

# ***The Suspicious Activity Report***

DECEMBER/JANUARY 2022

*New Zealand Financial Intelligence Unit*

## INTRODUCTION

*The Suspicious Activity Report* is produced by the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), part of the New Zealand Police Financial Crime Group, currently led by Detective Inspector Christiaan Barnard. This report is comprised of FIU holdings and open source media reporting collected within the last month.

## Background

The Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Act became law in October 2009. The Act's purpose is to detect and deter money laundering and contribute to public confidence in the financial system. It seeks to achieve this through compliance with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations. The Financial Intelligence Unit produces this monthly report as part of its obligations under section 142(b)(i) and section 143(b) of the AML/CFT Act 2009. The Financial Crime Group is made up of the Financial Intelligence Unit, Asset Recovery Unit, the Money Laundering Team, and a Headquarters group.

## Financial Intelligence Unit

The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), currently led by Detective Senior Sergeant Eddie Evans, has been operational since 1996. Its core function is to receive, collate, analyse, and disseminate information contained in Suspicious Transaction Reports, Prescribed Transaction Reports, and Border Cash Reports. It develops and produces a number of financial intelligence products, training packages and policy advice. The FIU participates in the AML/CFT National Coordination Committee chaired by the Ministry of Justice, and chairs the Financial Crime Prevention Network (FCPN). It is a contributing member to international bodies such as the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering.

## Asset Recovery Unit

The New Zealand Police Asset Recovery Unit (ARU) is led by Detective Inspector Craig Hamilton and was established in December 2009 specifically to implement the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009 (CPRA). The ARU is the successor to the Proceeds of Crime Units, which were established in 1991, and was combined with the FIU to create the Financial Crime Group. The CPRA expanded the regime for the forfeiture of property that has been directly or indirectly acquired or derived from significant criminal behaviour. It is intended to reduce the possibilities for individuals or groups to profit from criminal behaviour, to reduce the opportunities they have to expand their criminal enterprises, and act as a deterrent for criminal activity. There are five Asset Recovery Units, based in Whangarei, Auckland, Waikato/Bay of Plenty, Wellington, and Christchurch.

## Money Laundering Team

The Money Laundering Team (MLT), led by Detective Senior Sergeant Andy Dunhill, is the newest element of the FCG and was established in 2017 to target money laundering risks and reduce the investigative gap for financial investigations in organised crime. The MLT investigate criminal offenders moving the proceeds of predicate offending. The focus of the team is on disrupting and dismantling facilitators assisting organised criminal groups to hide illicit funds, including complicit Designated Non-Financial Business and Professions (DNFBPs) and other third parties such as money remitters.

## Notes from the Partnerships & Harm Prevention Manager

*Kylie Seumanu*

Tēnā koutou katoa

I'm incredibly grateful for the opportunity to connect with you all through this guest editorial. This month we are seeking to shine a spotlight on transnational organised crime (TNOC) in New Zealand, the government's Strategy to combat it, and the important role the private sector can play. The organised crime landscape in New Zealand is evolving rapidly which presents challenges for agencies and private sector alike. While our geographical isolation used to offer us some protection from transnational threats, in an increasingly globalised world that is no longer the case – we are now facing the same problems we have seen for many years overseas, as are our Pacific neighbours.



The scope and scale of TNOC activity in New Zealand (and the Pacific region) is growing and TNOC groups are becoming increasingly sophisticated in their business operations. The criminal activities of these groups are broad ranging – from drug crime, fraud, wildlife trafficking, and migrant exploitation – and they are enabled by money laundering which allows the perpetrators to enjoy the proceeds of their illicit activities. We feel the impact of these crimes in our communities and our economy. As the manager for the Partnerships & Harm Prevention team within New Zealand Police, I am responsible for leading the implementation of two cross-government work programmes to prevent and combat organised crime, and reduce the harm it causes to communities.

The TNOC Strategy, which is explored in more detail below, is primarily focused on the 'supply side' and international context of organised crime. The Strategy brings together 19 government agencies to tackle TNOC by setting out a framework for a coordinated, whole-of-system approach, with an increased focus on prevention. The TNOC Strategy is closely coordinated with the Resilience to Organised Crime in Communities (ROCC) work programme, which is an innovative multi-agency approach focused on addressing social drivers, reducing demand, and limiting community harms and impacts of organised crime. Central to the approach is agencies engaging with iwi and local providers to develop locally led responses that reflect the needs and opportunities within communities. Together, these two work programmes form an end-to-end approach to address the full spectrum of organised crime, from the flow of illicit commodities and activities across the border, to the harm experienced in communities from organised criminal activities.

So, what does this mean for the private sector?

The TNOC Strategy is clear, we can never be successful on our own. Government agencies must work with the private sector, academic institutions, not-for-profit organisations, and the public to identify and respond to TNOC threats. As organised crime is largely profit motivated, money laundering is an essential component of TNOC efforts and TNOC actors will constantly be looking for ways to get their illicit proceeds into the financial system. This means reporting entities are uniquely positioned to detect TNOC activity through the implementation of preventive

measures and reporting to the FIU. Following the money is one of the most effective tools we have to identify organised criminal activity and unravel TNOC networks. Likewise, seizing/forfeiting proceeds of crime is one of our most powerful enforcement tools, as it removes the incentive behind organised criminal activities and deprives these groups of the resources to reinvest in criminal activity.

A key priority for us under the TNOC Strategy is education and awareness raising – by increasing awareness of TNOC, we hope to reduce complacency and support the private sector to identify and report TNOC activity – this newsletter is a first step in that direction. We also hope to work more closely with the private sector to co-develop solutions to address TNOC vulnerabilities, particularly exploring what more can be done to prevent exploitation of the financial sector – it is only by joining up our own systems that we will be able to rival the complex business systems TNOC groups are now operating – as the adage goes “it takes a network to defeat a network”.

My team and I are grateful for the opportunity to work more closely together, join your network and collectively share in this very important mission.

Ngā mihi nui,

Kylie

## NEW ZEALAND AML/CFT NEWS

### FCG / Police News

#### *Recent Operations and Asset Seizures*

[Operation Mist](#) – A joint investigation with New Zealand Police and New Zealand Customs resulted in eight arrests, 50kg of cocaine and NZ\$300k in cash seized. More than 60 charges were filed relating to alleged drug importation and supply, participating in an organised criminal group, and money laundering. The investigation also included international partners United States DEA, Colombian National Police, Spanish Customs Service, and the Cook Island Customs Service.

[Operation Selena](#) – A total of 24 people were arrested and charged in a joint operation with New Zealand Police and New Zealand Customs. Those arrested are alleged to have smuggled methamphetamine into New Zealand as part of an organised criminal group. Millions of dollars in assets were seized including two Auckland properties, five vehicles, a Harley Davidson, and bank accounts totalling hundreds of thousands of dollars.

[Operation Chestnut](#) – Eighteen search warrants were executed in the Tasman, Wellington, Central, and Eastern police districts, resulting in seven arrests and restraining assets worth NZ\$3.5m. Assets seized included 19 firearms, a jet ski, classic cars, a motorcycle, NZ\$500k in cash, and a yacht. The ongoing investigation located an additional 17 firearms and 16,000 rounds of ammunition in [December 2021](#).

### FIU News

#### *Suspicious Activity/Transaction Reporting*



As mentioned in previous editions, the changes to the goAML indicators will go into effect in mid-March.

The FIU has communicated the specific changes and new guidance to reporting entities and intermediaries via the goAML message board – please contact us if you have not received the message.

### News from our Partners

#### *FMA 2021 AML/CFT Sector Risk Assessment 2021*

The Financial Markets Authority (FMA) [recently published](#) its Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) [Sector Risk Assessment 2021](#), which is an update to the 2017 version.


The risk profile for the majority of the nine sectors the FMA oversees had not changed since the 2017 sector risk assessment (SRA). However, virtual asset service providers (VASPs) were added and received the highest risk rating. The FMA Director of Supervision, James Greig, said the FMA expects all FMA-reporting entities to review the new sector risk assessment and update their own risk assessments accordingly, incorporating any new risks and findings.

## TRANSNATIONAL ORGANISED CRIME

### What is Transnational Organised Crime (TNOC)?

Transnational organised crime is crime that operates across national borders, or crime that is carried out in one country but has strong links to other countries. Globally, the revenue of TNOC groups is estimated to be [US\\$3 trillion](#) – equivalent to four percent of the world's gross domestic product (GDP). There is increasing pressure on governments to work together to combat TNOC.







TNOC poses significant risks to New Zealand's national security, law and order, public safety and wellbeing, and environment. TNOC groups are sophisticated businesses that operate across multiple crime types and countries. However, governments and private-sector entities often see and respond only to specific risks, such as a single crime type. They don't always make connections between different risks and respond to them in a coordinated and systematic way.



TNOC groups are sophisticated businesses designed to generate profits. They are agile, work together, and move between crime types to maximise their profits and avoid being detected by law-enforcement agencies. Like legitimate businesses, they generate demand and respond to it with supply. They use complex business structures, offshore control, and encrypted communications to stay anonymous and hide their illegal activity.

## The Scale of TNOC

While New Zealand doesn't yet have comprehensive data on TNOC, the Government of Australia has estimated that 70 percent of its serious and organised crime threats are based offshore or have strong links to other countries.

TYPES of TNOC		
 <b>Illicit Drug Crime</b>	 <b>Illegal, Irregular, and Unreported Fishing (IUU)</b>	 <b>Flora and Fauna Trafficking</b>
<p>In 2019, 2.5 tonnes of illegal drugs were seized at the New Zealand border, including 1.2 tonnes of methamphetamine.</p> <p>Since 2017, thirty operational TNOC cells in New Zealand were dismantled by law enforcement.</p>	<p>The estimated value of IUU fishing in the South Pacific each year is \$616 million.</p> <p>IUU is the most commonly reported environmental crime in the Pacific and is associated with unlawful labour practices and corruption.</p>	<p>Between 2011 and 2017, there was a 300% increase in the number of flora and fauna seizures at the New Zealand border.</p>
 <b>Migrant Exploitation</b>	 <b>Fraud and Corruption</b>	 <b>Tax Evasion</b>
<p>In 2018/2019, 64% of the Labour Inspectorate's investigations involved migrants.</p> <p>Immigration crime referrals have tripled in recent years to nearly 2,000 per year; more than one third related to exploited migrants.</p>	<p>More than half of New Zealand businesses reported being the victim of economic crime in 2017/2018.</p> <p>In 2018, there were 13,000 reports of scams, resulting in \$33 million of losses.</p>	<p>TNOC and tax evasion are inextricably linked, as TNOC activities are borderless and secretive.</p> <p>Laundering of illicit funds in New Zealand each year is estimated to be \$1.35 billion.</p>

Transnational organised crime is enabled by factors that allow criminal activity to be more efficient and effective, or to continue undetected with criminal proceeds disguised as legitimate. These factors include:

- Money laundering – intentionally moving criminal proceeds to separate them from their origin. It usually involves criminal networks laundering through multiple overseas jurisdictions and accounts.
- Corruption – can involve criminals paying bribes to public-sector officials, private-sector institutions, or professionals, so they ignore illegal activity.
- Identity fraud – can be used to commit other crimes, such as people smuggling and the use of computers to enable people to obtain credentials illegally.
- Computer crime – illegally accessing a computer system or network. It is usually linked with fraudulent activities that take place before or after the computer crime.

## TNOC in New Zealand

New Zealand consistently rates among the [least corrupt countries](#) in the world and is considered to be one of the best countries to do business in. New Zealand also has an open economy, is well connected through communications technology, and has large geographic borders. And historically, New Zealand has had low exposure to, and awareness of, transnational organised crime.

However, these strengths also make New Zealand vulnerable to TNOC. And while New Zealand has strong disruption and enforcement systems, there is scope to make these systems more resilient and improve our response domestically and internationally.

New Zealand also currently lacks good evidence about, and ways to measure the impact of, and harm from TNOC. Closing this gap is a priority and work has already begun under the TNOC Strategy in partnership with academic institutions.

TNOC in New Zealand is changing; organised criminal groups and networks are gaining greater access to our country, both from within and outside New Zealand; and the scope, scale and value of their business in New Zealand is growing. Globally, New Zealand is seen as a valuable market for illicit drugs as New Zealanders continue to have a high demand for them.

However, as shown above, the nature of TNOC is much wider than illicit drugs - it extends to other crimes, such as trafficking flora and fauna, exploiting migrants, and fishing illegally.

## [New Zealand's Transnational Organised Crime Strategy](#)

TNOC is a global threat that needs a global response. New Zealand law-enforcement and regulatory agencies work closely with their counterpart agencies in the Pacific, and further afield into Asia, South America, North America, and Europe to disrupt, dismantle, and target organised criminal activities, commodities, and proceeds.

While New Zealand's current response to combat TNOC starts offshore, it continues at the border and within New Zealand – nationally, regionally, and locally – and is governed and led by various government agencies that have different functions, powers, and responsibilities.

New Zealand is making progress towards combatting TNOC, however the TNOC strategy – which was launched in September 2020 – sets out a framework for a response that is more strategic, coordinated across the system, and focuses on prevention. The strategy is designed to align with, inform, and build on other national strategies and work programmes, including the anti-money laundering and countering financing of terrorism strategy.

## NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT AGENCIES INVOLVED IN COMBATTING TNOC

- Department of Conservation
- Department of Corrections
- Department of Internal Affairs
- Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC)
- Financial Markets Authority
- Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB)
- Inland Revenue
- Ministry for Primary Industries
- Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE)
- Ministry of Defence
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT)
- Ministry of Justice
- New Zealand Customs Service
- New Zealand Defence Force
- New Zealand Police
- Serious Fraud Office
- Reserve Bank of New Zealand



## PRINCIPLES


Four principles underlie New Zealand's TNOC strategy – they are woven into its approach and guide agency decisions and actions.

### *Prevention First: Proactive and more prevention-oriented response*

To prevent TNOC occurring in New Zealand, government agencies, businesses, and communities must first be aware of and understand TNOC, so they are alert to suspicious activity and prepared to report it.

### *Systems-Thinking: Coordination across the whole system*

Government agencies will work with the private sector, not-for-profit organisations, academic institutions, communities, and the general public to respond to emerging risks and threats.



### *Intelligence-Led: Prevention and enforcement that is driven by actionable intelligence*

The capability and connections between all parts of the system will be improved in order to share and use intelligence.

### *Evidence-Based: Agile responses to priority, emerging and existing, risks and threats*

The flow of information and intelligence will also be improved to ensure experts can piece together what the intelligence means and to be able to act on it.

## OBJECTIVES

The three main objectives of Zealand's TNOC strategy are driven by what makes New Zealand most vulnerable to TNOC. The objectives reflect the principles set out above as well as the changes needed to combat TNOC.



## FOCUS AREAS

New Zealand's law enforcement and regulatory agencies will work to combat TNOC by coordinating their efforts, making joint decisions, and focussing on three inter-connected strategic areas.

UNIFY	PREVENT AND DETECT	DISMANTLE
The cross-agency approach will coordinate New Zealand's relationships with its international partners and different parts of the New Zealand national system, including the private sector, academic institutions, and not-for-profit organisations.	Training programmes will be designed to raise awareness of who is most vulnerable to being TNOC victims, offenders, or enablers.  This strengthened capability and understanding will enable partners to identify and report TNOC, helping agencies detect emerging threats early.	Operational priorities will be set centrally, with a focus on sharing information and improving the use of existing legislative powers to target the profits and assets of organised criminal groups and enterprises.

## Partnering with Reporting Entities

Two focus areas of the TNOC strategy embody partnering with reporting entities. The priority actions related to these areas include:

- Working with more private sector industries, especially financial institutions and professional service providers, as they are well placed to spot indicators of TNOC enablers and victims.
- Co-designing easy-to-use, clear processes to report TNOC.
- Improving education to help reporting entities be more likely to identify TNOC.
- Working to build trust between sectors and the whole system.
- Encouraging reporting entities to detect and report TNOC early.

## Next Steps

The TNOC Strategy is implemented through an annual action plan containing a suite of high-priority cross-agency activities. Consistent with the phased approach to implementation envisioned by the Strategy, the focus in the first two years has largely been on government unification, with progress made in establishing cross-agency governance and enhancing coordination.

As we move into the third year of the strategy, the focus will shift to 'Prevent & Detect', where we will be seeking to enhance capability and understanding within agencies and the private sector, and to work more closely with the private sector to prevent and combat TNOC.

In future editions, *The Suspicious Activity Report* will further explore TNOC crime types and the links to money laundering, and ways to detect these types of activities, as well as report on the progress of New Zealand's TNOC strategy in future editions.

## ADDITIONAL TNOC RESOURCES

### TNOC Threat Assessments

[EUROPOL's Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment](#)

[The United Kingdom's National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime 2020](#)

[Organised Crime in Australia report by the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission](#)

### Various Resources

[The Global Organized Crime Index](#)

The [Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime](#) website has several publications on TNOC around the world.

The [United Nations Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific website](#) provides overviews of how the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime works with Member States as well as publications for several types of TNOC, including human trafficking, wildlife and forest crime, and cybercrime.

INTERPOL's [Organized Crime Unit](#) runs several projects which focus on specific types of criminal networks, governed by their [Global Strategy on Organized and Emerging Crime](#)

Royal United Services Institute's (RUSI) [Strategic Hub for Organised Crime Research \(SHOC\)](#)

### Training

Self-paced [e-Learning course](#) on transnational organised crime from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

## INTERNATIONAL AML/CFT NEWS

### Australia

#### [Sydney's 'mini casino' pokies venues targeted by professional money launderers](#)

In Australia it is believed criminal gangs are using poker machines at small regional pubs and clubs to launder the proceeds of illegal drug dealing in New South Wales (NSW), after suspect transactions were identified by data monitoring.

Chief NSW gaming investigator David Byrne said multi-agency investigations indicated NSW's 95,000 poker machines were being used as laundering machines for illicit cash. Some of the suspected launderers are linked to Vietnamese organised crime rings.

### Brazil / Israel

#### [DeepDotWeb administrator sentenced for money laundering scheme](#)



Tal Prihar, an Israeli national residing in Brazil, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering. He was sentenced to 97 months in prison for operating DeepDotWeb (DDW) and agreed to forfeit US\$8.4 million (NZ\$12.5m).

DDW was a website that connected hundreds of thousands of internet users with Darknet marketplaces where they purchased illegal firearms, malware and hacking tools, stolen financial data, and illicit drugs. For providing these links, Prihar and his co-defendant received kickback payments from the marketplaces in virtual currency. Prihar transferred the funds received to other bitcoin accounts and then to bank accounts he controlled in the names of shell companies.

### Canada

#### [Alleged money launderer forfeits over CA\\$1 million and casino chips](#)

Alleged money launderer Caixuan Qin has reached an agreement to forfeit over CA\$1.14 million (NZ\$1.38m) in cash previously seized by police from her illegal underground bank, Silver International Investments Ltd, as well as CA\$17k (NZ\$20k) in casino chips and 94 gift cards.

Silver International allegedly catered to local, Mexican, and Chinese organised crime rings, and was integral to the so-called "Vancouver Model" where local drug proceeds were turned into assets or gambling losses in Canada but paid back in China via Silver's network.

### India / New Zealand

#### [Helmets, hard disks: NCB ops uncover new ways of smuggling drugs](#)

The Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) has discovered a new 'modus operandi' for smuggling drugs including concealing them in stethoscopes, microwave ovens, bangles, and helmets.

According to the NCB director, seven operations were undertaken over 5 days in December 2021, seizing approximately 3 kg of Amphetamine, 4 kg of Opium and 2.5 kg of [Zolpidem](#) tablets. Two of the consignments were destined for Australia, while one shipment containing 848 grams of Amphetamine disguised in hose pipes and tie boxes was to be smuggled to Dubai and New Zealand.

## Panama

### [Panama uncovers extensive presence of Colombian cartel](#)



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Panamanian authorities recently seized US\$10 million (NZ\$14.9m) in cash and arrested 57 people in several raids, later stating that the Colombian drug gang known as the Gulf Clan cartel controls over half the cocaine shipments that travel through Panama, and had established an extensive logistics and money laundering network there.

Panama's police chief said the cartel has been infiltrating the country's business sector, which is largely based on the Panama Canal and banking services. "The (criminal) gangs use the country's legal services to carry out illegal activities."

## United States

### [Man admits laundering \\$1.94 million for drug cartels](#)

Julio De La Cruz Acosta admitted in federal court that he laundered nearly US\$2 million (NZ\$3m) for Central and South American drug cartels operating in New Jersey and New York, according to a Department of Justice press release.

Acosta and his [co-conspirators](#) converted cash from drug sales to more than 1,000 cashier's cheques that were then sent to brokers acting on behalf of drug trafficking organisations with ties to Central and South America. De La Cruz Acosta admitted that he knew the cash was from an illegal source and that he purchased the cheques to aid, abet and facilitate an illegal money transmitting business.

## United States / New Zealand


### [Leader of complex international fraud and money laundering ring sentenced](#)

According to court documents, Mary Kathryn Marr was the leader of a large, international fraud and money laundering ring that operated in the United States and abroad. Marr contracted with various international 'boiler rooms' to launder fraud proceeds that she and other conspirators had obtained from foreign victims, primarily by selling worthless investments. The majority of the victims that Marr's network targeted were located in Australia, New Zealand, the UK and countries in Asia.

Marr pleaded guilty in June 2021 and was sentenced to 14 years in federal prison for conspiracy to commit money laundering. The Court ordered Marr to forfeit various assets and pay restitution to victims in the amount of US\$14 million (NZ\$21m).

## Corruption

### [UNODC Global Report on Corruption in Sport](#)



The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) released its first edition of 'Global Report on Corruption in Sport'. The report highlights the scale, manifestation and complexity of corruption and criminal networks in sport at international and national levels.

The Global Report analyses the role of illegal betting, competition manipulation, abuse in sport, and the susceptibility of major sporting events to corruption and the involvement of organised crime.

## Crypto

### [Chainalysis Report: Crypto Crime Trends for 2022](#)

Chainalysis has released its report analysing cryptocurrency trends in 2021. Across all cryptocurrencies tracked by Chainalysis, total transaction volume grew to \$15.8 trillion in 2021 – an increase of 567% from 2020.

The company found that cryptocurrency-based crime hit a new all-time high, with illicit addresses receiving US\$14 billion in 2021, up from US\$7.8 billion in 2020. Of the crime Chainalysis analysed, two categories increased the most: stolen funds and scams. Scamming revenue rose 82% to US\$7.8 billion of cryptocurrency stolen from victims. Theft of cryptocurrency increased 500% over 2020's totals, to US\$3.2 billion.



## Human Trafficking

### [Revealed: the secret 'forced labour' migration route from Vietnam to the UK](#)



An *Observer* investigation has found that Serbia and Romania are being used as gateways to Europe for smuggling and trafficking gangs who are using guest worker visa programmes to transport large numbers of Vietnamese workers into eastern Europe.

[Official Home Office figures](#) show that Vietnamese were the third largest national group to be identified as victims of modern slavery. There were 653 Vietnamese people referred as potential victims of slavery in 2020, with the majority discovered in cannabis farms and nail bars.

## Wildlife Trafficking

### [Global arrests and seizures: INTERPOL-WCO operation strikes wildlife and timber trafficking networks](#)

Operation Thunder 2021, a worldwide enforcement operation against wildlife and timber crime coordinated by INTERPOL and the World Customs Organization (WCO) has resulted in hundreds of arrests worldwide. The month long (1-31 October) operation was the fifth in a global series





initiated by the INTERPOL Wildlife Crime Working Group, and involved customs, police, financial intelligence units and wildlife and forestry enforcement agencies in 118 countries.

“Organised crime networks are generating billions in illicit profits every year, at significant cost to our

environment as well as the associated impacts of fraud, corruption and violence” said INTERPOL Secretary General Jurgen Stock. Demonstrating the link between wildlife and drug crime, Operation Thunder 2021 saw Mexican authorities arrest three Chinese nationals smuggling Totoaba bladders, sea cucumber, and coral along with methamphetamine and cash.

Since the first edition in 2017, Thunder operations have seen 8,000 seizures of protected wildlife and forestry species and the arrest of more than 3,000 offenders.


## Europol

### [Europe-wide police operation busts online fraud scheme](#)

In an operation coordinated by Eurojust and Europol, authorities in Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Netherlands, and Ukraine searched over 20 locations and interrogated 66 witnesses connected to a suspected organised crime group. The group is believed to have defrauded victims of at least €15 million (NZ\$25m) in an online investment scheme. A variety of electronic equipment, financial information, and recordings were seized.

## MONEYVAL

### [Typologies report on AML/CFT supervision in times of crisis](#)



The Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism, known as MONEYVAL, recently published a report aimed at helping authorities to effectively carry out their AML/CFT supervisory activities in times of crisis.

The report is based on information collected from supervisors across MONEYVAL jurisdictions and other international actors on the actions they have taken to overcome the difficulties caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, notably the physical movement restrictions impeding on-site visits, limited human resources, and technical complications.

Member states and territories will be invited to provide feedback on the use of the report findings in one year's time.

# MONTHLY STATISTICS\*



# NEW ZEALAND POLICE FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT

December | 2021


## SUBMITTED REPORTS to the FIU\*

### Processed Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs)

	This Month	Last Month	Last Year
	December	November	December
	2021	2021	2020
Transaction-based	1,994	1,978	2,059
Activity-based	41	46	48
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,035</b>	<b>2,024</b>	<b>2,107</b>




### Processed SARs by Sector



### Transaction Volumes within SARs and PTRs


	This Month	Last Month	Last Year
	December	November	December
	2021	2021	2020
SARs	27,161	26,326	24,596
IFTs	521,308	454,964	465,046
LCTs	16,059	11,693	19,488




## FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS

### Disseminations of Products by Type


	This Month	Last Month
	December	November
	2021	2021
Information Reports	19	32
Analytical Products	4	2
<b>Total Products</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>34</b>



### Disseminations of Products by Recipient



### Disseminations of Products by Included SARs and PTRs



\*Statistical data for transaction reporting and intelligence products may be updated as new information is processed, and so there may be minor discrepancies between the statistical figures contained in this report and subsequent reports.



# QUARTERLY STATISTICS\*



# NEW ZEALAND POLICE FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT

# QTR 2 | 2021-22


## SUBMITTED REPORTS to the FIU\*

### Processed Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs)

	This QTR	Last QTR	Last Year
	QTR 2	QTR 1	QTR 2
	2021-22	2021-22	2020-21
Transaction-based	5,799	5,015	6,024
Activity-based	173	240	205
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,972</b>	<b>5,255</b>	<b>6,229</b>




### Processed SARs by Sector



### Transaction Volumes within SARs and PTRs


	This QTR	Last QTR	Last Year
	QTR 2	QTR 1	QTR 2
	2021-22	2021-22	2020-21
SARs	76,838	59,050	72,669
IFTs	1,412,338	1,308,474	1,293,591
LCTs	36,335	31,925	50,658




## FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS

### Disseminations of Products by Type


	This QTR	Last QTR
	QTR 2	QTR 1
	2021-22	2021-22
Information Reports	75	128
Analytical Products	7	11
<b>Total Products</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>139</b>



### Disseminations of Products by Recipient



### Disseminations of Products by Included SARs and PTRs





\*Statistical data for transaction reporting and intelligence products may be updated as new information is processed, and so there may be minor discrepancies between the statistical figures contained in this report and subsequent reports.


SUBMITTED REPORTS to the FIU\*

Processed Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs)

	This Month	Last Month	Last Year
	January	December	January
	2022	2021	2021
Transaction-based	1,752	1,994	1,806
Activity-based	37	41	46
Total	1,789	2,035	1,852




Processed SARs by Sector



Transaction Volumes within SARs and PTRs


	This Month	Last Month	Last Year
	January	December	January
	2022	2021	2021
SARs	23,287	27,161	23,529
IFTs	396,786	521,308	389,412
LCTs	12,819	16,059	16,787




FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS

Disseminations of Products by Type


	This Month	Last Month
	January	December
	2022	2021
Information Reports	24	19
Analytical Products	0	4
Total Products	24	23



Disseminations of Products by Recipient



Disseminations of Products by Included SARs and PTRs



\*Statistical data for transaction reporting and intelligence products may be updated as new information is processed, and so there may be minor discrepancies between the statistical figures contained in this report and subsequent reports.

