and rural staff. A total of 3,420 regression models were conducted for the 76 survey questions, including all the different combinations of district, team[37] and working environment.

To improve our ability to attribute these differences to the TRM, the regressions controlled for demographic variables ('covariates') that might otherwise account for any differences. For example, if length of service made a difference to people's feelings of safety, and if people in the PoC districts tended to have longer service, then any difference in ratings might be due to this difference in service length, not to the TRM. Gender and length of service in police were included as covariates for all of the regressions. For regressions for specific policing teams, urban or rural was also included as a covariate. For regressions specific to urban and rural staff, policing team was used as a covariate. We considered including ethnicity as a covariate but excluded it because of challenges involved in assigning participants to ethnicity categories given they could select multiple ethnicities.

When interpreting the results of these analyses, several caveats apply that limit our ability to draw firm conclusions that significant results are effects of the TRM. First, it is likely that the individuals who responded to the survey in Time 1 were not the same as those who responded to the survey in Time 2. We cannot rule out that significant effects were due to different people taking the survey rather than changes in individuals' feelings caused by the TRM.

Second, occasionally the regression models were unable to include covariates due to a lack of variability in responses. In these circumstances, we report uncontrolled regression coefficients excluding covariates, indicating that conclusions about TRM effects from these regression models are less firm because they do

[36] If a given question had a response option of 'prefer not to answer', participants who selected that option were excluded from the analysis.

[37] A separate analysis was not conducted for the 'other' police team group because of the miscellaneous nature of this category.

not control for differences between the PoC and non-PoC districts in the makeup of participants, aside from having the TRM in their district.

Lastly, given the large number of regression models and the nature of statistical significance testing, some 'statistically significant' results are likely to appear by chance. With a threshold for 'significance' of 0.05, we can expect significant results about 5% of the time when there is actually no effect, representing 'false positives'. When reporting and interpreting the results, we therefore focus on the pattern of results (i.e., consistency between similar questions or across the PoC districts or across groups) rather than isolated results from a single regression model.

FSED training and ratings of safety, confidence and enablement

We compared Time 2 survey ratings between participants who had received different levels of training, to test whether those who had received FSED training felt safer, more confident, and better enabled, than those who had not received FSED, in several contexts[38]. The contexts were: *In their role as a police officer*; *Due to the tactical training they had received***;** and *In high-risk 3Ts* (focused on FSED Day 1).

As the data was not normally distributed, we used non-parametric difference tests to analyse the data. More specifically, we conducted Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA tests using SPSS to assess the relationship between ratings (an ordinal outcome variable) and training level (a variable of interest with more than two categories). We considered results to be statistically significant if the p-value was less than 0.05, meaning that the results were highly unlikely to be seen by chance. For statistically significant comparisons, we ran a Dunn's post hoc test (pairwise comparisons) to identify which training levels differed and by how much. We report on statistically significant results in the TRM evaluation report.

We have no evidence that teams feeling less (or more) safe were prioritised to receive FSED training, which would prevent us from attributing any difference between FSED-trained and untrained staff to the FSED training. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that any differences between FSED-trained and untrained staff reflect existing feelings of safety, confidence and enablement in these groups, so attributions of any differences to the FSED training are only tentative.

Another limitation of the analysis is that we did not check whether the sample of participants who answered the survey represent the population of operational police staff (i.e., whether the sample has the same makeup in terms of demographic variables of the population). As a result, we cannot assume that results from the survey sample generalise to all operational police staff.

The next section presents the method implemented for the FSED reaction and learning surveys, presenting information on its design and dissemination and then details on how survey data was analysed.

FSED reaction and learning surveys

The questions on the FSED Reaction and Learning surveys focused on the extent to which trainees agreed that different aspects of FSED Day 1 and Day 2 training had been implemented; and that FSED Day 1 and Day 2 training had impacted their skills, competence and confidence, enabling them to make safer decisions and feel safer at work. The surveys also focused on the extent to which trainees agreed that FSED training teachings were applicable to their work.

Design and dissemination

Surveys focusing on FSED Day 1 and FSED Day 2 training were drafted with input from frontline safety improvement programme (FSIP) staff and based on plans for the lessons included in FSED Day 1 and Day

[38] Only Time 2 survey data was considered in this analysis because FSED training was one of the components of the TRM, being implemented during the trial (and not before).

2 training. The only socio-demographic question included in the surveys asked participants in which of the four PoC districts they were based. As FSED training was first provided as part of the TRM, it was available only in districts that were part of the TRM proof of concept.

Online surveys were hosted using SurveyMonkey and included both open-ended questions, answered using free text, and closed-ended questions, answered using a Likert-type scale with five points ('strongly disagree' to 'strongly agree'). The FSED Day 1 Reaction and Learning Survey is depicted in **Technical Appendix K**. The FSED Day 2 Reaction and Learning Survey is depicted in **Technical Appendix L**.

Invitations to answer the surveys were sent to trainees after their training on a weekly basis, based on lists provided by the Royal New Zealand Police College to the EBPC. Trainees were invited to complete the survey between 15 December 2021 and 28 June 2022. Reminders to answer the survey were sent to trainees who were invited to answer the survey in the prior month on day 10 of each month.

Analyses included only surveys that had been completed before 1 July 2022. The table below (**Table B.6**) includes the number of survey invites sent, the number of surveys completed and the survey response rate per district for both FSED Day 1 and FSED Day 2 reaction and learning survey[s]. Response rates varied across districts from 27.9% to 33.2% for the FSED Day 1 survey, and from 18.7% to 33.8% for the FSED Day 2 survey.

Response rates for FSED Day 1 and Day 2 reaction and learning surveys were generally in line with standard response rates for online voluntary surveys. Only the response rate for the FSED Day 2 Reaction and Learning Survey in Counties Manukau was lower than expected, possibly because FSED Day 2 training started to be provided later in this district than in other districts and, as a result, less survey reminders were sent to trainees in this district due to the evaluation PoC period being finalised.

Table B.6: Response rate for the FSED Day 1 and Day 2 reaction and learning surveys

District	FSED Day 1			FSED Day 2		
	Number invites	Number answers	Response rate (%)	Number invites	Number answers	Response rate (%)
Northland	187	56	29.9	147	43	29.3
Counties Manukau	337	94	27.9	284	53	18.7
Waikato	247	82	33.2	226	76	33.6
Central	298	96	32.2	284	96	33.8
Total	**1,069**	**328**	**30.7**	**941**	**268**	**28.5**

Analysis

Descriptive analyses for each closed-ended question, including percentage of answers per scale-point, were conducted using SPSS. Answers to open-ended survey questions were thematically coded using NVivo. Codes or themes were derived from the data itself, rather than being based on a pre-determined schema. Key findings based on the quantitative data collected in the survey are presented in the TRM evaluation report. These findings are framed using quotes provided by participants in response to open-ended questions in the two surveys.

Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA tests and pairwise comparisons were conducted initially to detect whether trainee perception of closed-ended questions varied across PoC districts. However, as most of the effect sizes for the Kruskal-Wallis tests were only small and the reaction to training was overly positive across PoC districts, these are not presented in the TRM evaluation report.

A limitation of findings from FSED reaction and learning surveys is that we did not assess trainee skills, competence and confidence as approached in FSED training before and after training. As a result, we are not able to assess variation in the perception of trainees of their skills, competence and confidence from before to after the training. We also did not collect from participants other demographic information than the district in which they were based. Therefore, we are not able to assess differences between other demographic groups (than district) in training perception.

Observations

Two different set of observations were implemented as part of the TRM evaluation. The first focused on how the TRM was working in districts and the second focused on how FSED training days 1 and 2[39] were being provided in districts.

More specifically, the aims of the TRM observation were:

- to increase EBPC staff understanding of how the PoC districts operate—and thus be able to provide more insightful explanations of the TRM data; and
- to develop stronger connections with PoC districts (given the inability to visit districts during interviews and focus groups with staff due to COVID-19).

FSED training days 1 and 2 observations focused on exploring how training was being provided in the four PoC districts and contextualising other evaluation findings connected to FSED training based on how training was structured.

TRM observations did not include informed consent as these focused on designing the relationship map of teams and roles involved in the TRM in each PoC district and not on behaviours of specific police staff members. FSED training observations included informed consent from TSCs who coached the training sessions being observed. Observation information sheets and consent forms were sent to TSCs prior to the session to be observed. FSED training sessions were observed only with verbal or written consent from TSCs.

On the day of the observation, EBPC observers checked with TSCs if they had any questions about the information sheet or consent form, addressing these (if any). If consent forms signed by TSCs had not been delivered yet to the EBPC, these were requested from TSCs. FSED training observations focused on how the training was being provided, not focusing on specific trainees or TSCs. Coaches were informed that session impressions and descriptions would be reported in an aggregated manner without any information that could identify which FSED sessions were observed. TSCs and trainees were not identified in final observation reports and notes and electronic documents depicting the observation were stored securely.

An information sheet about the FSED observation was also designed to be delivered to trainees. This was shared with training PoC leads so trainees in the observed sessions could be informed about the observation. In the day of the observation, FSED TSCs either introduced or asked EBPC observers to introduce themselves, emphasising that EBPC observers were attending the session to observe the training and not to observe trainees.

The following sections describe the method deployed to observe the TRM and FSED training in PoC districts.

[39] Only FSED days 1 and 2 training were implemented during the PoC period.

Observation of the TRM in districts

During the first set of interviews and focus groups with police staff involved in or who could be impacted by the TRM, the EBPC noticed that there was a difference in how PoC districts were working, and therefore a difference in how the TRM impacted staff. The EBPC therefore decided to explore in more depth how the TRM and components of the TRM operated and related to each other in different PoC districts. Observations of the TRM in PoC districts were designed with this main purpose and also served the purpose of developing stronger connections between the EBPC and PoC districts (given the inability to visit districts during interviews and focus groups with staff due to COVID-19).

Two staff members from the EBPC were sent to each PoC district for 2–3 days with the aim of understanding the relationships and roles within the TRM. EBPC observers were sent to districts a week prior to staff in PoC districts taking part in the second set of TRM evaluation interviews and focus groups. Arrangements to visit and speak to staff in PoC districts were booked by district TRM points of contact, who facilitated the visit.

EBPC observers were aware that on return they were to create a model of similar construction to that created by the team who visited Counties Manukau, which became the blueprint for all other PoC districts. EBPC evaluators were given a list of questions and roles to speak to in districts, but the parameters were not strict and allowed EBPC observers to follow their own judgement, so the models that were produced are not directly comparable. Once all EBPC staff had returned from districts and completed draft models, meetings between EBPC observers were arranged to ensure that the models for the different PoC districts were consistent in terms of colour, arrow usage, and specificity of content.

When interpreting the TRM evaluation findings based on models from the TRM observation, it is important to keep in mind that TRM observations happened in a specific point in time (a week prior to staff in PoC districts taking part in the second set of TRM evaluation interviews and focus groups). Therefore, district-based TRM models just apply to that point in time and might have changed since the observation. Further, if one model mentions a certain role and others do not, this does not mean that this role is unimportant in those other districts, only that it was not mentioned/visualised at the time of the observation.

Observation of FSED training sessions

The EBPC liaised with FSED training PoC district leads to identify dates that FSED Day 1 and Day 2 training could be observed in districts. Two observations of FSED Day 1 training were conducted in Counties Manukau and Northland. Due to COVID-19 affecting heavily New Zealand at the time and districts moving to provide FSED Day 2 training, only one session of FSED Day 1 training was observed in both Central and Waikato Districts. Two FSED Day 2 training observations were conducted in each of the PoC districts. Two EBPC staff members observed each FSED Day 1 and FSED Day 2 training session. The same EBPC staff members observed all training sessions in a given district. FSED Day 1 training observations occurred between February and March 2022. FSED Day 2 training observations occurred between March and June 2022.

Observation sessions varied in terms of the number of trainees and coaches present, as at the time of observation some districts were already providing 'catch-up sessions' to officers who had not been able to attend prior training sessions. The smallest session observed included only three trainees and two TSCs. The number of trainees in training sessions varied between three and 22, while the number of TSCs varied between two and five. The rate of trainees per coach in training sessions varied between 1.5 (in two 'catch-up sessions') and 7.3 (in one regular session).

Prior to observations, EBPC observers were advised to take notes about what happened during training sessions, including coaching practices and times at which training modules started. EBPC observers were also advised to focus on behaviours and practices during training and not on what they thought of these. As the content of the training and how this varied across districts was not fully known to evaluators, notes were to focus on all training aspects that were notable to evaluators. Before the observation, evaluators

were given the original lesson plan for the sessions to be observed and the schedule for each day of training. EBPC observers were advised that they did not need to know these by heart, but that they should familiarise themselves with the documents before observations.

After the training session was observed, observers typed their notes in a Word document. Observer pairs then merged their notes following a standardised document structure and delivered these to the EBPC team. A review process followed to ensure observation reports included all the information needed for analysis.

A qualitative analysis of observation notes was conducted after FSED Day 1 and FSED Day 2 observation notes were finalised. This analysis had the goal of describing how FSED training was being provided in the different PoC districts, also exploring similarities and differences between districts.[40] The first draft of the qualitative analysis was then fact-checked with EBPC staff members who observed training sessions to verify whether any information had been captured incorrectly or information that should be captured was not captured in analyses. Key findings for FSED training observations were then refined based on feedback from EBPC observers.

The TRM evaluation did not include a large enough number of observations to be conclusive about how FSED training was being provided in PoC districts. The observations also occurred at a specific point in time and speak to how training was being implemented at that time. As a result, training observations and analyses are just descriptive and should not be treated as conclusive or generalisable to all training sessions.

[40] Findings from this analysis also were used to contextualise other evaluation findings connected to FSED training based on how training was structured.

Appendix C. Results tables for police data based impact and outcome measure analyses

The tables below show the Controlled Interrupted Time Series results for police data impact outcome measures, grouped into the most likely pathways from operational impacts to safety outcomes during the PoC period. See **Appendix B** for detail about this method, and **Technical Appendix D** for detailed data dictionaries for the measures. The tables display the 'effects' (differences to what was expected without the TRM) with the highest estimated probabilities. Probabilities closer to 1 indicate a high probability of an effect being present, similar to the concept of 'statistical significance' where small p-values indicate a high likelihood of an effect. We treat probabilities of an effect over 0.95 as 'statistically significant', and those between 0.90 and 0.95 as indicating a high probability an effect of a given size from which we draw more tentative conclusions. For the high probability effects, the tables show the range within which 95% of possible values of the effect fall ('95% credible intervals') and the average of the distribution of possible effect values ('average estimated effect'). For example, an average estimated effect of -20% within a 95% credible interval of -10% to -30% means that the average estimate was that the PoC district was 20% lower than expected, but the estimates almost all ranged between 10% and 30% lower than expected without the TRM.

Use of force impacts and assault on police outcomes

Pathway to safety: FSED training should reduce use of force (and complaints about use of force) through improving officers' decision-making and tactical options use in situations posing a risk to their safety. The TRM should reduce assaults on police through the FSED training improving officers' decision-making and tactical options use in situations posing a risk to their safety. In the long term the TRM should reduce assaults on police by improving proactively prioritising and reducing risk from offenders at high-risk of assaulting police.

Table C.1: Results for use of force impacts and assault on police outcomes: high probability average estimated effects and 95% credible intervals

	Measure	Northland		Counties Manukau		Waikato		Central		All PoCs	
		Number	Rate	Number	Rate	Number	Rate	Number	Rate	Number	Rate
IMPACTS	**TOR: use of force Events[a]**	-	-	-24%† (-60% - 12%)	-32%* (-70% - 4%)	-	-	-	-	-17%* (-31% - -5%)	-17%* (-28% - -5%)
	- proactive	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	- reactive	-	-	-23%† (-55% - 10%)	-21%† (-52% - 10%)	-	-	-36%* (-69% - -3%)	-26%† (-63% - 12%)	-20%* (-36% - -4%)	-17%* (-36% - 2%)
	- empty hand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-36%† (-90% - 16%)	-32%† (-76% - 8%)	-18%† (-42% - 7%)	-
	- OC spray	§	§	-	-	-	-	43%† (-15% - 110%)	-	-	-
	- TASER	§	§	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	- firearm	§	§	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	- dog	§	§	-	-	-54%† (-119% - 11%)	-44%† (-108% - 19%)	-	-	-	-
	- other	§	§	-	-	-	-	-65%† (-157% - 45%)	-70%† (-161% - 20%)	-40%* (-85% - 3%)	-44%* (-94% - 6%)
	TOR: # tactics[b]	-	N/A	-	N/A	-	N/A	-	N/A	-	N/A
	Use of force complaints[c]	-	N/A	-63%* (-107% - -19%)	N/A	-	N/A	214%† (-98% - 490%)	N/A	-29%* (-60% - 3%)	N/A
OUTCOMES	**NIA: assaults on police[d]**	-	-	-17%† (-39% - 6%)	-15%† (-38% - 6%)	-	-	11%* (0% - 21%)	-	-	-
	HR: injury assaults[e]	-52%† (-123% - 22%)	-36%† (-90% - 9%)	-	85%† (-37% - 218%)	-	-	-	-	-	-19%† (-45% - 7%)
	TOR subjects injuring staff[f]	-	-	-55%* (-120% - 9%)	-	-	-	-	-	-34%† (-79% - 11%)	-40%† (-94% - 17%)

*>0.95, †0.90-0.95 probability of an effect (difference to expected during the PoC period based on best matched control districts).

§ Insufficient Records in the PoC period for the statistics to run.

[a] Number of tactical options report (TOR) CARD Events, and rate per 10,000 relevant Events attended. "TOR CARD Events" means CARD Events with one or more linked tactical options reports (TORs), indicating the reportable use of force by one or more officers. "Relevant Events" means CARD Event Types to which TOR reports have been linked in the past. Of the 'other' tactics, most are handcuffs/restraints with pain compliance; the remainder are baton, 'other', weapon of opportunity, sponge round and riot shield.

[b] Median number of tactical options used per officer in the TOR CARD Event, on average across all TOR CARD Events.

[c] Number of complaints about police use of force received by the IPCA.

[d] Number of assault on police offence Events, and rate per 10,000 relevant Events attended. "Assault on police offence Events" means CARD Events with a linked NIA Occurrence that includes one or more Offences with qualifying NIA Offence codes. "Relevant Events" means CARD Event Types at which police assaults have occurred in the past.

[e] Number of assault on police Incidents that resulted in injury (rather than near miss), and rate per 100 Incidents. "Assault on police Incident" means Incident Reports from MyPolice that HR have coded as involving an assault on police.

[f] Number of tactical options report (TOR) CARD Events where police were injured by a subject, and rate per 100 TOR CARD Events. "police injured by a subject" means at least one officer received an injury caused by a subject, rather than self or other officer, as recorded in the TOR for the Event.

Firearms impacts and outcomes

Pathway to safety: Prioritising people at high-risk of using firearms at police should increase (in the short term) the number of occasions where firearms are located, and the proportion of wanted HROs arrested, through proactively deploying specialist capability to risk. In the long term, this pathway should lead to fewer occasions where firearms are located. The TRM should reduce the use of firearms against police and the public through risk-based deployment reducing risk from HROs via arrests and firearms seizure.

Table C.2: Results for firearms impacts and outcomes: high probability average estimated effects and 95% credible intervals

	Measure	Northland		Counties Manukau		Waikato		Central		All PoCs	
		Number	Rate	Number	Rate	Number	Rate	Number	Rate	Number	Rate
IMPACTS	**NIA: wanted HRO arrests**[a]	–	-7%† (-18% - 4%)	–	-9%† (-22% - 4%)	-18%* (-34% - -2%)	-18%* (-26% - -10%)	–	–	-10%† (-25% - 5%)	-9%* (-18% - 0%)
	PROP: seizures[b]	–	N/A	24%* (-5% - 52%)	N/A	–	N/A	–	N/A	–	N/A
	GunSafe: located[c]	–	–	–	-14%* (-29% - 1%)	-54%* (-92% - -18%)	–	–	–	-24%* (-41% - -8%)	-13%* (-22% - -3%)
	NIA: located[d]	82%* (56% - 106%)	65%* (35% - 92%)	26%† (-5% - 57%)	28%* (-1% - 59%)	–	–	-24%* (-50% - 3%)	–	–	13%† (-4% - 29%)
← INCREASINGLY SPECIFIC OUTCOMES	**NIA: used**[e]	–	–	22%*∿ (0% - 45%)	26%*∿ (3% - 50%)	–	21%*∿ (1% - 42%)	-21%* (-44% - 0%)	-18%† (-40% - 3%)	–	–
	NIA: violence[f]	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	NIA: robbery[g]	–	–	121%*∿ (18% - 234%)	117%*∿ (12% - 233%)	-73%* (-148% - 9%)	-73%* (-148% - 3%)	–	–	–	–
	NIA: burglary/ theft[h]	-100%* (-188% - -3%)	-100%* (-190% - -13%)	-100%* (-219% - 15%)	-100%* (-218% - 17%)	–	–	§	§	–	–
	NIA: other[i]	–	–	41%†∿ (-17% - 91%)	56%*∿ (3% - 110%)	–	–	-51%* (-102% - -3%)	-51%* (-102% - -4%)	–	–
	GunSafe: use at police[j]	–	–	–	–	–	–	-75%† (-165% - 15%)	-84%* (-170% - -2%)	–	-58%* (-127% - 11%)
	NIA: use at police[k]	–	–	–	–	–	–	-100%† (-221% - 21%)	-100%† (-249% - 55%)	-100%* (-201% - 1%)	-100%† (-215% - 22%)

*>0.95, †0.90-0.95 probability of an effect (difference to expected during the PoC period based on best matched control districts).

∿ trend not consistent with an effect of TRM but consistent an exogenous event(s) during the PoC period (see Appendix B for further explanation).

§ Central result for NIA: burglary/theft not reported due to best matched districts prediction being consistently less than 0 per month, signalling a spurious result.

[a] Number of wanted high-risk POIs who were *arrested within 30 days* (of being recorded as wanted). "Wanted high-risk POIs" means people with one or more NIA alerts indicating they were wanted to arrest or interview with risk indicators present in NIA (including certain alerts, past Offences, and gang membership; these indicators are a subset of the risk indicators used by TacInt when assessing risk). "Arrested within 30 days" means a custody Record was created with an arrest date within 30 days of the wanted alert.

[b] Number of cases recorded in PROP where firearms or firearms parts were seized.

[c] Number of GunSafe Records that involved a firearm being located, and rate per 100 GunSafe Records. "Firearm located" means a firearm was located, recovered, seized or surrendered.

[c] Number of firearm located offence Events, and rate per 10,000 relevant Events attended. "Firearm offence Events" means Events with a linked NIA Occurrence that includes one or more Offences involving firearms being located (Arms Act offences such as possessing a prohibited firearm). "Relevant Events" means CARD Event Types at which firearms offences have occurred in the past.

[e] Number of firearm used offence Events, and rate per 10,000 relevant Events attended. "Firearm offence Events" means Events with a linked NIA Occurrence that includes one or more Offences involving firearms being used. "Relevant Events" means CARD Event Types at which firearms offences have occurred in the past.

[f] Number of violence firearm victimisations and rate per 10,000 residential population. "Firearm victimisations" means victim Offences committed with firearms. Violence includes homicide, assault, sexual assault, threats and harassment.

[g] Number of robbery firearm victimisations and rate per 10,000 residential population. "Firearm victimisations" means victim Offences committed with firearms.

[h] Number of burglary/theft firearm victimisations and rate per 10,000 residential population. "Firearm victimisations" means victim Offences committed with firearms.

[i] Number of other firearm victimisations and rate per 10,000 residential population. "Firearm victimisations" means victim Offences committed with firearms. "Other" means miscellaneous other Offence categories and predominantly includes presenting or discharging a firearm.

[j] Number of GunSafe Records that involved firearm use at police, and rate per 100 GunSafe Records. "Firearm use at police" means a firearm was presented or discharged at police officers, police dogs, police vehicles, and police premises.

[k] Number of firearm use at police offence Events per 100,000 relevant Events attended. "Firearm use at police offence Events" means Events with a linked NIA Occurrence that includes one or more Offences of presenting or discharging a firearm at police. "Relevant Events" means CARD Event Types at which firearms were used at police in the past.

Methamphetamine impacts and outcomes

Pathway to safety: Prioritising HROs involved in methamphetamine production and supply should increase (in the short term) the number of occasions where methamphetamine is seized, through proactively deploying specialist capability to risk (as indicated by methamphetamine production and supply). The TRM could reduce the amount of methamphetamine being consumed through proactively prioritising HROs, thus disrupting production and supply. This measure is a proxy measure for community safety with respect to methamphetamine. It reflects the prevalence of harm from methamphetamine use in the community.

Table C.3: Results for methamphetamine impacts and outcomes: high probability average estimated effects and 95% credible intervals

	Measure	Northland		Counties Manukau		Waikato		Central		All PoCs	
		Number	Rate	Number	Rate	Number	Rate	Number	Rate	Number	Rate
I	**PROP: meth. seizure cases[a]**	30%* (-2% - 60%)	N/A	-15%† (-36% - 3%)	N/A	-19%† (-39% - 4%)	N/A	-17%* (-30% - -4%)	N/A	-10%* (-19% - -1%)	N/A
O	**Meth. consumption[b]**	N/A	-	N/A	-	N/A	23%*∿ (2% - 43%)	N/A	-	N/A	-

*>0.95, †0.90-0.95 probability of an effect (difference to expected during the PoC period based on best matched control districts).

∿ trend not consistent with an effect of TRM but consistent an exogenous event(s) during the PoC period (see Appendix B for further explanation).

[a] Number of methamphetamine property cases. "Methamphetamine property cases" means cases recorded in PROP involving methamphetamine, amphetamine or precursors being seized by police.

[b] Estimated rate of methamphetamine consumption (milligrams per day) per 1,000 population. "Methamphetamine consumption" means the amount of drug biomarker detected in the wastewater. "Population" means the estimated residential population in the wastewater treatment plant catchment zones tested in a given month. PoC period data is only for 5 of the 6 months of the TRM trial.

AOS impacts

Pathway to safety: TPTs should reduce the number of pre-planned deployments and AOS TOIL, through deploying TPTs to pre-planned Events that would otherwise be AOS deployments. In the long term, the TRM should reduce the number of emergency AOS deployments through prioritising and reducing risk from HROs.

Table C.4: Results for AOS impacts: high probability average estimated effects and 95% credible intervals

AOS impacts	Northland	Counties Manukau	Waikato	Central	PN area[a]	All PoCs
Number of pre-planned AOS deployments	-43%* (-91% - 3%)	-45%† (-99% - 34%)	-	-	-55%* (-139% - -1%)	-27%† (-61% - 5%)
Number of emergency AOS deployments	-	-	-	-	-75%* (-140% - -12%)	-
Number of AOS TOIL instances	42%*∼ (1% - 81%)	-	-	-59%* (-112% - -10%)	-	-

*>0.95, †0.90-0.95 probability of an effect (difference to expected during the PoC period based on best matched control districts).

∼ trend not consistent with an effect of TRM but consistent an exogenous event(s) during the PoC period (see Appendix B for further explanation).

[a] Palmerston North Area, which had a TPT, compared with best matched Areas within.

Appendix references

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