

Budget Sensitive

Office of the Minister of Police

Cabinet Business Committee

Investing in Police Frontline Safety

Proposal

- 1 This paper seeks agreement to contribute funding for year one of a proposed Tactical Response Model to improve Police frontline¹ safety and tactical capability.

Relation to government priorities

- 2 The proposal supports the government's Law and Order reforms to improve public safety and wellbeing, as well as combatting organised crime networks. Improving how frontline staff are trained and deployed, and the tactical capability when deployed, will enable staff to better respond to high-risk incidents. These improvements will also enable staff to resolve these incidents more safely and reduce the risk to both the public and staff.

Executive Summary

- 3 Frontline Police staff have said they increasingly find themselves in situations where they feel ill-equipped and unsafe. Police operate in a dynamic and unpredictable environment and face risk of physical injury through their day-to-day work. We have seen increases in demand on frontline Police, particularly in more serious, complex and time-intensive areas. Staff are concerned about the harm and threats to safety caused by gangs and organised crime, drug-related violence, firearms, and a willingness of individuals to use violence against Police.
- 4 The numbers of Police firearms seizures have been rising over the past eight years, including an increasing proportion of more easily concealed firearms and handguns that are more likely to be seized from vehicles and in public places. Most presentations and discharges of firearms at and by police are not anticipated and involve non-specialised staff.
- 5 In response to these concerns and other risks staff face, Police has developed a Tactical Response Model to improve staff safety and increase overall frontline capability, while also retaining generally unarmed policing services. I am seeking Cabinet approval to commit to fund \$15.496 million of the year one rollout of the model. My preferred option enables a rapid implementation of the model and delivers the earliest safety and capability benefits to Police and communities.

¹ Frontline predominantly refers to Public Safety Teams (PST) and Road Policing (RP) staff with further work to define other areas across Districts.

- 6 Subject to Cabinet approval, and staff and public engagement on the draft model, Police will roll out the model focusing in year one on doubling tactical training for frontline staff, increasing tactical capability, and implementing proofs of concept in four Districts. s9(2)(f)(iv)
- [REDACTED]

The environment Police operate in is dynamic and unpredictable

- 7 Consecutive governments have recognised the increased demand on Police services, particularly in more serious, complex and time-intensive areas such as serious and organised crime, family harm, child abuse, sexual assault and mental health.
- 8 To address these demands, Cabinet agreed in Budgets 2017 and 2018 to fund an additional 1800 Police staff over and above attrition to 2022/23 [refer Cab-19-MIN-0158.220]. The goal was to resource Police so that it met government and community expectations of its prevention and response to crime and other calls for service. The additional 1800 staff is being deployed into two broad areas: 1100 police in the community who will be locally focused and engaged, with national-level coordination and support; and 700 police to combat serious and organised crime.²
- 9 The demand on Police has been compounded by COVID-19 enforcement, including the extraction of approximately 240 FTEs to Managed Isolation and Quarantine (MIQF) facilities. s 9(2)(f)(iv)
- [REDACTED]
- 10 Alongside increased demand, the policing environment continues to evolve and is a significant concern to officer safety, including:
- 10.1 the adoption of more sophisticated means to engage in criminal activity among organised crime groups, and exacerbated by some from within the groups of so-called '501' deportees;
 - 10.2 overt gang and drug-related violence;
 - 10.3 Police officers regularly encountering illegal firearms and other weapons on duty;
 - 10.4 a perceived hardening of the criminal mindset and willingness to use violence against Police.

² In addition to the 345 FTE already allocated to serious and organised crime, Police plans to allocate an additional 155 FTE in 2021/22 and a final 200 FTE in 2022/23. This will enable Police to meet the 700 FTE target by June 2023.

- 11 As of the end of 2020, there were an estimated 1.4 million firearms within New Zealand, and firearms seizures by Police have been rising over the past eight years. This includes a growing proportion of more easily concealed cutdown firearms and handguns, which are also more likely than other firearms to be seized from vehicles and in public places, where they pose a risk to the public and staff. In many cases the presence of firearms, including those used in presentations and discharges at police, were not anticipated by the officers.³ These are not planned, but surprise events, taking place during routine day-to-day policing operations.
- 12 In the four months from January - April 2021, Police recorded nine incidents involving the presentation or discharge of firearms at police.⁴ In five of these nine events, the first attending staff were not armed. Most shots fired at police involved non-specialist staff, including being targeted with higher threat⁵ firearms. Most instances requiring firearm discharges by police also involved non-specialist staff.⁶
- 13 Risk to staff safety encompasses a range of other threats in addition to firearms, including physical assaults, which are increasing over time. While not all assaults will result in injuries, the number of assaults on police which did result in injury nearly doubled between 2015 (251) and 2020 (497).⁷
- 14 Frontline staff have said they increasingly find themselves in situations where they feel ill-equipped and unsafe for the current operating environment. This is often due to a combination of feeling inadequately trained or supported, alongside the known and unknown risks from firearms and violent offenders they encounter in their day-to-day work.
- 15 The murder of Constable Matthew Hunt on 19 June 2020 as well as recent incidents where firearms have been discharged at Police, tragically highlight the risk posed to frontline staff and have heightened staff and public attention on frontline and community safety.

Initial options analysis to improve frontline safety

- 16 Police has a responsibility to ensure its staff are trained, equipped, and supported to keep themselves, and our communities safe. This is both a moral imperative, and a legal requirement under the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015.
- 17 Police has undertaken initial options analysis, which indicated three broad options for responding to staff concerns of safety and the dynamic operating environment staff experience:

17.1 *Status quo* – this option was rejected as it does not respond to the identified problem and risks both staff and public safety, and trust and

³ RORE (2021) Environmental Risk Scan: 2021 Update. NZ Police.

⁴ Gun Safe, Response and Operations Research and Evaluation.

⁵ Rifles with a calibre >0.22.

⁶ RORE (2021) Environmental Risk Scan, 2021 Update.

⁷ Ibid.

confidence in Police. Frontline officers clearly face significant safety risks, and Police has a duty to ensure staff are as safe as they can be when fulfilling their duties;

17.2 *Generally arming Police* – this option was also rejected by the Police Executive. The available evidence as to whether general arming makes police safer is, at best, equivocal. There is some evidence that suggests general arming may decrease public safety.⁸ Importantly, aspects of Police's current (unarmed) style of policing contribute to the safety of police, and we should be slow to shift such fundamental settings. On this basis, the Police Executive has committed to retaining Police as a generally unarmed service.

17.3 *Developing a new response model* – this option was preferred as it would address the concerns from frontline staff by developing a system response to the problem.

18 The rest of this paper outlines the proposed new response model and options for implementing this model.

Frontline Safety Improvement Programme

19 In response to the operating environment and feedback from staff, as well as directly in response to the murder of Constable Matthew Hunt, Police commenced the Frontline Safety Improvement Programme (FSIP) in 2020.

20 Police acknowledges that it cannot eliminate the risk to the safety of its people but recognises there is more that can be done to improve frontline safety. Having considered the current environment, listened to feedback from staff, and seen the results of existing baseline investment in enhancing the capability of frontline staff, it is clear Police can do more to enhance its current tactical capability. This shortfall needs to be addressed to keep our police safe and ensure New Zealand's model of community policing can continue.

21 Over the last 12 months, the FSIP engaged with more than 1,250 frontline responders and specialist tactical staff, and undertook a review of existing community insights, research and relevant literature. This extensive research has allowed it to identify the best opportunities to improve frontline safety across areas such as training, equipment, approach to risk, and Police's overall tactical response model. Feedback from Police's Frontline Safety Enhancement Course (FSEC) training, introduced under FSIP, has also highlighted the opportunity to significantly improve the current tactical training provided to frontline staff.

22 Police has accelerated this work in response to recent incidents involving firearm presentations and discharges at frontline staff, and the High Court trial for the murder of Constable Hunt. I now seek Cabinet's support to provide additional funding to enable a significant step up in this response.

⁸ RORE, EBPC, NIC (2021) Appropriate Tactical Settings, Insights and Evidence Brief, August 2021 Update.

Police has developed a new Tactical Response Model

- 23 Police has developed an integrated Tactical Response Model (TRM) to improve officer safety and increase overall frontline capability, while also retaining generally unarmed policing services.
- 24 The TRM will raise Police's overall ability to better understand, prevent and respond to high-risk and critical incidents⁹ through an integrated model, aligned with Police's Prevention First approach. This will increase capability across the wider system, while also ensuring specific health and safety issues are addressed. In short, it represents a 'capability model' rather than a 'deficit model' (looking narrowly at what might be missing in any particular area) to keep staff and communities safe across the spectrum of frontline policing. A key learning from the Armed Response Team trial was that a systemic, rather than single additional functional response is required.
- 25 The proposed TRM has three broad pillars summarised below. Appendix A provides a conceptual diagram of how the pillars support the TRM.

Pillar 1: Enhanced frontline training and technology

- 26 To address staff concerns and enable staff to prevent and appropriately respond to critical incidents requires specific, tactical training and ensuring that Police's equipment and technology remains world-class. The TRM enables this capability through:
 - 26.1 More than doubling the training for all frontline staff from three-and-a-half days, by adding a further four days of Tactical Safety Training – a scenario-based tactical training programme modelled on FSEC. This is specific to the operating environment and delivered in District (to enable staff to train as teams) by trainers with advanced tactical training (training to AOS qualification standard). While frontline Public Safety Teams (PST) and Roding Policing staff will be prioritised in the roll-out, the intent is to provide this enhanced frontline training to all Level One responders (those currently required to undertake regular tactical and firearms certification);
 - 26.2 Rolling out FSEC training to a further 2000 frontline staff by 30 June 2022 (to be met through Police baseline funding). FSEC training is a five-day programme for frontline supervisors and responders. It uses practical, realistic high-risk scenarios, with a focus on de-escalation, planning, risk assessment, and decision-making frameworks. There is overwhelmingly positive feedback from staff on the training;
 - 26.3 Ensuring Police can maintain and update its equipment and technology to enable its staff access to the tools they need to be safe and keep others safe is critical. For example, Police intends to explore

⁹ A critical incident means an incident involving death or life-threatening injury to a person during any Police activity or to a person in Police custody or under the care of Police. It also includes any incident where a Police employee discharges a firearm intentionally at a person, whether or not death or injury results, and any accidental discharge that results in death or injury.

technology opportunities to build its capability to provide incident-specific, real-time risk information on potential offenders to staff, to enable better risk-based decision-making, including for routine traffic stops.¹⁰

Pillar 2: Enhanced frontline access to specialist capability

- 27 Through the FSIP, staff have fed back that there can be a lack or delay of appropriate frontline backup. The Armed Offenders Squad (AOS) being 'on-call' can represent an issue and pose a gap in Police's real-time response capability.
- 28 Staff have also indicated that general duties staff are undertaking higher-risk activities that should be handled by those with specialist training. There is a particular heightened risk for dog handlers who deploy, normally alone, to some of police's highest risk incidents.

On-shift tactically-trained capability

- 29 Police requires better access to specialist staff with advanced tactical training (training to AOS qualification standard) to support existing investigative work to apprehend priority offenders and execute warrants. This capability is also required to more quickly respond to high-risk calls for service via deployment through District Command Centres (DCCs). To enable this capability to become a core part of Police's operating model would require:

- 29.1 New 'on-shift' capability in the form of Tactical Prevention Teams in each District to enhance Police's capability in responding to, investigating and apprehending high-risk offenders, including providing more accessible and visible support for frontline staff for critical events

s 9(2)(f)(iv)

- 30 Tactical Prevention Teams will support frontline investigation and prevention teams and will be rostered to undertake taskings focussing on high-risk offenders, firearms, methamphetamine, and organised crime groups. Whilst working this team can be redeployed by a DCC to support unplanned emergency or critical incidents. The staff in these teams will still deploy in blue uniform, in standard frontline vehicles models, predominantly during early and late shifts. There will also be support by Tactical Dog Teams discussed below and the AOS which remains on-call 24/7. The deployment of this on-shift capability would be intelligence-led and work to District priorities, providing guidance and experience to keep staff safe.

¹⁰ The rollout of Police's new Body Armour System is due to be completed in October 2021. Glock pistol and M4 rifle numbers continue to increase, and Police's access to high powered M4s provides a higher capability than many of our partner countries. A number of technology solutions are on the horizon for law enforcement globally, and Police is actively monitoring these developments. Of note, Police's new contract with Skoda enables it the opportunity to improve staff safety through real-time vehicle tracking, and together with increased use of Automatic Number Plate Recognition technology would increase real-time information available to staff and enable DCCs to have a full picture of vehicle deployment and locations to support real-time decision-making.

- 31 To be clear, this proposal does not mean specialist Tactical Prevention Teams will be armed. They will remain generally unarmed in the course of their normal duties. They will not self-deploy, instead relying on DCC deployment if required for an unplanned critical incident. The model is fundamentally different to the trial of Armed Response Teams, while building on the learnings from that trial.
- 32 This capability does not replace the work of AOS, such specialist planned deployment will continue and the AOS will retain its enhanced 'black role' capability. Instead it provides an increase in the availability of advanced tactically trained officers, increasing the frontline's ability to safely undertake daily activities that are currently being done by lower-trained general duties staff.
- 33 Police considers this approach enhances frontline safety and tactical capability, supports our community-focused policing model and provides a more appropriate alternative to the adoption of general arming, which would undermine New Zealand's current style of policing that itself contributes to the safety of Police and the community. I fully support Police in this view.

Tactical Dog Teams

- 34 Because the Tactical Prevention Teams will predominantly be available on early and late shifts, Police also proposes an uplift in tactical capability of dog units reflecting the current risk environment, learning from the FSEC training and following extensive consultation.
- 35 Police's dog units are regularly called to support frontline staff in dealing with critical and high-risk incidents and are recognised by the frontline as a significant source of tactical support for day-to-day policing. These units often search for unknown offenders, with unknown weapons, in unfamiliar surrounds, during the day or night. This higher risk work is currently done without ground support, as dog units are 'one up' (working alone), with only the handler and dog.
- 36 Recent feedback has included dog handlers expressing significant personal safety concerns, some expressing this view for the first time in their career. This reflects a significant shift in their perception of the current risk environment. Given the nature of the role and level of inherent risk, the TRM proposes:
- 36.1 Establishing Tactical Dog Teams that are 'two-up' by adding a specialist with advanced tactical training **s 9(2)(f)(iv)** to support current dogs and handlers to respond to critical incidents, providing additional safety benefits and tactical capability for staff and the public, including when and where Tactical Prevention Teams are not rostered.
- 37 Having these highly skilled and trained teams available will enable this new tactical capability to become part of the model's broader response to critical incidents. It would provide assurance to the frontline and add options for coaching and support to others.

Pillar 3: Risk-based Deployment Framework

- 38 Frontline safety risks can occur anywhere, at any time. Police seeks to reduce this uncertainty by establishing a new tactical intelligence capability to support leaders to make intelligence-informed deployments in the highest risk situations and to protect its staff and the public. A risk-based deployment framework is being developed to support the delivery of the TRM through an integrated, consistent response.
- 39 The deployment framework will ensure deployment is scalable to the situation and is informed by intelligence to increase situational awareness and understanding, and better identify the threats and need to act. The deployment framework will prioritise high-risk offenders and situations involving elevated public and staff risk, including the confiscation of illegal firearms, illicit drugs, and arrest warrants for serious offenders.
- 40 Building and implementing a tactical intelligence operating model and risk-based deployment framework will enable Police to develop the data, infrastructure, systems and processes that will give staff better real-time information with a specific local safety focus. These components will require an additional:
- 40.1 s 9(2)(f)(iv) to enhance coordination in DCCs;
- 40.2 s 9(2)(f)(iv) to provide District leadership of the model through supporting deployment and coordinating the tactical operating model in the four proofs of concept (from within Police baseline);
- 40.3 28 intelligence FTEs to District intelligence teams to support intelligence-led deployment.
- 41 Key aspects of the model that are core to implementing an enhanced safety system for Police staff are:
- 41.1 Enhanced tactical training for frontline responders – increasing training from three-and-a-half to seven-and-a-half days per year;
- 41.2 Tactical Dog Teams to be double crewed with an AOS-level partner – increasing safety for handlers and enabling an advanced tactical capability to support critical incidents;
- 41.3 Tactical Prevention Teams with advanced tactical training to undertake warrants and other work involving moderate risk, who are generally unarmed unless specific deployment requires and deployed to response to calls through the DCC only;
- 41.4 A new intelligence-led risk-based deployment framework to bring tactical capability together holistically and guide deployment through comprehensive risk assessments and proactive offender management.

Four options were considered to implement the model

42 Four options to fund and implement the TRM were developed and assessed:

- Option One – Accelerated (preferred option)
- Option Two – Delayed phasing
- Option Three – Reallocation of the 1800
- Option Four – Police baseline funded

43 These options have been assessed against the following key considerations:

- 43.1 enhancing the safety of Police staff and the community;
- 43.2 implications for the delivery of police services and the service level expectations of staff and the community;
- 43.3 impacts on staff and community trust and confidence;
- 43.4 practical considerations, including the ability to scale up capability to deliver the change, change readiness within the organisation, and the labour market.

44 An analysis of the options against these criteria is attached as Appendix B.

45 The options considered will deliver the full TRM over periods of between two-and-a-half years and four years. The options differ in speed of delivery reflecting the scale of Police baseline and new Government contribution.

s 9(2)(f)(iv)

46 I recommend Cabinet support Option One. To reduce the immediate costs to Government, I propose below how Police reprioritising and absorbing costs in year one can reduce the new investment needed in year one of my preferred option.

47 All elements of the model strike an essential balance by responding to staff concerns about safety and the need to enhance tactical capability, while remaining a generally unarmed police service. It is important to note that the proposals need to be understood as component parts of an improved 'safety system', and that to be effective, all parts need to be implemented. I am confident that, taken as an overall package of measures, the proposals will deliver significantly improved frontline safety benefits.

Option One – Accelerated (preferred option)

48 This option enables the implementation of the TRM at the greatest pace. This option can be implemented within two-and-a-half-years with Government funding support. This option delivers the earliest safety and capability benefits

to Police and communities. A detailed breakdown and costs of this option are appended to this paper.

Option Two – Delayed phasing

- 49 This option delays full delivery by a year. The option will deliver three proofs of concept, with a delayed phasing of the operational capability uplift and will be implemented over a three-and-a-half-year period.

Option Three – Reallocation of the 1800

- 50 This option implements the TRM in the same timeframe as Option One, with reallocation of the 1800 extra staff from Policing 2021 to partially fund the option. This option provides the same outcomes as Option One, however the trade-offs will be on reallocating s 9(2)(f)(iv) roles within the 1800 that are tagged to combat organised crime and repurposing these roles to support TRM.

Option Four – Police baseline funded

- 51 This option is fully funded from within Vote Police. This would be a delayed implementation of 12-18 months to enable Police to reprioritise and transition human and financial resources to enable the funding. Consideration needs to be given to the medium- and long-term unintended consequences of reprioritisation from areas such as prevention. I do not support this option as it would greatly impact on Police's ability to achieve outcomes for communities and Police's priorities.

My preferred option is for the Government to fund Option One - Accelerated

- 52 There is considerable pressure on the Police to consider general arming as a response to the current environment. The Police Executive does not support general arming as an appropriate response. I agree with them.
- 53 In my view, the option proposed by Police strikes an appropriate balance between staff safety and community expectations for safety and service delivery. The option has been socialised by Police with key external stakeholders and there has been broad support for the option. External stakeholders who support general arming as their preferred response, support this approach, if general arming is not on the table.
- 54 This option recognises the need to provide safety and capability benefits to frontline Police staff and communities as soon as practicable and builds the basis for extending the programme over time.

Implementation

- 55 The proposed implementation approach balances responding to the safety of frontline staff with managing the rollout and ensuring the model is fit for purpose for national rollout.

- 56 Police intends to seek feedback on the model from staff, the public and external stakeholders over a four-week period. Given the negative feedback on the trial of Armed Response Teams received from some Māori and Pacific communities, Police will ensure it seeks and enables feedback from these communities in the proposed consultation. Police will advise me of the outcomes of the engagement and the final model before implementation.
- 57 Police intends to phase the rollout of the model and use four proofs of concept to understand how the model operates in different locations, with different challenges. They will refine the TRM based on lessons learned before national rollout. Two proofs of concept will have the end-to-end model, with two having all components except additional tactical capability for Tactical Dog Teams. This is to ensure that the model can be refined and the learnings on dog teams can be incorporated into a broader review Police is undertaking on its dog capability, before rolling out the final model.
- 58 The following elements will be delivered in year one:
- 58.1 A national rollout of tactical safety training within year one to more than double the amount of training for frontline staff through adding four days of scenario-based tactical training specific to the operating environment, delivered in District, by trainers with advanced tactical training;
 - 58.2 Implement proofs of concept of the new model across four Districts;
 - 58.3 Introduce an enhanced 'on-shift' tactical capability to support responding to, investigating and apprehending high-risk offenders, including providing more accessible and visible support for frontline staff for critical events through Tactical Prevention Teams with advanced tactical training;
 - 58.4 Build and implement the tactical intelligence operating model and risk-based deployment framework to enable Police to develop the data, infrastructure, systems, and processes that will give staff access to better real-time information with a specific local safety focus;
 - 58.5 Stand up the infrastructure and equipment for the wider rollout.
- 59 Appendix C summarises the components to be delivered in year one and associated resource implications. The phasing of the rollout requires some components (including trainers, programme implementation resources and key enablers such as roles in DCCs) in quarter two of 2021/22. Some positions, such as intelligence staff, are expected to be in place following recruit intakes in November and February and will be phased throughout 2021/22.
- 60 Even with these measures in place, we cannot eliminate all risk for frontline staff. But Police can mitigate this risk through deploying an intelligence-led response model and providing the training and capability to effectively plan, assess, and respond to risk.

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- 61 The proofs of concept will be assessed and lessons learned applied to the national rollout. The remaining elements of the model and national coverage will be phased in over 2022/23 and 2023/24.
- 62 An indicative timeline is below, subject to Cabinet approval of investment.

Milestone/Activity	Timeframe
Minister of Police and/or Minister of Finance publicly announce the funding and a high-level outline of the response model Police Commissioner follows with a statement publicly communicating more details of the response model and the engagement period	Week beginning 13 September 2021
Internal and external engagement on the proposed TRM	Week beginning 13 September – 10 October 2021
Decisions by Police Executive on TRM following engagement	25 October 2021
Advice provided to the Minister of Police on the outcome of engagement and the final model	1 November 2021
Rollout of first two proofs of concept	Early November 2021
Rollout of second two proofs of concept	Late November 2021
Wider rollout of model to remaining Districts	From July 2022

Financial Implications

- 63 Immediate investment is required to implement and trial changes that will enhance the safety of frontline police, respond to the concerns raised by frontline staff, and meet Police's obligations under health and safety legislation. This timing will also manage supply chain issues by enabling Police to order, receive and distribute equipment for staff prior to the proofs of concept rolling out.
- 64 Fully implementing the model without impacting service delivery standards requires additional Government investment to supplement a Police baseline contribution. The preferred option (Option One – Accelerated) delivers the priorities from year one, with the full model rolled out in two-and-a-half-years.
- 65 The proposed TRM will have financial implications in the Budget forecast period and ongoing costs in outyears. Costs are driven by training, including training venues and trainers with advanced tactical training, new constabulary and non-sworn positions, equipment, and programme and technology costs.
- 66 The costs for year one across the four options are below:

Frontline Safety Programme - Summary



2021/22 Implementation Costs	Option 1	s 9(2)(f)(iv)
Implementation Cost operating	32.482	
Implementation Cost capital	16.555	
Total Implementation Cost	49.037	
Less Year 1 overheads absorbed	-4.012	
Total Implementation Cost	45.025	
 NZ Police Contribution	29.530	
Government Contribution	15.496	
Total Contribution excl Depreciation	45.025	

67 I am seeking \$15.496 million for the 2021/22 financial year to enable the model to be rolled out as soon as possible. Appendix D provides a detailed breakdown of year one costs for the preferred option.

68 Police have already invested establishing the frontline safety programme and delivering enhanced frontline training to staff. In order to deliver on frontline safety priorities in 2021/22, Police proposes to meet the remaining \$29.530 million of the \$45.025 million required for the preferred option. In 2021/22, Police is able to self-fund the following:

68.1 s 9(2)(f)(iv)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

69 Police proposes to continue to self-fund the rollout of the FSEC training to up to 2000 staff by 30 June 2022 at a one-off cost of \$3.1 million. Police will also release all frontline staff for an additional four days of training.

s 9(2)(f)(iv)

s 9(2)(f)(iv)

[REDACTED]

B U D G E T S E N S I T I V E

70 Further absorption of costs from Police's baseline in 2021/22 would require reprioritisation from the allocated 1800 additional staff and would likely impact on service delivery in other areas, including Police's ability to combat organised crime.

71 This is a key priority for Government and it is important we maintain the delivery of changes proposed in 2021/22 to enable the step change in Police capability required to enhance the safety of frontline staff. s9(2)(f)(iv)

72 s9(2)(f)(iv)

Frontline Safety Programme

	FY2021/22	FY2022/23	FY2023/24	FY2024/25 & Outyears	4 YR TOTAL
Option 1: Accelerated	(\$M)	s 9(2)(f)(iv)			
Funding Source					
NZ Police Baseline Opex	12.974				
Government Funding Requested Opex	15.496				
NZ Police Baseline Capex	16.555				
Government Funding Requested Capex	0.000				
Total Funding Source	45.025				
NZ Police Funding	29.530				
Government Funding Requested	15.496				
Depreciation Opex	0.000				
Government Funding Requested incl Depreciation	15.496				

73 The annual ongoing costs will be circa s 9(2)(f)(iv) and include staff costs, equipment and asset replacement, and ongoing costs associated with new leased sites for District training venues.

Legislative Implications

74 The decisions in this paper do not have legislative implications.

Impact Analysis

75 Regulatory impact analysis requirements do not apply, as the decisions sought in this paper do not involve the introduction of new legislation, or changes to, or the repeal of existing legislation. A Climate Implications of Policy Assessment (CIPA) is not required for this paper.

Population Implications

76 The proposals in this paper will increase the tactical safety training of all frontline staff and improve the tactical capability of Police teams responding to

high-risk and critical incidents. It is expected that these improvements will keep staff safer when attending both planned incidents and responding to calls for service, and enable staff to more safely resolve incidents, improving public safety.

- 77 The proposal is not expected to have any direct population implications. However, it will be important to clearly communicate the model and proposed changes and seek key community insights. The previous trial of Armed Response Teams received negative feedback from some Māori and Pacific communities. Police has built lessons from that trial into the development of this model, and will seek and enable direct feedback from Māori and Pacific people during the proposed public consultation.

Human Rights

- 78 The decisions in this paper are consistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993.

Consultation

- 79 Due to the urgency to progress the proposal, limited consultation was taken with the following agencies: the Ministry of Justice, Ara Poutama – Department of Corrections, Oranga Tamariki, Serious Fraud Office, Crown Law, Public Services Commission, the Treasury, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.
- 80 Ara Poutama has indicated it is supportive of the proposal, noting that enhancing frontline capability to improve safety closely aligns with its own focus on work to improve staff safety through ensuring a well-trained, capable and safe workforce.
- 81 Through the FSIP, Police has engaged with 1,250 frontline staff over the past 12 months. The option has been socialised with key external stakeholders, including community leaders and the Police Association. Community leaders are broadly supportive of the suggested approach and have been overwhelmingly positive around options that avoid the need for general arming.
- 82 This paper proposes a four-week engagement with internal and public stakeholders before final decisions are made on the model.

Communications

- 83 It is critical that the case for change is well understood by staff and the public. Subject to Cabinet agreement, it is proposed the Minister of Police and/or Minister of Finance will publicly announce the funding and a high-level outline of the response model in the week starting 13 September 2021.
- 84 The Commissioner of Police would then follow with a statement publicly communicating more details of the response model.

- 85 The communications will clearly set out the case for change, how the enhanced resources will work, differences between this and previous models, and how members of the community can provide feedback. An engagement strategy and communications plan have been prepared.
- 86 The Minister of Police's office will be provided with a media release, talking points, and reactive Q&As.

Proactive Release

- 87 I intend to proactively release this paper following public engagement on the draft response model and following final investment decisions by Cabinet. The release of the paper will be subject to redaction as appropriate under the Official Information Act 1982.

Recommendations

The Minister of Police recommends that the Committee:

1. **note** that frontline Police have said they increasingly find themselves in situations where they feel ill-equipped and unsafe;
2. **note** that evidence suggests an increase in risk to staff with Police seizing more firearms (with an increasing number of these concealable), and that most presentations and discharges of firearms at and by police involve non-specialised staff;
3. **note** that the evidence analysed by Police is at best equivocal on the claim that general arming would make staff or communities safer, and the Police Executive has agreed to remain an unarmed police service in order to preserve its style of policing and the safety benefits that brings;
4. **note** that Police has developed a Tactical Response Model that improves frontline safety and tactical capability to prevent serious offending;
5. **agree** the proposed Tactical Response Model be implemented by Police to improve frontline safety of Police staff, subject to internal and external consultation to refine the model;

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Financial implications

6. **approve** the following changes to Vote Police appropriations to give effect to the policy decision in recommendation 5 above, with a corresponding impact on the operating balance and net core Crown debt:

	\$m - increase/(decrease)			
Vote Police Minister of Police	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24	2024/25 & Outyears
Multi-Category Expenses and Capital Expenditure:				
Policing Services MCA;				
- Crime Prevention	5.124	-	-	-
- Policy Advice and Ministerial Services	0.008	-	-	-
- Primary Response Management	4.599	-	-	-
- Investigations and Case Resolution	5.765	-	-	-
- Road Policing				
(funded by revenue Crown)	-	-	-	-
New Zealand Police	-	-	-	-
Capital Injection				
Total Operating	15.496	-	-	-
Total Capital	-	-	-	-

7. **agree** that the proposed changes to appropriations for 2021/22 above be included in the 2021/22 Supplementary Estimates and that, in the interim, the increase(s) be met from Imprest Supply;
8. **agree** that the expenses incurred under recommendation 6 above be charged against the between-Budget contingency established as part of Budget 2021;

9. **invite** the Minister of Police to seek funding through Budget 22 to fund financial years 2022/23 to 2024/25 and outyears, subject to Budget approvals and an assessment of the proofs of concept and any refinement of costings, with the indicative financial implications as follows:

s 9(2)(f)(iv)



10. s9(2)(g)(i) Police will work with Justice Sector agencies as part of the Budget 22 process;

Implementation

11. **agree** that Police publicly communicate the proposed high-level response model and seek feedback over a consultation period of four weeks;
12. **note** that Police will advise the Minister of Police of the outcome of further work in recommendation 5 prior to rollout of the model.

Authorised for lodgement

Hon Poto Williams

Minister of Police

BUDGET SENSITIVE

Appendix C – Detailed summaries of Option One (Accelerated)

Component	2021/22 cost	Detail	Assumptions/phasing
s 9(2)(f)(iv)			
TOTAL	\$45.03 million		

Appendix D – Detailed costs for Option One (Accelerated)

Frontline Safety Programme

s 9(2)(f)(iv)

