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# Assurance Group



## Assurance review of emergent technologies

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### PURPOSE

This assurance review has a dual purpose:

- to assess the extent of New Zealand Police's involvement in trials making use of emergent technologies - including, but not limited to, artificial intelligence (AI) and surveillance technologies; and
- to identify opportunities for how to most safely position New Zealand Police around emergent technologies in the future.

### BACKGROUND AND SCOPE

In May 2020, the Commissioner of Police requested that a targeted assurance review be undertaken to better understand the extent of Police engagement with what are known as emergent technologies. This is a term generally used to describe 'new tech', but may also refer to ongoing development of an existing technology. Emerging digital technologies, in particular, can generate opportunities; but can also raise ethical issues, particularly related to privacy interests.

The review was sparked by concerns raised by the Police Executive and other stakeholders about Police's engagement with Clearview AI (a facial recognition software firm based out of the United States), and the process Police followed prior to that engagement.

Questions about the potential investigative applications of emergent technology, such as Clearview AI, in turn prompted consideration of what other technology is currently being piloted (or being proposed) elsewhere in Police. For instance, the Service Delivery Group's Digital Person ('Ella') and Virtual Access Portal (a.k.a. 'Police Connect') prototype trials have both incorporated AI; and AI helps with the operation of the NIA User Manual, 105 Online Form, and Police's public-facing Internet site. Automated Identity Matching is also used to a limited extent in the work of the Police Vetting Service.

Covert surveillance regulated by the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 was out of scope for the review. In addition, given the imperative to bring the results of the review back for the Executive's consideration as swiftly as possible, the review's scope was confined to relevant work groups; including National Operations, the Service Delivery Group, and other relevant business units such as the Legal Service Centre (LSC) and the Evidence-Based Policing Centre (EBPC).

A copy of the formal *Terms of Reference* for the review are [attached](#).

### OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH

The assurance review has three main objectives:

- complete a stock take of what trials of emergent technology are currently being undertaken by New Zealand Police
- assess the ethical and privacy implications of such trials
- provide assurance that such implications have been appropriately flagged to key stakeholders, such as the Privacy Commissioner and Independent Police Conduct Authority.

In order to advance these objectives, the reviewers first consulted National Operations to establish the context for the Clearview AI trial, and any other relevant technologies; then similarly consulted Service Delivery Group on current and future options for developing Police's AI capability, particularly vis-à-vis digital services. Inquiries were also made with other relevant areas, such as the LSC and EBPC. The second phase of the review involved assessing Police's trials of emergent technology against the Government Chief Data Steward's and the Privacy Commissioner's *Principles for safe and effective use of data and analytics* (2018). Finally, the review looked at both domestic and overseas models for how to approach trials of emergent technology.

### KEY FINDINGS

- Compared to counterpart law enforcement agencies, New Zealand Police currently makes limited use of 'new tech'. Even so, the review identified close to 20 examples of emergent technologies which have been either tested, trialed or rolled out. With an eye to the future, other technologies are under various stages of consideration.
- Use of Clearview AI software was a relatively short test, which was approved by an internal governance group, albeit not at Executive level.
- Opportunities have been missed to inform or consult some stakeholders before certain trials of 'new tech'.

### CONCLUSIONS

- Against a backdrop where the use of AI and other 'new tech' has become commonplace in other fields, New Zealand Police's use of emergent technologies has been reasonably conservative and carefully thought-through.
- To varying degrees, privacy, legal and ethical implications appear to have been considered before such technologies are deployed, although there is room for improvement in consistently sharing this knowledge with stakeholders.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

- Consider centralising the governance of emergent technologies, to provide strengthened oversight and better ensure consistent stakeholder engagement.
- Consider new policy guidance specifically on emergent technologies, that draws on domestic and international best practice for the safe and responsible use of data, and sets out a standard process for business groups to submit a proposal for pre-approval to the recommended new central governance group.
- Consider commissioning a more comprehensive 'deep dive' into ethical and privacy implications of technologies which have already been rolled out within Police.

## 1. Stock take of piloted and/or rolled out use of emergent technologies

The stock take established that Police has either tested, trialed or rolled out the following emergent technologies:

### Clearview AI

- Clearview AI is software that compares a photograph of a facial image for matches in the company's database.
- A short non-operational test of Clearview AI was conducted in February-March 2020. This was confined to a free trial of a small number of licences to test the viability of the product (i.e., its accuracy in recognising faces).
- Both LSC and the Assurance Group's privacy team were consulted. Advice was provided that if the test proved viable, and if the software was to be considered for ongoing (i.e. non-test) use, then a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) and a formal legal review would be necessary – before the software was deployed as an investigative tool.
- The team responsible for the test briefed the relevant operational governance group, which supported the test.
- The tests uploaded photos of the faces of Police volunteers and the faces of a small number of persons of interest wanted by Police.
- It is current Police practice to disclose to media the photographic images of faces of persons of interest.
- In total, 133 searches were completed using photos of the faces of Police volunteers and other available images.
- Another 49 searches were made by three users across Wellington and the upper North Island, using real case data, from 20 February 2020. The last search was on 19 March 2020. No positive results were noted by the users.
- No licenses of Clearview AI were subsequently purchased or deployed operationally.

### Darknet website scraper

- A set of python scripts/utilities, written by a Police technical investigator, used to programmatically scrape Darknet sites.
- A PIA was not considered necessary, as the information that is obtained using this program is readily available to anyone with an Internet connection. The program simply automates the day-to-day Darknet analysis by Police operators – work that would be done manually, should this automated process not exist.
- No formal business approval was sought or received prior to first use, and there was also no on-boarding process.

### Child Protection System (CPS)

- Program that searches peer-to-peer networks for people who are offering to supply child exploitation material. It searches based on hash sets and keywords of the files that are being offered.
- Police staff were trained in the use of CPS by Australian law enforcement in 2011. A Police member received further training in the USA in 2015.
- It is unclear whether first use of CPS was supported by any prior business approval. Advice was sought from LSC. In short, the advice was that no information is obtained from suspects that isn't already publicly available online.

### Auror: Child Abuse

- A program used to analyse images to categorise them as child abuse material.
- Matches hash values and metadata and compares them with known images.

### Griffeye

- A program used to analyse images to identify them as child abuse material. This is done by matching hash values and metadata, and comparing them with known images.
- Police has been using this software for 7–8 years. Other New Zealand law enforcement agencies involved in investigating child abuse also use it, and it is the most common tool used by law enforcement worldwide to categorise images. A trainer came to New Zealand to train Police staff before its implementation.
- A full PIA was not considered applicable, as the information obtained using this program compares images already held of child abuse and compares them to other images, based on similarities and hash values.

### Brief Cam

- Used to analyse CCTV footage acquired by Police to establish the presence of a known face or a car movement.
- Approved for use by the Investigations Governance Group on 20 February 2020.
- It is estimated that use will cut the time Police staff spend analysing evidential CCTV footage. For example, the time it takes to analyse three months' worth of CCTV footage will likely reduce from six weeks to two hours.

### **NewX**

- Searches unstructured data and platforms for faces, guns, and body markings (tattoos).
- Already in use. Forensic and Asset Recovery Unit staff use NewX to search evidential clones of computers.

### **Cellebrite**

- Analytics enterprise tool which searches lawfully-seized cellphones for data.
- Includes a facial recognition capability that Police has not made use of.

### **Automated Biometric Information Survey (ABIS)**

- Project has been ongoing for a number of years and, once commissioned, ABIS will have an upgraded algorithm to provide better facial recognition.
- Deployment is planned by September 2020. By Q1/Q2 of 2021, ABIS will also be able to provide search capability across scars, marks and tattoos; enabling searches of our images database for matches with evidential images.
- The tool is managed by the Forensic Group and isn't available to Police staff in general, except by formal request.
- A formal business case for ABIS was signed off, recognising that National Criminal Investigations Group (NCIG) is ABIS's business owner. A PIA and security certification and accreditation (C&A) are ongoing considerations.

### **Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR)**

- Deployed by several Districts/Areas (Tāmaki Makaurau, BoP, Taupō, Putaruru) to assist enforcement initiatives.
- Currently managed out of Tāmaki Makaurau using a convergent server supplied by an external provider, which enables ANPR to be acquired by Police for locating vehicles of interest.
- The project is developing policy, defining/accommodating privacy and other risks, and considering governance.
- Current deployment in Tāmaki Makaurau is managed at Inspector-level in the District Command Centre (DCC) where the designated senior officer is responsible for security of the system and responding to requests for ANPR information sought for investigations of serious offending.
- At present, the system is predominantly used for detecting vehicles of interest, but where a valid and authorised request is made to the system manager for information that will support the investigation of a serious crime, information may be released to the investigation team.
- Auror is an independent provider of CCTV and ANPR platforms for the private sector, including fuel stations and other retail outlets.
- In the case of fuel stations, the retailer has access to the Auror system; and if an offender returns to a station, the ANPR system will alert the retailer who can then shut off the fuel pump. Police can then be notified by email.
- The business owner for ANPR is the National Prevention Centre.

### **RPAS**

- Use of remotely-piloted aircraft systems (a.k.a. 'drones') was endorsed by the Police Executive on 12 June 2019.

### **Axon Citizen (Evidence.com)**

- This system is currently used by Police to store evidentiary video interviews acquired from family harm victims. It is also used to store video footage generated after activations during the deployment of TASERs by our officers.
- Communication Centres can use Axon to store images or videos provided by members of the public for evidential purposes. The images are saved through a URL link that is sent to the caller. This was trialled at Central Comms and is likely to be rolled out nationally in the near future. There is no AI or facial recognition capability.
- The product was proposed for use by the supplier at no extra cost to Police and is a simple way to receive and store digital photographic evidence from a witness to an incident.
- The business owner for Axon is the Communications National Management Group.

### **MobileLocate**

- MobileLocate is used by Land and Marine SAR to locate missing people (who wish to be found).
- Police uses MobileLocate to find the location of a cellphone of someone who has rung in to say that they're lost. We send the person a text, asking the lost person to reply (the reply will contain the GPS location of the device).
- If mobile locate is turned off, the person is sent another email that activates mobile locate. Police is then sent the location information needed to pin-point the missing individual.
- The business owner for MobileLocate is the Communications National Management Group.

### Device Location Information (DLI)

- This is an enhancement to the MBIE-owned product ECLI (Emergency Caller Location Information).
- The ECLI Service enables call takers from a range of emergency services (including Police) to receive automatically generated geographical information about the likely location of a caller when a 111 call is made from a mobile device on a cellular network. ECLI extracts real time location information on demand at regular intervals from a person's mobile device if it is connected to the cellular network – whether or not they've called 111. To this extent, it's intrusive and can be operated without the knowledge of the person being enquired after.
- The system has been scrutinised by the Privacy Commissioner, who publicly consulted and issued an amendment to the Telecommunications Information Privacy Code (TIPC) to allow use of this service for restricted purposes, where it is required to prevent or lessen a serious threat to the life or health of an individual.
- The business owner for DLI and the ECLI Service is the Communications National Management Group.

### Online Forms

- AI used on the Police 105 Form website (for non-emergency reports) to help prioritise jobs.
- The AI scans the 105 Form for key words and assigns a priority. This fast tracks priority jobs to Comms for action.
- Rollout followed an appropriate internal governance process, including privacy and security risk considerations.

### Natural Language Processing

- AI deployed as a training aid to look for common themes used by Police staff when searching a system manual.
- This application is no longer used, though the ongoing value of this kind of software is still being examined.
- Rollout followed an appropriate internal governance process, including privacy and security risk considerations.

### Front counter person tracking and counting

- Deployed in Christchurch's Justice and Emergency Services Precinct, Te Omeka, to gain an accurate picture of Police public counter demand and requirements in the CBD, and across the Christchurch Metro Area stations.
- Information is collected to improve service delivery at the public counter. The service uses cameras to assess the volume of people visiting a station, when people visit, and the length of time people spend at the counter. The technology is sensitive enough to detect when one staff member is faced with 10 customers, as well as when four staff members are faced with just one customer.
- Rollout followed internal governance and TEB decision-making processes, including consideration of privacy and security risks.

### Digital Human

- An Electronic Life-Like Assistant ("Ella"), powered by conversational machine-learning AI, was stationed in the lobby of PNHQ for a three-month trial, from February to April 2020. Ella assisted the concierge team and talked to visitors about Police services. Users could ask for information, or be connected to whoever they were visiting.
- Rollout followed an internal governance process, which included consideration of both privacy and security risks.
- Police extended an invitation to see a demonstration of the capability to the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner.

## 2. Emergent technologies being considered for piloting and/or potential use

In addition, the stock take found Police staff considering the following potential uses of emergent technologies:

### Hubstream

- Software which takes overseas referrals relating to child exploitation material and completes checks on any phone numbers, IP addresses, user names, and emails for referrals that have already been seen, based on already-held data. Police is one of three agencies which is considering seeking permission to use this software for a proof of concept trial.

### NewCops website

- Although not currently considered viable, some discussions have occurred in the People and Capability Group about the use of chatbots for the NewCops recruitment website, as a way to help answer site visitors' questions.

### Other potential 'new tech' applications which were mentioned during the review as being under consideration

- ANPR feed directly into CAD where, for example, a number plate matching a stolen vehicle would present an alert, which CommCens would currently manually create a CAD event for, but AI could create automatically.
- Displaying CCTV feed by camera location as an icon on a CAD map, that when clicked would display a pop-up window (web browser) displaying either a direct video feed or the last still photo taken. Current functionality has NZTA Traffic Operations Centre camera feeds coming in to the Centres along with some other CCTV feeds. A number of these feeds are provided through external provider SecuroGroup and Auror.
- CommCens' use of chat bots for call management for some less urgent situations.
- Communications National Management Group and the Service Group are looking at options to allow community patrols to interact with CommCens in the automated logging-on and logging-off procedures, which are currently manual and require a phone call.
- Aspect and MyPolice – We are currently unable to connect these two systems so that they 'talk' to one another, creating interest in an e-solution to run a disparity report between MyPolice and Aspect which can be acted on (i.e. shifts do not match or leave records do not match). This would better ensure staff are getting their correct entitlements, reduce the risk of employment disputes, and should reduce overall leave liabilities as all leave taken will be followed up for recording in My Police. This could also do the work using desktop automation to actually update MyPolice with changes in schedules, and starting times made by the Workforce Team in Aspect, so there is no need for double-keying.
- Part of our EBPC performance reporting regime will look to use some sort of process automation in the future.
- Towed Vehicles/Keys taken – Comms are looking to put a system in place where people can query a database to see if their car has been towed - and if so, where to – as well as finding out where their keys are, if they have been taken. This may use either a chat bot or some form of automation.
- Body-Worn Cameras (BWCs). Response and Operations Group have been looking at BWC technology for some time and are keen to run a proof of concept, but a directive was given to pause any further work on this idea.
- Digital Information Management. ICTSC has indicated it will be running an RFI/RFP to look at systems that will store both evidential information and CCTV, social media and photographs. It is likely the tenders will list AI and potentially facial recognition as part of the requirements.

## 3. Assessment

New Zealand Police's use of emergent technologies is fairly limited compared with overseas police agencies. Such technologies are basically used to detect and investigate crime, or to assist with communications and road policing.

Of note, we use 'new tech' to search the large amounts of unstructured data we capture when we seize computers from suspected child exploitation offenders. The main purpose of these kinds of searches is to establish if a computer holds photographic images. Use of AI reduces the sheer volume of data our people would have to sift through, and saves considerable investigative time.

We also use these technologies to aid major investigations, for example we would use search software to filter masses of historic CCTV footage for relevant evidence. This saves police investigations considerable time, reduces investigator fatigue and aids accuracy. Searches that once took six weeks can now be done in two hours; freeing up detectives to spend more time considering the accuracy of information they are evaluating as potential evidence.

Many technological tools that we use (for example, mobility devices) have an in-built facial recognition capability. However, we do not use this functionality.



We also use emergent technologies to assist with communications functions: essentially to populate data collected by one process into another system, such as to prioritise the relative importance of 105 non-emergency forms, and to detect vehicle number plates linked to traffic offending and serious crime.

While Automated Identity Matching is used to a limited extent in the work of the Police Vetting Service, we do not generally substitute machines and algorithms for human decision-making. Likewise, while New Zealand Police does use the YORST algorithm, as a 2019 Law Foundation and University of Otago report into *Government Use of Artificial Intelligence* noted, YORST can only be considered an algorithm “in a weak sense of the term”. Unlike police agencies in the United States (and United Kingdom, in a limited way) New Zealand Police does not use algorithms to predict patterns of emerging and reoccurring crime at the community level. Rather, Police sets the parameters of searches and police officers review data which are selected for relevance, accuracy and evidential sufficiency. And our use of these technologies as part of investigations is regularly reviewed by the Courts and subject to judicial oversight.

## 4. Ethical and privacy framework

The ethics and privacy implications of Police’s use of emergent technologies are subject to the overarching requirements of necessity and proportionality. Necessity boils down to the legal framework that sets out the purposes of an agency. To meet our legal obligations we are obliged to make sure that we collect information related to our purposes, and no more. The lawful functions of Police include keeping the peace, maintaining public safety, law enforcement and crime prevention. In addition, the enabling provisions of the Privacy Act 2020 give Police the authority to collect personal information for a lawful purpose connected with our functions and activities.

The Privacy Act enables Police to collect personal information directly from the individual concerned, unless our responsibility to maintain the law provides reasonable grounds to make non-compliance necessary. There will be times when we will need to collect information covertly, or not directly from an individual to carry out our functions. In addition to our legal framework, the Government Chief Data Steward and Privacy Commissioner have published *Principles for the Safe and Effective Use of Data and Analytics*. The *Principles* provide agencies with high level guidance on the collection and use of data. The *Principles* emphasise that data and analytics should be used to deliver a clear public benefit, be fit for purpose, focused on people, transparent, and maintain human oversight. The inherent limitations of such an approach need to be understood.

Our processes for evaluating the use of data are both grounded in law and are broadly consistent with the *Principles*. We have developed internal guidance around personal information. Our approach relies on Privacy by Design (PbD), which mandates a risk and legal assessment of proposed projects for privacy and human rights implications. PbD is formally written into the *Police Manual*, and reflects the ‘three lines of defence’ model recommended by both the Office of the Auditor-General and Government Chief Privacy Officer’s Privacy Maturity Framework. Proposed projects typically benefit from specialist privacy advice, a Privacy Analysis and/or a full Privacy Impact Assessment. As a project matures, it will be supported by increasing levels of advice, analysis and assessment. Legal review is also considered case-by-case and traverses the legal, privacy and human rights implications of a proposed project.

## 5. Stakeholder engagement

Police consults with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) when it considers there are valid issues for concern for the Privacy Commissioner and the public. Prior consultation examples include the gun buy-back scheme and Device Location Information (resulting in amendments to the Telecommunications Information Privacy Code). We worked closely with OPC, and the IPCA, when Police Vetting Service operations were reviewed. In addition, we consulted on: the Child Sex Offender Register; Other Countries’ Nationals (a collaboration with MBIE to share information about deportees leaving and returning to New Zealand); the review of the Privacy Act; an AISA on name change, death and information sharing (including the Operating Procedures and Reporting Notice); the automated business process between TradeMe and Police to confirm any auction of firearms involves registered individuals; and deployment of an All of Government (AoG) dashboard to assist with geographic location of Covid-19 infections.

The Privacy Commissioner and Commissioner of Police entered into an MoU for consultation on agency-to-agency agreements pursuant to section 95D of the Policing Amendment Act 2015, which includes an understanding of the obligations on both parties during consultations.

Beyond section 95D, consultation with the Privacy Commissioner is done at the discretion of Police, consistent with the need under section 16(2) of the Policing Act for the Commissioner of Police to act independently on operational matters. Even so, both policy and practice encourages Police to consult regularly with OPC, and we do so often. There will be times when Police's deployment of a technology to gain a law enforcement advantage will see the project subject solely to internal checks and balances. These internal checks and balances include Executive review, as well as scrutiny from LSC and specialist privacy and security assessments led by teams in the Assurance Group. We also consult extensively with the Police Association and the IPCA on any technology deployments involving the collection of information about our own staff. And, as noted earlier, we typically consult with or proactively brief the Privacy Commissioner on relevant developments, especially on issues of wider public interest.

Despite this context, the surprise created when details emerged of the short-lived testing of Clearview AI software indicates that opportunities can still be missed to inform or consult stakeholders before certain technology is trialed. While the Clearview AI example would appear to be 'the exception that proves the rule', it still offers valuable lessons.

## 6. Discussion

New Zealand Police has deployed a range of technologies over the years to assist legitimate law enforcement goals, and keep pace with the enthusiastic adoption of 'new tech' by criminal elements. For example, we have replaced our labour intensive fingerprint card index with digital searching. Digital technology is now integral to the Police communications network, and is more secure than analogue radio. Word processors have replaced type writers, and biometric databases store and have the capability to search for matches of fingerprints and photographs using digital technologies. Digital case files are increasingly replacing paper-based records, and much of the day-to-day work of frontline officers is now done using small mobility devices. Capturing photographic images in the form of cell phone cameras or CCTV footage is now the norm, replacing the use of the hand held 'box' cameras of the past.

At times, the rollout of a new technology will be accompanied by public questioning on ethical and privacy grounds. In New Zealand, concerns expressed about Police's use of emergent technologies have focussed on issues raised overseas around use of facial recognition in public settings, and use of algorithms for so-called "predictive policing". We have done neither. We have not used algorithms to profile communities for crime and we have not deployed facial recognition in public places. Our deployment of ANPR has not gone beyond a trial, and Police use of CCTV is limited in scale. Moreover, both projects were reviewed by LSC and formal PIAs were completed in a timely manner.

## 7. Opportunities to more safely position Police

Before concluding this review, the opportunity was taken to look at both domestic and overseas models for how to approach trials of 'new tech', with a view to identifying opportunities for most safely positioning New Zealand Police around emergent technologies in the future.

### ***Domestic models for how to approach emergent technologies***

The Government Chief Data Steward and Privacy Commissioner have developed *Principles for the safe and effective use of data and analytics*, while Statistics New Zealand have proposed an *Algorithm Charter for Aotearoa New Zealand*. The *Principles* and *Charter* provide state sector agencies with high-level guidance on the responsible and safe use of data. Both the *Principles* and *Charter* highlight the importance of governance oversight and the need to give staff clear guidance around data use.

The *Principles* remind agencies that any new use of data must have a solid foundation in law; the views of relevant stakeholders should be considered; and data products should be bias free. "Guidance, oversight, and transparency are essential to fostering trust, confidence, and integrity around the use of data the government holds on behalf of New Zealanders", the *Principles* make clear. "It's important for Kiwis to understand how their personal data is used."

The Government Chief Data Steward has also established a Data Ethics Advisory Group to help agencies make the most of the opportunities and benefits presented by the new and emerging uses of data, and to assist the responsible management of potential risks and harms. This group of independent experts encourages the innovative and ethical use of data and provides advice to agencies on how to seize data opportunities appropriately.

Broadly speaking, New Zealand Police's legal and privacy guidance is consistent with the *Principles* and the *Charter*. There is no evidence that our testing, trials and use of emergent technologies has been inconsistent with either the *Principles* or the *Charter*, and our operational groups take care to consider ethical and privacy related implications, make use of our PbD and legal review processes, and refer new projects to relevant governance groups within their reporting lines.

That said, we would benefit from taking advantage of the expertise of the Data Ethics Advisory Group when considering the operational deployment of emergent technology, or when we propose to change the way we use an existing technology. Using the Data Ethics Advisory Group as a sounding board would allow us to put our thinking before a panel of some of the best experts to get advice on ways to safely deploy technology. The experience of London's Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) suggests engagement with a panel of this kind could be valuable. In addition working with this Group would enable us to draw on expertise to work through the implications of international best practice, such as the work of the OECD on AI ethics and the Australian government's AI ethics framework.

The *Principles* also emphasise the need for transparency, as openness helps foster public trust and the confidence that government agencies will use and hold data on behalf of all New Zealanders. We could consider being more transparent around our uses of 'new tech' to fight crime, and this may potentially help dispel some misconceptions.

During the course of this review, operational staff identified the value of modernising our governance processes around emergent technology. We could benefit from enhancing our internal governance of any 'new tech' proposals to better balance operational considerations with privacy, legal, human rights and ethical considerations. Centralising governance around 'new tech' would provide a clearer path for operational groups to follow when seeking approval to deploy an emergent technology, support strengthened oversight, and create a mechanism to encourage greater consistency around approaches to stakeholder engagement.

### ***Overseas models for how to approach proposed trials of emergent technologies***

Emergent technologies, when used responsibly, offer significant advantages. CCTV and ANPR, if widely deployed and integrated, offer the potential for law enforcement to significantly improve detection and prevention. The use of these technologies has, for example, enabled London's Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) to significantly reduce vehicle theft, car pursuits, burglary and serious violent crime taking place in public spaces. To take another example, South Wales Police (SWP) have deployed automated facial recognition (AFR) at major public events to detect persons of interest. The deployment of facial recognition technology by SWP was examined by the High Court in May 2019, with the Court finding that SWP's limited use of AFR was consistent with relevant human rights and data protection laws.

The experiences of the MPS and SWP serves to demonstrate that these kinds of emergent technologies can be used safely and responsibly in a policing context. These deployments also provide us with insights that we could examine as we look to strengthen our safe and responsible use of emergent technologies. For instance, the UK has a specific Surveillance Camera Code which offers police a framework of transparent guidance and the social license to deploy 'new tech'. [The principles of the UK Surveillance Camera Code are reproduced at Annex B.] Similarly, inspiration could be taken from specific guidelines developed by SWP to help its officers weigh up whether to make use of AFR: "It is important to ensure that a balance is maintained between transparency and engagement whilst not unduly impacting on the effectiveness of the deployment", the guidelines state. "This balance is achieved via a risk-based approach, at times it may be appropriate to advertise a deployment so that individuals of concern are deterred from attending. At other times it may be more appropriate to encourage attendance by not disclosing deployment specifics so that an individual is more likely to attend and be detained."



Also of note, the Mayor of London has established an independent Ethics Panel, and the Panel's assessment of the MPS' use of live facial recognition software has come up with a set of overarching rules that could be usefully considered here as we grapple with emergent technologies (even though we do not use AFR). The Panel recommends police only deploy emergent technologies like AI when the overall benefits to public safety are great enough to outweigh any potential public distrust in the technology; assess and authorise each deployment to ensure that it is both necessary and proportionate for a specific policing purpose; and train operators to understand the risks associated with emergent technologies and to understand that they are accountable.

Finally, the MPS publishes information about its use of public facing technologies on the MPS website, and use this information platform to help educate the public about what relevant software (like AFR) is attempting to achieve. This model chimes with the *Principles for the safe and effective use of data and analytics*, highlighted earlier, which emphasise the need for openness and transparency to help foster public trust and the confidence. Again, the MPS experience might serve as inspiration for New Zealand Police to consider being more transparent around our uses of 'new tech' to fight crime, particularly to help 'myth bust' and counter any concerns about New Zealand Police's use of emergent technologies.

## 8. Charting a course forward

While the discussion of leading-edge international practices is of more relevance to any future consideration of 'new tech' trials, more immediately there would seem to be some areas for improvement to current practices. We could strengthen our internal governance by centralising the Police governance of emergent technologies. Centralisation would help drive policy, operational and ethical consistency, and ensure our standardised processes for C&A, PIAs and legal review are consistently followed. Any new governance arrangements (and the processes work groups should use to raise proposals for governance consideration) should be set out in a policy document easily accessible to operational groups.

We could also consider introducing new policy guidelines for the deployment of emergent technologies in light of domestic and international best practice. Such an exercise would do well to draw on the Government Chief Data Steward's and Privacy Commissioner's *Principles for the Safe and Effective Use of Data and Analytics* and the UK Surveillance Camera Code of Practice.

We could also consider consulting the Data Ethics Advisory Group around any more significant 'new tech' proposals.

## 9. Conclusions and recommendations

The key conclusions of this review are:

- Against a backdrop where the use of AI and other 'new tech' has become commonplace in other fields, New Zealand Police's use of emergent technologies has been reasonably conservative and carefully thought-through.
- Privacy, legal and ethical implications have appropriately been considered by Police before emergent technologies are deployed, although there is room for improvement in consistently sharing this knowledge with stakeholders.

Based on the findings of the review, it is recommended that the Police Executive:

- Consider centralising the governance of emergent technologies, to provide strengthened oversight and better ensure consistent stakeholder engagement.
- Consider new policy guidance specifically on emergent technologies, that draws on domestic and international best practice for the safe and responsible use of data, and sets out a standard process for business groups to submit a proposal for pre-approval to the recommended new central governance group.
- Consider commissioning a more comprehensive 'deep dive' into ethical and privacy implications of technologies which have already been rolled out within Police.

## Annex A: Terms of Reference for the review

## Terms of Reference

## Assurance Group



NEW ZEALAND  
**POLICE**  
Ngā Pirihimana o Aotearoa

## Assurance review of pilot emergent technologies

## Context for the work

The Commissioner has requested a targeted assurance review to better understand the extent of Police's engagement in trials that involve emergent technologies (including but not limited to artificial intelligence (AI) and surveillance technologies).

Emerging technology is a term generally used to describe a new technology, but it may also refer to the continuing development of an existing technology. Emerging digital technologies have generated new opportunities while creating new ethical challenges, particularly related to privacy.

A prompt for the review has been concerns raised by the Police Executive and stakeholders about Police's engagement with a US-based facial recognition software firm, Clearview AI, and the process followed prior to this engagement.

Questions about the potential investigative applications of emergent technology such as Clearview AI, have also prompted consideration of what other trial technology is currently being piloted (or being proposed) elsewhere in Police. For instance, the Service Delivery Group's Digital Person ("Ella") and Virtual Access Points (a.k.a. "Police Connect") prototype trials have incorporated AI; and AI helps with the operation of the NIA User Manual, 105 online form and Police's Internet site. It is also understood that Automated Identity Matching is used to a limited extent in the work of the Police Vetting Service.

## Objectives

The objectives of the assurance review are:

- Completing a stocktake of what trials of emergent technology are currently being undertaken by New Zealand Police.
- Assessing the ethical and privacy implications of such trials
- Providing assurance that such implications have been appropriately flagged to key stakeholders, such as the Privacy Commissioner and Independent Police Conduct Authority.

## Intended approach

The assurance review will involve:

- Consulting with National Operations Group staff over the circumstances of the Clearview AI trial, as well as any other relevant initiatives involving emergent technologies.
- Consulting with Service Delivery Group staff on current and future options for developing Police's AI capability, particularly vis-à-vis digital services
- Assessing Police's current and any proposed trials of emergent technology against the Government Chief Data Steward and Privacy Commissioner's *Principles for safe and effective use of data and analytics* (2018)
- Consulting other relevant business groups (for example, the Legal Service Centre and EBPC) to understand the risks and opportunities of Police's engagement with emergent technologies
- Reviewing domestic and overseas models for how to approach proposed trials of emergent technologies.

## Timing and resourcing

The review work will commence by 22 May 2020, led by senior staff in PNHQ's Assurance Group. While the bulk of the work will be conducted in-house, it may be appropriate for some aspects to be peer reviewed by specialist external advisers (contracted to Police).

## Key contact

Dr David Dickens  
Principal Adviser: Privacy

## The deliverable

A written report will be drafted detailing key findings, any risks as well as corresponding opportunities, and recommendations for how to most safely position New Zealand Police around emergent technologies in future. A draft of the report will be circulated for management review by 30 June 2020.

Mike Webb  
GM: Professionalism and Assurance

22/05/20

Angela Brazier  
A/DCE: Strategy and Partnerships

22/5/20



## Annex B: Principles of the UK Surveillance Camera Code of Practice

The Principles of the UK Surveillance Camera Code of Practice are:

- Use of a surveillance camera system must always be for a specified purpose which is in pursuit of a legitimate aim and necessary to meet an identified pressing need.
- The use of a surveillance camera system must take into account its effect on individuals and their privacy, with regular reviews to ensure its use remains justified.
- There must be as much transparency in the use of a surveillance camera system as possible, including a published contact point for access to information and complaints.
- There must be clear responsibility and accountability for all surveillance camera system activities including images and information collected, held and used.
- Clear rules, policies and procedures must be in place before a surveillance camera system is used, and these must be communicated to all who need to comply with them.
- No more images and information should be stored than that which is strictly required for the stated purpose of a surveillance camera system, and such images and information should be deleted once their purposes have been discharged.
- Access to retained images and information should be restricted and there must be clearly defined rules on who can gain access and for what purpose such access is granted; the disclosure of images and information should only take place when it is necessary for such a purpose or for law enforcement purposes.
- Surveillance camera system operators should consider any approved operational, technical and competency standards relevant to a system and its purpose and work to meet and maintain those standards.
- Surveillance camera system images and information should be subject to appropriate security measures to safeguard against unauthorised access and use.
- There should be effective review and audit mechanisms to ensure legal requirements, policies and standards are complied with in practice, and regular reports should be published.
- When the use of a surveillance camera system is in pursuit of a legitimate aim, and there is a pressing need for its use, it should then be used in the most effective way to support public safety and law enforcement with the aim of processing images and information of evidential value.
- Any information used to support a surveillance camera system which compares against a reference database for matching purposes should be accurate and kept up to date.