# State Services Commission

## Commission of Inquiry into Police Conduct

Report on Change Management Programme Progress

Third Phase of Review
November 2010

# Restrictions

- This Report has been prepared solely for the purposes stated herein and should not be relied upon for any other purpose. We accept no liability to any party should it be used for any purpose other than that for which it was prepared.

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- We have not independently verified the accuracy of information provided to us, and have not conducted any form of audit in respect of the New Zealand Police. Accordingly, we express no opinion on the reliability, accuracy, or completeness of the information provided to us and upon which we have relied.

- The statements and opinions expressed herein have been made in good faith, and on the basis that all information relied upon is true and accurate in all material respects, and not misleading by reason of omission or otherwise.

- The statements and opinions expressed in this report are based on information available as at the date of the report.

- We reserve the right, but will be under no obligation, to review or amend our Report, if any additional information, which was in existence on the date of this report was not brought to our attention, or subsequently comes to light.

This report is issued pursuant to the terms and conditions set out in the Contract with SSC dated 25 May 2010.

# PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS ⊞

Helene Quilter
State Services Commission
PO Box 329
Wellington 6011

3 November 2010

Dear Helene

**State Services Commission - Commission of Inquiry into Police Conduct**

In accordance with the terms of our contract with you dated 25 May 2010, we attach our report on our third phase review of the Commission of Inquiry into Police Conduct.

We have greatly enjoyed our interactions with your team and Police in the course of preparing this report. Police is a very special organisation and one that faces unique challenges. Thank you once again for the opportunity to undertake this project.

If you require any clarification or further information, please contact me on (04) 462 7182.

Yours sincerely
PricewaterhouseCoopers

Debbie Francis
**Partner**

# Glossary of Terms

| | |
|---|---|
| AO | Authorised Officer |
| CEA | Collective Employment Agreement |
| COI | Commission of Inquiry |
| CSA | Crime Scene Attendants |
| CVIU | Commercial Vehicle Investigation Unit |
| EBA | Excess Blood Alcohol |
| EPM | Employment Practice Managers |
| FTO | Field Training Officer |
| HR | Human Resources |
| ICT | Information and Communication Technologies |
| MPES | Maori, Pacific and Ethnic Services |
| NCO | Non Commissioned Officer |
| NIA | National Intelligence Unit |
| NIC | National Intelligence Centre |
| OAG | Office of the Auditor General |
| OD | Organisational Development |
| PCT | Physical Competency Test |
| PEC | Police Executive Committee |
| PEM | Police Executive Management |
| PIB | Police Infringement Bureau |
| PIP | Performance Improvement Plan |
| PNHQ | Police National Headquarters |
| PPS | Police Prosecutions Service |
| PSG | Professional Standards Group |
| PwC | PricewaterhouseCoopers |
| RNZPC | Royal New Zealand Police College |
| SAR | Search and Rescue |
| SCG | Strategic Change Group |
| SOCO | Scene of Crime Officer |
| SOI | Statement of Intent |
| SSC | State Services Commission |
| TSC | Training Service Centre |
| TOIL | Time off in Lieu |
| YES | Youth Education Services |
| 1,2 3 stations | Police stations staffed by only one, two or three constables |

# Table of Contents

# 1. Executive Summary

Although significant progress on culture change at New Zealand Police has been achieved, progress in relation to the Commission of Inquiry seems to have reached a plateau. Improvements in practice around human resource management and integrity issues are required to achieve further progress. Urgent, co-ordinated and decisive action is now required to ensure that the case for change in Police is refreshed and management practices are better aligned with policy and rhetoric.

1.1.1. This review is the third by the State Services Commission ('SSC'), in conjunction with PricewaterhouseCoopers ('PwC'), examining the change process undertaken by New Zealand Police ('Police') following from the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry into Police Conduct 2004-7 ('COI'). It builds on initial reviews of change management effectiveness and human resources performance frameworks undertaken in 2007-8 and 2009. The report makes a number of practical suggestions and recommendations for management action to assist Police with culture change and ensure that the programme of work supports Police's wider strategic goals and policing reform programme (known as "Policing Excellence").

1.1.2. This review finds that many of the recommendations of the 2009 review have not been acted on or have not found traction. Much of what was observed in 2007-8 and 2009 still stands. This year our review has had a stronger focus on the employment relations area and COI recommendation 37, which required Police to develop a good practice employment relations framework. Accordingly, we probe more deeply into matters of employee performance management and employment relations strategy.

1.1.3. This review found continued positive progress in some respects. The Code of Conduct is now well-embedded in Police culture, and meaningful discussions on matters of ethics, integrity and conduct happen at all levels in the organisation in a more open way than was the case at the time of the first review. This is a strong indicator of improving organisational health. Almost all of those we spoke to in this year's review felt that positive change was still gathering momentum and that much had been achieved since Dame Margaret Bazley's report.

1.1.4. All findings should also be considered in the context of New Zealand Police's comparative freedom from entrenched or systematic corruption throughout its history. In this, New Zealand Police are virtually unique in comparison with other jurisdictions. Although there are some who lack trust in the service, New Zealand Police also has consistently high levels of public trust and confidence. Further, the trend is toward improvement and is positively correlated with crime reduction rates. This is unlike the situation in most western jurisdictions, in which, although crime is decreasing, public trust and confidence continue to worsen.

**Figure 1  Percentage of Public Trust and Confidence in the New Zealand Police**

1.1.5. Another sign of health in Police is the increasing maturity of strategic vision and the leadership and innovation that is occurring within the policing reform programme. Few police services have the vision and aspiration of our own. Although the findings outlined below and the lack of traction with regard to culture change are problematic, we should not lose sight of the fact that there is much to be proud of with respect to policing in New Zealand.

## 1.2. 2010 Findings

1.2.1. This review found that in order to maintain COI-related actions that will ensure successful transition to a high-performing organisation comparable with best practice, Police at all levels need to grasp that there is a need for fundamental change. Change cannot be limited to the careful technical implementation of policies based on our recommendations. In particular, we find that:

1.2.1.1. Senior management lacks the confidence and adeptness to make bold, circuit-breaking, and symbolic moves that will change the DNA of the organisation, signal to staff at all levels that poor performance and behaviour will not be tolerated, and that a new type of leader in Police will be fostered and advanced. Management has tolerated the continuation and even appointment of some of the wrong people in high places. Managers have sometimes failed to act decisively on high profile incidents when a strong gesture has been required;

1.2.1.2. While COI-related issues remain highly relevant within Police, the COI now lacks urgency as a platform. The case for change needs to be refreshed in light of the policing reform programme, so that change remains urgent and meaningful, particularly to newer Police staff;

1.2.1.3. The theoretical and policy toolkit supporting COI-related change is now embedded and of sound quality. Police have been diligent in implementing some of the recommendations. Many tools however, are not well used in practice, which means that while compliance may technically have been achieved, cultural change has not. This is true particularly with regard to the triaging of performance matters and the management of poor performers;

1.2.1.4. There is inconsistency in management style, quality and practice at all levels within and across Police Districts. There are pockets of both first-rate and very poor performance. This means staff do not hear consistent messages from managers. There is also a widespread feeling among staff that senior management are out of touch with the pressures faced by the frontline;

1.2.1.5. Police middle managers, particularly NCOs and Area Commanders, are not well-equipped with respect to performance management and need to be supported to lift their skills and confidence. Middle management efforts will be undermined while non-performers at middle and senior levels remain unaddressed;

1.2.1.6. Human resources management in Police has to change to offer a more strategic and modern approach. In making this transition it has to confront a range of existing practices including those in recruitment, appointments, and performance. HR management has to align activities more tightly to the Police programme in order to enable the overall policing programme. More emphasis on core competencies, management development, talent management, career pathing, and succession is required. A greater link between core HR activities training is also needed;

1.2.1.7. There is a specific need for new approaches to coaching and talent management, including a targeted programme for women;

1.2.1.8. The Professional Standards Group ("PSG") was established for a different purpose than is presently required. It has struggled to integrate with the new methods required to support cultural change and to take a leadership role in building integrity within Police. It remains case-based and has not performed a strategic function in the reform programme. Accordingly, it does not enjoy widespread respect;

1.2.1.9. Change at the Royal New Zealand Police College ("RNZPC") and the Training Service Centre ("TSC") has not gone far enough. Culture is not reflective of the values and behaviours required by the COI findings and some staff may be inappropriate role models of integrity and high performance; and

1.2.1.10. Although the Police Executive has a role in the development of an employment relations strategy, the role is too muted. A reformed HR function would assist the Executive to take more control of the strategy, integrating it more directly into the overall business strategy for Police and operating in a way that the HR Group can implement it.

1.2.2. Although Police now has the legislative framework, management tools, and policies to support a modern approach to performance management and employee disciplinary matters, managers, unions, and central HR continue to apply old-paradigm mindsets to their use. While the theoretical settings are fundamentally changed and many respondents feel that progress has been made, to our eyes, progress is limited to some of the more obvious behavioural problems. There is low confidence on the part of managers to use the full suite of tools that are now at their disposal. This confidence is lowest in relation to management of poorly-performing staff. This affects actual practice and contributes to perceptions that undermine the overall policing reform programme. This approach differs significantly from the zero tolerance approaches taken in other agencies that face high public expectations with respect to integrity.

1.2.3. While we again found the overall level of reflective practice and candour in Police impressive, we admit to having developed some impatience with the many comments we have heard along the lines of "this change will be slow - it's generational". While this is partly true, adept change leadership uses symbols, stories and examples in the short-term to seed longer-term change and to jolt staff into understanding that leaders are serious about the new ways of behaving. Simple things, such as moving to regulate all Police bars, stressing the importance of physical competency test ("PCT") compliance for all Police, and removing a handful of non-performers and inappropriate role models, would have profound signalling power.

1.2.4. Taken together, these key findings place at risk not only the changes in culture advocated in the COI findings but the wider reform programme of change in policing practice. These issues are all resolvable, but require urgent and decisive management action.

# 2. Background

*"I unreservedly and unequivocally apologise to the women who were caught up in the actions of those few officers. I acknowledge the hurt and harm that's been done and the grief that's been caused to you, your families and supporters.*

*To the women of New Zealand I say: I have been disgusted and sickened, as you will be, by the behaviour put before the Commission of Inquiry in many of the files that covered some 25 years of our recent history.*

*On behalf of the Police leadership, present and past, can I say this to the overwhelming number of good people serving or who have served in the Police: You and your families do us great credit. I have already asked each of you to stand firm with me in the face of this character test. I now ask all the serving members to join with me to make the changes necessary to prevent this sort of behaviour ever happening again."* [1]

2.1.1. This review relates to the change management programme currently being undertaken by New Zealand Police, following from the COI into Police Conduct 2004-7.

2.1.2. The COI reported to Parliament in April 2007 with 60 recommendations, 48 of which Police had responsibility to implement. These recommendations entailed extensive organisational change and placed a premium on effective change leadership and implementation practice.

2.1.3. The Police Commissioner asked the State Services Commissioner to provide him with advice, in line with recommendation 59 of the COI, to ensure that Police took account of best practice in the state sector as the work programme was undertaken.

## 2.2. The 2007 Review

2.2.1. An initial SSC-Police review of progress toward the implementation of the COI recommendations, undertaken in late 2007, took the form of an interim evaluation of the effectiveness of the Police change programme. It used John Kotter's change management framework to identify the following key questions:

- How effectively are the changes being led?

- Are changes being given urgency and priority?

- Do Police have an appropriate change management 'toolkit' and the skills to use it?

2.2.2. The review found that corporate change management, focussed on culture and capability shift, was new to Police, and that the changes that had been secured to date were fragile. While the leadership being applied to the change was strong, and processes and systems supporting change appeared sound, reviewers were concerned about a lack of managerial skills required to drive home change implementation, and to change behaviours at the 'frontline'.

2.2.3. The review recommended:

- Greater urgency around the case for change;

- Improved prioritisation of the many change projects underway at Police, and evidence of trading-off;

- A more systematic strategy for internal and external communications;

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[1] Howard Broad, Commissioner of Police, at a media conference on the release of the Commission of Inquiry report, 3 April 2007.

- That mechanistic changes in policies and procedures be balanced by change at a 'hearts and minds' level;

- That change imperatives are more strongly felt by staff outside the executive, particularly middle managers and key frontline influencers within the organisation; and

- Greater evidence of traction at line management level, with sergeants and others who mentor junior officers clearly understanding required changes, being equipped with the tools to secure them, and being supported to model and incentivise appropriate behaviours on a practical day-to-day basis.

2.2.4. In 2007 the SSC also undertook, in response to recommendation 37 of the COI Report, a review of performance management frameworks at Police, in the context of legislative changes that 'modernised' the Police disciplinary system and brought it into line with conventional employment practices. This review resulted in the development of a 'good practice performance management framework', including measures of progress toward the integration of performance management and disciplinary procedures within the HR function.

## 2.3. The 2009 Review

2.3.1. In the second phase of review, six key dimensions of the Police change programme were explored:

- Change infrastructure: what systems and processes have been placed around the change programme to maximise its effectiveness?

- Culture of integrity and performance: how effectively have Police put arrangements and safeguards in place to ensure that the lapses in Police integrity that gave rise to the COI will not, in future, be repeated? How effectively has a high-performance culture been developed?

- Attitudes and skills of leadership: how well are leaders managing and modelling the changes required?

- Integration with day-to-day work: how well-embedded is the change programme in everyday operations?

- Integration with HR processes: how well-integrated is the change programme with HR systems, processes and work programmes?

- Change management: are the change processes in line with best practice in the state sector?

2.3.2. The second phase of review in 2009 found that:

- The Police change programme was consistent with state sector good practice;

- Excellent progress had been made in triaging and project managing key change initiatives to the extent that an excellent foundation for organisational culture change had now been laid;

- The next phase of change must be tightly focussed on implementation and management issues, particularly at NCO or Sergeant/Senior Sergeant level and below;

- The many current change initiatives should now be simplified and reprioritised, with as many as possible driven through business-as-usual line management rather than as special initiatives. Change positioning moving forward should reflect the notion that changes are not "projects"; rather they are "how Police do business";

- As Police build on the progress in cultural shift made to date, the organisation continues to face other major challenges. Current resource utilisation and value

for money pressures actively reinforce the need for a streamlining and normalisation of change;

- Although the attitudes of those interviewed were largely positive, Police success in embedding changes into line management or business-as-usual could not be taken for granted at this time. There was a need to remain diligent and to keep the rationale for change fresh, urgent, and relevant at all levels in the organisation; and

- The monitoring regime by SSC should move to a results-based approach.

2.3.3. The 2009 review expressed the view that change management in Police needed to move from a stand-alone add-on managed largely from the senior leadership team at Police National Headquarters ("PNHQ"), to an integrated and consolidated approach managed on a devolved basis as part of business-as-usual.

Figure 2. From *Change* Management to Change *Management*



| *From* **Change** management | *to* change *Management* |
| --- | --- |
| Add | Align |
| Atomise | Consolidate |
| Projectise | Link to strategy |
| Train | Develop |
| High touch, high investment | Light touch, selective investment |
| Internalise | Refer external exemplars |
| Drive from the top | Drive through the line |
| Eliminate risk | Mitigate risk |
| Lead | Manage |

2.3.4. The 2009 report warned of the risks of allowing the changes to remain top-down. It suggested that it was time to weave what has been developed and learned into business-as-usual, and to focus on the accountabilities and people management skills of middle managers and front-line supervisors.

2.3.5. It also suggested a shift from a deficit-driven approach of righting cultural and behavioural wrongs, to a more aspirational approach to building confidence and skills to make Police all that it can be as a modern, high-performance organisation.

# 3.  Review Dimensions & Methodologies

3.1.1.  In this third phase of review, five key dimensions of the Police change programme were explored as follows:

- An organisational culture of integrity and performance;

- The attitudes and skills of leaders;

- Change management practice and performance;

- A comprehensive performance management approach; and

- Employment relations practice and performance.

3.1.2.  The first three dimensions have been the focus of prior reviews, enabling direct comparisons with earlier results. Dimensions four and five are new in 2010. They are intended to address the issues raised in the prior reviews with regard to the practice (as opposed to theory) of performance management, and the link between COI-related changes and overall strategies for employment relations.

## 3.2.  Approach

3.2.1.  Our approach utilised five elements:

- A desktop review of Police documentation relating to the change programme;

- High-level review of similar change processes in Police organisations in the UK and other jurisdictions;

- Objective analysis of the Police Engagement Survey and additional customised interpretation of results in relation to organisational culture;

- A series of interviews on aspects of the change process with senior Police Executives and NCOs in a range of Police Districts, PNHQ staff, and external stakeholders; and

- A limited sampling of frontline views by meeting with focus groups of Police NCOs and frontline staff in Wellington, the Bay of Plenty, Gisborne, and Auckland. We also canvassed views of women in Police. We do not pretend that this small group of staff was representative, as statistically they constituted a tiny sampling of the more than 12,000 personnel currently serving in Police, but we felt it was important to engage with this critical group to explore issues and potential solutions more deeply than interviews would allow.

3.2.2.  In this phase of review, we took the approach that if the findings and recommendations made in 2009 were gaining meaningful traction, not only from the 'top to the middle', but from the 'middle to the frontline', we should couch our questions in the language of business-as-usual. We had two additional reasons for this approach: the COI is now firmly in the past for many of the younger frontline staff with whom we spoke, and secondly, we wished to reduce the likelihood of being told what more senior respondents thought we wanted to hear.

3.2.3.  This report crystallises a number of issues relating to the Police change programme to date and to wider issues of implementation, management and performance in a large, complex organisation (subject to uniquely high public and political expectations). It is not intended to constitute an audit or definitive assessment. Rather, it is intended to provide the basis for practical suggestions for Police leadership to consider and take forward.

3.2.4.  The report is also partly subjective in nature. The judgements and suggestions made, while based on interviews, survey findings, and a high-level review of the literature on changing police cultures in other jurisdictions, are also filtered by the reviewers' experience of planning, managing and evaluating large-scale change in

highly accountable public sector entities. Change management is far from an exact science, and a number of the assertions and suggestions made here are not directly traceable back to 'hard evidence'. We have balanced objective analysis and rigorous methodology with more subjective assessments based on a range of experiences with organisational change.

## 3.3. Methodologies

3.3.1. The review evaluated progress in each of the five dimensions outlined above, as summarised below:

- An organisational culture of integrity and performance: results from the stakeholder interviews and targeted focus groups were used to compile Police-specific definitions of integrity and performance and to determine the progress of changes in culture. This assessment is partly subjective and therefore has been underpinned by the reviewers' experience of large scale cultural change in public sector organisations;

- The attitudes and skills of leaders: change leadership involves setting direction and influencing others to give support and commitment to a change initiative and the resulting new organisational culture. The test of success is the demonstration by the workforce of their commitment and ability to successfully deliver the change. For this dimension we used a diagnostic (based on the definition of 15 key leadership actions that describe effective change leadership) as the foundation for our analysis of survey results, focus groups, and interviews. Special attention was taken to ensure a holistic view of leadership, from line management through to middle management and senior leadership;

- Change management practice and performance: the review used John Kotter's[2] framework for successful change, set out in Figure 3 below, as the basis of the assessment of change management effectiveness. This framework has been used in the previous reviews, allowing the assessment of results against the 2007 baseline;

**Figure 3: Kotter's Eight Factors for Successful Change**

- **Increasing urgency**. Change leaders need to help others see the need for change and the importance of acting immediately.
- **Building guiding teams**. There should be a powerful group guiding the change - one with leadership skills, credibility, communication ability, authority, analytical skills, and a sense of urgency.
- **Getting the vision right**. Leaders must clarify how the future will be different from the past, and how staff can make that future a reality.
- **Communicating for understanding and buy-in**. Change leaders need to make sure as many others as possible understand and accept the vision and strategy.
- **Enabling action**. Leaders must remove as many barriers as possible so that those who want to make the vision a reality can do so.
- **Creating short term wins**. Leaders need to create some visible, unambiguous successes as early as possible.
- **Not letting up**. Guiding teams must press harder and faster after the first success. They need to be relentless with initiating change after change until the vision is reality.
- **Making it stick**. Leaders need to hold onto the new ways of behaving and make sure they become ingrained, until they become strong enough to replace old traditions and a new culture is created.

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[2] John Kotter, The Heart of Change, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 1996

- A comprehensive performance management approach: the review focussed on behaviour and practices (rather than policy) in relation to systems, processes, and resources for performance management and monitoring. The actions of frontline supervisors and NCOs were of particular interest, given their huge impact, through modelling, on culture and desirable behaviours; and

- Employment relations practice and performance: through interviews, focus groups, and desktop research, the review considered current employment practices and wider employment relations issues.

### 3.4. Police engagement

3.4.1. We wish to acknowledge the thoughtfulness, candour, and willingness to engage shown by the Police personnel and stakeholders to whom we spoke in the course of preparing this report.

# 4. General Observations & Findings

*"I'd like a kind of Viking funeral for the COI…we need change, and major change, but let's position it positively, and not in such a retrospective, deficit-type way."[3]*

## 4.1. Keeping the case for change current

### The COI

4.1.1. This is the third in a series of reports which will continue for a period of ten years. The OAG is providing more formal audits of progress towards change over the same period. From the outset, monitoring agencies have expected that the process of cultural change in the Police would be a difficult and protracted process. Some police respondents have been troubled by the difficulty of keeping the COI-related case for change fresh and relevant over a protracted period. This is expected and consistent with what we have found. In order to make progress, and particularly rapid progress, commitments to organisational change are required from Police leadership and stakeholders.

4.1.2. Newer recruits felt that the COI was ancient history and emphasised that they had been well-trained in matters of integrity and conduct. They expressed a strong sense of "that was then". This is a positive reflection on a significant part of the change programme.

### A plethora of change projects

4.1.3. Police staff felt that it was hard to see a joined-up change story in Police and struggled to express the current case for change. In particular they found it hard to see the future state vision for Police and to express it in their own language. The approach to the Policing Excellence project to date has been to support a range of pilot initiatives, rather than to define it as an integrated programme of change.

4.1.4. Police staff work from the heart as well as from the head. At all levels they appeared to be hungry for a simple, aspirational change story that unifies the many pilot projects and initiatives underway as part of both COI-related change and the policing reform programme.

4.1.5. The culture is also characterised by professional scepticism. Care will need to be taken that any refreshed case for change is not viewed as yet another PNHQ fad. This is likely to require some bold gestures by Police leadership - both symbolic and actual - to signal the new behaviours and ways of working.

4.1.6. A refreshed, compelling, and simple case for change in which COI-related culture change is tightly linked to Police's new strategy for policing reform is now required. This coherent change story needs to be delivered through line management rather than by means of projects and pilots.

4.1.7. In our experience, it is only possible for managers driving change and the staff on the receiving end of change to maintain the energy of transformational change for so long. Police should carefully align and prioritise COI-related and policing reform progress so that the overall programme does not overwhelm responsible managers and staff.

## 4.2. Progress with respect to 2009 second phase of review

4.2.1. This review found that many of the findings and recommendations of the 2009 review had not yet been acted upon or had not found traction. These findings and recommendations remain relevant and stand now as critical to merge with the revised programme of action as a comprehensive programme of work. Much of what was observed in 2007-8 and 2009 still stands.

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[3] Area Commander, interviewed 2010.

4.2.2. Although Police have shown continued diligence in implementing the letter of the recommendations, many tools are not well used in practice, which means that while compliance has technically been achieved, fundamental cultural change in hearts and minds has not. Some of the recommendations made in the 2009 report have not been fully implemented. Failure to do so places at risk not only some COI outcomes, but the wider reform programme.

4.2.3. For this reason, recommendations this year have been replaced with more granular suggestions to Police management on each dimension of review and consistent with our understanding of the wider Policing reform programme. Police may wish to consider these suggestions as potential items for inclusion in business and implementation plans.

## 4.3. 2010 Findings

4.3.1. This review found that in order to maintain COI-related actions that will ensure successful transition to a high-performing organisation comparable with best practice, Police at all levels need to grasp that there is a need for fundamental change. Change cannot be limited to the careful technical implementation of policies based on our recommendations. In particular, we find that:

4.3.1.1. Senior management lacks the confidence and adeptness to make bold, circuit-breaking, and symbolic moves that will change the DNA of the organisation, signal to staff at all levels that poor performance and behaviour will not be tolerated, and that a new type of leader in Police will be fostered and advanced. Management has tolerated the continuation and even appointment of some of the wrong people in high places. Managers have sometimes failed to act decisively on high profile incidents when a strong gesture has been required;

4.3.1.2. While COI-related issues remain highly relevant within Police, the COI now lacks urgency as a platform. The case for change needs to be refreshed in light of the policing reform programme, so that change remains urgent and meaningful, particularly to newer Police staff;

4.3.1.3. The theoretical and policy toolkit supporting COI-related change is now embedded and of sound quality. Police have been diligent in implementing some of the recommendations. Many tools however, are not well used in practice, which means that while compliance may technically have been achieved, cultural change has not. This is true particularly with regard to the triaging of performance matters and the management of poor performers;

4.3.1.4. There is inconsistency in management style, quality and practice at all levels within and across Police Districts. There are pockets of both first-rate and very poor performance. This means staff do not hear consistent messages from managers. There is also a widespread feeling among staff that senior management are out of touch with the pressures faced by the frontline;

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More emphasis on core competencies, management development, talent management, career pathing, and succession is required. A greater link between core HR activities training is also needed;

4.3.1.7. There is a specific need for new approaches to coaching and talent management, including a targeted programme for women;

4.3.1.8. The Professional Standards Group ("PSG") was established for a different purpose than is presently required. It has struggled to integrate with the new methods required to support cultural change or to take a leadership role in building integrity within Police. It remains case-based and has not performed a strategic function in the reform programme. Accordingly, it does not enjoy widespread respect;

4.3.1.9. Change at the NZPC and TSC has not gone far enough. Culture is not reflective of the values and behaviours required by the COI findings and some staff may be inappropriate role models of integrity and high performance; and

4.3.1.10. Although the Police Executive has a role in the development of an employment relations strategy, the role is too muted. A reformed HR function would assist in the Executive taking more control of the strategy, integrating it more directly in the support of the overall business strategy for Police and operating such that the HR Group can implement it.

4.3.2. Although Police now has the legislative framework, management tools, and policies to support a modern approach to performance management and employee disciplinary matters, managers, unions, and central HR continue to apply old-paradigm mindsets to their use. While the theoretical settings are fundamentally changed and many respondents feel that progress has been made, to our eyes, progress is limited to the more obvious behavioural problems. There is low confidence on the part of managers to use the full suite of tools that are now at their disposal. This confidence is lowest in relation to management of poorly-performing staff. This affects actual practice and contributes to perceptions that undermine the overall policing reform programme. This approach differs significantly from the zero tolerance approaches taken in other agencies that face high public expectations with respect to integrity.

4.3.3. While we again found the overall level of reflective practice and candour in Police impressive, we admit to having developed some impatience with the many comments we have heard along the lines of "this change will be slow - it's generational". While this is partly true, adept change leadership uses symbols, stories and examples in the short-term to seed longer-term change and to jolt staff into understanding that leaders are serious about the new ways of behaving. Simple things, such as moving to regulate all Police bars, stressing the importance of PCT compliance for all Police, and removing a handful of non-performers and inappropriate role models, would have profound signalling power.

4.3.4. Taken together, these key findings place at risk not only the changes in culture advocated in the COI findings but the wider reform programme of change in policing practice. These issues are all resolvable, but require urgent and decisive management action.

## 4.4. Suggestions for Management Action

4.4.1. For this year's review we have changed our usual approach of making high-level recommendations and, instead, make a number of practical suggestions against the relevant review dimensions for the consideration of Police managers. These are suggestions for practical action, based on our understanding of Police and experience of what works in other organisations.

4.4.2. Although a large number of suggestions are made in this section, it is essential that Police align these to policing reform initiatives and prioritise very carefully. Management energy and capacity is finite and the capacity of staff to absorb change is also limited. It will be important not to try and do too much, but rather, to carefully agree the measures that will have most impact.

4.4.3. *Culture of Integrity & Performance*

- Re-launch and restructure the Professional Standards Group, both at PNHQ and in Districts.

- Use membership to the new restructured Group as a rotational appointment for top talent, both locally and at PNHQ. That is, Police selected for their high integrity, investigative ability and ethical leadership are rotated through the positions on a short-term basis as an element within a wider talent management plan.

- Task the group to sample and review integrity-based issues, such as those arising from the COI, in a formal work programme. These could include inappropriate sexual relationships, adult sexual assault investigations, child abuse investigations, bullying and harassment.

- Work with District Commanders to identify quick-win signalling measures on culture and integrity and plan for their implementation.

- Act as decisively, quickly, and publicly as possible on ethical breaches amongst senior managers.

- Shift the training culture in Police from one in which individuals decide on training and specialisation needs to one in which the organisation determines the training path for each employee.

- Centralise the quality assurance and coordination of training products and programmes to minimise duplication between the RNZPC and Districts, to ensure quality standards and maintain alignment with the Police core competency framework.

- Work with staff to revise and promulgate a new Code of Conduct that reflects higher expectations of behaviour.

4.4.4. *Attitudes & Skills of Leaders*

- Fast-track the national implementation of rostering-to-risk models.

- Actively manage or retrain those staff who will not comply with the new models, and give the relevant managers the skills to support this.

- Undertake regular outreach visits by PNHQ staff to Districts over the next 12 months to communicate some of the policing reform initiatives.

- Roster Police managers to frontline (late or night) shifts with the General Duties Branch from time to time, in order to reinforce the importance of frontline policing.

- Reduce the number of Superintendents and Inspectors without line responsibilities at PNHQ and elsewhere.

### 4.4.5. *Change Management Practice & Performance*

- Refresh the case for change and the related internal communications plan. The plan should link and unify change initiatives relating to the COI and policing reform.

- Ensure that all policing reform and COI-related change is led by excellent operational managers (District Commanders, Area Commanders and selected NCOs) to maximise its credibility and practicality. This may require freeing some managers from business-as-usual demands. The resourcing investment needed to drive effective change should not be underestimated.

- Ensure that each manager, from NCO upwards, has COI/policing reform-related goals in their performance. The goals should be tailored to both leadership obligations and business unit contributions.

### 4.4.6. *Comprehensive Performance Management System*

- Provide enhanced initial and ongoing training and support from HR to frontline supervisors in the management of performance appraisals, targeting NCOs and Area Commanders.

- Replace the current performance appraisal system, not because it is flawed *per se*, but because its reputation has become weakened by practical misuse.

- Appraise the performance of staff to a bell-curve distribution.

- Introduce a new intra- and inter-District moderation process for performance appraisals.

- Use the learnings from pilots to develop a new coaching and mentoring model linked to e-Performance and the appraisal system.

- De-couple coaching responsibilities from specific allowances such as   the current Field Training Officer ("FTO") model.

- Use specialist external advisors to train District and Area Commanders on triaging (i.e. categorising new situations into different levels of appropriate response), and to clarify the process differences between performance management and disciplinary proceedings.

- Periodically sample quality of decision triaging with regard to performance management in Districts each year.

- Develop a zero tolerance approach to some behaviours. This would entail the development and promulgation of a fast-track disciplinary process for some behavioural transgressions that reflect low integrity. Areas that might attract such a policy could include:
  - Inappropriate sexual relationships;
  - Bullying; and
  - Sexual harassment.

- Develop an improved mechanism for protected disclosure.

- Reflect on the role, composition, and protocols of the central disciplinary committee.

- Develop a programme within the talent management programme to specifically target women.

- Ensure that the new coaching programme has a focus on coaching female staff and assign appropriate mentors to high-performing female staff.

- Survey women in Police to identify barriers to advancement and elicit suggestions to resolve these.

### 4.4.7. *Employment Relations Practice & Performance*

- Re-specify the central HR function to reflect the strategic capabilities it needs. This could entail:

  - Consolidating HR, training and Organisational Design portfolios into a new strategic leadership role;

  - Greater use of web tools to enable staff to manage transactional issues themselves;

  - Creating a dedicated talent management function;

  - Rethinking the recruitment brand and strategy in the context of policing reform changes; and

  - Completely refreshing the training model and curricula.

- Centralise decision-making for all appointments at Inspector and above.

- Adopt the default principle of using acting roles only as a last resort.

- Ensure externals to the Area/District are included in all promotion panels for NCO and above.

- Reset the policy, communications, and expectations with regard to appointments and promotions.

- Revisit promotional criteria in the context of the work on core competencies and training redesign.

## 4.5. A Possible Roadmap for Implementation

Police have now been subject to three reviews by the SSC and two by the OAG in relation to the COI recommendations. Moving forward will require boldness, courage, and a willingness to 'just do it' in the context of wider Police reform. It will also require a much strengthened strategic HR capability. We recommend careful planning of sequencing and interdependencies with regard to the suggestions made in this report. Police should refine the roadmap below to align to the policing reform programme. Police managers should also be wary of attempting to do too much, or to pilot in a fragmented manner.



**Year 1**

- Re-launch and restructure PSG.
- Task the group to sample and review integrity-based issues in a formal work programme.
- Develop a zero tolerance approach to some behaviours.
- Centralise QA and coordination of training products and programmes.
- Fast-track national implementation of rostering-to-risk models.
- Actively manage or retrain staff who will not comply with the new models. Give managers the skills to support this.
- Undertake regular outreach visits by PNHQ staff to Districts.
- Roster Police managers to frontline (late or night) shifts with the General Duties Branch from time to time.
- Refresh the case for change and the related internal communications plan.
- Use externals advisors to train District and Area Commanders on triaging, and to clarify the process differences between performance management and disciplinary proceedings.
- Reset the policy, communications, and expectations with regard to appointments and promotions.
- Re-specify central HR function to reflect the strategic capabilities it needs
- Revisit promotional criteria in the context of the work on core competencies and training re-design.
- Adopt the default principle of using acting roles only as a last resort.

**Year 2**

- Use PSG membership as a rotational appointment for top talent.
- Develop a programme within the talent management programme to specifically target women.
- Reduce the number of Superintendents and Inspectors without line responsibilities.
- Reflect on the role, composition, and protocols of the central disciplinary committee.
- De-couple coaching responsibilities from specific allowances.
- Ensure all policing reform and COI-related change is led by excellent operational managers.
- Ensure each manager has COI/policing reform-related goals in their personal performance plans.
- Provide enhanced training and support from HR to frontline supervisors for managing performance appraisals.
- Ensure externals to the Area/District are included in all promotion panels for NCO and above.
- Centralise decision-making for all appointments at Inspector and above.
- Introduce a new intra- and inter-District moderation process for performance appraisals.

**Year 3-5**

- Shift training culture so the organisation determines the training path for each employee.
- Work with staff to revise and promulgate a new Code of Conduct that reflects higher expectations of behaviour.
- Periodically sample quality of decision triaging with regard to performance management in Districts each year.
- Survey women in Police to identify barriers to advancement and solicit suggestions to resolve these.
- Appraise the performance of staff to a bell-curve distribution.
- Develop a new coaching and mentoring model, linked to e-Performance and the appraisal system, but not to formal performance management.
- Ensure new coaching programme has a focus on coaching female staff and assign mentors to high-performing female staff.
- Replace the current performance appraisal system.

How can New Zealand Police address the lessons of the COI, change its culture for the better, and achieve its strategy within the next five years?

# 5.    A Culture of Integrity & Performance

*"I do swear that I will well and truly serve our Sovereign lady the Queen in the Police, without favour or affection, malice or ill-will, until I am legally discharged; that I will see and cause her majesty's peace to be kept and preserved; and I will prevent to the best of my power all offences against the peace; and that while I continue to hold the said office I will to the best of my skill and knowledge discharge all the duties thereof faithfully according to law. So help me God."* [4]

## 5.1.    The Challenge of Cultural Change in Police

5.1.1.    There is extensive international literature on the culture of policing and the difficulty of effecting cultural change in police. We briefly consider here, as context, some of the changes in Police culture that have occurred over the history of New Zealand Police.

5.1.2.    Our Police evolved from the armed constabulary of early colonial days to a community service, based on policing by consent. In 1829, Sir Richard Mayne defined the role of Sir Robert Peel's 'new Police', adopted in New Zealand, in these terms:

> *"Protection of life and property, preservation of the peace, along with prevention and detection of crime."*

5.1.3.    By the 1920s, then Commissioner of Police O'Donovan required his officers to be 'peace officers', administering the law in a 'beneficent manner', using their batons in a manner 'scrupulously apportioned' to need. The constable was expected to be a 'moral exemplar'; with the highest qualities of 'deportment, demeanour, alertness, uniform dress, civility and restraint'.

5.1.4.    By the 1960s, Police were in cars with radios and operating within a centralised power structure. They had professionalised and specialised their functions and become focussed on a 'war on crime'. This new professionalism in crime fighting created risks:

> *"They run the risk of becoming, by reason of their professionalism, a 'corps d'elite' set apart from the rest of their community."* [5]

5.1.5.    This approach also somewhat undervalued the work of frontline officers and took Police far from Peel's first principles. These problems led Police to introduce, in the 1970s and in a continuing effort to the present time, new approaches to community-oriented policing that in effect returned policing to its roots.

5.1.6.    The idea was to become more proactive and increase Police visibility. The emphasis was on advisory and educational services, but they remained secondary to crime control. Officers were expected to span the continuum of policing approaches. These ranged from cooperative community partnerships requiring empathy and patience (the 'heart' and 'mind'), to traditional hard responses which simply involved physical presence (the 'body').

5.1.7.    The change was difficult. The traditional role was very clear and simple. The new role was ambiguous and much harder. The decentralisation of Police management that took place during the 1980s involved a cohesive plan to work in partnership with communities to identify and share problems and perspectives. Goldstein[6], the founder of community policing in the United States, described that plan as one that required police to:

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[4] The Constable's Oath.

[5] Quoted in John Van der Heyden, <u>Opportunities for the New Zealand Police to change its organised culture</u>. A research paper in partial fulfilment of the MBA Programme, Victoria University of Wellington, 1997, p12.

[6] Quoted in ibid, Van der Heyden, p25.

> *"Move beyond just handling incidents. It calls for recognising that incidents are often merely overt symptoms of problems."*

5.1.8. The 'problem-solving approach' required new skill sets. Police initiated action to:

- scan communities for persistent or recurring problems;
- analyse all factors associated with the problems to identify the underlying causes;
- implement a range of appropriate responses, not limited solely to law enforcement; and
- establish problem-solving as a standard operating procedure for all field staff.

5.1.9. Community policing involved a proactive, decentralised approach designed to reduce crime, disorder, and fear of crime by involving the same officer in the same community intensively on a long-term basis. Residents would then develop trust and cooperate with Police by providing information and assistance.

5.1.10. Police functional strategies over the last fifteen years have been a mixture of maintaining centralised control and devolving management responsibility in line with this preventative, community-oriented strategy. PNHQ maintains a significant directive and control function for the organisation in areas of payroll, employment conditions, and personnel, legal, and industrial services. However, the last fifteen years have seen greater decentralisation of management, including planning responsibilities, to the District business units.

## 5.2. Policing Reform 2010

5.2.1. The current policing reform programme (known as 'Policing Excellence') is relevant to evolving Police culture and we explore it briefly here. The ethos of this programme, initiated in 2009, is again to move policing back in the direction of a more proactive, community-embedded, preventive model in which Police also address the drivers of crime.

5.2.2. The recent review of policing in the United Kingdom, undertaken by Sir Ronnie Flanagan, defined the challenge for successful 21st century policing in this context of proactive policing as having "the right people in the right places at the right times, doing the right things, in partnership, for the public." This simple mantra applies just as well to New Zealand Police's current reform programme. To it we might also add: 'measured by the right things'. These elements are summarised below:

- **The right people in the right places at the right times**: this is about using constabular officers in a targeted and cost-effective way, improved Police visibility, and better risk/return equations that ensure Police are problem-solving in the right communities at the right times. It will involve using the tactical, intelligence-led deployment approaches that Police are developing, alongside a much more systematic approach to workforce management and better rostering of resources to known demand.

- **Doing the right things:** a victim-centric approach to the delivery of services, in particular building 'duty of care' information and risk systems. This implies culture change within Police, shifting the balance from offender-based strategies to a focus on increased public and victim safety. Police need to involve complainants more in the process of case management.

  Police officers are also weighed down by paperwork. Analysis of the responses to the recent workplace survey shows that current organisational structures,

systems, processes, and risk aversion create unnecessary bureaucracy in policing. Key initiatives here relate to increased online and alternative channel access by the public for non-emergency services, reduction of unproductive activity associated with recording, improved ability for frontline staff to upload real time information from the field, and greater use of discretion on the frontline.

- **In partnership**: policing is not undertaken solely by Police, but is carried out in partnership with other government agencies, private sectors, schools, iwi, local government entities and communities. A partnership approach helps to build trust and confidence and combat low level crimes that, if unaddressed, can lead to more serious threat.

- **Measured by the right things**: a difficulty in answering the question of how well Police is performing is that there is no other organisation in New Zealand performing a similar role against which performance can be benchmarked. The present Police Commissioner believes that although benchmarking against foreign police agencies (for example the State Forces in Australia) has merit and is being pursued, the real test of Police is the recognition the organisation receives amongst all types of organisations, anywhere. In addition, it will be important to move away from public debate that measures Police success in terms of constabular numbers, to a debate that considers Police performance on a variety of service performance measures.

5.2.3. The need for change in Police is a simple value proposition. The public has high expectations of Police. The Police workforce is a highly capable if overly bureaucratic force, many of whom in our experience, passionately wish to achieve a new level of service performance. The limitations are a mix of externally-imposed constraints and current internal culture and management models.

5.2.4. The policing reform programme as envisaged is extensive and is being ably led by District Commanders as sponsors. We consider that the changes to areas of culture and human resources suggested in this review will assist Police to implement its wider reform programme.

## 5.3. Integrity & Ethics

5.3.1. We found that matters of ethics and integrity are now, at a general level, well embedded in everyday Police culture. It is now much more common to have conversations about such matters in informal settings within Police, rather than just in ethics training sessions or other formal events. Whether we raised them in a focus group, interview or I car, Police were keen to discuss such issues, and the debate seemed spontaneous and healthy, particularly at the frontline. A muster briefing in Kapiti-Mana, for example, included the following exhortations by an NCO to constables going on shift:

*"Remember how we are around here: ethical and impartial; integrated - no bullshit between groups; professional - no 'TJF'; considerate - the human touch; fast; we use information and intelligence; quality counts; we're innovative - where we can, we do. Above all, we're honest!"* [7]

5.3.2. We have now spent considerable time with constables on shift in various regions. We never fail to be impressed by their ability to make robust judgement calls on the street, and to switch from the 'catch the criminal' aspect of their role to the empathy, care, and protection modes due to victims. We have seen first-hand direct and often subtle guidance and modelling from NCOs on matters of professional tone and behaviour. We have also seen careful and impressive prioritisation and tasking of section staff according to CIB, Crime Manager or Intel

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[7] 'TJF' stands for 'The job's f____d', a popular shorthand amongst Police who identify a work-related problem.

directives. We are increasingly of the view that any problems that remain with respect to COI-related issues, belong mostly to those in management positions.

5.3.3. We also found that internal communications, such as presentations to staff, training materials, speeches, and newsletters, tended to place significant emphasis on integrity and ethics. Coverage of issues such as standards of conduct, the Code of Conduct, conflicts of interest, discretion, ethics and professionalism is extensive and well-targeted.

## 5.4. The Code of Conduct

5.4.1. The Code of Conduct is now well-embedded in Police culture.

*"[The Code] has had a big effect on the organisation, and will continue to do so. Every member of Police has seen the code, signed the back page, they embrace it – that document has been a very significant underpinning."* [8]

5.4.2. Although it serves as a satisfactory guide to the standards of behaviour that an employer ought to expect from its employees, it does not confront the reality that the standard of conduct expected of Police employees is higher than that expected of the general public, or indeed most other public servants.

5.4.3. The credibility of the Code as a tool to maintain public trust and faith in the Police is dependent on its ability to ensure that Police behaviour on and off the job is beyond reproach. One focus group attendee expressed the view that the Code now needs further follow-up, as it acts as a "bible" for officers and staff. Another said, *"[The Code's] current brand is valuable and incredibly strong."* [9]

5.4.4. At present, the language of the Code does not articulate the higher expectations of behaviour generally expected from Police staff and officers. Additionally, guidance accompanying the Code does not specify inappropriate sexual behaviour as being a potential breach of the Code.

5.4.5. In our view, the Code is now accepted within Police culture but is perceived by some as being "weak". The concept of reflecting the higher expectations placed on Police than the general public should be explored.

## 5.5. Professional Standards

5.5.1. We have concerns about the composition and the work of the PSG at PNHQ and within Districts. A number of respondents commented on the fact that some poor performing staff tended to get 'dressed for export' to the Professional Standards Group and 'stuck there forever'. In our view, the Professional Standards Group should contain role models of probity and performance. One respondent said "the clue is in the name - professional standards - this is a unit in which you want the highest of integrity and the very best of the best. We don't view it this way."

5.5.2. There is a perceived lack of proactiveness and leadership by the Professional Standards Group with respect to integrity issues. It appears to be viewed more as a processing and investigative group than as a power house of probity and integrity, or a guardian of the best attributes of Police culture.

5.5.3. Some interviewees referred to the 'capture' of Professional Standards Group staff in some Districts by Area or District Commanders, resulting in reduced independence and objectivity.

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[8] National Manager

[9] NCO

5.5.4. Several respondents suggested that the Professional Standards Group should be a 'rotational' group through which top talent migrates for a period of time, in order to ensure quality of personnel and mitigate risks of inappropriate influence or capture.

5.5.5. We suggest that it may be timely to review the Professional Standards Group both centrally and in the regions, and consider placing it in a direct reporting relationship with the Commissioner or a Deputy, as would be the case with corporate internal audit or assurance functions. At present, the Professional Standards Group is not respected internally and does not act in a leadership role on integrity issues. There is an opportunity to rethink its role, composition and the attributes required of its staff.

## 5.6. The Royal New Zealand Police College & Training Service Centre

5.6.1. The link between central and District-provided training and development and HR is confusing and appears underdeveloped. A conventional approach would use a competency-based framework at all levels of seniority - from recruit to executive - and map all training and development activities against these. Such a framework is not consistently applied to unify people management initiatives. Training and development activity appears to happen largely at the behest of the staff member from a personal development perspective, rather than according to the requirements of the organisation. Coherent development and career path programmes for individual staff also appear to be rare.

5.6.2. Central to improving Police culture is a more sophisticated training model. While considerable change at the RNZPC and the TSC has been undertaken in recent years, we doubt this has gone far enough. We also suggest that there are opportunities to fundamentally change the Police recruitment brand, and the pre-service and in-service training models.

5.6.3. We consider that training models should transition to the more modern and strategic approaches currently under discussion in Police, as set out below:

**Table 1: Old & New Training Approaches**

| | Previous Training Model | Future Training Model |
|---|---|---|
| Coverage | As many programmes with as many people as possible | Fewer programmes for a smaller number of participants |
| Location | District based to drive common culture | Cross District to drive "innovation" and cross boundary relationships |
| Managerial Support | Ideal but was not a structured part of the programme design | Core prerequisite |
| Incentives | Qualifications and/or exemptions | Fulfilment of personal aspiration and drive |
| Selection | Not contestable, based on rank/role | Contestable based on potential |
| Content | Content heavy with a smorgasbord approach | Individual development plan oriented |
| Linkages | Low integration between components, a focus on programmes that stand as independent entities | Stair-cased programmes with strong explicit linkages |
| Framework Structure | Suite of programmes | Range of programme and non-programme interventions |
| Cost Structure | Mixed costing model  (PNHQ and Districts) | Primarily centrally-funded |

## 5.7. Women

5.7.1. The COI expressed concerns about bullying and harassment of women in Police. We found that both female employees and constabular staff felt that Police internal culture demands personal resilience and assertiveness from female staff. They did not feel that overt bullying or harassment were major issues. However, they did worry about inappropriate sexual relationships in the workplace. What *most* concerned them was the lack of women in senior management roles, particularly at Inspector and above. As one focus group member said:

*"We do need to build women leaders in Police. For sworn women what is going on? For me it's a real sign of failing health in an organisation to have such a dearth of women."*

5.7.2. The issues were summed up by one senior female officer as:

*"[I] don't know whether it's higher standards [for women] but it's been a harder fight. …For a lot of us…the issues are the more insidious ones, having to work with the person who is so anti-women they are probably also anti everything else. And it's those reputational things as a woman; you just can't afford to have that type of stuff sticking to you because it'll stick around a very long time."* [10]

5.7.3. Police have undertaken no formal analysis of the reasons female constabular staff do not progress to senior positions. Anecdotally, women at NCO level told us that they do not apply for Senior Sergeant or Inspector roles as this would likely necessitate a geographical move – difficult if the woman is the family's second income earner. These statements appear not to be supported by Police mobility statistics. Others made comments such as "I'm happy here; I just don't need the politics entailed in going further". We suggest that these issues be probed further.

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[10] PwC PEC member Interviewee, 2010.

**Table 2. The Facts: Women in New Zealand Police, March 2010**

| Rank | No. of Women | Percentage Women |
|------|-------------:|-----------------:|
| Recruits | 22 | 26.6% |
| Constables | 1,289 | 19.6% |
| Sergeants | 134 | 9.8% |
| Senior Sergeants | 42 | 9.9% |
| Commissioned Officers | 21 | 6.9% |
| Total | 1,508 | 17.2% |

### *Getting Ahead*

5.7.4. Most women respondents felt that it took a special kind of woman to get ahead in Police. Women told us in focus groups that:

- "We need to be at least as competent as a male, often more."

- "Building up credibility, part of that is being strong, and not being bowled over easily, standing up for the decisions you make and sticking by them. There's a pressure of continuing to demonstrate that capability."

- "You'd be going in on a one-by-one basis. If you've only got males on the Police Executive Committee ("PEC") and Police Executive Management ("PEM") you'd have to be a unique individual. Visibly you stick out, the support base isn't there, how long can you stick it out and how do we support women in that environment? There would be a lot of eyes on that person, it'd be a very very difficult position to be in. How do we break into it, one female around a totally male table would be almost impossible."

### *Developing Women in Police*

5.7.5. Police have undertaken women's development programmes in some areas as pilots and these have been well received. A more systematic approach is now needed, as part of an overall strategy of talent development, coaching and mentoring. Women respondents were generally opposed to affirmative action policies. They told us in focus groups that:

- "We have to perform at least 100% and slightly above that to be regarded as equal anyway. Policy around gender or equity balance is damaging. People laugh at it, she got there because of the policy rather than her competence. It takes women back."

- "We haven't defined what competence looks like at different levels, and we need to recognise that some people don't want to be promoted. Some people want to be career constables, they need to know how they can develop within that. Develop a path for those who want to stay as constable etc."

- "Individualised performance development, effective performance management, the things that make people want to stay and progress. We need to acknowledge that a lot of women make a deliberate and conscious decision not to progress."

- "We need to address the lack of women in management – individual development plan, champion, mentoring programmes internally."

- "You could continue the emphasis of the leadership development for women programme – it encourages women coming from lower level positions and encourages them over longer periods of time. I'm not sure what the organisational commitment is to that long term as opposed to "attend a course

here" – maybe an enhancement of that process that makes it a prolonged thing, supporting those people to continue with their learning".

5.7.6. Women with whom we spoke were convinced that inappropriate relationships between managers and subordinates continued to exist. They believed that such issues were difficult to deal with for the same reasons that performance management in Police was problematic; "it's hard to have that conversation".

5.7.7. In regard to relationships, bullying or harassment, women with whom we spoke wanted action, not policies. One said:

*"It's important that there's not a whole lot of reactive rules falling out of a specific incident. These things always happen, there's no organisational benefit in having a ten page policy. If you just did performance management and did it well, there'd be a massive change".*

## 5.8. Leadership & Culture at PNHQ

5.8.1. Top Police leadership continues to keep the focus on the COI alive as a driver for change. In mid-2009, the Commissioner had this to say:

*"New Zealand Police is on a long path of change. The allegations that surfaced in 2004 caused huge upheaval and disruption. Would I wish that it had never happened? I would wish that it had happened differently and I wouldn't wish our experience on anyone else.*

*But it gave our organisation an unavoidable kick start. We have made progress with a focus and speed that would not otherwise have been possible.*

*That our staff have survived this, that the public still support us, that we continue to attract such high calibre, competent staff, is testament to the reliance of those who stuck with us throughout, and the leaders who we have begun to grow.*

*We will continue to be monitored by the COI until 2017. It is inevitable that we will be quite a different organisation by that time - better, fitter, stronger and healthier."* [11]

5.8.2. Several respondents commented that, in their observation, the fact that no action had been taken to deal with poor-performing senior staff at PNHQ was impacting negatively on the credibility of policing reform changes. There is a widespread feeling that if Police are to progress as a modern organisation, PNHQ needs to be purged of some staff who were "dressed for export" to PNHQ as a response to past performance issues. As one respondent to the Police Engagement Survey put it:

*"Where have all the staff gone? To bloody PNHQ and Police College working on "projects". It's diabolical."*

5.8.3. Specific individuals were repeatedly referred to. One NCO said: "you know good stuff is happening and us new NCOs really 'get' that management is about people management and role modelling, but it's sickening to think that still, some people seem to get promoted as a reward for bad behaviour. It makes us think twice about being brave on the people stuff because you wonder if the higher-ups will have your back."

5.8.4. This comment from the Police Workplace Survey was indicative of many:

*"Will this survey make any difference...No...Will the Inspectors and others at the top making decisions that affect the hard workers on the street ever have to work under those rules and guidelines....No....There are far to [sic] many idiots promoted because they know how to play the system and are not promoted on merit...I have*

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[11] Howard Broad to Griffith University and Queensland Police, July 2009.

*heard far too often from colleagues that this Inspector or that Area Commander is hopeless and was never much good on the street but has positioned himself/herself to gain promotion and is now making rubbish decisons [sic] that affect us all ... good luck with the survey but I doubt it will make any difference. The only people I really trust are my mates and colleagues I work with".*

5.8.5.  Another interviewee said:

*"Start cleaning. Pick on someone and make an example of someone. Pick someone under the Commissioner, and then everyone will know we are actually serious; something different is going to happen."* [12]

5.8.6.  Most respondents, and we share this view, felt that while there are elements of both 'could not' and 'would not', failure to act was largely due to lack of management confidence to take bold action.

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**Management Suggestions for Police to Consider**

- Relaunch and restructure the Professional Standards Group, both at PNHQ and in Districts.

- Use membership to the new restructured Group as a rotational appointment for top talent, both locally and at PNHQ. Police selected for their high integrity, investigative ability and ethical leadership would be rotated through the positions on a short-term basis as an element within a wider talent management plan.

- Task the group to sample and review integrity-based issues such as those arising from the COI in a formal work programme. These could include inappropriate sexual relationships, adult sexual assault investigations, child abuse investigations, bullying, and harassment.

- Work with District Commanders as a group to identify quick-win signalling measures on culture and integrity, and plan for their implementation.

- Act as decisively, quickly, and publicly as possible on ethical breaches among managers.

- Shift the training culture in Police from one in which individuals decide on training and specialisation needs to one in which the organisation determines the training path for each employee.

- Centralise the quality assurance and coordination of training products and programmes to minimise duplication between the RNZPC and Districts, to ensure quality standards, and to maintain alignment with the Police core competency framework.

- Work with staff to revise and promulgate a new Code of Conduct that reflects higher expectations of behaviour.

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[12] PwC Interviewee, 2010

# 6.    Attitudes & Skills of Leaders

*"We can dream anything we like in our lovely plan but unless we take our NCOs with us, it's a dead duck. A lot of the plan will be people-focussed. It can't be led from the top. It will take a whole lot of actions from a whole lot of people."* [13]

*"[There is] consistent promotion of staff who [are] disliked and not respected and are not leaders."* [14]

## 6.1.  Leaders and the Frontline

6.1.1.  Many Police felt that long-serving constabular staff and middle and senior managers were out of touch with frontline Police and particularly with frontline staff in the General Duties Branch. They believed that this magnified cultural problems and weakened management credibility.

> *"The Commissioner and all his Inspector mates in bullshit castle at Headquarters should get back on the street and get a reality check. And I've heard this sort of directive before and do we see any of them back on the street...NO...."* [15]

6.1.2.  There is a widely held view that senior Police leaders are not seen often enough in Districts, Areas or on the frontline. Many acknowledged the excellent community and stakeholder relationships developed by senior Police, but internally, Police felt out of touch with PNHQ and Police leadership. This is in spite of some excellent internal communications such as Ten-One, the uniquely personal and well-crafted Commissioner's blog and many positive District initiatives.

## 6.2.  Current Rostering

6.2.1.  There are a number of issues related to current constabulary (General Duties Branch and to some extent CIB) deployment practices that reduce optimal visibility and operational efficiency. The current deployment model is based on the needs of staff, rather than on risk and demand. The poor alignment of actual deployment to priority one calls on a sample week in 2007 is shown in the graphic below:

Figure 4: Constabulary Employees Deployed Nationally in November 2007 Compared to P1 Calls for Service



Constabulary employees deployed nationally in November 2007 compared to P1 calls for service

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
[13] Commissioner Howard Broad, Speech to Area Commanders' Conference, 2009

[14] Police Engagement Survey 2010

[15] Police Engagement Survey 2010

6.2.2. The current lack of correlation between these priority calls and staff on duty places unfair pressure on some staff and puts service quality at risk. The solution is not more Police, but better utilisation of existing employees.

6.2.3. This model allows some senior constabular staff to avoid frontline duty and means that some NCOs have low operational contact with their staff. These problems make it difficult to address behavioural or performance shortfalls on the job.

6.2.4. Many NCOs with whom we spoke felt that if there was a single magic bullet that would place pressure on non-performing NCOs and allow effective NCOs to get more leadership traction with their staff it was a move to rostering to risk/demand. This is currently the subject of one of the Policing Excellence work streams. Sergeants felt that rostering to risk would improve their own management contact with their staff, and place pressure on those few of their number who were "waiting for their super fund to recover from recession before leaving, and meanwhile making 4 hours work last for eight," as one NCO put it.

6.2.5. Given some management fortitude, improvements to rostering could be effected under the existing collective employment arrangements:

- Introducing contingency rostering on a consistent basis in all Areas and Districts (while allowing for urban/rural difference in rostering models);

- Including all workgroups in the roster pools;

- Improving tactical deployment plans using PeopleSoft; and

- Actively performance-managing staff who do not comply with the new models.

6.2.6. Those managers who have piloted or implemented improved rostering models report a wide range of benefits which go to both operational efficiency and cultural change, including:

- Reductions in sick leave, annual leave and TOIL (a major source of staff/management friction);

- Reduced use of stand-by allowances (typically approximately $1m per year per District);

- Better contact and relationships between constabular staff and NCOs through shared shift time;

- More pressure on resistant "day shifters" to comply or leave Police;

- More ability to apply critical command Intel to inform deployment;

- Improved morale through having more staff available when on shift; and

- Reduced pressure on station resources (such as computers) at shift change.

## 6.3. Disaffected Staff

6.3.1. Almost all respondents commented, in a wide range of contexts, on the existence of a cadre of long-serving staff and/or highly disaffected staff with low morale and who often "get paid for eight hours, work four, never do nights and take long lunches". One respondent said:

*"[We need to] get rid of those lazy old cops. They find themselves a community-based job and drink more than their fair share of coffee."* [16]

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[16] Focus Group 2010 .

6.3.2. We spoke with several such disaffected staff in the course of this review. Their comments included the following:

*"I got the black spot put on me years ago. But I'm not leaving. To hell with management – they can't make me go and if they try I'll fight them every step. As for young "x" [new manager] I'll see him off."* [17]

*"Anyone tells me to do a night or a late, I'll just ring in sick. Stuff them!"* [18]

6.3.3. There appears to be a particular issue in this regard with residue of the old culture continuing to stick in some regional/rural '1, 2, 3 stations' (stations staffed only by one, two or three constables). These staff are at a greater distance from day-to-day management reach, and in these situations, a single less-than-optimal performer can have profound effect on peers and communities. It is often difficult to attract high flyers to remote areas and equally hard to ensure a quality service in small towns, given the skill specialisation required in areas such as adult sexual assault investigations.

## 6.4. Promotions & Appointments

6.4.1. There is widespread lack of confidence by Police staff in the current practices surrounding promotions and appointment of Police staff to leadership positions. Many respondents felt that the wrong people were sometimes appointed to senior roles. The cynicism and concern with respect to current processes and outcomes provides an opportunity to fundamentally rethink the approach to progression and appointments.

6.4.2. Respondents felt that progression by staff within Areas was a particular problem. Senior managers risked hiring "in their own image" due to the small pool of talent being tapped. This is shown in Table 3 below.

**Table 3: Movement of constabulary employees in 2009-10 (not including PNHQ and Service Centres)**

| Rank | Same area | Different area, same district | Different district | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sergeant | 413 (67%) | 124 (20%) | 83 (13%) | 620 | The prevalence of appointments within Areas and Districts is not conducive to ensuring a wide talent pool for selection |
| Senior Sergeant | 111 (61%) | 40 (22%) | 30 (17%) | 181 | |
| Inspector | 12 (21%) | 21 (36%) | 25 (43%) | 58 | |

6.4.3. The composition of recruitment panels is inconsistent and sometimes not transparent. There is a widely-held view that some panels are easily manipulated by Area or District Commanders.

6.4.4. Several pointed to the high rates of review and repeal (shown in Figure 5), of appointments as a signal that "something is off". Some appointments have repeatedly been overturned, with long-term vacancies as the result. This weakens overall confidence in the process.

**Figure 5: Percentage of Appointments Reviewed and Overturned, 2006-2010**

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[17] Police Focus Group, 2010.

[18] Police Focus Group, 2010.

**Percentage of appointments reviewed and overturned, 2006–2010**

6.4.5. Protracted appointments processes can result in large numbers of staff in acting roles, including acting up to cover a more senior role. A snapshot of the current position is shown in Table 4 below. These staff often have no training for the role being covered and low credibility as leaders.

**Table 4: Hours for which employees received a higher duties allowance for temporarily acting in a more senior position (2009-10 year)**

| Hours | People |
|---|---|
| < 100 | 750 |
| 100-200 | 558 |
| 200-300 | 361 |
| 300-400 | 257 |
| 400-500 | 201 |
| 500-600 | 115 |
| 600-700 | 91 |
| 700-800 | 50 |
| 800-900 | 29 |
| 900-1,000 | 33 |
| 1,000-1,500 | 81 |
| >1,500 | 29 |
| Total | 2,555 |

Source: Police HR

6.4.6. Although perceptions do not necessarily accord with reality, staff in focus groups told us:

*"[Say] there's a vacancy in Wellington, and we don't know quite what to do with you here so we'll flick you there – it's a common practice. It's annoying for other people when they're trying to fill a vacancy and those things really have an impact on the effectiveness and attitude of a work group. It's packaging for export – they get rid of their bad staff by making them look good so they can apply for a job elsewhere and go there."*

*"Are our recruiting processes strong enough, we seem to be recruiting so that one in ten is a real fizzer. Down the ranks, it's just a matter of ringing someone up and asking whether they're good at their job. And a lot say yes when they're not."*

*"We must never forget – we promoted the hell out of Clint Rickards. Almost to the very top. It must never, ever happen again!"*

*"Nepotism is rampant… Appointments are not based on merit – its [sic] who you know not how good you are at doing the job. The appointment process needs to be replaced as the current system can easily be rigged by the panel. There is no transparency."*

*"I don't know anyone who now has faith in the promotion system. It is seen by many staff as straight out corruption."*

## 6.5.  Area Commanders

6.5.1.  The critical middle management group of Area Commanders contains a mix of old and new-style leaders with some, in the words of one interviewee: "managing their staff downwards, and very effectively, while others are focussed on managing up; that is, their own careers".

6.5.2.  Management approaches appear highly inconsistent across this group, with pockets of both excellent and weak practice.

6.5.3.  This critical group numbers only 43 people, a manageable number for training and individual development. Some of them have line control of NCOs and thus effective influence over key change agents.

6.5.4.  More needs to be done to develop this group, support the real talent within it and ensure that best practice is shared and becomes the norm.

6.5.5.  For example, if each Area Commander with line management responsibilities felt empowered and equipped to actively manage two poorly-performing NCOs, and 80 NCOs either exited Police or lifted their game, a vital cultural shift would occur in the organisation. If each also actively mentored two top-performing NCOs, further gains could be secured.

6.5.6.  Beside management action, the power of symbols and simple gestures is important here. If each Area Commander regularly did a night shift on the frontline, kept their PCT up to date, and took extra care to promote and reward the right NCOs, credibility would be improved and line staff would feel that changes were being modelled, rather than merely talked about at the 'top'.

6.5.7.  Care also needs to be taken that those at Inspector rank in PNHQ do not communicate messages or make decisions counter to the overall change programme.

## 6.6.  NCOs

6.6.1.  Respondents agreed that, with more than half the Police workforce made up of Constables, the most effective and important leaders of cultural change in Police are Sergeants and Senior Sergeants. As the Commissioner remarked in a recent speech:

*"These NCOs are the critical backbone of our organisation. Firstly, they control the activities of our operational staff. Workplace by workplace, what they say, goes. They interpret the environment…and they pass it on to our staff.*

*"This is a huge responsibility. As one person told the Commission [of Inquiry], they are the 'mums and dads' of the Constables. They make the commentary on the corporate literature, respond to issues aired in the media, make judgments about the personalities and requirements of bosses and so on.*

*"If the supervisor trashes the message, we are likely to lose the staff member as well. I have talked a lot with NCOs this year and I instil the message that it is not a sound strategy to trash the Police. Aside from the straight ethical issues, our staff see through that approach and know that it does not engender respect. The troops tend to avoid these people because negativity is so often associated with a capricious style of management or they take advantage of weak leadership."*

6.6.2. NCOs, the first-line managers in the organisation, who are the strongest modellers and shapers of culture, are poorly trained for their management roles. They are inadequately supported to develop and share good practice once in the role, and inconsistently mentored by Area Commanders or senior NCOs. The talent, energy and aspiration for new styles of policing that exist within this group are further undermined by the continued failure of senior management to address a small number of under-performing NCOs. These tend to be long-serving or senior NCOs of the old school, who undermine senior management initiatives and poison the well of Police culture in subtle but pernicious ways. There is wide acknowledgment of these under-performing staff, and a seeming resignation to the fact that they need to be 'waited out' through natural attrition, rather than addressed more proactively.

6.6.3. Although there has been considerable success in pushing cultural change from the top of Police into the 'middle', there has been mixed success from the middle to frontline ranks. This concern has been raised in each of our reviews, with little apparent progress to date. There appears to be a widely-held view in Police that changes in management style are 'generational' and thus, slow. We categorically disagree and believe that the issues noted below are largely a matter of equipping Area Commanders and NCOs with some practical management tools to enable them to performance-manage staff. The issues are not only readily correctable, but demand urgent action in the short-term if the talent and goodwill of the right sort of middle managers are to be retained.

## 6.7. Field Training Officers

6.7.1. Police constabular staff told us that they take ethical and behavioural cues from their first-line supervisors or early mentors, and that these values tend to be imprinted within the first two years of their careers. Senior constabular and NCO talent shapes the attitudes of recruits. Respondents suggested, however, that the current Field Training Officer (FTO) model is fundamentally flawed and should be replaced with a more modern coaching model that utilises the best senior constabular and NCO talent to shape young recruits.

6.7.2. Respondents told us that while the FTO model was fine in theory, the quality and ability of FTOs to guide and role model was extremely variable in practice. Some felt that quite inappropriate people were given the roles, such as when "he's been around forever and it's a way of giving him a bit of recognition and salary top-up".

6.7.3. Focus groups told us:

> *"As a Probationary Constable I have received no FTO support over the last two years."* [19]

> *"I've seen some very good mentors and coaches but the message that comes with it isn't always the right message."* [20]

> *"The [FTO] concept itself is brilliant…In practice I don't think they get enough training. Some FTOs are brilliant, I've got one who's magnificent, there are others who have got the abilities but couldn't communicate how to make a cup of coffee…"* [21]

6.7.4. Again, alternative formal approaches to coaching and mentoring have been piloted in New Zealand Police and exist in other jurisdictions. This is another area in which a "reset" of the current model appears to be required.

## 6.8. Talent Management

6.8.1. Broadly, Police have few systematic mechanisms to identify, mentor, and develop talent at any level. Doing so is also likely to be challenging within the somewhat egalitarian Police culture. We strongly suggest that this should be a key area for investment within a reframed strategic HR function.

6.8.2. The staff with whom we spoke had nothing but good feedback on the leadership training courses that were run at Sergeant level, although these appear not to have been migrated from pilots to business-as-usual on financial grounds. One NCO told us that the course: "restored my passion for policing and gave me confidence I could manage my people in a practical sense."

6.8.3. Some of those staff involved in delivering organisational development activity reported however, that they felt this area was the first to have resources withdrawn when fiscal constraints came into play, that it was viewed as a "nice to have" rather than an essential service (including by central HR), and that it was not well integrated into the policing reform work streams.

6.8.4. Planning for a shift in talent management approaches is already underway, toward targeted solutions for individual development under a centralised talent development model.

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**Management Suggestions for Police to Consider**

- Fast-track the national implementation of rostering-to-risk models.

- Actively manage or retrain those staff who will not comply with the new models.

- Give the relevant managers the skills to support this.

- Undertake regular outreach visits by PNHQ staff to Districts over the next 12 months to communicate some of the policing reform initiatives.

- Roster Police managers to frontline (late or night) shifts with the General Duties Branch from time to time, to reinforce the importance of frontline policing.

- Reduce the number of Superintendents and Inspectors without line responsibilities at PNHQ and elsewhere.

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[19] Focus Group, 2010

[20] Focus Group 2010

[21] Focus Group 2010

# 7. Change Management Practice & Performance

*"So, how do we get these messages through the organisation? You can't change culture through strategies or policies or any other written document. Culture is what you live every day; it's what you hear and do".[22]*

## 7.1. Change Management

7.1.1. There is a perception by both staff and external stakeholders that Police leaders, while making significant policy and process improvements, have not acted boldly on the emotional or irrational aspects of change. Carefully selected gestures, aimed at winning the hearts and minds of staff, would signal the new ethical standards and underline expectations of integrity.

7.1.2. In the second phase of review, we observed that the strategic change framework within Police was an overly complex mechanism with a projectised approach to change management that risked developing an unmanageable number of change initiatives and allowing line managers to abdicate responsibility for driving change. The change management framework was highly theoretical, and largely incomprehensible to many staff and managers. Change projects were legion.

7.1.3. Under the leadership of the Police Commissioner, there is growing confidence on the part of District Commanders to prioritise, own and drive the changes that comprise the policing reform programme. With an increasing proportion of 'the right sort' of Area Commanders and NCOs, we now go further. We no longer see any need for a stand-alone change group at PNHQ. If changes are worth implementing, then they should be implemented through line management. If the critical groups of Area Commanders and NCOs are properly equipped with people management skills and supported to actively manage performance, then change management will become 'the way Police does things'.

7.1.4. The wider policing reform programme also provides an important opportunity to give middle managers and talented frontline staff opportunities to innovate and lead change by involving them in planning and implementation activity. We suggest that the business owners of Policing Excellence work streams should be involving more junior staff and managers in these teams. In this way, emerging talent can cut their teeth on real business issues.

7.1.5. In almost all areas, including those noted above, there are pockets of best practice in change management, as well as examples of inaction and poor practice, including variability from District to District. This means that the energy of able middle managers seeking to drive change is often squandered on reinventing a practice that already exists elsewhere in the organisation. Many of the best ideas do not gain traction or ongoing funding, as their champions move Area, District or rank. Inconsistency also leads to confusion for staff on the frontline. It feeds the views expressed in Police climate surveys that change is too overwhelming to cope with, or, more cynically, that changes are management fads that can be waited out.

7.1.6. If a change is well-investigated, affordable, and its business and implementation plan has merit, then it should be rolled out nationwide. Keeping improved discipline on this matter should reduce the high numbers of change projects underway in Police, and over time, reduce inconsistencies between Districts.

## 7.2. Some Necessary Gestures

7.2.1. There is a symbolic and intuitive aspect to change management that can be easily grasped. Change management is not about Gantt charts or workshops, but can

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[22] Commissioner Howard Broad, Presentation at Griffith University to Queensland Police, July 2009.

often be a matter of taking simple steps and telling stories that grab an organisation's attention and heart strings. In this context, measures such as regulating Police bars,[23] requiring managers to have an up-to-date PCT, refusing to appoint where candidates do not meet the quality threshold, dealing promptly with the small number of influential non-performers and so on would all send powerful messages through Police in a way that policies and training sessions never will.

## 7.3. Rating Change Effectiveness

7.3.1. In previous reviews we have used our own qualitative judgements on John Kotter's eight dimensions of change to illustrate Police "uptake" of COI-related change by level. The progression below indicates continued lack of traction. This suggests to us that the COI now lacks currency and impact as a change driver.

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[23] Most were closed at the time of the COI but some remain and are not run under the club regulatory regime. For example, there remains an unregulated bar at the Royal New Zealand Police College. This may send the wrong signals.

**Figure 6: John Kotter's Eight Dimensions of Change**

2007

Making it stick · Urgency · Guiding teams · Vision · Communication · Enablement · Short-term wins · Perseverance

Executives · Middle Management · Front-Line Employees · Change Programme Team

Area ready for change · Area of potential concern · Area with obstacles to change

2009

Making it stick · Urgency · Guiding teams · Vision · Communication · Enablement · Short-term wins · Perseverance

Executives · Middle Management · Front-Line Employees · Change Programme Team

Area ready for change · Area of potential concern · Area with obstacles to change

2010

Making it stick · Urgency · Guiding teams · Vision · Communication · Enablement · Short-term wins · Perseverance

Executives · Middle Management · Front-Line Employees · Human Resources

Area ready for change · Area of potential concern · Area with obstacles to change

Source: Judgements are based on interviews, focus groups and engagement survey feedback – they are entirely qualitative.

**Table 5: Summary of changes between 2009 and 2010**

Key:

= Negative Change

= No Change

= Positive Change

| | Executives | Middle Management | Front-line Employees | Human Resources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Urgency | Negative | No Change | No Change | Negative |
| Guiding teams | No Change | No Change | Positive | Negative |
| Vision | Positive | No Change | No Change | Negative |
| Communication | Positive | No Change | Positive | No Change |
| Enablement | No Change | No Change | Positive | Negative |
| Short-term wins | Negative | Negative | Negative | Negative |
| Perseverance | No Change | No Change | Negative | No Change |
| Making it stick | Negative | Negative | Negative | Negative |

**Management Suggestions for Police to Consider**

- Refresh the case for change and the related internal communications plan. The plan should link and unify change initiatives related to the COI and policing reform.

- Ensure that all policing reform and COI-related change is led by excellent operational managers (District Commanders, Area Commanders and selected Non-Commissioned Officers) to maximise its credibility and practicality. This will require freeing some managers from business-as-usual demands. The resourcing needed to drive effective change should not be underestimated.

- Ensure that each manager, from NCO upwards, has objectives related to COI and policing reform in their performance agreements. The objectives should be tailored to both leadership obligations and business unit contributions.

# 8.  A Comprehensive Performance Management System

 *"We have to stop overcomplicating all this and just do the basics of people management well. We are an extraordinarily underdeveloped and naïve set of people managers. We relish the most dangerous operational command, but throw a people performance issue at us and we freak out."* [24]

*"We've lost the ability to sit down with someone and say it isn't working for us and it can't be working for you - the system is such that it really, really discourages that conversation.*

*"In New York they're tough, they rank people and drop off those at the bottom - we don't do that. It's not the New Zealand culture and I think that's good. There's a compassion aspect to an organisation like this and you get the inefficiency that goes with that."* [25]

*"More than anything else Police policy in respect of dealing with poor performers or those breaching the Code of Conduct should be significantly simplified, the process shortened and the ability to dismiss and/or seriously sanction transgressors be made far more immediate. The current process is significantly more cumbersome than that used by much of the private sector – hence the deadwood doesn't feel threatened and the good performers continue to watch the low performers sail along – almost with impunity. The reason that so many supervisors don't pursue poor performance anywhere near as vigorously as they could is that the system is, in practice, toothless. In an organisation of 10,000 or so people how often are people being sacked? – short of committing a criminal offence. The organisation continues to seriously let down the majority of employees by not getting real in this regard."* [26]

## 8.1.  Performance Appraisals

8.1.1.   Modern performance management tools exist in Police, are excellent in theory, and are well-supported by employee practice managers in the Districts. However practice surrounding their use is immature, because of both cultural attitudes and a lack of training and support given to line managers in this area.

8.1.2.   The performance appraisal system is inconsistently applied. Some staff receive regular and timely feedback on their performance and areas for development; others receive none, or perhaps worse, have their appraisal undertaken formulaically by email or phone. One Area Commander told us that he had received no appraisal feedback at all for five years. Many NCOs have similar stories. Few of the people we spoke to had received regular, candid or constructive feedback.

8.1.3.   Many staff reported being given one of the two highest scores on the appraisal rating scale. The most common performance rating last year was 'Consistently better than agreed' - two standards higher than we would expect if performance scores were normally distributed.

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[24] Focus Group, 2010.

[25] External Stakeholder Interview, 2010.

[26] Police Engagement Survey 2010.

## Total Ratings Distribution vs Normal Distribution



| Performance Rating Key | |
| --- | --- |
| ML | Much less than agreed |
| SL | Slightly less than agreed |
| AS | To the agreed standard |
| SB | Sometimes better than agreed |
| CB | Consistently better than agreed |
| RM | Role Model |

8.1.4. Staff agreed that the current appraisal system was in need of fundamental overhaul, not because there was anything wrong with the system *per se*, but because the whole organisation needed to 'start again' in this area and reset performance standards.

8.1.5. We reviewed files on a number of Police who had displayed poor judgement on integrity matters. A number of these are currently being investigated by the IPCA or are the subject of court action. We found a number of similar themes, which go to a weak appraisal regime:

- Concerns about performance or behaviour had been voiced over a long period by supervisors or staff;

- Formal performance appraisals, however, were generally rosy;

- Key incidents had been investigated but deemed insufficiently problematic in and of themselves to warrant disciplinary action; and

- When performance management or disciplinary actions *had* been taken, process glitches had occurred which made senior managers hesitate to take matters forward.

## 8.2. Performance Management & Disciplinary Procedures

8.2.1. While the changes in legislation and policy should make management response to Code of Conduct matters straightforward and in line with conventional employment relations approaches, this appears not to be the case in practice.

8.2.2. Police managers appear to struggle with the initial triage between informal response, formal performance management, disciplinary process and criminal process and have difficulty separating these different approaches in their minds. As one respondent put it: "awareness of the policy is there, but Police learn intuitively on the job - the contextualisation of policy isn't there for us yet."

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[27] Source: New Zealand Police internal report, *Performance Appraisal Analysis*

8.2.3.  This is in spite of the fact that the importance of both informal and formal performance management is emphasised in training. For example, part of the Sergeants' qualifying course requires participants to conduct an initial performance meeting with a member of staff from a hypothetical team concerning poor performance.

8.2.4.  In practice, Sergeants and managers at all levels told us they lacked confidence to manage these processes, to adequately "triage" behaviour of staff and to react in the appropriate manner.

**Figure 8: Incident Response Triaging**



**Table 6: Complaints to Police 2009/10 year**

| | Assault | Use of force | Cause damage | Attitude / Language | Inadequate service | Disgraceful behaviour | Harassment | Sexual harassment | Sexual offending | Procedural failure | Breach of privacy / Confidentiality | Rights breach | Unlawful arrest | Unlawful act | Corruption | Dishonesty | Exhibit/Property | Treatment of CYP | Dogbite | Use of vehicle | Other |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Recruit | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Constable | 92 | 73 | 7 | 266 | 68 | 15 | 33 | 1 | 8 | 322 | 27 | 25 | 35 | 19 | 2 | 40 | 44 | 9 | 4 | 19 | 99 |
| Sergeant | 23 | 7 | 4 | 37 | 14 | 3 | 10 | | 1 | 51 | 12 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 13 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 28 |
| Senior Sergeant | 2 | 1 | | 14 | 6 | 1 | 1 | | | 24 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | 2 | 1 | | | | 8 |
| Inspector | 1 | | | 1 | 2 | 1 | | | | 11 | | 1 | | 1 | 6 | 2 | | 1 | | 1 | 7 |
| Superintendent & Above | | | | | 1 | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | | 1 | | | | | | 2 |
| Not specified / Blank | 16 | 14 | 7 | 51 | 77 | 5 | 19 | 1 | | 145 | 18 | 17 | 5 | 8 | 7 | 12 | 21 | | 1 | 11 | 56 |

Source: Police Professional Standards Group

8.2.5.  There were also many stories about the difficulties of using performance improvement plans in practice. An Area Commander commented: "the minute we raise even the hint of a problem with a staff member, it quickly gets bitter and personal. I once had a constable and his representative come up with 50 pages of justification and argument over a minor development point that I wanted to reflect in a performance improvement plan ("PIP"). To him, the PIP was the first step on the road to jail. That's what you get if you try and be bold and deal with something. Most guys, as managers, they will have someone do something utterly stupid and all they'll do is put them in an easier role that won't expose their shortcomings or move them on to another work group. We'd rather carry non-performers than act for fear of the fight-back".

8.2.6.  Staff from Constable to District Commanders agreed that Police managers were weak at giving negative feedback to peers and staff. This is a consistent message across the three years of review and we have remarked on it often: "We've got people who are happy to tackle an armed offender in a dark alley, but they're scared to talk to Mavis in the corner of the room about her performance".

8.2.7.  This is probably the single most important area in which Police need to improve. It is also time to act. Giving feedback, both negative and positive, is a trainable skill and comes with practice and support from senior management and the HR function. Again, our practical experience suggests that if appraisals were graded to a bell curve, and if every line manager within Police made a resolution to take action to support one poor and one strong performer, the entire Police culture would change and the much talked of 'generational shift' would happen within a couple of years.

## 8.3.  Decision-making on Employment Matters

8.3.1.  Respondents felt that there was sometimes still a failure to act decisively and quickly on very serious behavioural breaches. As one NCO put it: "we're supposed to be acting like a normal employer but between our natural tendency to put our CIB hats on when we're looking into an internal matter and the staff and Association's tendency to take any investigation highly personally and be litigious, we seem to complicate the hell out of this stuff."

8.3.2.  On reviewing specific complaints files, while these are process-compliant almost to a fault, we also had a concern that the conceptual lens applied appears still to be prosecutorial and 'criminal' in its view. The new tools and processes are in place, but Police, whether because of training or the litigious elements within their culture, still seem to be applying this old mindset and struggling with making judgements about what to escalate.

8.3.3.  Another said: "For many, a disciplinary process is like the first step toward prison. You hesitate as a manager too - for these guys with lots of years in, Police has been their whole life - they'd lose everything [if found at fault]."

8.3.4.  Several respondents saw it as normal for a disciplinary process to take months or years. We do not agree that extended process is a necessary outcome of the New Zealand employment relations framework. When we asked about the reasons for protraction, respondents suggested that HR was itself partly responsible: "they struggle as much as we do to get with the new employment relations approach." Police's tendency to search for a potential criminal allegation within an employment issue complicates matters.

8.3.5.  We also wonder at some of the thresholds and judgements applied in formal disciplinary processes. An NCO told us of a Constable who clipped a stone pillar inside the Police car park. Rather than being given a stern talking to by his manager or having a plan for some remedial driver training developed, the officer

was charged (unsuccessfully) with careless use of a motor vehicle in open court. Conversely, we also reviewed files revealing some seemingly highly inappropriate behaviour, which appeared to us likely to have earned dismissal in any other work environment, ultimately sanctioned only with a warning.

8.3.6. We followed a number of complaints that had resulted in performance management action, a Police disciplinary process and/or a professional standards investigation, from lodgement to the conclusion of the matter. We found no evidence that process had not been followed; indeed many investigative files appeared almost too exhaustive in terms of investigative depth.

8.3.7. Overall, while progress is being made, there is often an overly complex, process-focussed and delayed reaction to a behavioural issue. Lack of response, and inappropriate or protracted responses, are often perceived by staff or stakeholders as lack of action. They tarnish faith in leadership to act decisively on matters of integrity.

## 8.4. HR Reporting

8.4.1. While our reviews of files on performance improvement and professional standards breaches showed such plans and investigations to be appropriate on their face, we have little confidence that any concerning *patterns* of behaviour would currently be detected by District or area HR and professional standards or the PNHQ units in these areas. This risk of non-detection is exacerbated by the high churn rates of staff.

8.4.2. We were told in both prior reviews, and again this year, of the functionality of the IAPro software to report on trends and patterns in adverse behavioural indicators, including uses of force. We have now had IAPro demonstrated to us several times, but always in 'development' form. We cannot yet see evidence of joined-up reporting that would show, at Area, District HQ or PNHQ levels, patterns of poor performance or problematic behaviours on an individual and workgroup basis. This seems to be an example of Police's difficulty in getting initiatives from pilot stage to national implementation.

8.4.3. We understand that HR's 'e-Performance' initiative will help with joined-up reporting on people and performance issues. We hope that this can be rolled out and populated with the relevant data on national basis and that managers are properly trained and equipped to use it in a meaningful way.

8.4.4. We asked, for this review, to see overall trends in numbers and types of complaints; whether performance-related, disciplinary, criminal and/or referral to the IPCA. We also asked for outcomes data, such as number of complaints settled, those which ended in a resignation or those which resulted in sanctions of some kind. This information was available, but required manual collation from a range of sources.

8.4.5. Outcomes for the period 1 July 2009 to 13 May 2010 are as shown in the charts overleaf. These show the outcomes of two different processes; when action was taken following a complaint, and the outcomes of National Disciplinary Committee hearings.

**Figure 9: Outcomes of Complaints**

**Final outcome where action was taken following a complaint**
**(1 July 2009 - 13 May 2010)**



- Other
- Counselling
- Training
- Final warning
- Policy and procedure
- Performance management

**Outcome of National Disciplinary Committee hearings**



- Resigned/retired
- Final warning
- Warning
- Misconduct (no further action)
- No misconduct
- Dismissed

8.4.6. Monthly reports to the Police executive, while containing copious HR information, report on neither behavioural patterns nor trends in complaint type, handling and results. We are concerned that this approach means any inconsistency of approach between Districts is undetected, and that senior managers cannot see the overall picture.

8.4.7. We also found little evidence, aside from periodic presentations, that the Professional Standards Groups in District and central HQ are capturing evidence of good practice, disseminating this across Districts and reporting it at executive level.

## 8.5. Protected disclosures

8.5.1. We could not establish precise evidence that protected disclosures are well-handled in practice. This is in spite of first-rate policy both existing and being well-communicated. A number of interviews and focus group respondents made comments similar to this Police Engagement Survey respondent:

*"The lower your position in Police, the higher the level of accountability you are held to. Once promoted accountability evaporates: a supervisor can be absent for days, use a Police car while on leave or private use, claim TOIL while absent, treat their staff like scum and no one dares speak out as there is a climate of fear that prevents a person from raising a complaint as they are expected to do in the Code of Conduct and experience shows that any issue raised will either not be dealt with or the whistleblower will be crucified."*

This area may require closer attention in the course of the next review.

## 9. Employment Relations Practice & Performance

### 9.1. A New Direction for Human Resources?

9.1.1. The HR function within Police has traditionally combined transactional HR and industrial relations services. The HR section has worked hard on implementing and developing high quality tools and policies and, in the face of the high transactional requirements of complex Collective Employment Agreements ("CEAs"), has made significant progress on modernising the function.

9.1.2. There is considerable negativity toward the HR function reflected in feedback from staff. These perceptions appear to us to signal the need for a fresh approach in which a reconfigured HR function is at the heart of change enablement and support.

*"I now have zero faith in HR group within the Police and this is a sentiment echoed by my colleagues. For the NZ Police to function better, we need adequate Human Resource staff."* [28]

*"HR section are bureaucrats, they see their job as following rules rather than helping staff. …NZ Police have no idea how to bring out the best in their staff. We have incredible talent in this organisation and there is a will to do well but there is a lack of staff resources and an overtly critical and negative management in place ready to jump on any staff member."* [29]

*"HR energies get directed onto clerical rubbish. The section isn't configured to lead in a strategic sense."* [30]

*"What would make the difference in HR? Clear performance management, talent development, better processes and better management development and support."* [31]

*"HR [should] focus on institutional change – not just [be] a salary machine."* [32]

9.1.3. Justly or unjustly, the HR function is still viewed by many within Police as a dead hand on effective organisational change. Given the challenges the organisation now faces and the need to gain deeper traction on cultural shift, there are significant opportunities for greater emphasis on strategic HR and organisational development. A high-performing strategic HR function appears to us to be fundamental to continued progress.

9.1.4. A strategic HR function will need to be staffed and organised to provide leadership in organisational development, coaching, capability frameworks, career pathing, and talent management.

9.1.5. The link between the strategic HR function imperatives and the pre- and in-service training delivered by the RNZPC and TSC also needs development. Neither the HR function nor the training agencies are currently positioned to act as effective enablers and business partners to managers in support of the policing reform programme.

9.1.6. There is a continuing disconnect between centrally-led and District-led HR-related training, staff development, and performance and talent management. There are also inconsistencies in practices between Districts.

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[28] NZ Police Workplace Survey, 2010.

[29] NZ Police Workplace Survey 2010.

[30] PwC Interview, 2010 .

[31] PwC Interview, 2010 .

[32] NZ Police Workplace Survey, 2010.

9.1.7. We suggest that Police explore consolidated HR shared services options, in which centres of excellence could deliver services across multiple Districts.

## 9.2. Employment Relations

9.2.1. Police has traditionally had a somewhat adversarial and industrial relations-based relationship with the Police unions, with the relationship largely held by Police HR and centred on the annual wage bargaining round. Under the leadership of the Police Commissioner, this relationship is beginning to change as unions and Police leaders engage on a broader range of strategic issues. Both unions and Police managers should continue their focus on learning to operate with reference to modern, external best practice standards of strategic HR, Organisational Development (OD) and performance management.

**Management Suggestions for Police to Consider**

- Respecify the central HR function to reflect the strategic capabilities it needs. This could entail:
  - Consolidation of HR, training and OD portfolios into a new strategic leadership role;
  - Greater use of web tools to enable staff to manage transactional issues themselves;
  - Creating a dedicated talent management function;
  - A rethinking of the recruitment brand and strategy in the context of policing reform changes; and
  - A complete refresh of the training model and curricula.
- Centralise decision-making for all appointments at Inspector and above.
- Adopt the default principle of using acting roles only as a last resort.
- Ensure externals to the Area/District are appointed to all promotion panels for NCO and above.
- Reset the policy, communications and expectations with regard to appointments and promotions.
- Revisit promotional criteria in the context of the work on core competencies and training redesign.

# 10. Conclusions

10.1.1. Police have now been subject to three reviews by the SSC and two by the OAG in relation to the COI recommendations. While results are less than optimal to date, the solutions are largely matters of basic management concepts and with careful prioritisation and planning, remain achievable. Police managers should also be wary of trying to do too much or of piloting in a fragmented manner.

10.1.2. Moving forward will require boldness, courage and a willingness to 'just do it', in the context of the wider Police strategy and vision. It will also require strengthened strategic HR capability to support management.

10.1.3. In summary, we believe that the challenge Police now face is to move from the current to future state shown below.

Table 7: From current state to future state

| From: Current State | To: Future State |
|---|---|
| • The plethora of change initiatives makes it hard for Police staff to see a coherent change story. | • A compelling and simple case for change in which COI related culture change is tightly linked to Police's new strategy for policing excellence. |
| • Some stakeholders lack trust in Police because theories/policies do not align to actual practice. | • Diligence in creating policies, tools and frameworks is matched by diligence in supervisory management practice. |
| • There is a lack of faith in Police leadership because rhetoric does not always align to action. | • Credible leaders, who are great role models, do as they say and act decisively with regard to poor performance and practice. |

# 11. Summary of Findings of 2009 Recommendations & 2010 Management Actions

11.1. The following diagram maps the 2009 recommendations to the findings made in 2010 and the suggested management actions for Police to consider.

| 2009 Recommendations | 2010 Findings | Management Suggestions |
|---|---|---|
| • Improve the differentiation between performance management and disciplinary systems. Work inclusively with staff to develop a new, balanced scorecard style performance management system, understanding that the process of its development is as important as the final result. Equip NCOs and senior managers with the skills to use it effectively.<br><br>• Consider individual development plans (IDPs) for all sworn staff, which are developed from initial training and which 'follow the person' throughout their career.<br><br>• Replace the FTO model (and its equivalent in CIB/CIU) with a new coaching model that includes criteria for the selection of coaches and training for those in coaching roles.<br><br>• Review training packages for sergeants and senior sergeants. Amend these to include more practical management tools. Require training to be completed prior to permanent appointments being made and develop a fast-track training package for those in acting roles.<br><br>• Fast track structural and pedagogical changes at Police College, better co-ordinate centrally delivered and District-based initiatives and ensure that these are carefully targeted to the development of the core competencies required of specific roles and ranks. Improve the quality assurance arrangements around training and development programmes.<br><br>• Refresh stakeholder communications development programmes for all ranks from Senior Sergeant upwards.<br><br>• Review, rationalise and reprioritise the Police organisational change programme with a view to reducing the numbers of projects and initiatives additional to business as usual. Undertake this exercise in a manner that involves both District and area management teams and secures the input and ownership of senior NCOs. Following this exercise, rationalise the change programme infrastructure at PNHQ.<br><br>• Review Police organisational form with a view to reducing operational complexity and improving the economic management of people and other resources.<br><br>• Rationalise and simplify policies, Commissioners' circulars and other instructions and communications to promote ease of access and enhanced understanding by frontline Police.<br><br>• Hold a session with the District Commander group to hone clarity and consistency with regard to the positioning and internal communication of the rationale for change. Subsequent communications should reflect the importance of 'stories' in changing Police hearts and minds and should contribute to ensuring the case for change is kept fresh, urgent and relevant.<br><br>• Work with the SSC on the development of some form of simplified internal upwards feedback mechanism.<br><br>• Engage early and closely with the relevant unions as work is undertaken on Police value for money or economic management initiatives.<br><br>• SSC should work with the OAG to develop a results-based review and audit programme for the next five to ten years. | • Senior management lacks the confidence and adeptness to make bold, circuit-breaking, and symbolic moves that will change the DNA of the organisation, signal to staff at all levels that poor performance and behaviour will not be tolerated, and that a new type of leader in Police will be fostered and advanced. Management has tolerated the continuation and even appointment of some of the wrong people in high places. Managers have sometimes failed to act decisively on high profile incidents when a strong gesture has been required;<br><br>• While COI-related issues remain highly relevant within Police, the COI now lacks urgency as a platform. The case for change needs to be refreshed in light of the policing reform programme, so that change remains urgent and meaningful, particularly to newer Police staff;<br><br>• The theoretical and policy toolkit supporting COI-related change is now embedded and of sound quality. Police have been diligent in implementing some of the recommendations. Many tools however, are not well used in practice, which means that while compliance may technically have been achieved, cultural change has not. This is true particularly with regard to the triaging of performance matters and the management of poor performers;<br><br>• There is inconsistency in management style, quality and practice at all levels within and across Police Districts. There are pockets of both first-rate and very poor performance. This means staff do not hear consistent messages from managers. There is also a widespread feeling among staff that senior management are out of touch with the pressures faced by the frontline;<br><br>• Police middle managers, particularly NCOs and Area Commanders, are not well equipped with respect to people performance management and need to be supported to lift their skills and confidence. Middle management efforts will be undermined while non-performers at middle and senior levels remain unaddressed;<br><br>• Human resources management in Police has to change to offer a more strategic and modern approach. In making this transition it has to confront a range of existing practices including those in recruitment, appointments, and performance. HR management has to align activities more tightly to the Police programme in order to enable the overall policing programme. More emphasis on core competencies, management development, talent management, career pathing, and succession is required. A greater link between core HR activities training is also needed;<br><br>• There is a specific need for new approaches to coaching and talent management, including a targeted programme for women;<br><br>• The Professional Standards Group ("PSG") was established for a different purpose than is presently required. It has struggled to integrate with the new methods required to support cultural change or to take a leadership role in building integrity within Police. It remains case-based and has not performed a strategic function in the reform programme. Accordingly, it does not enjoy widespread respect;<br><br>• Change at the Royal New Zealand Police College and the Training Service Centre has not gone far enough. Culture is not reflective of the values and behaviours required by the COI findings and some staff may be inappropriate role models of integrity and high performance; and<br><br>• Although the Police Executive has a role in the development of an employment relations strategy, the role is too muted. A reformed HR function would assist in the Executive taking more control of the strategy, integrating it more directly in the support of the overall business strategy for Police and operating such that the HR Group can implement it. | *Culture of Integrity & Performance*<br>• Re-launch and restructure the Professional Standards Group, both at PNHQ and in Districts.<br>• Use membership to the new restructured Group as a rotational appointment for top talent, both locally and at PNHQ. That is, Police selected for their high integrity, investigative ability and ethical leadership are rotated through the positions on a short-term basis as an element within a wider talent management plan.<br>• Task the group to sample and review integrity-based issues, such as those arising from the COI, in a formal work programme. These could include inappropriate sexual relationships, adult sexual assault investigations, child abuse investigations, bullying and harassment by working with District Commanders to identify quick-win signalling measures on culture and integrity and plan for their implementation, and acting as decisively, quickly, and publicly as possible on ethical breaches amongst senior managers.<br>• Shift the training culture from one in which individuals decide on training and specialisation needs to one in which the organisation determines the training path for each employee.<br>• Centralise the quality assurance and coordination of training products and programmes to minimise duplication between the RNZPC and Districts, to ensure quality standards and maintain alignment with the Police core competency framework.<br>• Work with staff to revise and promulgate a new Code of Conduct that reflects higher expectations of behaviour.<br><br>*Attitudes & Skills of Leaders*<br>• Fast-track the national implementation of rostering-to-risk models.<br>• Actively manage or retrain those staff who will not comply with the new models, and give the relevant managers the skills to support this.<br>• Undertake regular outreach visits by PNHQ staff to Districts over the next 12 months to communicate some of the policing reform initiatives.<br>• Roster Police managers to frontline (late or night) shifts with the General Duties Branch from time to time, in order to reinforce the importance of frontline policing.<br>• Reduce the number of Superintendents and Inspectors without line responsibilities at PNHQ and elsewhere.<br><br>*Change Management Practice & Performance*<br>• Refresh the case for change and the related internal communications plan. The plan should link and unify change initiatives relating to the COI and policing reform.<br>• Ensure that all policing reform and COI-related change is led by excellent operational managers (District Commanders, Area Commanders and selected NCOs) to maximise its credibility and practicality. This may require freeing some managers from business-as-usual demands. The resourcing investment needed to drive effective change should not be underestimated.<br>• Ensure that each manager, from NCO upwards, has COI/policing reform-related goals in their personal performance plans. The goals should be tailored to both personal and business unit contributions.<br><br>*Comprehensive Performance Management System*<br>• Provide enhanced initial and ongoing training and support from HR to frontline supervisors in the management of performance appraisals, targeting NCOs and Area Commanders.<br>• Replace the current performance appraisal system, not because it is flawed per se, but because its reputation has become weakened by practical misuse.<br>• Appraise the performance of staff to a bell-curve distribution.<br>• Introduce a new intra- and inter-District moderation process for performance appraisals.<br>• Use the learnings from pilots to develop a new coaching and mentoring model, linked to e-Performance and the appraisal system, but not to the formal performance management programme.<br>• De-couple coaching responsibilities from specific allowances such as the current FTO model.<br>• Use specialist external advisors to train District and Area Commanders on triaging, and to clarify the process differences between performance management and disciplinary proceedings.<br>• Periodically sample quality of decision triaging with regard to performance management in Districts each year.<br>• Develop a zero tolerance approach to some behaviours. This would entail the development and promulgation of a fast-track disciplinary process for some behavioural transgressions not centred on integrity. Areas that might attract such a policy could include, Inappropriate sexual relationships, bullying, and sexual harassment.<br>• Develop an improved mechanism for protected disclosure.<br>• Reflect on the role, composition, and protocols of the central disciplinary committee.<br>• Develop a programme within the talent management programme to specifically target women.<br>• Ensure that the new coaching programme has a focus on coaching female staff and assign appropriate mentors to high-performing female staff.<br>• Survey women in Police to identify barriers to advancement and solicit suggestions to these.<br><br>*Employment Relations Practice & Performance*<br>• Re-specify the central HR function to reflect the strategic capabilities it needs. This could entail consolidating HR, training and Organisational Design portfolios into a new strategic leadership role; greater use of web tools to enable staff to manage transactional issues themselves; creating a dedicated talent management function; rethinking the recruitment brand and strategy in the context of policing reform changes; and completely refreshing the training model and curricula.<br>• Centralise decision-making for all appointments at Inspector and above.<br>• Adopt the default principle of using acting roles only as a last resort.<br>• Ensure externals to the Area/District are included in all promotion panels for NCO and above.<br>• Reset the policy, communications, and expectations with regard to appointments and promotions.<br>• Revisit promotional criteria in the context of the work on core competencies and training redesign. |