

PLANNING FOR MORE POLICE IN COUNTIES MANUKAU

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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- 1. Counties Manukau District (CMD) policing operates in a difficult and complex environment. Policing results on a wide range of key indicators are below the national average and Government has committed to providing 300 additional staff to the district. In recognition of this, the Deputy Commissioner: Operations has initiated a planning process to ensure Police management and staff are best placed to utilise the additional resources and deliver on the high expectations the public rightly have of their police. Once this report has been signed off by the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner: Operations a Resourcing and Implementation Plan will be drafted for approval and action.
- 2. The project has adopted the view that the gap between supply and demand needs to be addressed with a three fold approach, namely by (a) increasing productivity (b) reducing demand and (c) the provision of additional staffing.
- 3. At national level Police has developed a number of productivity improvement models that have the capacity to increase productivity in the district. The district policing model will be driven by the National Intelligence Model which uses strategies that focus on prolific and serious offenders, locations and targets. The Case Management Programme is designed to improve the productivity of reactive processes from the initial request for service through to final disposition. The programme will also deliver electronic data enhancing management information systems. The Access, Communications and Mobility strategies are designed to enhance two way communications between the police and community, improve efficiency in repetitive tasks and facilitate more operational time in the community. The roll out of these models has commenced in CMD and will be completed within an integrated package of initiatives as part of a planned strategic Productivity Improvement Agenda.
- 4. The inexperience of staff in the CMD is quoted by staff and management as a significant constraint. While CMD experience at 7.7 years compares unfavourably with the national average of 12 years, experience levels are not dissimilar to those of Waitemata and Auckland City districts. However the experience of Constables on CMD response functions is half that of those engaged in non response functions in the district and this needs remedying.
- 5. More than 1 in 5 of national Priority 1 (P1) calls for service are recorded in the CMD and response functions is estimated to consume between 30 35% of district resources. The district would benefit from a greater understanding of capacity and demand. There is potential to increase productivity of the function by more closely matching supply with the hourly and daily pattern of demand, optimising the number of car units presented from each shift and reducing staff abstraction rates. Demand is greater during summer months but staff leave is granted over this period at up to three times the winter rate. Additional staff should not be added to existing shifts but should be deployed on new shifts in a manner that moves towards matching supply with demand. Clarification of managerial accountability for results and optimisation of productivity is necessary.
- 6. The principal driver of investigative difficulties is the draw off of staff to assist in major investigations. The district does not have a dedicated serious crime section. The constant draw off of staff, including unit managers, is disruptive and often leaves units without leadership and advice. It also results in GDB Enquiry Office staff being left to investigate serious cases, often beyond their abilities, while crimes they should be addressing remain unattended. Too often assistance has been drawn from other districts to assist in serious crime investigations and/or in clearing the backlog of cases accumulated while district staff have been involved in prolonged investigations. A

1

dedicated serious crime section is required. Implementation of the Case Management Programme will improve investigation productivity and provide electronic data as a foundation for fact based management and enhanced accountability.

- 7. Drawing off of staff to assist in response functions and serious investigations reduces the potential to develop accountability because managers of the units from which staff are constantly drawn are able to claim they do not have unfettered use of their resources.
- 8. The launching of a major offensive against organised crime, gangs, drugs and alcohol has significant potential for reducing demand for reactive services. Currently there are only six district members dedicated to addressing these elements. Auckland Metropolitan Crime and Operations Support Group (AMCOS) have six teams deployed to drugs and organised crime but these units address national and international level offending. The National Intelligence Model will improve the sharing of information between AMCOS and the district. Rationalisation of the AMCOS focus in relation to organised crime, gangs and drugs would be beneficial.
- 9. Road Policing results are substantially below district targets and national averages on key indicators. One third of road policing staff are centralised and two thirds decentralised as Strategic Traffic Units (STU). There is a tendency to deploy STU to carryout road policing functions in crime hot spots rather than road policing hot spots. The district Road Policing Manager is required to organise the delivery of road policing outcomes through the Area Commanders. Accountability for road policing outcomes is therefore blurred and the ability to deal strategically with high level road policing issues is constrained. To persist with the current model will require significant changes in management processes. A centralised model with the District Road Policing Manager accountable for road policing outcomes is another option. Given that the recommendations of this report place significant accountabilities on the District Commander to deliver results by an identified date the decision should rest with him.
- 10. Considerable variation in the tactics and deployment of tactical, youth and community units across policing Areas is evident. The identification of best practice and use of benchmarking would improve productivity.
- 11. Staff abstraction refers to absence due to features including annual leave, sick leave, training days and court appearances. A UK study determined that operational police members have an abstraction rate of 50%. This figure is constantly quoted in the CMD as a 'given'. It is a very high percentage and has a huge impact on productivity. It needs to be addressed, perhaps in conjunction with a national initiative.
- 12. Youth and Community Services need to be accepted as "real policing" and raised to the level of mainstream policing. Achievement of this may be assisted by stronger linkage to the Tasking and Coordination Model and "whole of policing" responses, raising the position of Manager, Youth and Community Services to the district leadership group, changing the mindset of members engaged in the delivery of reactive policing services and presenting the work of Community Constables in a more tangible form with operational plans and identified outputs. Longer term tenure in Youth and Community positions would assist familiarity between officers and communities. The drawing off of staff to reactive duties tends to further under-value the role.
- 13. Family Violence is a major district issue. Repeat victimisation rose from 4,089 to 4,845 between 06/07 and 07/08. Family violence contributes to 34% of P1 calls for service. Four different multi agency groups meet to consider family violence issues. Police Family Violence units of 2 3 constabular members are deployed in each policing Area and focus on the top 10 repeat offenders in each Area. It is planned to increase the number of repeat offenders targeted.

- 14. CMD will extend the concept of reassurance policing. The perception of order and security will be improved by an integrated package including improved response and investigative effectiveness and enhanced accessibility, visibility, familiarity, problem solving and partnership involvement. The district is currently developing a Visibility Strategy designed to maximise the visible impact of police resources. The national productivity models will play a significant role in enhancing community reassurance. Other initiatives will include proactive use of the media and wider use of the mobile police station and team based beat Constables.
- 15. An approximate 50% increase in operational staff will result in a significant increase in arrests for both offences and the execution of warrants. This will impact directly on Youth Aid Section, Custodial Services and Police Prosecution Services. It will also impact on Courts and close liaison is being maintained with the Northern Region Courts Manager. A communication plan needs to be developed for consultation with agencies including Corrections, CYFS and MSD in particular. CMD criminals impact substantially on the Auckland City crime scene. It is believed by senior managers in neighbouring districts that increased productivity and proactive policing strategies in CMD will reduce the impact on neighbouring districts rather than displace criminal activity.
- 16. Interviews were conducted with over 150 staff at all levels and with senior management teams from neighbouring districts. Following those interview it is believed that overwhelming pressure of work over a sustained period, together with a belief that the district is under resourced, has tended to develop a number of management mindsets that need to be addressed if the benefits of the additional staff are to be optimised.
- 17. Securing additional staff to meet demand for reactive services has assumed greater importance than increasing productivity and a lower than desirable level of managerial awareness and focus on productivity has resulted. A district belief has also emerged that capacity must exceed demand for reactive services before pro-active policing strategies can be implemented. Further, managers do not *feel* accountable and are able to rationalise results as a consequence of, and indeed further evidence of, under resourcing.
- 18. It is believed that the focus on meeting immediate demand has also resulted in operational staff having a reduced <u>sense</u> of strategy. Task oriented deployment of units and the absence of aligned operational plans developing a sense of common purpose has led to the development of parochial silos, with reduced cooperation between units and consequential loss of productivity.
- 19. The development of operational plans addressing key functions, both reactive and proactive, would be highly beneficial. These need to be aligned and integrated to optimise synergies. They need to define measurable outputs for each plan and address the drivers of productivity. The plans also need to link activities to outputs, district policing priorities and policing outcomes to provide operational staff with a sense of strategy and an understanding of how they are "making a difference". Samples are provided in 14.3.
- 20. The undesirable mind sets resulting from perceived under resourcing will <u>not</u> naturally and automatically change on receipt of the additional staff. The provision of additional staff is a short term solution but with potential to be counter productive in the longer term. There is a risk that the provision additional staff may be interpreted as confirming the wisdom of seeking additional staff rather than focussing on decreasing demand or increasing productivity. The additional staff could provide a period of short term comfort, but failure to address demand or productivity issues will result in the seeking of more staff in the near future.

- 21. It is critical that the situation not be viewed by staff as one of continuing with "business as usual" with the added comfort of extra staff. The medium to long term solution lies in taking this opportunity to make a major step change, using the three fold approach of (a) increasing productivity (b) reducing demand and (c) the provision of additional staffing. This will position the district to meet future demographic growth.
- 22. Powerful messages need to signal to CMD staff that this is a major step change. The first step may be achieved by defining the future target position in the form of stretch goals, over a range of key results and key processes [listed at 14.8] to be achieved by the 31 December 2011. This would be communicated to staff through a range of key messages.
- 23. The issues facing CMD are addressed in detailed recommendations which address all three strategic goals and policing outcomes.
- 24. The recommended Transition Plan is in the form of an integrated package of initiatives, not all of which require additional resourcing. There is no single solution to the situation and to resource one or two strands of the plan would not be helpful. The approach adopted has been to develop a detailed plan then accurately resource that plan.

Summary of Recommendations

The recommendations presented are in the form of a detailed Transition Plan and include the details for implementing the plan.

It is recommended that:

- A future state for the CM District be defined in terms of results to be achieved and management processes to be implemented by the 31 December 2011.
- A three fold approach be adopted for achieving the defined future state, namely by (a) increasing productivity (b) reducing demand and (c) the provision of additional staffing.
- In consideration of the provision of the additional staff, the CMD District Commander enter into a SLA contract with the Deputy Commissioner to deliver the desired future state by the due date.
- Senior CMD Managers enter into PMS contracts with the CMD District Commander to deliver relevant elements of the future state by the due date.
- Clear messages be sent to all CMD staff that this transformation involves a major step change.
- A Communication Plan for consulting with key stakeholders be developed.
- A concerted Strategic Productivity Improvement Agenda be launched.
- The proactive and reactive impact and the productivity of the following policing services be enhanced as detailed in the schedule of recommendations:
 - Response Services.
 - Investigation Services.
 - Family Violence Services.
 - Road Policing Services.
 - Community Policing, Youth, and Community Services.
 - Services delivered by the Area Tactical Groups.

- A rigorous offensive on CM District organised crime, gangs, drugs and alcohol be launched.
- Staff "engagement" and retention strategies be developed and implemented.
- A formal Change Facilitation Programme be developed and implemented.
- The number of direct reports to the District Commander be reduced from 14 to seven
- The above initiatives be imbedded into the 2009/10 CMD Business Plan

2 INTRODUCTION

2.1 Background

- 25. CMD has received considerable investment in staff and resources in recent years. Since the year 2000 staff numbers have increased by over 39%. Innovations including the Criminal Justice Support Unit have helped the District to work more efficiently while initiatives like the introduction of a mobile police station and cross-agency work targeting at-risk youth and young offenders have had an impact. The District faces constant pressure from rising crime, particularly violent crime, and urgent calls for service.
- 26. CMD deliver policing services in an extremely complex operating environment where results are suboptimal on many performance metrics compared with other districts. This is despite the committed efforts of staff. Crime in the district is increasing at a faster rate, or declining at a slower rate in some categories, than in other districts and resolution rates across all categories remain substantially below the national average. In particular, total crime has increased by 17% over the past 5 years against a national decrease of 0.7%. Violent crime has increased by 46% over the same period against a national increase of 22% and CMD with a resolution rate of 67% compares unfavourably with a national rate of 77%
- 27. Family violence comprises 47.5% of all grievous assaults, 65.5% of serious assaults and generates 34% of the top 20 Priority 1 (P1) calls for service
- 28. The Government has committed to provide a priority boost of 300 new front-line police to the CMD by the end of 2010
- 29. In recognition of this, the Commissioner of Police has initiated a planning process to ensure Police management and staff are best placed to utilise the new resources and deliver on the expectations the public have of their police.
- 30. This report is designed to document phase one of that process.


2.2 Terms of Reference (TOR)

- 31. The TOR [presented in Appendix 1] requires the development of a recommended policing model capable of stemming the rise in crime, supporting communities in the promotion of pro social behaviours and improving the relative performance of the CMD policing.
- 32. In particular the TOR requires that the project be outcome and value focussed, that district strategies, programmes and initiatives be aligned to optimise synergies and value for money. It also requires that structures and management processes be examined to ensure they are maximising the creation of value. The integration of national models for Intelligence Led Policing, Case Management, and Access, Communications and Mobility into the recommended policing model is to be ensured.
- 33. The project is not a formal review of the district but is an assessment of the current situation designed to assist in optimising the potential benefits of the additional staff and their placement.
- 34. The TOR stipulates that the project is not about cost cutting or reduction in resources. It is not about one size fits all districts, nor is it about changes in the basic nature of existing resources, the personal commitment of staff or personal blame.

35. In the event that the recommended policing model is approved by the Executive, it will be returned for completion of Phase Two which involves recommendations in relation to staffing levels and implementation.

2.3 Methodology adopted for the Review

- 36. The focus of the project was on operational policing, both proactive and reactive.
- 37. In essence, the methodology is centred on the gap between supply and demand for police services in the district (the gap), or more particularly on five key elements of the gap. Logic suggests that the filling of the gap is best accomplished by a multi faceted approach as in (a) (e) below, rather than solely by the allocation of additional staff. The process is further illustrated in Figure 1.
 - (a) Gaining an enhanced understanding of the gap in relation to each facet of policing.
 - (b) Fully or partially closing the gap by increasing productivity and thereby capacity.
 - (c) Allocating staff precisely to fill the remainder of the gap if any; that is "a" minus "b"
 - (d) Reducing the gap by applying downward pressure on demand with pro-active policing.
 - (e) Development of a policing model that continues to optimise productivity of both reactive and proactive plans within the context of the NZ Police Strategic Plan, the NZ Police Statement of Intent and the National Business Plan.



- 38. Insufficient data in current management information systems preclude the ability to address the issues in terms of value creation.
- 39. The project team adopted the following methodology:
 - Extensive consultation with PNHQ staff in relation to relevant policing functions.

- Briefing papers were obtained from each CMD policing group. Included in these
 papers were indications of workloads and estimates of future staffing needs.
- Review of a very large volume of national and district background documents.
- Extensive interviews were carried out with some 140 staff at all levels of CMD. Care was taken to ensure that interviewees were fully representative of CMD staff in terms of constabular and police employees members and functions within the district.
- Interviews with district, Area and Group managers were carried out. These were designed to drill down into the details of the briefing papers submitted by Groups.
- Interviews were carried out with Commanders and managers in neighbouring districts.
- Interviews were carried out with community groups, a review of the MOUs and SLAs developed with relevant local body and government agencies.
- Assessment has been carried out in relation to
 - Reactive work volumes and corresponding police capacity.
 - Managerial and supervisory focus on productivity.
 - Potential productivity gains.
 - Means of optimising the placement of the additional staff to gain the greatest benefit.
 - Identification and assessment of raw data not currently available in management information systems
- 40. The term "operational plans" rather than "operational strategies" is used throughout the document because it is believed police staff identify more readily with the former.
- 41. The Project team has liaised with the Police Association throughout the period of the project.
- 42. The focus of the project has been on identifying opportunities for increasing productivity and reducing demand. The reader needs to be aware that this has of necessity reduced the focus on the excellent initiatives already implemented in CMD and the overall commitment of district staff to the delivery of high quality policing services. The district is well placed to build on these initiatives and the commitment of CMD members.

2.4 National Productivity Improvement Models

- 43. Three national productivity improvement Models will be referred to prior to a detailed description of them in Part Two of the report. A brief introduction to the models is required to assist interpretation of them in early sections of the report.
- 44. The National Intelligence Led Policing Model brings national uniformity to intelligence led policing which is an integral part of the NZ Police policing style. It is a model where data analysis and intelligence are pivotal to enabling crime and road trauma reduction, through strategic management and effective strategies that focus on prolific and serious offenders, locations and targets.
- 45. The Case Management Programme provides an end to end view of managing police cases from a request for service through to final disposition. Case Management includes the Crime Reporting Line, File Management Centre, Criminal Justice Support Unit and Investigation Support Unit. Related initiatives include, in particular, further development of the National Intelligence Application (NIA). This will also standardise and enhance the

recording and counting of statistics to ensure accurate reflection of police workload and effectiveness and will rectify current management information data inadequacies that constrained the Project Team in this instance.

46. The Access and Communication Strategy delivers a range of initiatives designed to enhance two way communications between police and the community. The Mobility Strategy is designed to enable members to remaining mobile in the community while completing administrative tasks.

2.5 The CMD Policing Environment

- 47. A number of very extensive environmental scans of the district have previously been completed and are available for perusal.
- 48. CMD Police operate in a very distinctive, complex and challenging environment. Key characteristics of the environment include:
 - Intergenerational unemployment.
 - Intergenerational gang membership.
 - High levels of alcohol and drug abuse and dependency.
 - A population increasing at more than double the national rate
 - Rapidly growing youth population against the national trend.
 - Disproportionately high youth population.
 - Ethnic diversity, with only 60% of residents born in NZ, more than 1 in 4 identifying with pacific ethnic group (4 times the national average) and with twice the national average identifying as Asian.
 - The number of decile 1 and 2 schools is 2.1 times the national percentage.
 - High truancy rates and poor levels of educational achievement.
 - Youth inactivity and boredom.
 - More than 35,000 working aged residents receiving govt funded benefits.
 - Strained resources amongst partner agencies.
 - Family and individual involvement with multiple government agencies.
 - Few social services and community support structures.

2.6 Annual Performance Results

- 49. The following crime categories are those addressed in the CMD Annual Performance Report for 2007/08 and are drawn from that document.
 - *Recorded total crime levels*. Over the past 5 years the CMD recorded a 16.7% increase in total crime against a national increase of 0.7%.
 - Resolution rate total Crime. The district has steadily raised its resolution rate for total crime from 36.1 % to 42.1% over the same period. Over this period the national resolution rate improved from 45.1% to 47%. The resolution rate remains lower than the national average but over the period CMD closed the gap on the national rate.
 - Violent attacks offending levels. Attacks in CMD have increased by 46.4% in the past 5 years against a national increase of 22.2%
 - *Violent attacks resolution rates.* Resolution rates for CMD have remained stable at 66.6% to 66.5% against a national rate of 76.8% to 77.4%.

- Dwelling burglaries recorded offending levels. Dwelling burglaries have increased by 14.2% against a national increase of 0.71%.
- Dwelling burglaries resolution rates. The resolution rate for the district has moved from 10.3% to 9.8% against a nation fall of 17.7% to 16.3%
- Unlawful Takings recorded offending levels. Unlawful takings have increased by 5.5% over the 5 year period against a national decrease of 10.7%.
- Unlawful Takings resolution rates. Resolution rates for the district have risen from 13.1% to 14.8% against a national increase from 20.4% to 21.1%.
- *Theft ex car recorded offending levels.* Theft ex car increased by 4.7% against a national decrease of 12.7%.
- Theft ex car resolution rates. The CMD resolution rate increased from 3.5% to 3.6% against a national fall from 8.3% to 6.4%
- *Family Violence*. Total reported family violence, INCLUDING incidents, in the district increased from 10,984 in 06/07 to 12,703 in 07/08. Repeat victimisation increased from 4089 to 4845.
- Road Policing.

Table 1

FATAL ACCIDENTS					
	District Target as proportion of national target	CMD Actual			
Fatal accidents 2008	20	31			

Tabl	e 2
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FATAL FIVE						
Fatal Five 2008		Fatal Five 2008 Surveys		Infringement notices issued per 10,000 population		
		CMD	National	CMD	National	
Alcohol	% drivers over legal limit	2%	0.5%	64	88	
Speed	Cars exceeding 50 km/hr	80%	64%			
	Cars exceeding 100 km/hr	54%	30%	468	789	
Restraints	Deaths – no restraints	27%	29%			
	Front seat wearing rates	95%	95%	124	178	
Dangerous/	careless driving			250	243	
High risk drivers				477	478	

 P1 Response rates. While not addressed in the Annual Performance Report CMD P1 response times do not compare favourably with the national average.

				Table 3		
EMERGENCY RESPONSE 2008 – CALENDER YEAR TO OCTOBER 2008						
	Unit attend within 10 min	Unit attend within 15 min	Unit attend within 20 min	Not attend within 20 min		
Counties Manakau	54.8%	71.2%	79.5%	20.5%		
National Ave	66.3%	81.4%	87.2%	12.2%		

50. The relevance of recorded crime as indicators of crime trends will diminish further in the near future. The prime objective of the family violence campaign is to increase reporting of the crimes. The national productivity improvement models particularly the Crime Reporting Line and the Access, Communications and Mobility Strategies are designed to render the reporting of crime easier and simpler. Increased confidence in the police will also raise expectations and increase reporting levels.

2.7 NZ Police Strategy

- 51. This paper is aligned to the NZ Police Strategic Plan to 2010, the Police National Crime Strategy, the Police Statement of Intent 2008/09, the Police National Business Plan 2008/09 and the Counties Manukau District Business Plan 2008/09.
- 52. It is aligned with the following Strategic Goals:
 - *Community Reassurance*. Outcome: Confident, safe and secure communities
 - Provide opportunity for participation
 - Set local priorities
 - Work in partnership
 - Provide protection
 - Policing with Confidence. Outcome: Less actual crime and road trauma, fewer victims
 - Evidence-based proactive policing
 - Timely and effective response to calls for service
 - Thorough investigations
 - Effective resolutions
 - Organisational Development. Outcome: A world class Police service
 - Leadership and people in policing
 - Integrity and accountability
 - Technology and innovation
- 53. The paper notes reference in the NZ Police Strategic Plan to challenges including the need to deploy people at the right time, the need for a more visible, accessible, familiar and reliable service and the need to develop innovative and technological solutions to unproductive and repetitive activities.
- 54. It also notes reference in the NZ Police Strategic Plan to opportunities for renewed investment in community policing, a whole of government approach, investment in intelligence, partnering for purpose and <u>best practice</u>. Of particular note is the following statement under the heading "*Systems and processes*", "While we are excited about new resources we must also ensure we are making the <u>best use of current resources</u>. We

have the opportunity to review and assess the way we police and identify how we can be <u>more effective and efficient</u>. We will benefit from <u>better understanding of Police</u> <u>processes</u>". [Emphasis added]


The Strategic Plan, under the heading 'Performance and Success Indicators", acknowledges that over the next few years our success will be assessed from a range of perspectives and lists some success indicators, in particular, as:

Government

- Has trust and confidence in us.
- Receives sound return on investment
- Is satisfied that we are fiscally responsible

2.8 CMD Police District Structure

- 55. The Auckland region comprises three police districts, Waitemata, Auckland City and Counties Manukau. AMCOS operates as a fourth district.
- 56. The CMD District Commander has 14 direct reports, including four Area Commanders who operate in a decentralised model. The District Structure is presented in Figure 2.



57. Each of the 4 Areas are organised in a similar manner essentially comprising 4 groups:

- *Response Group*: comprising 5 sections providing 24/7 response to reported incidents
- Area Community Services: comprising community Constables and units addressing youth issues.
- Investigations: comprising CIB units and GDB enquiry units
- *Tactical Group*: of varying composition including, Intel Unit, a Tactical Crime Unit, Strategic Traffic Unit and one with a Youth Action Team.

2.9 CMD Staffing

- 58. For comparison purposes CMD generally use constabular staff in the CMD as the base figure. This does not take cognisance of the fact that the CMD has a higher ratio of police employee staff or that AMCOS have staff normally included in the figures used for other districts. A more reliable comparison is provided using total staff (constabular and police employee) and including a proportion of AMCOS in the CMD base figure. AMCOS has total staff of 292 less 47 of who are engaged in wider region or national roles. AMCOS staff actually servicing the three districts in the Auckland Region are estimated at 245. In discussion with the AMCOS Commander, 36% or 88 of these may be apportioned to the CMD and 78 each to Auckland and Waitemata.
- 59. Using these adjusted figures the following comparisons are made in tables 4 and 5 in relation to the ratios of district staff to 100,000 population and to 10,000 total crime. The tables also show the comparisons when adjusted for the addition of 300 additional staff to CMD. Details are provided from PNHQ sources.

DISTRICT FTE NUMBERS PER 100,000 POPULATION								
	FTE AMCOS Total FTE FTE per FTE/100,000							
	Numbers	Allocation		100,000	With add 300			
Auckland	874	78	952	228.5	228.5			
Waitemata	881	78	959	184.5	184.5			
CMD	947	88	1035	<mark>211.7</mark>	<mark>273.1</mark>			
Wellington	964		964	207.4	207.4			
Canterbury	1021		1021	187.4	187.4			
National Ave.				<mark>211.7</mark>	<mark>218.8</mark>			

Table 5

TOTAL OFFENCES PER FTE								
	FTE AMCOS Total FTE Offences Offences per Numbers Allocation Per FTE FTE (+ 300)							
Auckland	874	78	952	41.0	41.0			
Waitemata	881	78	959	59.2	59.2			
CMD	947	88	1035	<mark>49.9</mark>	<mark>38.7</mark>			
Wellington	964		964	46.1	46.1			
Canterbury	1021		1021	47.7	47.7			
National Ave.				<mark>47.9</mark>	<mark>46.3</mark>			

60. CMD matches the national average in relation to FTE per 100,000 population and is not markedly dissimilar to the national average in relation to offences per FTE. With the

additional 300 the district is favourably placed in relation to both. A distinguishing feature is the volume of violent crime in CMD referred to in 2.5.

- 61. The inexperience of staff in the CMD is universally quoted by district staff as a significant constraint. While the CMD at 7.7 years compares unfavourably with national average of 12 years, experience levels are not markedly dissimilar to those of Waitemata and Auckland City districts. Table 6 indicates that the average length of service is slightly lower in CMD but the percentage with less than 2 years service is identical to Auckland City and similar to Waitemata. The staff attrition rate for CMD is slightly higher.
- 62. AMCOS, with average length of service of 15.5 years and only 2% with less than 2 years service, is drawing experienced staff from districts in the Auckland Region

					Table 6
STAFF EXPE		AUCKLA	ND REGIO	N	
	CMD	Auck	Waitem.	AMCOS	Nat Ave
Ave Length Service (Years)	7.7	8.5	8.9	15.5	12
% staff less than 2 yrs service	19%	19%	20%	2%	16%
Attrition Rate %	3.5	3	3.2	3.3	3.2
Ave sick leave/FTE last 12 months	6.1	6.3	6.8	6.7	6
Lost time injury rate last 12 months	10.9	8.3	12.8	21.7	12.2

- 63. It may be that perceived difficulties arising from the inexperience of staff in the district is exacerbated by the frequent rotation of staff through groups and units. A staff desire to retain the shift workers allowance available on response duties results in the need to frequently rotate staff through Area General Duties Branch (GDB) Enquiry Offices [4.10], Strategic Traffic Units [8.1] and Youth and Community units [6.2] means that experience in any particular role is minimised. Relationships between Community and external agencies and groups are constantly being broken down. Similar issues arise with staff rotations in CIB where for example 10 members have been rotated through the Child Abuse unit in the last 6 months [4.3].
- 64. Over the past 3 years 114 additional Government New Initiatives (GNI) staff have been allocated to the district. The precise allocation of these staff is presented in Appendix 3. Table 7 presents a summary of the allocations. Youth and Community have been the major beneficiaries over this period. However redirection of staff from Youth and Community Services to reactive services is common. Patrol was allocated 6 additional members but in real terms has actually experienced a decline in numbers since 2005: refer 3.2.

		Та	able 7
CMD STAFF ALLO	CATION	IS OVER PAST 3 YE	RS
Youth:	23	CJSU:	7
Community:	10	Patrol (Response)	6
Crime Scene Attendants:	13	Road Policing:	6
Mobile Police Station:	12	Family Violence:	4
CIB:	9	Crime Reporting Line:	2
Tactical Groups:	9	Admin Support	2
GDB investigators:	8	Deployment Officer	1

2.10 CMD Challenges & Initiatives 2004 – 2009

- 65. In early 2004 CMD underwent a major restructure and change management programme. The district moved from a structure with seven Areas, each under a Senior Sergeant, and with a centralised incident and response capability, to four Areas, each under an Inspector and with decentralised incident and road policing responses.
- 66. A number of issues emerged that had to be addressed as the District moved through the change programme. These included in particular, the need to address a range of major disciplinary issues, the beginning of the youth gang problems and a spate of murders commencing in October 2005.
- 67. Over the past 8 years there has been an effort to move from a reactive culture to one of professionalism, community engagement and teamwork through a programme of change and innovation. Some of the initiatives implemented over this period include development of the annual business planning cycle, introduction of Youth Action Teams, Mobile Police Station and Cops in Schools. A state of the art custody suite was developed at Manukau together with police employee custody officers. Other innovations include introduction of Service First at public counters and introduction of District Maori, Pacific and Asian advisory groups. The introduction of District FTO and acting Sergeant courses was duplicated by other Districts.
- 68. The district is well placed to build on these initiatives. The introduction of the Criminal Justice Support Unit, the Investigation Support Unit, the File Management Centre, and the establishment of the Crime Reporting Line during the period of the project are partially in place and ready to build as a part of optimising the additional staff.

PART 1: OPERATIONAL GROUPS AND UNITS

3 RESPONSE GROUP

3.1 Overview

69. The response group provides the initial GDB attendance in response to calls for police assistance. Staff are deployed in either an "I" Car (two Constables), a "Q" Car (one Constable) or a unit with a Sergeant alone. A total of 196 constabular members are deployed from the four policing Areas as indicated below. Shift supervision is provided by an additional 7 Senior Sergeants deployed from District HQ.

				Table 8	8		
COUNTIES MANUKAU – AREA RESPONSE GROUP							
	Central	East	West	So	uth		
				PK	PU		
Sergeants	5	5	5	5	5		
Relief Sergeant	1	1	1				
Admin Sergeant		1	1	1	1		
Constables	35	39	45	25	20		
Staff per shift	1 + 7	1 + 8	1 + 9	1 + 5	1 + 4		
Minimum I Cars level	2	2	3	1	1		

"1 + 5" indicates one Sergeant and 5 Constables

Additional 7 Senior Sergeants at District HQ provide shift management

- 70. In each Area the Response Group is managed by a Senior Sergeant who is also Officer in Charge of a Police Station in that Area.
- 71. Groups in each Area operate in five sections on a 24 hour roster with respective shift numbers as indicated in the above table. The shift Senior Sergeants are rostered to provide 24/7 supervision of the combined district response capability. The Senior Sergeants work to a progressive roster while the remainder of the groups work to an Ottawa roster. Some of those members interviewed believe that this does not allow a supervisor to become familiar with the strengths and weaknesses of individual members of the group. Potential problems arising from this issue may be exacerbated by the relative inexperience of Constables in the groups
- 72. The situation presents some interesting control lines and some potential blurring of accountability. Staff are directed to tasks by Northern Communications Centre (North Comms). The designated Manager of each Response Group is also the Officer in Charge of one of the police stations in that Area. Shift control is under a Senior Sergeant from District HQ. These Senior Sergeants work a different roster to the staff so do not identify with any particular shift or with the *performance* of any particular shift. The situation is not conducive to strong effective leadership. Further, the scenario raises some potential issues in relation to who can actually be held accountable for any instances of sub-optimal performance or indeed who is accountable for optimising the key drivers of productivity.
- 73. Response Group members express a strong preference for the Progressive roster. This issue has been reviewed by the district and is outside the scope of this project.
- 74. District response capabilities are centrally directed by North Comms. Calls for police assistance are directed to North Comms where they are evaluated according to priority as either P1 or P2 calls.

- 75. District Response staff are deployed from policing Areas but are not constrained to those Areas in terms of actual tasking. Staff leave is granted by Area Commanders on the basis of maintaining minimum staffing levels for each Area. The number of units deployed per shift is recorded on a shift report but is not recorded in management information systems and retained for analysis.
- 76. In South Area, with total staffing of 2 + 9, two "I" cars are presented because they operate from two sub bases at Papakura and Pukekohe. This is due to the distances between the two centres. Operating from one base they could present 3 'I' cars.
- 77. Staff abstractions refer to absence from the designated tasks due to a range of features including annual leave, sick leave, training days and court appearances. A UK study¹ determined that operational police members have an abstraction rate of 50%. This figure is constantly quoted by members in the district as a 'given'. It is a very high percentage and has a huge impact on the productivity of the district. This is not a problem peculiar to CMD. The district has addressed issues such as sick leave and it is noted that sick leave rates in the district match the national average.
- 78. However, the ability to lower this rate for example from 50% to 45% would have a significant impact on unit capacity over 12 months and constitutes one of the key drivers for increasing district productivity.
- 79. Rosters present the same number of staff for each shift regardless of the pattern of peaks and troughs in demand over 24 hour periods.
- 80. Sergeant supervision appears to differ between Areas and also between the personal approaches adopted by different Sergeants. One Area is noted for the speed which staff are again available for deployment following an arrest; referred to in North Comms as 'drop and run', while other Areas are not so swift in returning to the road.
- 81. The timeliness for response to P1 jobs is shown in Table 3 above.

3.2 Changes in Response Group staffing levels since 2000

82. Table 9 presents a summary of the movements in Response Group Constable numbers; totals exclude AMCOS.

			Table 9				
RESI	RESPONSE GROUP STAFFING 2000 – 2008						
Year (July)	Total constab RAT	Response Staff (Const)	Response # as % of district				
2000*	605	84	13.8				
2001*	625	84	13.4				
2002*	634	84	13.2				
2003*	633	<mark>84</mark>	13.2				
2004	642	<mark>164</mark>	25.5				
2005	639	178	27.8				
2006	670	172	25.6				
2007	734	166	22.6				
2008	748	165	22.2				

* Emergency Response Group and attending only P1 jobs

¹ "Open All Hours - A thematic inspection report on the role of police visibility and accessibility in public reassurance", Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary; Published Home Office, December 2001, London; ISBN 1-84082-760-2

- 83. The apparent major increase in Response Constables in 2004 is misleading. Prior to 2004, 84 members were deployed from a district Emergency Response Group and attended only P1 jobs. P2 jobs were attended by 120 members deployed on patrol. In 2004, the two groups were combined, decentralised to the 4 Areas and tasked to attend both P1 and P2 jobs. The combined groups would have totalled 204 but was reduced to 164 with the balance being deployed to other duties.
- 84. Numbers reached a peak of 178 in 2005 but have steadily declined to the current level of 165. Table 7 suggests that in real terms staff numbers engaged on P1 and P2 jobs have not increased since 2000 and may have declined.

3.3 Relative Experience of CMD Response staff

85. Table 10 compares the experience of Sergeants by numbers in CMD Response against CMD non response groups and against the national total. It also shows the total CMD Sergeants as a % of national total in that experience band. The district has been successful in spreading the Sergeant experience across response and non response groups in each Area with a relatively even distribution. In a national comparison (far right column of table 10) it can be seen that CMD is more highly represented in the lower experience levels and less highly represented in the higher experience bands.

				Table 10		
RELATIVE EXPERIENCE OF RESPONSE GROUP SERGREANTS						
	Counties M	lanukau	Natio	onal		
Service as Sgt	Non Response	l Car	National.	CMD as %		
		Response	Total	national.		
1 year	16	20	321	11.25%		
3 year	28	34	607	10.21%		
5 years	34	38	803	8.96%		
7 years	41	40	1021	7.93%		

86. The relative experience of Constables in Response Groups is shown in Table 11:

				Table 11		
RELATIVE EXPERIENCE OF RESPONSE GROUP CONSTABLES						
Service	Non	l Car	District	National.		
	Response	Response				
Less than 1 year	<mark>6%</mark>	<mark>17%</mark>	12%	<mark>8%</mark>		
1 year	<mark>9%</mark>	<mark>20%</mark>	15%	<mark>9%</mark>		
2 years	17%	24%	21%	10%		
3 years	13%	11%	12%	7%		
4 years	10%	8%	9%	6%		
5 years	<mark>5%</mark>	<mark>5%</mark>	<mark>5%</mark>	<mark>5%</mark>		
8 yrs	4%	3%	3%	4%		
3 years & less	<mark>32%</mark>	<mark>61%</mark>	48%	<mark>27%</mark>		

87. The table demonstrates the relative inexperience of staff in CMD compared to the national average. It also shows a significant imbalance in the experience levels between response staff and non response staff in CMD. The percentage of Response Group Constables with less than 1 years experience is three times that of non response groups.

Tabla 11

- 88. As indicated in Table 6 however, the overall district experience levels in CMD, Auckland City and Waitemata districts are not dissimilar.
- 89. The quality of initial attendance at jobs is a major determinant of the ultimate success or failure in an investigation. The inexperience of members in the Response Group is constantly cited as a major cause of problems in terms of time taken to attend the job and the quality of the attendance. The Response Group is carrying a disproportionately high percentage of the district's junior members. It may be argued that what staff lack in experience they make up for in enthusiasm but that notion does not extend, for example, to competence at crime scenes or in attendance at domestic disputes. The problem of shift inexperience could be mitigated slightly with a better balance of experience across the groups.
- 90. The allocation of additional members to the response groups is likely to be drawn principally from members direct from the Police College. This is expected to further reduce the average length of service of Constables in the CMD response groups and may pose additional supervisory and training issues.

3.4 Response Workload

- 91. For the 12 month period to October 2008 North Comms received 23,835 P1 calls for service for CMD. This represented 21%, or more than 1 in 5 of national P1 call outs.
- 92. Nationally the two top P1 events are for domestic violence followed by behaviour offences. CMD contributed 18.1% of all calls for service for domestic disputes to which New Zealand Police were called. The district also contributes 14.5% of all calls for service for behaviour offences in New Zealand.
- 93. The district P1 response times are significantly lower than the national average as indicated in Table 3.
- 94. Due to response workload, CMD has 26% (all ranks) of the total district constabular members deployed to the response function, compared to Auckland district with 19%. This significantly reduces the number of CMD staff available for deployment to other policing functions in the district.
- 95. In terms of P1 events per dedicated Response staff member, CMD and Auckland City District are not dissimilar due to the higher percentage of CMD staff dedicated to this function. Despite this, CMD still draw off staff from other functions in the district and still fails to match the national average response times. This may of course be due to the relative inexperience of staff and/or the seriousness of the events in CMD.
- 96. Family violence, at 34%, is a major contributor to P1 response calls in the district. No statistics indicating the average time consumed by each domestic event are available. Interviewee estimates of the average time required to attend a domestic violence incident vary from 60 70 minutes. More recently members are required to complete a 12 page form (FVIR) relating to each event and generally complete this immediately after the incident. Estimates of the time required to complete this form vary from 20 40 minutes. It may be that total time to attend a family violence incident with no arrest or follow-up is up to1 hour 45 minutes.
- 97. Not all calls to domestic complaints involve an offence. The national ratio is 70% offences and 30% disputes not involving actual assaults. Area family violence coordinators who review Area FVIR forms daily, suggest that the ratio in CMD is the opposite with approximately 40% involving assaults and 60% being disputes with no assault. Many of the latter are resolved with advice. Staff inexperience may result in the increased number of call outs to the same address and the higher offending rates.

98. Behaviour offences are resolved more swiftly but may involve the attendance of multiple cars to one incident, albeit for a shorter period of time.

3.5 Draw off of staff from other Units

- 99. The scale of response demand has a huge impact on other policing units in the CMD district whose members are constantly drawn off to assist. This is highly detrimental to the latter units. It is not only disruptive but tends to demean the nature of other policing functions and certainly reduces the scope for accountability. Managers of other units are less likely to feel accountable or be challenged on results where they do not have unfettered use of their own resources.
- 100. No CMD policing units have measured outputs. The results of failure to attend response functions are immediately obvious regardless of defined outputs while failure of other units to carry out their functions is less immediately obvious. Hence the ease with which staff are redeployed to response. Public demand for response is voiced and has high public profile.
- 101. As the recommended policing model moves towards greater accountability this draw off of staff will become more untenable; refer "Recommendations".

3.6 Response Capacity and Demand

- 102. Computer Assisted Response Dispatch (CARD) is the electronic system used by North Comms. The system secures an extensive range of raw data relevant to all aspects of the "response" function and has the potential to facilitate fact based management of the function.
- 103. Response capability is one of the most critical functions in the district in terms of (a) resources consumed (b) the draw off of staff from other Area Groups and (c) impact on reassurance policing.
- 104. In view of the critical nature of the response function it would be beneficial for the district to have a greater level of understanding of the various elements of the process. Of particular interest would be:
 - (a) The potential annual, monthly, weekly and daily capacity of the dedicated Response Group.
 - (b) The average number of P1 and P2 jobs attended and completed per unit, per shift. This would be fundamental to establishing "a".
 - (c) It has not been possible to determine "b" in a reliable manner because staff fail to consistently log on and off the air at jobs as required. This indicates that there are supervisory issues to be addressed.
 - (d) The percentage of calls for service actually attended in total; the percentage of those attended by dedicated Response staff and the percentage attended by staff drawn off from other work groups.
 - (e) P1 jobs cancelled due to lack of attendance and the pattern of those jobs by hour and day of the week.
 - (f) The precise pattern of demand for response services on an hourly, weekly and seasonal basis. This data was extracted from CARD during the project.

- 105. Extraction of more precise data from CARD would also facilitate the development of a relatively simple spreadsheet model based on car units per shift, abstractions rates, total staff available per shift etc. The model would allow confirmation of the precise impact of key productivity drivers such as reducing the abstraction rate, delivering an additional "car unit" per shift, balancing staff leave between summer and winter months and matching supply with demand.
- 106. These are some of the key drivers of productivity in relation to response and should form the basis of meaningful <u>process</u> KPI; refer "Policing Model", Part Three
- 107. The mismatch of supply and demand was examined in the district in 2007 but recommendations were not followed through due to the pressure of other initiatives being developed at the time.
- 108. The absence of this information precluded the ability of the Project team to secure the information required to precisely determine the number of additional staff required to meet response demand. The information gained from CARD by the project team will contribute to district understanding of the issues.
- 109. Constraints on the availability of relevant data will ease in the future. The Case Management Programme or Work, and in particular the Crime Reporting Line (CRL) using Business Object have the potential to present electronic reports and "drill down" indicators that will in future facilitate fact based management of the response function. The data needs for the district require to be identified early to ensure that relevant reports are produced.
- 110. It is noted that the issues are not unique to police, or to the CMD, and are regularly addressed in relation to organisations such as Accident and Emergency Departments and Airline Scheduling which have developed sophisticated models.
- 111. P1 and particularly P2 incidents have significant potential as a cheap, readily available and timely source of survey type data to identify "what concerns the community".

3.7 Role Clarity

- 112. The Response Group should be at the fore front of reassurance policing and this role needs to be constantly reinforced. The labelling of this group "Response" sends a strong conflicting message that the role does not extend beyond simply being directed to attend jobs. A more appropriate name for the group is required.
- 113. The core activities of the group include response and all of the elements impacting on reassurance policing; refer 7, "Community Policing and Community Reassurance". Clearly defined outputs and more particularly the KPIs for those outputs should be used to clarify the role of this group; refer 14.3.
- 114. At current staffing levels, the Response Group staff have been acting precisely as "response" and nothing more. Additional staff will present potential to extend the reassurance policing role but the current mindset will not change automatically. If the benefits of the additional staff are to be optimised there will need to be a concerted effort to change this mindset.

3.8 Optimisation of Additional Staff

- 115. Available management information data has not facilitated a calculated estimate of the number of additional staff required to fill the gap between supply and the demand for response services. This will need to be estimated.
- 116. Optimisation of the value these staff will deliver will require a concerted effort to maximise productivity. It has long been argued that it is not possible to measure police performance. However drivers of productivity have similarities regardless of the industry. They can be measured and are similar across many industry sectors that are responsive to varying volume demands.
- 117. There is potential to improve the productivity of this group. An established minimum standard for East, Central and South to each present 2 "I" cars and West to present 3 "I" cars is consistent with the command and control management style but not designed to maximise productivity. Interviewees state that this is not always achieved, but the results are not recorded and not readily available in a management information system. The aim should be to maximise capacity. Area Commanders should be challenged to be the "best they can be" with stretch goals and benchmarking across the Areas.
- 118. The NZ Police Strategic Plan refers to having the right people in the right place at the right time. The extent to which the pattern of the response capacity produced matches the hourly and daily pattern of demand for response services is another key driver of productivity. Further, CARD research shows a marked seasonal difference in the pattern of demand, with a "summer" season, between October and March, recording significantly higher demand. However the summer season is the period in which significantly more staff leave is granted. Leave granted in December and January, in particular, is 3 times higher than the winter months. The extent to which leave is balanced throughout the year is a further determinant of response productivity.
- 119. It is essential that additional staff not simply be added to existing shifts. Adding two more "I" cars to a slightly deficient roster will not optimise the additional staff.
- 120. The provision of the additional staff presents an ideal opportunity to move towards rostering to meet the pattern of demand. There are various options for this, extending from (a) simple 'roll out sections' similar to a swing shift, but more dynamic to meet peak demand periods, through to (b) more complex adjustments to the roster requiring wider staff consultation. This is an issue that requires swift action to ensure optimisation of additional staff as they come on strength and is now being addressed by the District Commander.

4 INVESTIGATION SERVICES

- 121. Implementation of the national Case Management Programme will provide valuable management information data supporting fact based management of investigation processes. It will in future resolve the difficulties experienced by the project team in accessing data on which to evaluate the staffing needs and the productivity of investigation units.
- 122. Investigation type services are delivered in the district from four general groups, namely:
 - An Investigation Support Unit reporting directly to the District Commander.
 - Crime Services comprising specialist CIB units are centralised at district level.
 - General CIB investigators decentralised to the four policing Areas
 - GDB Enquiry Office in each Area, generally attached to the Area CIB office but in Central Area reporting to the Manager Tactical Support Unit.

4.1 Investigative Support Unit

123. An Investigative Support Unit, comprising 20 staff, as indicated in Table 12, reports to the District Commander through the Research and Development Group.

				Table 12		
INVESTIGATIVE SUPPORT UNIT STAFFING						
	Car Squad	Records	Fraud Squad	General		
Detective Senior Sergeant			1			
Sergeant				1		
Constables				2		
Non constab FTE	2	4	1	8		
Constab FTE			1			

124. The district does not have dedicated Car Squads, Burglary Squads or Fraud Squads. Some fraud inquiries are dealt with by Area Enquiry Office staff but commercial organisations in the district generally utilise private investigation firms.

4.2 Crime Services

- 125. Crime Services is a district capability comprising 76 constabular and 16.5 police employee members. The remaining CIB members are deployed in decentralised units in the four policing Areas.
- 126. Crime Services staff are deployed in the six specialist units within Crime Services as shown in table 13.

						ble 13	
CRIME SERVICES UNITS - STAFFING							
	Child Abuse Team	Adult Sexual Abuse Team	Organised Crime Unit	Crime Squad	Scene of crime	Family Violence	
Det. Inspector		1			1		
Det. Senior Sergeant		1		1			
Det. Sergeants	2	1	1	5			
Sergeants						1	
Detectives	12	7	4	25			
Constables	2					3	
Operational Analyst			1				
Child Interviewers	3						
SJSU (File briefers)	5			.5			
TOTALS (Excl S/S)	24	8	7	40		4	

127. The Crime Services Manager is responsible for management of the district specialist sections and for the coordination of Area CIB staff. He coordinates staff drawn together from throughout the district to form serious crime operations. The manager also has responsibility for coordinating District police services in relation to Family violence; refer 9.3 "Family Violence".

4.3 Child Abuse Team (CAT)

- 128. The team comprises one Detective Senior Sergeant, two Detective Sergeants, 14 Detectives, two Constables, three specialist interviewers and a file briefing unit of 4.
- 129. Members are holding 6 7 active investigation files each, with 70 unassigned. CAT staff are ring fenced from major inquiries but are used on occasions in this role.
- 130. The Detective Senior Sergeant and Detective Sergeants do not hold files but principally assist inexperienced members with investigations. They do however at times hold residual files from major investigations. During the period of Project CM 300, a Detective Sergeant in the unit held a homicide file.
- 131. CMD record the highest number of child abuse files in the country followed by Canterbury. Both units have maintained very good records including numbers and percentage in relation to complaint files, offenders, prosecutions and convictions.
- 132. CMD with the above complement of staff handled 580 files in the past year. Christchurch handled 387 with a staff of 1 Detective Sergeant, 3 Detectives, 1.5 Constables and 0.6 specialist interviewers. The Christchurch Detective Sergeant holds files and is a full investigator. There is no suggestion that members in either unit are less than very busy and the different file loadings provide an opportunity to compare the different operating environments:
 - Christchurch CAT has experienced staff. CMD has rotated 10 staff out of 19 through the unit in the past six months. Three of the staff are qualified Detectives but none have held the designation for longer than 6 months. A high percentage of the staff are under training and assessments.
 - Language barriers present difficulties in CMD with a high percentage of interviews requiring interpreters and in other cases 'pigeon English' prolonging interviews.

- -

- Cultural issues, including family attitudes towards being 'tarnished' by the event present special problems in CMD. This together with trial delays means that CAT staff have to maintain consistent contact with, and manage witnesses carefully, over a long period to ensure they remain viable witnesses at trial date.
- Travel time and traffic delays in CMD are suggested as a further constraint.
- Both units are drawn off to major inquiries but the draw off from the CMD unit may be greater.
- 133. The Christchurch unit is severely stretched and is seeking additional staff as is the CMD unit.

4.4 Adult Sexual Abuse Team (ASAT)

- 134. The unit, comprising 1 Detective Sergeant and seven Detectives, investigates complaints that are over three months old. All 'current' complaints are investigated by the four Area CIB offices. It is suggested by Crime Services that an addition of one Detective Sergeant seven Detectives need to be added to the unit to allow it to take the current investigations from the Area CIB offices to allow the unit to investigate both historic and current complaints.
- 135. As indicated below Area CIB offices believe they can cope with their current workload if they were not drawn off to major investigations. If the Area units have the capacity to deal with current workload then any centralisation of the function of investigating current adult sexual abuse files should be accompanied by the centralisation of Area CIB staff equivalent to the centralised workload.
- 136. The investigation constraints listed above in relation to CAT apply equally to ASAT investigators.

4.5 Multi Agency Centre (MAC)

- 137. CMD is in the process of relocating the Evidential Video Unit, CAT, ASAT and the Family First Team into new premises to work alongside other government agencies in a move designed to establish an interagency approach to the investigation and management of abuse.
- 138. For child complaints the following agencies will be involved:
 - CAT
 - South Auckland Video Unit (SAVU) responsible for interviewing child complainants
 - Specialist Services Unit (SSU) from CYFS responsible for ongoing counselling and welfare of child complainants
 - Department of Health
- 139. For adult complainants the following agencies will be involved:
 - ASAT
 - Police specialist interviewers (SAVU)
 - Family Safety Team; refer 9.3 "Family Violence".
 - Counselling Services Centre responsible for counselling and ongoing welfare

- Department of Health Doctors of Sexual Assault Care responsible for medical examinations and ongoing medical welfare.
- 140. The national Case Management Model will in future provide the management information data required to precisely evaluate staffing needs and manage productivity.

4.6 Organised Crime Unit

141. Refer 9.1 "Major District Issues".

4.7 Crime Car

- 142. Crime Car Section is a dedicated district unit within Crime Services. The section is managed by a Detective Senior Sergeant and comprises five Detective sergeants and 25 Detectives, a total of 31 staff. The section operates in five shifts with one Detective Sergeant on each shift acting as crime coordinator. The section endeavours to present two cars each crewed by two Detectives on each shift. At times they are able to present only one crew but management information systems do not record the number of units produced. The Section is not rostered to meet peak demand but maintains a steady roster through the week. Many of the productivity issued indicated in Section 3 also apply to the provision of Crime Car services.
- 143. A constant concern expressed by GDB is that relatively inexperienced Response Group GDB staff are being required to attend jobs beyond their skill level because Crime Squad is involved at other crime scenes. Analysis of Crime Car occurrence sheets indicates a low average of 21 jobs attended per week by the section.
- 144. The function of the unit is to provide initial CIB attendance at serious crime scenes and submit the file to Area investigation units for further inquiry, in which case the occurrence sheet would be a reflection of their workload. This is not so. The manager of the Crime Squad Section, on assessment of the file loadings in the Area CIB office to which a file will be forwarded for further inquiries, may decide that his section will continue with inquiries for up to a week. Rather than being restricted only to initial crime attendance the Section is also holding ongoing inquiry files. Their ability to attend a particular serious scene may also be constrained by the fact that they may already be deployed at another serious crime scene. At times of major crime investigations this section in effect becomes the "CIB Office".
- 145. The District Commander commenced a review of Crime Car Section during the period of CMD Project to determine whether or not the section should be decentralised.

4.8 Specialist Forensic and Regional Units

- 146. The specialist forensic units are deployed from AMCOS and service the three metropolitan districts. Each of the Auckland metropolitan districts provide two staff to the AMCOS DNA unit and each third year provide a Sergeant for the unit.
- 147. The district is satisfied with the level of service provided by the units including Photography, Fingerprints and DNA. Satisfaction is also expressed in relation to Eagle, Maritime Unit and Dog Section.

4.9 Scenes of Crime Officers and Crime Scene Attendants

148. A Scene of Crime Officers unit SOCO) also reports to the Crime Section Manager. This unit comprises one Sergeant, seven Constables and three non constabular members. SOCO and Crime Scene Attendants were subject to an in-depth review by Inspector Andrew Coster in September 2008. He did not report favourably on the productivity, focus or deployment of the units. This may be a management issue more than a reflection of the commitment of the members of the units. The District Commander is currently in the process of addressing these issues.

4.10 Area Investigative Capability

				Table 14		
AREA INVESTIGATIVE CAPABILITY						
	Central	East	West	South		
				PK	PU	
Detective Senior Sergeant	1	1	1		1	
Detective Sergeants	2	2	2	1	1	
Detectives	10	10	12	6	3	
Sergeants (Enquiry Office)	1	1	1	1	1	
Constables (Enq Office)	6	8	7	3	5	
CJSU (File briefers)	*	*				
ISU	*	*				
TOTALS	20	22	23	22		

149. Investigative staffing for the four CMD policing Areas is shown in Table 14.

* Two Areas have CJSU and ISU units on trial [See 12.5 below]

- 150. GDB Enquiry Offices are generally attached to the Area CIB office, reporting to the Area Detective Senior Sergeant. Central is an exception where the Enquiry office is a separate entity reporting to the manager Tactical Support Unit.
- 151. The division of categories of crime addressed by CIB and Enquiry Office staff is not consistently applied across Areas. Each Area appears to have a different threshold for the division of work. There appears to be no established policy or best practice.
- 152. Area CIB members are constantly drawn from Area offices to engage in serious crime operations. This causes GDB staff to shift their threshold of investigations to more serious categories of crime, often beyond their abilities, while crimes they should be addressing remain unattended. Staff return to overdue files and with leave and time off in lieu owing.
- 153. More critically, Detective Senior Sergeants in charge of Area investigation offices are drawn away to manage serious crime operations. This removes the manager from these offices and reduces the leadership and advice available to investigators.
- 154. It is claimed that the investigative ability of Enquiry office is constrained by the inexperience of GDB staff, with probationary Constables at times performing this role. It has been found necessary to rotate staff through the office because members are reluctant to loose the FTO allowance they receive working on Response Group shift work. The claim of inexperience is not fully supported by Tables 6, 11 or 15.

Table 15						
RELATIVE EXPERIENCE LEVELS NON RESPONSE STAFF						
Service	Non Response	l Car Response	District	National.		
3 years & less	<mark>32%</mark>	<mark>61%</mark>	48%	<mark>27%</mark>		

- 155. Area Commanders and staff believe that the number of CIB officers in the Area CIB offices is sufficient to deal with the workload if they were not drawn away for serious crime operations. Full implementation of the Case Management model will assist in reducing workload and will also provide clarification of the levels of crimes categories to be addressed by CIB and GDB Enquiry office respectively.
- 156. The district believes that the staffing levels for the GDB Enquiry offices needs to be increased to adequately cope with workload and that view is supported.

4.11 Commitment to Major Investigations

- 157. The driver of much of the problems relating to crime investigation in the district is the high incidence of violent crime and the need to draw investigation staff from designated functions. Similar to the draw off of staff to response functions, this process is highly disruptive, soul destroying, tends to devalue designated functions and impacts adversely on accountability and the leadership of Area CIB offices. Unfortunately there is no management information data in relation to the extent and regularity of the draw off of Area CIB staff for these investigations. It is understood however to be substantial.
- 158. The district does not have a centralised unit to deal with serious crime. A major investigation arising in an Area is based in that Area and staffed by members drawn from the four Area CIB offices, including on occasions, staff from GDB Enquiry Offices.
- 159. On a number of occasions staff have been drawn from other districts to assist with serious crime investigations particularly where simultaneous investigations are operating. On nine occasions staff have been drawn from other districts to assist clear the backlog of files accumulated while staff have been involved for a prolonged period on serious crime investigations.
- 160. Management information systems do not record the extent of the external assistance provided either to major crime investigations or to the clearing the backlog of files following such investigations. Table 16, drawn from accommodation and travel costs, provides a very general indication of the extent of draw down from other districts for assistance in clearing the backlog files. It does not reflect assistance from the other Auckland metro districts where travel and accommodation costs would not apply.

Table 16				
EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE IN CLEARING FILE BACKLOGS				
Date	Number of staff	Operation name/project code		
2001/02	6	Clearance/502421		
2002/03	61	Cavalry/502581		
2003/04	Nil			
2004/05	8	Assist/504624		
2005/06	12	Roundup/504814		
2006/07 (a)	23	Assist/505440		
2006/07 (b)	6	Cat/554770		
2007/08 (a)	23	Assist Mar 08 /505743		
2007/08 (b)	70	Assist Jun 08 505820		
2008/09	116	Sustain/505864		

- 161. The duration of the above operations varied between 4 10 weeks and involved more than 325 'out of district' staff. Operation Sustain is estimated to have associated costs of over \$500,000 for travel, accommodation and rental cars and a Business Case has been submitted to PNHQ for financial assistance.
- 162. As an indication of the work volume addressed in these operations, Table 17 presents a summary of the results of Operation Sustain.

Table *		
OPERATION SUSTAIN RESULTS		
Total files resolved	459	
Number files resulting in prosecution/custody clearance/YAS action	187	
Number of files POI inactivated	50	
Number of files filed	8	
Number of files sent out of district	36	
Number of search warrants executed	5	
Number of adult arrests in total	96	
Number of summons issued	39	
Number of youth arrests/YAS referrals	11	
Number of warnings issued	78	
Number of voluntary DNA samples obtained	6	

- 163. The draw down of staff from other districts to assist in the clearance of file backlogs has several negative implications:
 - Financial burden.
 - 'Out of district' staff resent assisting with 'general' files knowing that files in their own districts are accumulating and they also return with leave and time off in lieu owing.
 - CMD staff resent working alongside 'out of district' officers who are receiving a substantial additional weekly allowance for carrying out the same work.
 - Difficulties associated with coordinating and preparing prosecution files, particularly files handled by 'out of district' members.
- 164. There may be benefit in applying some of the formal principles of project management to the management of major investigations.

165. Given that the driver of much of the investigatory problems in the district result from the draw down of staff to serious crime investigation it is imperative that a designated serious crime investigation unit be established. The provision of additional staff provides an opportunity to rectify this problem

4.12 Unassigned Files

- 166. The district practice is to establish a maximum number of files to be held per investigating member. Files above those allocated are retained by the office manager as "unassigned files".
- 167. The maximum number of files to be held by each member is not consistent across the Areas with one Area regarding 20 files as the appropriate maximum for an Enquiry office member and another Area setting 15 as the maximum. At the time of project team visit, staff in one Area Enquiry Office were holding an average of 8 files and had unassigned files recorded. These problems will be resolved by the Case Management Model.
- 168. Unassigned files is not an appropriate measure of workload. A more relevant measure would be the number of files actually filed with a live avenue of inquiry un-explored.
- 169. There is insufficient management information data on which to precisely quantify the number of additional staff required to appropriately resource the district investigation capability. This constraint will also be resolved with implementation of the Case Management model.

4.13 Alignment with Community Policing

- 170. All members regardless of their dedicated functions must embrace Community Policing (CP). Sections 6.2 and 7 outlined the CP philosophy and indicate the means of securing improved benefits from the philosophy.
- 171. Investigations must be viewed within the wider perspective of CP and community reassurance. Timely investigations and effective resolutions are substantive elements of community reassurance and investigators need to be constantly aware of their potential to reinforce reassurance. For example successful resolution of a major investigation presents wide media exposure and an ideal opportunity to reinforce the community reassurance message while releasing details of unassigned files has the opposite effect.
- 172. Of particular relevance to investigators is the need to engage in "whole of policing" response to identified community problems where composite teams are led and coordinated by the tasking and coordination model; refer 6.2.

5 AREA TACTICAL GROUPS

173. The Tactical Group capability of the district is delivered from Area policing as shown in Table 18

					Table 18	
ARI	EA TACTICAI	GROUPS -	STAFFING			
	Central	East	West	So	outh	
				PK	PU	
Senior Sergeant	1	1	1		1	
Intelligence Unit						
Manager	1	1	1		1	
Analysts	4	4	2	2	2	
Clerk	1	1	1	1		
Total Int. Unit	6	5	4	3.5	2.5	
Tactical Crime Unit						
Det. Sergeant	1	1	1		1	
Sergeant	1	1	1		1	
Detectives	3	3	3		3	
Constables	4	3	5		5	
File briefer					1	
Total TCU	9	8	10	1	11	
Youth Action Team						
Sergeants	0**	1	0	0	0	
Constables	0**	4	0	0	0	
Total YAT	0**	5	0	0	0	
Strategic Traffic Unit						
Sergeant	1	1*	1	1	1	
Constables	7	8*	9	5	6	
Total STU	8	9*	10	6	7	
Crime Scene Attend						
Police employee	4	4	4	0	0	
TOTAL TACTICAL	27	31	28		30	

*STU Attached to Youth & Community Services in East Area

**YAT attached to Youth and Community Services in Central Area Central has GDB Enquiry office attached to Tactical Support Group

5.1 Intelligence Units

174. The nature of the deployment of the current intelligence units is irrelevant because the National Intelligence Model is being implemented. Details of that model are presented in Section 11.

5.2 Youth Action Team (YAT)

175. These are proactive units specifically addressing youth issues. The nature of the deployment of the units and the tactics adopted are not consistent across Areas but the general design is that the fortnightly District Tasking and Coordination Meetings identify targets, offenders, and locations based on intelligence analysis. From this the Area Commanders set priorities for the following fortnight in relation to various crime types. The YAT provides tactical options for dealing with youth issues identified in this process. Where, for example, youth are involved in a priority crime category, say burglary, the unit researches the priority and delivers an operation.

- 176. Activities include not only taking youths off the street but may also link them to organisations including Work and Income, and the Solomon Trust (Youth Transition Service). On the other hand if the Area Commander decides the activities need to be more in the nature of a team policing type operation then that type of operation is mounted.
- 177. Some units have more recently been mandated to support disorder incidents, becoming team policing type unit for the Area.
- 178. Papakura does not have a Youth Action Team and that should be addressed during the allocation of additional staff.

5.3 Strategic Traffic Unit (STU)

179. Refer 'Road Policing' at 8.1.

5.4 Strategic Crime Unit

180. The units began life as ring fenced Law Enforcement Teams comprising 1 + 8 with a high ratio of CIB members. The units engage in proactive tactical operations using a range of tactical options to achieve their purpose, including for example night surveillance on burglary hot spots or offenders. In the past the unit members were file holders but they do not now hold files. The unit is frequently drawn off from their designated function to assist with serious crime operations.

5.5 Crime Scene Attendants (CSA)

181. Addressed together with SOCO in 'Investigations'; refer 4.9.

5.6 General Observations

- 182. Considerable variations exist across Areas in relation to the manner in which Tactical, Youth and Community units are deployed and the tactics engaged by those units. The variations can not all be best practice. There is a need to identify best practices and benchmark these across the four policing Areas.
- 183. This group like others would benefit considerably from the development of operational plans, particularly plans with identified and measurable outputs and process KPIs focussing in particular on the drivers of productivity.

6. YOUTH, MAORI, PACIFIC AND ETHNIC (MPES) AND COMMUNITY SERVICES

6.1 Youth, MPES and Community Services

Youth, MPES and, Community services are delivered in CMD as indicated in Table 19.

YOUTH AND COMMUNITY SERVICES – STAFFING											
	District	Central	East		West			South			
			OE	HI	ОН	PP	RY	PK	PU		
Senior Sergeant (Y&C)	1	1		1		1		1			
Sergeant (Y&C)		2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
Youth											
YFC Prosecutor Sgt	1										
Youth Services Sgt	1										
Youth Aid Sgt	1										
Youth Aid (Const)		7	5	2	5	3	4	4	2		
Youth Education		2	2	1	1	1	1	2	1		
Youth at Risk							3				
Youth Development			3								
Youth Projects		3									
Youth Action Team											
Sergeant		1									
Constable		4									
Total Youth	3	17	10	3	6	4	8	6	3		
Community											
Comm. Constables		4	3	5	2	2	3	4	9		
Comm. Relations Sgt	1										
Iwi Liaison	2										
Pacific Island Liaison	2										
Asian Liaison	1										
Indian Liaison	1										
Graffiti Coordinator	1										
Total Community	8	4	3	5	2	2	3	4	9		

184. With the exception of Ethnic Liaison Officers, services are coordinated at district level and delivered at Area Level. Staff at district level are responsible for monitoring, auditing, co-ordination, training, reviewing and leadership in relation to project partnering, at risk families, responsiveness to Maori, responsiveness to Pacific Peoples and Community Policing.

185. Comments in relation to Youth, MPES and Community Services are to be read in conjunction with Section 7, "Community Policing and Community Reassurance".

6.2 Community Constables

186. Community Constables provide an ability to listen to the community's crime and safety concerns as well as the opportunity to proactive problem solve to address these concerns. However they must be part of the whole policing response to an identified community issue and not seen as the only response.

Table 19

- 187. Community Constables in CMD generally should have a problem profile to address, which should be linked with the tasking and coordination process. This is not always the case. Some are operating under the old model of a sole Community Constable who is accessible and familiar but not part of the more modern "whole of policing" style outlined below.
- 188. The approach adopted in the Areas differs and this is to be expected because it depends on the differing communities and how they determine the manner in which they will engage with the police. The social cohesion and dynamics of each community may be different.
- 189. West Area for example is involved in a Community Engagement Leaders meeting bi monthly. At this meeting, community safety priorities for the area are debated and action points agreed. Action points are passed to the Area pro active groups to act on and the Area Commander reports back to the next meeting. In this way the Area Commander is accountable to the community leader's forum. The model however is not necessarily able to be replicated readily in another community for the above reasons.
- 190. Potential increase in the impact of Community Constables will be created through the tasking and coordination process of the Intelligence Model, with Community Constables tasked in the same manner as tactical units. In an effective and productive Community Policing Model evidence of the following features should be expected:
 - Strategic engagement for crime, crash and reassurance activities reflected in formal and informal partnerships.
 - Tactical engagements in problem solving partnerships across crime, crash and reassurance activities.
 - Engagement with vulnerable and ethnic communities as part of this mechanism.
 - Mechanisms to capture community concerns (Community Intel) as part of the Intel tactical assessment process.
 - An Intel informed Tasking and Coordination Model tasking a range of responses (including Community Constables and community policing teams) as part of an overall model.
 - "Whole of policing" responses to tasked problems, with the problems being owned by Area Commanders.
 - Assessment of the outcome of activities being fed back into Intel to assist advising further taskings.
- 191. There is value in deploying Community Policing Teams under a Youth and Communities Sergeant and for example comprising two members from Youth Sections, three Community Constables and an Ethnic Liaison officer to problem solve an identified geographic or community of interest problem in a mini "whole of policing" approach.
- 192. Members involved in reactive Policing do not always see Community Policing and Community Constables as "real policing". The role needs to be raised to main stream policing level. Four potential means of achieving this are:
 - Stronger linkage to the Tasking and Coordination Model and "whole of policing" responses.

- Raising the position of Manager: Youth and Community to the district leadership group to present a higher profile and a stronger voice in strategy development for the district; refer 14.6.
- Changing the mindset of members engaged in the delivery of reactive policing services; refer 14.2.
- Presenting the functions of Youth, MPES and Community Services in a more tangible form with operational plans and identified outputs and KPIs for those plans.
- 193. Familiarity between Community Constables and their Communities is critical but long term tenure in a position is constrained by two factors in particular:
 - Remuneration. Most officers experience a significant drop in take home pay without shift and other allowances. The economic issue results in staff turnover.
 - Absence of a career plan for staff in Community Policing and limited opportunities for progression. Because of the remuneration issue, recruitment for Community Policing positions takes longer with many vacancies constantly being advertised.
- 194. Community Constables are frequently drawn off from their duties to attend other functions. This not only reduces their effectiveness in the dedicated functions but also tends to further under-value the role.
- 195. There would be considerable potential benefits in placing members direct from Police College to Youth or Community Services to work with Youth and Community Constables for a period before being placed in reactive services. The provision of additional staff will provide the opportunity to do this. The initiative may have implications for early training modules but new members would enhance their skills in proactive policing and gain an understanding of the role and importance of community policing. Currently the police recruiting campaign is based around the exciting reactive policing activities. Direct placement in reactive policing units immediately provides further reinforcement of those functions as "real policing".

6.3 Ethnic Liaison Officers

196. The services of Ethnic Liaison Officers are a district capability and comprise lwi Liaison Officers, Pacific Liaison Officers and two Asian Liaison Officers, one of whom is Chinese and the other Indian.

(a) Iwi Liaison Officer (ILO - Kaitakawaenga and Pouwhakataki)

- 197. There are two ILO's within the CM. One is a managerial/advisory role (Pouwhakataki)
- 198. The roles include:
 - Identifying key Iwi/Hapu personnel, their areas and relationships,
 - Providing a bridge between the Police and the Maori people,
 - Helping create an environment where Maori and Police can discuss issues affecting both parties, and where Maori can have an input into policy and planning.
 - Developing Maori Advisory Groups and Area Support Groups
 - Developing initiatives and projects
- 199. Pouwhakataki manages the District Maori Liaison Committee (SG1). This group comprises local Tainui kaumatua, Tau Iwi members, Te Puni Kokiri Regional Manager, Maori Educationalist and Police. The Committee meets bi-monthly and assists the

District Commander in setting strategies involving Maori. The role also includes management of the "Last Chance Card Project" in the District. This project was initiated in the Counties Manukau Police District in 2004 due to the large numbers of young people receiving Infringement Notices for Driver Licence offences and Restraint offences involving children.

200. The Iwi Liaison Officer works with the Maori Wardens, Te Puni Kokiri and Manukau City Council on the Maori Wardens Project and Project WalkThrough.

(b) Pacific Liaison Officer (PLO)

- 201. The focus of the role is on Pacific peoples responsiveness; responsiveness to at risk families, responsiveness to young people, road policing (child restraint) and recruiting "Pacific Style".
- 202. CMD, has the largest population of Pacific Islanders in New Zealand with 98,000 recorded in the 2006 census.
- 203. There is one PLO and one Pacific Coordinator appointed to the Liaison roles.

(c) Asian Liaison Officers (ALO)

204. The role includes:

- Undertaking specific police and community projects with a particular focus on Asian communities including Asian Council on Reducing Crime, Asian Safety Expo, Asian seat belt enforcement, Safety seminars, Asian Senior citizen crime prevention and neighbourhood support.
- Providing advice, support and training to all staff regarding Asian customs and protocol.
- Maintaining a database of all relevant community leaders, groups and organizations that can assist police in responding to issues affecting Asian people.
- Developing strategies and initiatives with Areas to reduce rates of Asian crime and crashes.
- Assisting Areas with Consultative Committee networks/meetings including Eastern Area Asian Advisory Group, western Area Asian Advisory Group, District level Asian Advisory Group.

(d) Additional Ethnic Liaison Officers

- 205. The Ethnic Liaison team are driven by the need to service their cultural communities. This group is passionate about making policing effective for their people.
- 206. The risk to this group of individuals is burnout. District and Area expectations are that the officers are available 24/7, whether for assistance with translation or to attend incidents where cultural understanding and knowledge are important.
- 207. The real grass root partnerships with Maori, Pacific Island, Asian and Indian communities are developing through the Pouwhakataki, Pacific Co-ordinator and Liaison Officers, however these are limited by the level of resourcing. It is these relationships that were publicly acknowledged at the Community meetings as adding value to the community.

208. It is recommended that additional Ethnic Liaison Officers be appointed to each of the four Areas. The ethnicity of these additional officers should be based on the ethnic proportions in the particular Area.

6.4 Graffiti Co-ordinator

- 209. This role was created in 2007 under a Community Policing GNI due to the high level of graffiti vandalism in CMD. The position is one of coordination and liaising with all parties concerned with this type of offending.
- 210. The role also involves intelligence gathering, problem solving, devising new initiatives and enforcement. There is potential for the role to extend into a more operational function.

6.5 Youth Aid Services (YAS)

- 211. Youth Aid staff in CMD are primarily a "pseudo" youth prosecutions service. Youth offending files are received from operational staff or via the Youth and Family Court Sergeant after children or young persons are arrested and then either bailed or kept in Police or CYF custody.
- 212. CMD meets national standards with 72-80 % of child and youth offenders dealt with through alternative action by Youth Aid. This action is tariff based dependent upon factors such as the level of offending, type of offending and public interest.
- 213. The district has 24 Youth Aid positions. The position description has proactive elements which include Blue Light Ventures and specific problem solving and intelligence gathering functions. There is no national formula for Youth Aid distribution and consequently new positions have been based upon file loads in each Area.
- 214. The workload of YAS will be significantly impacted by the activities of the additional members allocated to CMD. The units will require additional staffing to cope with the increased workload; refer section 10.

6.6 Youth Education Services (YES)

- 215. There is a National strategy for delivering crime and road crash prevention programmes to schools and school communities. It seeks to promote individual safety with school students and school communities, and is designed to reduce the levels to which these groups become either the perpetrators or victims of road crashes, crime and anti social behaviour.
- 216. The Youth Education Programmes services are delivered by Police Education Officers (PEO's) in accordance with national guidelines. Teachers and Police Education Officers co-operate to develop and teach in an agreed partnership.
- 217. There is a perception in the district that this service is under staffed.
- 218. Staff are located in each Area with reporting lines to Area Commanders while District Office has responsibility for coordinating staff and reporting on results.
- 219. It is notable that not all primary schools in the district have readily accepted YES, with 45 schools not encouraging police visits or did not respond favourably to offers of visits. It is of special concern that 20 of these were in high crime areas of Mangere, Clenden, Manurewa and Otara.

6.7 Cops in Schools (CIS)

- 220. The Cops in Schools initiative has evolved from a historic role where successful outcomes were achieved by the deployment of Police Officer at secondary schools. The original project involved only two secondary schools in CMD.
- 221. This has now been expanded to 10 schools with five participating Police staff. These members are Community Constables assigned as part of the community policing GNIs. The designation is based on the notion of the school being the community of interest so the function extends beyond youth to all matters concerning the school community. PNHQ are in the process of developing policy and guidelines in relation to best practice and terms of "engagement".
- 222. The current ' pilot sites ' have been requesting additional time to be allocated to their schools.
- 223. The CIS scheme is due to be ' evaluated ' by the CMD Strategic Advisor in 2009. There are 26 secondary schools within CMD with 30,000 students. Two additional schools have opened this year and given this growth the district anticipates that there will be requests from school communities for the services of more CIS staff. Anecdotally CIS has been highly successful and dependant on the result of the formal review consideration could be given to increasing this resource. This would provide management with the ability to deploy to priority needs.

6.8 Observations

- 224. A Pacific Island Focus Group strongly made the point that there are too few opportunities for encouragement, support or positive interactions with the Police and as a result, many children and youth have a negative attitude towards the Police.
- 225. The majority of interactions experienced by children and youth with CMD Police are negative. The interactions are seen as generally involving street confrontations with police units or investigation and arrest of members of their extended family.
- 226. They are seeking opportunities for the children and youth in their community to experience positive interactions with the Police to help break down the barriers and fear of the Police.
- 227. The Blue Light initiative is viewed positively within the community as a successful interaction youth experience with the Police; however this is diminishing as fewer officers elect to be part of this programme. Members are engaged in the project on a volunteer basis. There may be benefit in including this type of function within the role of police members, including members not dedicated to community policing or youth roles. It should be noted that the Blue Light initiative is not the only useful initiative of this type.

6.9 Alignment of Partnership Programs and Initiatives

- 228. The district is engaged in a very high number of partnership programs and initiatives. At district level alone, 106 such programs and initiatives are listed. It is noted however that most of the 106 do not record minutes of meetings and develop formal action points. This issue aside the district has a range of impressive initiatives. To gain a useful understanding of the effectiveness of these initiatives would require a review specifically addressing that issue alone.
- 229. There are no district operating plans coordinating the delivery of Youth, Community and MPES services and accordingly it is difficult to assess the alignment of the programs and initiatives other than in a review focused solely on Youth, Community

Services and MPES. The absence of defined outputs for the units renders it very difficult to determine the effectiveness of the units and leads to frequent reviews. At the time of this project, Youth, MPES and Community Services were being reviewed by two other internal reviews, one by the district and one by the Organisational Assurance Group. The latter review is due for completion soon and will provide further insight into the alignment and effectiveness of Community Policing and the implementation of the GNIs.

- 230. Staff are very committed and are undoubtedly delivering effective services but due to the absence of measurement criteria are constantly having their performance questioned and/or reviewed.
- 231. The delivery of Youth, MPES and Community services in the district is not consistent. The number of staff deployed and the focus of the units varies between Areas. While there needs to be some flexibility due to the varying nature of the different communities there is potential to benefit from identifying best practice for the delivery of these services. This is being carried out at a national level through evaluations and case studies.
- 232. The "whole of policing" approach outlined in 6.2 will assist with the alignment of programs and functions.

7. COMMUNITY POLICING & COMMUNITY REASSURANCE

7.1 Community Policing (CP)

- 233. CP is the philosophy or style of the NZ Police. It is designed to engage with and identify community related crime and safety problems, as well as ensuring participation and partnerships. It is a philosophy in that it suggests a community centred, proactive mindset by all staff; refer 14.2. It embraces community engagement, intelligence and research, external partnerships, community problem solving, reassurance policing, organisational capability building and internal alignment.
- 234. The following principles identify important elements of successful CP that guide the New Zealand community policing philosophy and approach:
 - Communities are the focus of the NZ policing approach.
 - CP reduces crime and road trauma, improves safety and reassures the community.
 - Police are visible, accessible and familiar with their community.
 - Police listen to their community, jointly prioritise their concerns and keep them informed.
 - Police provide opportunities for community participation.
 - Problems are identified and responded to on a local level with area, district and national support when required.
 - Police engage other government, non government and community groups in problem solving partnerships.
 - Flexibility with accountability for achieving local community outcomes is emphasised.
 - CP requires an integrated intelligence led approach.
 - CP is the responsibility of all police staff irrespective of role or rank.
- 235. The 'refreshed approach' to CP sets broad guidelines and encourages innovation at a local level within those guidelines. A community may be based on a geographic area or a community of interest, that is, a group who have something in common for example ethnic or religious.
- 236. The concept of CP requires a community centred mindset by all police staff but particularly by supervisors and managers. It requires leadership at all levels of the district, with special responsibility resting with first line managers, officers in charge of stations and Area Commanders. Attitudes towards CP are heavily influenced by the leadership of individual stations and units in particular; refer 14.2.
- 237. The following features have potential to improve the impact of CP in CMD:
 - Appointment of a District Manager of Youth, MPES and Community to the District Leadership Team.
 - Ensure Community policing is part of the tasking and coordination process, to ensure that community concerns are identified and brought to the table together with the tasking of community staff.
 - Ensure teams of Youth, MPES and Community staff all report to one supervisor, have clear roles and are held accountable for the performance of those roles.

- Promote community policing across the district to ensure everyone appreciates their role in community policing, and also understand the functions and objectives of the dedicated community policing staff.
- 238. One of the key focus areas of community policing is reassurance. It was notable that in the detailed briefing papers supplied by each of the four Areas, Community Policing had a one sentence reference in one report. The term "Reassurance Policing" was used more often in reports and interviews. While "Reassurance Policing" does not encapsulate all of community policing, it is good that the style has been recognised.

7.2 Community Reassurance

- 239. The Strategic Plan lists "Community Reassurance" as a strategic goal together with the outcome of "Confident, safe and secure communities". Key themes are providing opportunities for participation, setting local priorities, working in partnership and providing protection.
- 240. Reassurance, in the context of Police work, has been defined as the extent to which individuals perceive that order and security exist within their local environment. This perception of order and security does not result from one component of policing but from a full range of elements delivered in a strategic, coherent and integrated package. In addition to the themes listed in the Strategic Plan, elements of the package include in particular:
 - Proactive policing strategies, with both longer term and shorter term horizons, designed to reduce crime, disorder and road trauma.
 - Prompt effective response to calls for service and successful resolution of cases.
 - Accessibility, including the ease with which the public can obtain appropriate police information, access services or make contact with police staff; refer 7.3.
 - Visibility including the level, profile and impact of police resources deployed within communities; refer 7.4.
 - Familiarity or the extent to which police members both know and are known by the local community.
 - Problem solving with the public having confidence that, should a problem arise, they will have ready access to the appropriate information and services and that these will be delivered by staff who take ownership of the problem.
 - Partnership involvements by ensuring that other sectors which can contribute to feelings of public safety do so in a way which is properly co-ordinated with police activity.
- 241. It is important that all CMD staff appreciate the integrated role of all of these elements in generating order and security in the district and the overall strategy for achieving these. Reassurance and public confidence need to be integrated into the districts mainstream operational strategies. Reassurance has to be seen by members as a legitimate objective. Refer 14.2 in relation to the need for staff to develop a sense of strategy

7.3 Accessibility

242. It is accepted that the Police cannot be everywhere but community concern centres on how easily the police can be contacted and then how promptly and efficiently they respond when they are required. Initiatives in The National Access and

Communications Strategy, to be implemented in CMD are designed specifically to address these concerns; refer Section 13.

243. In support of the national Access and Communications Strategy, ownership of accessibility needs to be taken at CMD district level. An ethos of service to 'customers' needs to be instilled at all levels of district staffing.

7.4 Visibility

- 244. A visible police presence is a significant contributor to a feeling that order and security prevails. CMD is currently in the process of developing a Visibility Strategy. Elements under consideration will include:
 - Maximising the visible impact of police resources.
 - Making uniform the default apparel unless circumstances dictate otherwise.
 - Making support staff more recognisable as police personnel.
 - Ensuring that the maximum number of vehicles is liveried.
 - Plain-clothed staff wearing some form of identification when performing duties in public unless good operational reasons apply.
 - Reducing abstractions.
 - Increasing the visibility of partnerships.
 - Deploying response officers singly rather than in pairs.
- 245. Visibility must be kept in perspective. It is one strand of an integrated package, hence the need for operational strategies to be integrated and aligned. Care must be taken to ensure that visibility strategies are not counter productive in terms of reducing the effectiveness or goodwill of those members involved in delivering other elements of the package. For example the deployment of road policing units in high visibility areas rather than at road policing hot spots would be counter productive and contrary to NZ Police Strategy. There is also the risk that the gap between expectations and delivery will be exposed where recognisable and visible support staff are unable to deliver a professional response to approaches from the public.

7.5 Intelligence

- 246. Intelligence will have a critical role both in receiving and dispensing information.
 - To maximise the potential of increased visibility, staff will be deployed based on intelligence to known hot spots, vulnerable localities and to areas of high public presence and;
 - Increased visibility, accessibility and familiarity will result in an enhanced inward flow of information from the public which will be relayed to the Intelligence units.

Refer also 6.2

7.6 Media

- 247. Perceptions of police performance are hugely impacted by the media. People gain most of their information about crime and community safety from the media. Both the public and the community have an apparently insatiable appetite for stories of crime and police activities. This is however a double edged sword for the district. It presents opportunities to convey messages and seek assistance but adverse stories make good copy and CMD suffers more in this regard than most districts.
- 248. The district needs to maximise the opportunities to promote public reassurance through proactive identification and provision of appropriate material to the media.

There is potential to develop a distinctive reassurance policing "brand" which is easily recognised by the public and is reinforced by delivering a consistent message in support of the "brand" through a structured media strategy.

- 249. The challenge is to exploit the high level of public/media interest in order to communicate the district priorities and achievements and keep local communities informed. This is not simply a case of putting a professional spin on stories but is the proactive use of media channels to promote a positive image and enhance public reassurance.
- 250. CM developed a District Communications Strategy in 2007 and this is currently being updated. The district has experienced some success with the smaller local newspapers but has been less successful with the larger media outlets.

7.7 Mobile Police Station (MPS)

- 251. The MPS comprises a large vehicle that is able to perform most of the functions of a static police base. The mobile base includes a public counter, bailing facility, interview room(s) and an operations room. Designed in police colours and suitable signage the vehicle is deployed in a manner to ensure it is highly visible. The base is normally deployed together with two cars. The Unit commenced operations in February 2008 and is staffed by one Senior Sergeant, one Sergeant and 10 Constables. The initiative is due for formal 12 month review.
- 252. MPS members are deployed as community problem solving teams. The teams operate to a problem solving methodology within a focused deployment model under the control of the District Deployment Manager. The initiative provides the Deployment Manager with increased real time flexibility options in terms of size and speed of response to emerging issues. Foot patrols are deployed from the base.
- 253. The vehicle is deployed to hot spots identified by the Intelligence Section. The effectiveness of this deployment is expected to improve with the roll out of the National Intelligence Model.
- 254. Hot spots may include an area in which vehicle offenders are operating, areas of disorder, liquor related offending or youths congregating. The unit is deployed in those areas not only as a preventive measure but also to gather information for the purpose of problem solving those issues. The base is also deployed at serious crime scenes, establishing an 'on the spot' police station at the scene. It is also deployed at major events.
- 255. The initiative is aimed at reducing demand, enhancing confidence in the police and improving accessibility and service delivery by taking policing into the community. It is designed to enhance 5 of the 8 primary police interventions including community policing, civic disorder policing, reassurance policing, problem oriented policing and intelligence led policing.
- 256. Anecdotally the base has been very successful. If the formal evaluation supports this view then it would be beneficial to increase daily hours of coverage with additional resources.

7.8 Extending High Visibility, Problem Solving Capacity

257. Community Reassurance is based on elements of problem solving, visibility, accessibility, familiarity and partnerships and is Intelligence led; refer 7.2 and 7.5. Units capable of providing these elements in varying degrees can conveniently be considered as:

- Beat Constables
- Community Policing Teams Youth and Community Services
- Problem Solving Teams Tactical Group
- Mobile Police Station District based

(a) Beat Constables – based in 'local' Police Stations

- 258. CM district does not routinely deploy dedicated beat constables.
- 259. Beat constables deployed from a local police station meet the criteria of providing visibility and accessibility. In working a regular beat they can become familiar with, and familiar to, the local community. The constables are generally deployed in areas of higher public concentration such as shopping centres.
- 260. The Constables however tend to lack deployment flexibility in terms of meeting the changing concerns of the community. It could be argued that visibility requirements change as community concerns change. For example at a time when community concern is focused on a spate of house burglaries, the high visibility of a beat constable in a shopping complex during the day may do little to create reassurance.
- 261. It may be that beat constables do not significantly improve meaningful community communications, create partnerships, involve communities in solving local problems or develop ownership of community problems.

(b) Community Policing Teams – based in Youth and Community Services

262. Teams focused on identified problems in geographical community areas or communities of interest, such as an iwi, a school, or a church and reporting to a common supervisor who is able to coordinate similar work; refer 6.2. The teams are linked with intel to provide community intelligence to complete tactical assessments and meet the criteria for community assurance. Measurable outputs would be required. Extension of this capability may require one Sergeant and five Constables to each Area and would utilise the additional MPES officers recommended for each Area. The option is consistent with Area accountability.

(c) Problem Solving Teams – based in Tactical Support

263. These teams are seen as different in that they focus on problem types rather than on geographic or communities of interest. The proactive teams are intelligence driven and tasked as part of the tactical tasking and coordination process and work along side community constables, iwi liaison officers etc to provide support for operations to address their communities issues. Canterbury for example deploys such a unit addressing alcohol as a problem type. The unit may periodically undergo a name change as the problem type addressed changes. It may for example be known for a period as the CMD Alcohol Team. One member of the team may be assigned a geographic sub area within the targeted problem type and be responsible for developing relevant relationships within that sub area. Measurable outputs would be required. Staffing requirements would be similar to "b" and the option meets Area accountability requirements.

(d) Mobile Police Station – District based.

264. CMD management has expressed interest in extending the MPS to provide it with the capacity to operate 24/7. The initiative is operating very well and needs some extension, however this raises two issues:

- Extending the capability to 24/7 may in effect provide the unit with excess capacity. While Intelligence may present the requirement to operate night shifts this may be able to be accomplished by adjusting day shifts.
- Significant extension of this district based unit is not consistent with the decentralise model or with Area Commander accountability. The centralisation of Road Policing is resisted on the basis that it reduces Area Commander accountability for that function and this rationale needs to be applied consistently.
- 265. The MPS may be extended at least to the extent that two shifts can be presented daily and one of the Area based teams as indicated in "b" or "c" above implemented in each Area.
- 266. Team Policing has the potential to provide two days during the week operating as an additional visibility and community reassurance capability; refer 8.3. The unit could be utilised (a) as Beat Constables in shopping centres with an identified problem as another problem solving resource directed by the tasking and coordinator process or (b) linked with the MPS or (c) rotated through the Community Policing Teams and/or the Problem Solving Teams. This would present the additional advantage of broadening the views of the unit members.

8. DISTRICT OPERATIONS

8.1 Road Policing

- 267. Road policing services in the district are delivered in a centralised/decentralised model. The centralised component, indicated in Table 20, comprise Highway staff, Illegal Street Racing Supervisors, Serious Crash investigators, Speed camera Car operators and a training Sergeant.
- 268. The decentralised component is designated as a Strategic Traffic Unit (STU), generally attached to the Strategic policing group in each Area, with numbers indicated in the table below. A further road policing resource available to the district is the Community Response Unit (CRU); an Auckland Metro traffic response unit consisting of a Sergeant and three Constables based at the Harbour Bridge. The unit rotates, for two month periods, through the three Auckland districts

CMD ROAD POLICING DEPLOYMENT											
	District	Central	East	West	South						
Inspector	1				PK	PU					
S/S Traffic Support	1										
Training Sergeant	1										
Serious Crash Team	1+5										
State Highway Patrol	1+9										
Sniper Cood. Sgts *	2										
Strategic Traffic Unit			1 + 8								
(Within Comm. Services)											
Strategic Traffic Unit		1 + 7		1 + 9	1+5	1+ 6					
(Within Tactical Group)											
TOTALS	21	8	9	10	6	7					

- 269. Response staff are the first in attendance at a serious crash and remain until arrival of the centralised Serious Crash Unit who carryout the forensic work. The workload of the serious crash unit is such that files are frequently sent to Area staff for follow-up inquiries. There are then issues relating to the quality of completed work. To allow the Serious Crash Unit to be fully accountable for serious crashes investigation the Unit should be sufficiently resourced to complete the process without follow-up inquiries being completed by Area staff.
- 270. 'Sniper' is an ongoing operation relating to illegal street racers. Each Area supplies two Constables to this operation each Friday and Saturday evening while Central Road Policing Group supply the Sergeant. CMD is the only district in the region that routinely mounts operations against illegal street racers and on occasions follow them into neighbouring districts.
- 271. Areas rotate staff through the STU after members have received four weeks training. This is not regarded as a good return on training investment. The rotation policy is losing the benefit of training and experience. There is a local belief that better results are achieved by members who are keen to be working in the unit rather than by those members who do not want to be on engaged in the unit.
- 272. Mobile offenders do not respect Area boundaries and a more strategic approach is needed to provide solutions to sustainable trauma reduction. The "patch policing" model defines the delivery framework for road policing in the District. Performance

Table 20

suggests that deployment of resources and delivery of outputs is localised with the strategic consideration of District and Metro issues being of lesser concern. The capability to deal strategically with high level road policing issues is constrained. The District Road Policing Manager has no authority to command or control the District's road policing resources, resulting in reduced coordination of strategic assets.

- 273. The stated purpose of the Counties Manukau District Road Policing Manager is to provide and ensure a District wide high quality traffic safety capability and manage the Strategic Traffic units so that services are delivered within a quality customer service framework. The purpose of the District Road Policing Senior Sergeant is to manage "the operational and administrative functions of a combined Strategic traffic unit and Highway Patrol as assigned, to improve the safe use of roads by the delivery of dedicated services relating to alcohol, speed, restraints and general road policing activities as allocated.
- 274. With reference to Tables 1 and 2. Fatal accidents are 50% higher than target. In relation to drink/drive, surveys show CMD has four times the national average of drivers driving while over the legal limit but in the past 12 months District staff issued infringements for this offence at a rate of 64 per 10,000 population compared to the national average of 88. This represents 73% of the national average.
- 275. Surveys reveal that 80% of cars in CMD exceed the 50 km/hr speed limits compared to 64% nationally and that 54% exceed the 100 km/hr limit compared to the national average at 30%. Despite this significantly higher offending rate, infringement notices in CMD were issued at a rate of 468 per 10,000 population compared to a national rate of 789. This represents 59% of the national rate.
- 276. CMD restraint use rates are similar to the national average but the CMD issue infringement notices for this offence at a rate at 124 per 10,000 population compared with a national rate of 178. This represents 70% of the national rate.
- 277. The Accident Compensation Commission advises that Counties Manukau District represents their highest risk location for road trauma and subsequent compensation.
- 278. The District is required under its Service Agreement to deliver District and National operations targeting speed, seatbelts and drink drive. To achieve these targets or to run a seat belt campaign or to deliver trauma reduction hours the District Road Policing Manager has to work through the Area Commanders. However there is no guarantee that STUs will be available for duty when strategically significant operations are planned. On occasions STU members are required by the Areas to carry out other policing functions. STU staff feel they are driven by both central and Area management
- 279. Accountabilities are blurred. With the splintered control of STU and all deployment decisions at the discretion of the four Area Commanders, a significant challenge exists for Road Policing. District Road Policing Management should be inclusive, in line with their position requirements instead of excluded as is currently the case.
- 280. It is recommended at 14.7 that in consideration for the additional 300 staff the District Commander will enter into a service level agreement with the Deputy Commissioner to match or exceed national averages on key performance indicators by 31 December 2011. These will include in particular a significant lift in performance in relation to fatal accidents, serious crashes (status 1 and 2), and the "fatal five" indicated in Table 2.
- 281. This brings into focus the need for the CMD District Commander to be confident that he can achieve these improvements utilising the current road policing deployment model. Two options are presented for consideration.

- 282. One option is to retain the current hybrid centralised/decentralised model, with improved management processes as indicated in section 14 below. The model would require definition of strategic deployments from the Road Policing Manager; with delivery and achievement of clearly defined and measurable outcomes resting with the Area Commanders and performance reviewed by the Road Policing Manager and the District Commander. Some blurring of accountabilities would still be present.
- 283. An alternative option is to centralise the road policing resources under the District Road Policing Manager who would then be clearly accountable for road policing outcomes. This model also takes cognisance of the fact that highly mobile offenders are not constrained to Area boundaries.
- 284. The District Commander is accountable for matching or bettering national averages by 31 December 2011. This represents a major improvement in road policing performance. The Commander needs to decide which management model provides him with the greatest confidence of achieving the targets.

8.2 Airport Police

- 285. Policing at Auckland Airport delivers a range of services related to CAA Regulations, Customs, Immigration, MAF, MOJ enforcements, VIP travel, law and order and visibility. 2,000 prisoner movements are also required to be carried out. Two public counters are manned 24/7. Airport police have 32 FTE staff members, including five shifts with a Sergeant and four Constables.
- 286. Businesses at the Airport operate on a 24/7 basis with domestic flights operating between 0600 hours and 2300 hours and international flights operating 24/7.
- 287. In accordance with CAA regulations and mandated in the National Aviation Security Programme, two armed police officers must be able to attend at any security screening point incident within 2 minutes of being notified and other security incidents within 5 minutes. These sites are at both the international and the domestic airports. The 9 current screening points will be increased to 11 in 2011.
- 288. Airport police require five additional Constables to ensure the national security requirements are met. The staff will also present higher visibility to over 12 million passengers who currently pass through Auckland Airport.
- 289. During the period of CM Project 300 Airport Police was placed under the control of the Area Commander West.

8.3 Team Policing Unit

- 290. CMD has one Team Policing unit comprising one Sergeant and eight Constables. Auckland City district has 3 units, but bars in that district are open 24/7. Waitemata has 2 units.
- 291. The CMD unit operates as a team and is designed to deliver a strong visible police presence at hot spots identified by the Intelligence unit. Areas submit bids for the services of the unit. CMD is experiencing difficulty drawing applications for engagement in the Unit and the unit is consequently often under strength.
- 292. The team currently works a four day week roster. It is believed that the optimum use of this unit would be to deploy to a five day week roster and adopt core business hours of Thursday, Friday and Saturday evenings with day time deployment on

Tuesdays and Wednesdays as Beat Constables in shopping centres with an identified problem or linked with the MPS or rotated through the Problem Solving Teams; refer paragraph 266 for details.

293. No increase in resourcing is recommended.


9 MAJOR DISTRICT ISSUES

9.1 Organised Crime, Gangs and Drugs

- 294. The district unit addressing these issues is currently staffed by one Detective Sergeant, five Detectives and one operational analyst.
- 295. AMCOS, based in Counties Manukau but servicing the Auckland region, also deploy a Drugs and Organised Crime Squads with six teams. These units undertake investigations relating to what is described as the upper echelon of drug and organised crime offending. This type of offending is described as being normally beyond the reach and capability of Auckland Metropolitan district policing. The focus of the AMCOS units is upon high level drug offending at national, trans-national and international levels. The units do not generally have a district level focus due to priorities but at times have been involved in a number of operations where support has been provided to district investigations.
- 296. AMCOS also deploys an Asian Crime Unit and a Motorcycle Gang Unit among the groups criminal Intelligence Sections. The objectives of these units include supporting Auckland metropolitan districts in disrupting and prosecuting gang members primarily in intelligence gathering.
- 297. AMCOS is experiencing increasing pressure to provide covert support including technical support, surveillance and other specialist functions. Demand is already significant and their ability to provide support to crimes such as rape, robbery and serious assaults is decreasing. Ability to supply services to volume crime has virtually terminated. More of the 'lower level' operations are being serviced by district capability but controlled deliveries need both surveillance and TSU expertise.
- 298. District staff suggest that the sharing of information between the district and AMCOS drugs and organised crime units in less than desirable. District units consider there would be considerable benefit in a stronger exchange of information between the groups. AMCOS on the other hand advance strong argument to the contrary and believe that information sharing is satisfactory.
- 299. The Project Team does not recommended that the current structure be changed. The introduction of the national Intelligence model to the district will resolve problems related to the sharing of information. There may be issues around the need for AMCOS units to lower the threshold of operations in relation to drugs and organised crime in particular and provide greater assistance to the district.
- 300. The district Organised Crime Unit should address organised crime, drugs and gangs and the title should perhaps reflect the wider role. The project team believes that the strength of this unit is critical to the policing of the district. Additional staffing will be required.
- 301. A knowledge profile prepared by CMD Intelligence Section has found clear evidence that drugs and drug use have a significant impact on crime within the district. Violent crime, gangs and organised crime are assessed to be heavily interlinked with drugs and youth crime. Outlaw motorcycle and ethnic gangs are responsible for supplying the drug market with the product. Youths are solicited by the gangs to sell the drugs. A substantial proportion of volume crimes are committed to acquire drugs. A proportion of violent offenders are drug users. Other violent crime is associated with 'enforcement issues' around organised crime and gang enterprises.
- 302. The unit is currently not sufficiently resourced (0.8% of district resources) to have a significant impact on these major problem causes. Strong viable targets are

consistently identified and not followed through due to the lack of resources in the unit. Motorcycle and ethnic gangs are receiving minimal attention from district resources.

- 303. It is not productive to continue to focus on crime and disorder problems with reactive and with crime prevention type activities rather than focus on the problem cause. The simplified flow indicated in Figure 3 below suggests that the level of commitment to these causal factors is less than desirable.
- 304. The district has a disproportionately high percentage of Youth, Maori and Pacific Island people. The current environment has the capacity to attract people who are highly susceptible to the adverse influences of drugs, alcohol, gangs and organised crime. A moderate level of resources is applied to reducing the susceptibility of youth but much of it with indefinite results.



- 305. Anti-social behaviour in the CMD scenario is a factor of (a) the susceptibility to organised crime, gangs, drugs and alcohol and (b) availability of these elements. Despite this, the resources dedicated to reducing "b" is very low, particularly when compared to the resources dedicated to reactive activities.
 - 306. An intense campaign directed at combating, reducing and disrupting organised crime, gangs, drugs and alcohol has significant potential to impact on reducing demand for reactive services. The strategy needs more resources together with a documented plan and measurable outputs.
 - 307. There is reference in The National Business Plan 2009/10 theme relating to Organised Crime (including Gangs and Drugs).

Figure 3

9.2 Alcohol Abuse

- 308. Anecdotally, alcohol features in a majority of P1 incidents attended by CMD staff. However ALCOLINK data shows that an offender has consumed alcohol in 23.9% of all offences, 52.2% of all traffic offences and 22.4% of all incidents attended by CMD Police.
- 309. It is assessed that these percentages do not accurately reflect the relationship between alcohol misuse and demand on Police. Fiscal year 2007/2008 statistics show that alcohol consumption on the part of the offender is recorded as "unknown" in 35.3%, 10.2% and 36.7% of all offences, all traffic offences and all incidents respectively.
- 310. Road policing surveys of the percentage of drivers driving while over the legal limit provide an informative comparison, with the CMD rates 4 times higher than the national average.
- 311. The district currently has 750 premises licensed to serve and/or sell alcohol. It has a number of commercial business areas and satellite shopping facilities which contain "clusters" of licensed premises, including 'off license' premises, with up to 10 premises within 500 metres of each other. There is significant concern in the community that the number of premises is disproportionate to demand. This concern is elevated in Manurewa and Mangere. It is noted however that the total number of such premises is not unreasonably high compared with other districts.
- 312. ALAC has identified three groups more likely to experience disproportionate alcohol related harm, namely, Youth, Maori and Pacific Island populations. These groups are more highly represented in the CMD than in other districts.
- 313. A District Licensing Unit of one Sergeant, four Constables, an analyst and a clerk are responsible primarily for licensing and vetting in relation to the Sale of Liquor Act and three other Acts. The unit vetted 5,358 applications in the past 12 months. It visits licensed liquor outlet and occasionally makes covert purchases but their available time is limited. The unit works with other agencies using a graduated response system where premises gain 'harm matrix' points. Three graduation responses are employed consultation, compliance and cancellation.
- 314. The Team Policing section act on weekly alcohol intelligence briefing documents from the unit to address public drinking behaviour. The quality of intelligence will improve with the introduction of the National Intelligence Model. While surveillance can be maintained on public drinking behaviour, home based drinking is a major problem in the district.
- 315. The Alcohol Section of the Police Manual is currently under review. Part of the review involves preparing good practice guidelines in relation to the policing of alcohol abuse. Drafts of the sections relating to "Alcohol misuse: prevention, monitoring and enforcement strategies" and "Intoxication host responsibility and promotions" are now available.
- 316. The New Zealand Police Alcohol Action Plan lists four objectives and a range of potential strategies and tactics addressing each of those objectives. It highlights the most significant areas where Police efforts can impact positively on alcohol-related problems and outlines priorities for action.
- 317. The district should set out to significantly increase the focus on alcohol abuse with a documented operational plan addressing alcohol abuse; the plan to be based on the alcohol section of the Police Manual and the New Zealand Police Alcohol Action Plan.

- 318. The National Business Plan 2009/10 requires progressive implementation of the Police Alcohol Plan, with particular reference to minimising alcohol-related crime and crashes and tailoring responses for special events and population groups.
- 319. There is potential to increase the focus on alcohol abuse with Problem Solving teams specifically addressing alcohol abuse as set on in 7.8.
- 320. The need for additional staff to address this issue is not recommended.

9.3 Family Violence Units

- 321. The Crime Services Manager has responsibility for family violence coordination within the district. He has reporting directly to him a Family Violence Manager, with staff of a Family Safety Sergeant and three Family Safety Constables
- 322. Family Safety Teams (FST) is a police led joint initiative involving Police, Ministry of Justice, Child Youth and Family (CYF) and the community.
- 323. The Counties Manukau FST is the largest in NZ and consists of 3 police investigators, one CYF worker on secondment and six Non Government Workers (NGO) representing the community sector. The current NGO contract is held by Eastern Women's Refuge (EWR). The day to day supervision is provided by police in the form of a sergeant.
- 324. The supervisor reports to a District Management Team (DMT) which comprises middle management representatives from the respective agencies contributing to the FST. The current DMT includes the District Family Violence Coordinator, a senior CYF manager and the operations manager of EWR. The DMT meets monthly to discuss FST issues and approve projects and training planned by the team.
- 325. The DMT reports to a National Steering Committee. A Secretariat based at PNHQ is responsible for coordinating the FST nationally.
- 326. Family Violence units are attached to a different Area Group in each Area:
 - In East Area one Family Violence Sergeant and one Constable are attached to the Response Group.
 - In West and Central Areas one Family Violence Sergeant and two Constables are attached to the Area Youth and Communities Groups.
 - In South Area one Family Violence Sergeant and one Constable are attached to the Area Tactical Group.
- 327. FST operate from a central office but are now in the process of decentralising one of the NGO to each of the district Areas to work alongside the Area Family Violence Coordinators.
- 328. In the past year 12,000 family violence complaints have been dealt with. Between 2,500 and 3,300 events are addressed in each Area. Police attendees at family violence disputes are required to submit a 12 page form FVIR. Each is reviewed by the Area family violence Sergeant for risk, further investigation and/or proactive action and for quality of initial action. Each Area operates differently with variations dependant on the views of the Area Commander.
- 329. The Sergeants rate the file quality as 'satisfactory with room for improvement'. Training needs are identified in the review process and the Sergeant delivers training at Section 'fall in'.

- 330. Every case is reviewed at a weekly multi agency meeting comprising the Sergeant, CYFS (children), Victim Support, Probation Service (parolees or home detention), Womens Refuge and an NGO (who works holistically).
- 331. Another Group, a Whole of Government Group, addresses top 10 Repeat Offenders in each Area. This group comprises Ministry of Education, Housing Corp, Work and Income, CYFS, Police, Probation Service and Victim Support. The group has managed the exodus of 12 – 14 families from its focus in one Area in the 12 months it has been operating.
- 332. It is possible that the heavy response workload and the comparative inexperience of CMD staff has been compromising the quality of attendance at 'domestic disputes'. It is noted (at 3.4) that in CMD, 60% of these events do not involve violence. It may be that more time and improved quality of attendance could reduce the number of the non violent incidents from subsequently escalating to violence.
- 333. Up to 80% of the time of the police family violence Sergeants is devoted to administration type duties, principally reviewing all Area FVIR forms or at meetings. As a result, actual interventions are constrained to a low number of priority cases.
- 334. With the additional staff there will be a needed to improve the quality of attendance and the quantity and quality of follow-up action.
- 335. The National Business Plan 2009/10 requires each Area Commander to sign off and implement a Family Violence Case Management Intervention Plan. This plan is to include extension of the top 10 priority cases to 20. It may be advantageous for CMD to extend the number of priority cases beyond 20. Area Family Violence units may require additional staffing to achieve this.
- 336. The district has begun to document a plan for addressing family violence

10 DOWN STREAM IMPACTS

10.1 Internal Services CMD

- 337. The issue of increasing typists to cope with the additional workload and to free frontline members to return to operational functions has been raised by district members. However it would appear that allocation of staff to these functions will be outside the intent of the allocation of the additional resources.
- 338. The significant increase in operational staff is expected to result in an increase in the number of arrests both for new offences and in relation to the execution of warrants. This will have a downstream impact in relation to the following police units:
 - *Custodial Services*. The custody suite will be impacted regardless of the use of alternative resolutions. Arrest and release procedures for example, will involve holding such prisoners for up to six or eight hours.
 - Prosecution Services. Additional prosecutors will be required to address the increased workload. This requirement will be closely linked with the capability of the Courts to provide court space and officials. The impact may be reduced slightly as a result of a project instituted by the CMD District Commander and designed to evaluate available alternative resolutions.
 - Youth Aid Services. The workload of these services may be significantly impacted.
- 339. The extent of the increase and assessment of consequential additional staffing needs will be determined in Phase Two of this project.

10.2 Downstream impact - Associated Agencies

- 340. Courts will be impacted in the same manner as Custodial Services and Prosecutions Services. The Northern Region Manager Police Prosecution Services has been maintaining dialogue with the Northern Region Courts Manager at regular routine meetings.
- 341. The ability of the courts to cope with increased arrests is perhaps the greatest concern.
- 342. The number of outstanding cases on hand is now higher in Auckland Region than in other region and cases face longer waiting times for disposal than elsewhere. As at December 2008, the average age of jury trials in Auckland District Courts was over 435 days since the defendant's first appearance in court. The New Zealand average was under 300 days.
- 343. There is an urgent need for additional criminal courtrooms with perhaps 11 more jury courtrooms and 15 more general courtrooms required by 2018 for the District Court alone.
- 344. In the shorter term, plans are designed to increase the rate of disposal in Auckland courts by increasing the number of judges and judicial officers; and to provide additional criminal capable courtrooms.
- 345. Shorter term it is planned to introduce Community Magistrates into Auckland courts to concentrate on high volume charges, and additional District Court judges for jury

courts to cope with Methamphetamine cases which can now be heard in the District Court.

- 346. The Ministry will pilot extended operating hours for some criminal courts in Auckland in mid 2009.
- 347. A building programme is a longer term solution together with a move to electronic filing and electronic court records to improve and speed up processes.
- 348. It is also planned to establish a Community Justice Centre in South Auckland to ensure greater community involvement, and broader services including social services, are more available to address background factors in lower-level criminal offending.
- 349. Child Youth and Family may be impacted in a similar extent as the Police Youth Aid Section. Corrections Department will also be impacted but to a lesser extent. A separate study will be required to establish the extent of these impacts.
- 350. Constant and effective communications will need to be maintained with all stakeholders including partnerships. It will be useful to establish a formal forum involving all stakeholders impacted by the additional police activities to ensure that adequate planning is carried out.

10.3 Downstream impact – Neighbouring districts

- 351. Auckland suburbs provide attractive opportunities for CMD criminals who already impact substantially on the Auckland City crime scene. It is understood, for example, that some 18% of Auckland City district arrests are of offenders with residential addresses in CMD while 55% of cars unlawfully taken in Auckland are recovered in CMD.
- 352. Discussions with District Commanders suggests a belief that increased policing activity, particularly proactive strategies, will reduce the impact of CMD offenders on neighbouring districts rather than displace criminal activity into those districts.

PART 2: NATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT MODELS

- 353. The national productivity models developed at PNHQ over the past 15 months for the specific purpose of improving the productivity of operational performance will provide huge assistance to CMD in the quest for improved productivity and reduced demand. The district provides the opportunity to integrate a range of national productivity models into one district. Some of the initiatives have been piloted in different districts but not as a single model integrating all of the features. The initiatives include:
 - National Intelligence Model.
 - Case Management Model
 - Access and Communications strategies.
 - Mobility Strategy
 - Field Technology
- 354. The integration of these models into the CMD Policing model will play a critical role in improving productivity in the district. Implementation and integration of the models are addressed in section 14.5. Characteristics of the models are summarised below.

11 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MODEL

- 355. The CMD policing model will be intelligence driven and is the first district in which the National Intelligence Model will be rolled out.
- 356. It is an integral part of the NZ Police policing style. To date its development has relied primarily on local initiatives at district and Area levels. This has lead to variations in how intelligence units are structured, the type of products they produce and practices they follow. The lack of national direction has also affected the tools, data bases and information available to the units. This has impacted on the ability to interpret the criminal environment and convey that intelligence to the front line and to key decision makers, especially at senior levels.

11.1 Fundamental Principles of the New Model

- 357. Intelligence led policing (ILP) is a model where data analysis and intelligence are pivotal to an objective, decision making framework. This framework enables crime and road trauma reduction through strategic management and effective strategies that target prolific and serious offenders, locations and targets. Key characteristics include:
 - A robust scanning process to develop a clear understanding of the criminal environment.
 - An organisation-wide approach.
 - Integrated crime and criminal analysis.
 - A focus on prolific and serious offenders.
 - Strategic and tactical tasking meetings.
 - Much routine investigation is screened out.
 - Data that is complete, reliable and timely.
 - Appropriate use of prevention, disruption and enforcement tactics.

358. Implementation of the model in CMD will enable existing silos to be broken down, information sharing and access to information to be enhanced and result in an aligned strategic approach which is intelligence driven. It is also fully aligned with the existing community policing model.

11.2 District Intelligence Hub

- 359. The model comprises a series of "Networked Hubs" within Areas, districts and PNHQ. Each hub will principally exist to support local needs, with a clear focus on improved service delivery for local commanders. These "hubs" will be connected together through common systems across territorial boundaries in order to maximise the sharing and exploitation of intelligence across the police.
- 360. The CMD Intelligence Group will provide the "District hub" through which intelligence flows and is coordinated and supported throughout the District.
- 361. The success of this "hub" concept relies on intelligence sections, at all levels, including those specialists CIB and other Police units, feeding information into one central location. The district should continue to build on and evolve the Intelligence model implemented in the district in 2004 through the Blueprint Project. The creation of a District Intelligence Group in CMD that has access to <u>all</u> relevant information, regardless from which unit it comes from, is considered a fundamental requirement. It is important that the policing model framework cuts across the silos of activity that already exists in the Areas; refer 14.2. It will underpin the Districts management focus in terms of strategy.

11.3 Tasking and Coordination

- 362. In order to maximise the value to the district to be derived from the intelligence product it is important that a District Tasking and Coordination decision making forum be established, chaired by the District Commander and comprising key stakeholders.
- 363. The Tasking and Coordination Group will be the principal customer for District Strategic Assessments, which will identify the medium to long term issues that are apparent or emerging. The District Strategic Assessments and the advice/endorsement of the District Tasking and Coordination Group will contribute to the CMD business planning process. At the operational or tactical level the Group will function as a regular, fortnightly or monthly, meeting.
- 364. It will be the responsibility of the District Tasking and Coordination Group to:
 - set the strategic direction for crime and crash reduction across the district
 - own high priority District crime and crash problems
 - sanction the intelligence requirement and direct effort as required
 - arbitrate on and inform the allocation of relevant police resources
 - A sub-group of Tasking and Coordination Group might provide oversight and accountability for sensitive investigations and operations
- 365. The role of the District Manager Intelligence (DMI) in this process is instrumental in ensuring that the right intelligence support and products are required in order to support the strategic decision making process. This process is also vital if the current silos that exist within the district are going to be broken down and the flow of information and intelligence improved so that a joined up strategic approach can be applied; refer 14.2.

11.4 Coordination and Integration of PNHQ Models

- 366. The implementation of the national productivity improvement models need to be integrated into the district policing model. The development of the district Intelligence Framework should be seen as integral to the success of the Case Management and Crime Reporting Line (CRL) projects.
- 367. It is critical that intelligence has an input to the screening, prioritisation and case assignment process that has been identified for the district Case Management Programme. The new Crime Reporting Line has the potential to improve data entry quality and timeliness which is an important requirement of ILP.
- 368. Details of the CRL are outlined in 12.2. One of the key benefits of CRL is that offence reports are taken at the first point of contact and transmitted to the district as electronic files which are then processed through the File Management Centre which operates a 24 hour service. While largely unknown at this early stage, it is envisaged that the implementation of CRL will result in the standard data entry related tasks becoming automated, and this will in turn free up intelligence staff within the Areas so that they can focus on their core intelligence business.
- 369. It is also critical that intelligence has an input to the screening, prioritisation and case assignment process that has been identified for the district Case Management Programme and outlined in 12.
- 370. Case Management links intelligence at District and Area levels through the File Management Centres and effectively creates the forum for a robust "inter-relationship". There is a clearly defined process for screening and prioritisation that provides consistency and acts as a facilitator for the exchange of information and discussion between intelligence and other staff.

11.5 Staffing the District Intelligence Model

- 371. There are currently 28 dedicated intelligence appointments within CMD.
 - Five of those positions are currently allocated to the District Intelligence Group;
 - An additional two (2) intelligence positions exist but are managed in isolation to the other District Intelligence staff.
 - The staff levels within each *Area intelligence Section* have remained largely unchanged since 2007.
 - However, the removal of most Intelligence Support Officer positions from each Area in late 2008 (in order to fill the shortage in data entry staff needed for the CRL project) has led to a reduction in the numbers of intelligence staff in most Areas.
 - Indications are that an additional 8 staff will be required.
- 372. In order to make the district intelligence framework work the following staffing and structural changes are required:
 - To fully embrace the concept of ILP the DMI should report directly to the District Commander as a principle staff advisor for the first 12 months.
 - Additional staff be appointed into intelligence appointments within the District Intelligence Group and Area Intelligence Sections. The primary advantage in appointing additional staff will be seen in the increased support to front line staff by the Field Intelligence and Intelligence Officers, as well as the increased analytical capability within the District.

- The vacant Band J supervisor position is retained and filled with either a Lead Crime Intelligence Analyst or a Supervisor (dependant on appointed DMI).
- The existing Organised Crime Analyst and the District Alcohol Intelligence Analyst are placed under the District Manager Intelligence and become Crime Intelligence Analyst generalists who hold specific portfolios. The District Road Policing Analyst becomes a Crime Intelligence Analyst generalist and holds the Road Policing portfolio and other portfolios as directed.
- 373. Subject to a further review of the relationship between District and Area intelligence groups each Area is reorganised so that it has the following positions:
 - Intelligence Supervisor one for each Area
 - Crime Intelligence Analysts reduce the overall number from 14 to 11 to create additional operational positions and to comply with the Commissioners' direction for each District to release 3 intelligence staff to the general pool
 - Intelligence Officers increase the number from 2 to 4
 - Field Intelligence Officers appoint 2 at District Level and one for each Area.
 These are front line operational roles that have benefits for all policing activity
 - Intelligence Support Officers one for each Area
- 374. It is acknowledged that this structure cannot be achieved without the appointment of additional staff. It is further acknowledged that it may be possible to achieve efficiencies of scale if District/Areas are willing/ prepared to share resources. For example creating a 'pool' of District/Area analysts with resources shared as and when necessary. This would allow efficiencies of scale.

11.6 Implementation of the Model

375. The new District Manager, Intelligence will be responsible for implementing the changes to the district Intelligence framework and will be supported and assisted by a project team from the National Intelligence Centre.

12 CASE MANAGEMENT

12.1 Overview

- 376. Case Management provides an end to end view of managing police cases from a request for service (either a call, a walk in or officer initiated) through to final disposition. The following combination of components make up the end to end case management process being examined in the current pilot:
 - The *Crime Reporting Line* (CRL) is a centralised non-emergency contact centre within North Comms that collects large amounts of information about crime at the time of call, allowing decisions on further enquiries and deployment to the scene to be completed, based on the information obtained.
 - The *File Management Centre* (FMC) is a centralised focal point for receiving categorising and electronically recording files. An Initial File Assessment (IFA) is performed using a recognised screening tool resulting in cases being 'early case closed', forwarded for initial enquiry at the ISU or directed to a specialist enquiry group.
 - The *Investigation Support Unit* (ISU) is a centralised case management unit to improve the preparation, prioritisation and management of cases centrally following initial attendance by responding staff. Telephone, database and Intel Enquiries are carried out to obtain readily available evidence.
 - Criminal Justice Support Unit (CJSU) is a centralised case processing unit that prepares information for court following investigation by response staff. CJSU has been operating in CMD since 2005. In this district the unit has become an operations' model including training and enhancements
 - Work Group Supervisor Capability. The case management model will show improved workflow practices through the effective use of NIA information. NIA support boosts the supervisory capability of each group, squad or section within police that receive cases for active inquiry and brings those cases to either a positive or negative conclusion.
 - Case management together with NIA also has the capacity to provide valuable data for CMD management information systems.
- 377. Case management has a direct impact on the management of investigative processes so that police become more productive in managing resources and response in the investigative role.
- 378. The project delivers a national workflow model with benefits to the public and police, including:
 - Consistency of decision making and case handling which can be applied nationally
 - Improved response to victims and complainants
 - Improved quality of investigations
 - Reduced outstanding case files

- Real time intelligence for deployment decisions.
- 379. The programme is aligned with the National Intelligence Strategy, outlined in 11 and the Access and Communications Strategy, outlined in 13. Related initiatives include development of enhancements to the National Intelligence Application (NIA).
- 380. Police have embarked on a national strategy to standardise the recording and counting of statistics to ensure accurate reflection of police workload and effectiveness. A key element in this strategy is the NIA National Recording Standard. NIA development has the potential to provide data relating to input, processes and output KPIs for District Operational Plans; refer 14.2.
- 381. Case management business improvements include:
 - Quality investigations and increased case resolution. The ability to identify and type cases end-to-end so that best practice methods, skills and knowledge can be applied to improve the quality of investigations and case resolution.
 - Resource efficiency management. The ability to optimise resource utilisation while achieving resolution and quality targets levels. The status of cases from acceptance through to closure will be managed, including encouragement for early closure (using case screening) when further investigation is not warranted.
 - Focus effort to case type and/or priority. The ability to focus on applying resources and predefined approaches and measurements to specific priority case types.
 - Improve public confidence, including the ability to identify when the status of a case changes and when the victim should be updated about the status. Case screening will provide a consistent approach and transparent reasoning and decision making process for the closure, suspension or continued investigation of a case.
- 382. The programme is designed to deliver outcomes associated with Strategic Goal 2: Policing with Confidence, with particular reference to:
 - Evidence based proactive policing
 - Timely and effective response to calls for service
 - Thorough investigations
 - Effective resolutions
- 383. Outcomes sought include the tracking and reporting of cases against performance indicators at critical points in the case life cycle. These critical points will utilise case screening assessment and prioritisation tools. This process will identify investigative bottlenecks and reduce wasted effort. In practical terms, supervisors and managers will be able to identify potential risks, allowing better decisions to be made to manage them. The success of Case Management will depend on standards being set, monitored and enforced. A programme of measurement is currently being developed which will include performance data which will be designed to meet the needs of the policing model.
- 384. Implementation of Case Management in CMD in the proposed policing model will be designed to incorporate all substantive elements; Case Screening, Crime Reporting Line, File Management Centre, Investigative Support Unit, Criminal Justice Support Unit, enhanced supervisory capability and provision of data for district management information systems.

12.2 Crime Reporting Line

- 385. Access to police services is currently achieved in 3 ways, either as a 111 emergency call, a non emergent call to a police station, or face to face contact with a police member either at road side or at the public counter. Currently capacity is being developed for e reporting including texting; refer Section 13 Access and Comms Strategy.
- 386. Emergency calls are dealt with and dispatched in the Comms Centres. Non emergency calls are received at Police stations and, if a crime is to be reported, transferred to the CRL at the Comms Centre. Calls can be upgraded or down graded from one to the other.
- 387. The CRL has a particular function to take non urgent crime reports on the phone directly into the National Intelligence Application (NIA); refer 13.1. Thus the generation and the transiting of wholly electronic files has been tested in the CRL project at North Comms servicing the Auckland and Bay of Plenty (BOP) districts. Members of the public who ring are put through CRL and their reports are taken by the phone directly into the NIA system. When the CRL project began in 2006 the CRL was entering 23% for both districts' files. BOP results are comparable (23% and now 36% of files directly entered by the CRL). It is worthy of note that CRL is now dealing with 69% of Auckland's burglaries and 70% of BOP burglaries. This means more patrol time is freed up to attend other jobs.
- 388. The CRL service has been expanded into CMD on 20 January 2009. The result at this stage for CMD is 22%. It is intended that police capability for handling totally electronic files will continue to grow through development.
- 389. The benefits generated by the process is a reductions in reports at the public counter, less time on task for patrols at the scene (because the information on particular events is already recorded in the system) and less handling of paper files within the district because they are received electronically. Information is entered in to the system at the first point of contact and is then available for real time intelligence analysis. The process also provides increased capability for the Comms Centres to manage their call queues.

12.3 Case Screening and Prioritisation Model

- 390. The objective of the model is to ensure that appropriate and consistent decisions are made in relation to cases against an agreed set of priorities. The purpose of this is to manage case demand against resourcing availability and ensure that the highest priority cases are being worked on within agreed Case Type groupings.
- 391. The case management screening and prioritisation model is made up of the following components:
 - *Initial file assessment*, where the case is assessed against solvability factors and the case may be screened out. Only volume crime can be prioritised out at this stage of the process.
 - Case Categorisation, where the case is categorised into one of 4 priority groups.
 - *Mandatory* categories include homicides, statutory requirements (perjury), missing persons, sudden deaths and suicides.
 - *Critical* categories include all the serious crime types which are essentially offences against the person.

- *Priority* crimes are all other crime types that relate to serious offending against property or offending against the person of a lesser seriousness.
- Volume crime is primarily dishonesty offending and disorder.
- *Case Prioritisation* is where the case is reviewed by the instigative team supervisor against a number of priority factors to determine the order in which cases should be assigned for investigation.
- 392. The first point of centralised investigative screening occurs in the File Management Centre, a centralised processing centre. The case is reviewed against a set of solvability criteria and may be closed where it fails to reach a set hurdle level. Cases categorised priority, critical or mandatory are recorded on NIA and forwarded to the appropriate workgroup.
- 393. On receipt of a case the investigative supervisor conducts an immediate prioritisation of the case, using the case prioritisation matrix with a rating for each priority factor. The factors will be reviewed throughout the introductory phase of the pilot.

12.4 File Management Centre

- 394. The FMC performs the functions of a records office with added features including the screening of files in the initial file assessment using standardised case screening tools. The FMC operates 24/7 and is primarily responsible for receiving all incoming files into district policing system. This includes electronically generated files from the CRL, reports generated by staff attending scenes, reports generated at public counters in stations and files received from other districts.
- 395. The FMC mitigates the risk of files entering the district system which have not been entered in NIA. This has in the past led to files which are up in the NIA file management sub system being actively investigated. This is particularly frustrating for victims and complainants who ring to ask the state of their investigation and the file is unable to be found.
- 396. After initial file assessment, files may be filed or inactivated, assigned to a work group or forwarded to a station or district. Until file assessment is carried out on all files then the screening tool is applied to volume crime types only, to take out of the system, cases which are low level and in relation to which no viable avenue of inquiry exists. If on initial file assessment, further inquiries are indicated, the file may be sent directly to a specialist investigation group depending on the severity of the case.
- 397. Where in initial file assessment, the file assessor can see that a phone call will reveal further evidence then the file may be forwarded to the ISU.

12.5 Investigation Support Unit

398. The ISU is charged with obtaining readily available evidence which will improve the chances of locating an offender for a reported offence. They will make telephone contact with complainants who may be able to nominate further witnesses or point to evidence which could support intervention. They will also make arrangements for the uplifting of evidence and maintain a consistent contact and progress advice to complainants. They may close out cases at that stage and provide the complainant with a complaint acknowledgement form, a victim advice notification and crime prevention advice.

399. Where further action is indicated they will summarise the file and available evidence and forward the enhanced case to specialist investigative groups

12.6 Criminal Justice Support Unit

- 400. The initiative began as a pilot project in the CMD Central policing Area in December 2005. It is based on a UK model and is designed to remove unnecessary administration tasks from constabular officers, allowing them more time on the street.
- 401. It has been traditional practice for officers to not only gather evidence and arrest the offender but also to prepare the file for court hearings, assemble disclosure and file the file on completion.
- 402. The CJSU intervenes at an early post charge stage by taking over the prosecution file prior to the first court appearance and completing the administrative tasks associated with it. This includes preparing witness summons, briefs of evidence, liaising with defence counsel, providing ongoing disclosure and filing. The arresting officer never relinquishes ownership of the file.
- 403. This initial intention was extended when it quickly became apparent that given the relative inexperience of CMD staff a significant training and mentoring need existed. By recruiting experienced retired and ex constabular members, CJSU assumed a secondary role of training and mentoring. A direct consequence of this coaching and mentoring role is the need for CJSU to be Area based and woven into the fabric of Area life. A further extension of this role has been the rotating of operational staff through the unit.
- 404. Following a favourable evaluation, the CJSU was extended into pilot programmes in CMD East Area, Lower Hutt and Palmerston North. The Evaluation Report noted significant improvements in the timeliness, accuracy and quality of prosecution files with positive feed back from all functions associated with the prosecution process.
- 405. Measuring actual investigator productivity improvement generated by the units has been problematic. Failure to gather baseline data prior to commencement of the project and a switch from AMS to People-Soft makes precise evaluation of benefits difficult. The Lower Hutt pilot is based on 2008 baseline data but the results will not be known until July 2009.
- 406. Prior to introduction in Central and East Areas, GDB enquiry staff had assessed that they were spending approximately 50% of their working week on correspondence with a CIB assessment of 75%. Anecdotally it is believed by staff that introduction of the CJSU in Central and East has resulted in 30% more officer time on the street.
- 407. Average files held by Central and East Enquiry Office were previously in the 300 range but have been reduced to approximately 100, while total files in the West Area, which is arguably the busiest area and without CJSU, is in the range of 430. There are however too many variations for this to be accepted as a reliable assessment.
- 408. Central Area CJSU has processed 7,301 prosecution files since inception. 71% of these have been resolved and filed. 64% of files currently held by the unit are for not guilty hearings and 3.95% for status hearings compared to December 2006 when 30.34% were for not guilty hearings and 60.67% where status hearings. The significant reduction in status hearings can be attributed to the improvements in the quality of the first appearance files resulting in the files not being returned for status hearing preparation and the introduction of the Criminal Procedure (Simplification) Project to the Counties Manukau District Court.

- 409. Central Area CJSU has a throughput of approximately 2,500 arrests per annum and at December 2008; East has processed approximately 1,454 files since commencing in April 2008.
- 410. The appointment of a large number of inexperienced staff to the district will accentuate the value of coaching and mentoring provided by the CJSU.
- 411. Judge Blackie, Senior District Court Judge at Manukau provides independent support to the CJSU. He supports the units and points out that he can identify which cases have been prepared through the CJSU and which have not.

12.7 Enhanced Management Capability

- 412. A key component of case management is the introduction and enforcement of business processes which support accountability for the management of files using the NIA system functionality which is provided for that purpose. The collection of data about the progress and outcome of cases is crucial for managers and supervisors. Under the case management model, District and Area Commanders, managers, supervisors and staff will know systematically how many cases are held, for how long and how effective they are in case load management. Recent NIA developments include a standard set of prosecution forms which pre-populate at the first point of entry as well as pre-populating forms introduced for crime reporting in the CRL.
- 413. The view that police are too busy to improve is counter productive and in order to demonstrate workload, effectiveness and capability supervisors are required to follow those processes in order to keep track of their own and their staff's workload and performance on task. Performance on task contributes to the outcomes that the district is striving to deliver. These business processes and the NIA capability are helping to clarify the role of the supervisor in the district. It brings into focus the extended nature of the supervisory role to management of performance and productivity.
- 414. One of the key benefits generated in case management is that NCO supervisors are capable of keeping track of their work load and the performance of their staff on tasks. It is pleasing to note the high number of supervisors in CMD who are volunteering to be trained in the business processes and NIA capability.
- 415. The success of case management depends on standards being set and rigorously enforced. Standardised forms and regulation of data entry contribute to the required level of rigour.

12.8 Management Information

- 416. The Case Management Programme is developing a model that will illustrate workload and throughput, formatted for CMD. The model will illustrate calls for service, translating down to active investigation files and on down to resolutions, prosecutions and ultimately convictions.
- 417. At each step numbers and/or percentages will electronically record and illustrate workload and throughput for the entire district. Accompanying the workload and throughput model are a number of management indicators which illustrate the effectiveness of case management within each district. These management indicators will include the case load by categories, as indicated in 12.3, the age profile of the cases assigned and age profile of cases that are unassigned.

- 418. In the NIA system the four categories of file status are 'filed', 'inactivated', 'assigned' and 'posted'. There are sub categories which allow variations in the status of assigning cases so information including unassigned cases can be drawn. This can be rendered down by district, Area and work groups.
- 419. This management information data will be aggregated into Business Object reports. Further reports are under development which will illustrate performance in even greater depth. Of particular interest will be data relating to key productivity drivers and identification of opportunities to improve productivity.

12.9 Identified Problem with Case Management

- 420. The assignment of cases passing out of district to Police Prosecutions Section and their return is seen as problematic. If files are not correctly assigned when they transit to and from Prosecutions or to other stations and/or work groups these files float without assignment to any individual. CMD had over 40,000 overdue files in the district arising from this scenario. With the implementation of case management, a pre-go live clean up has reduced these overdue cases at a rate of 1800 per week. Police could not systematically identify unassigned files which are not adding value from serious crime files requiring allocation.
- 421. Unless the processes of Service Centres like Prosecution are aligned with district processes the potential for poor file management follows.

12.10 Staffing Requirements for Case Management

- 422. It is anticipated that additional staffing will be required for FMC, ISU and CJSU.
- 423. CJSU in Central Area is staffed with a supervisor, six file managers, a typist and a data entry clerk. East Area has the same compliment but with five file managers. Early indications are that West Area would require the same staff compliment but with 8 file managers. It is anticipated that South Area will require five file managers.

13 ACCESS, COMMUNICATIONS, MOBILITY STRATEGIES

- 424. In the National Business Plan 2009/10, technology is listed as an enabler. It describes this strategic theme as being about enhancing technology assets, making better use of existing technology systems and process and creating technology solutions that enhance productivity.
- 425. Activities listed in the theme include continuing to automate repetitive tasks, including systems enhancements to capture information once and in the right format. It requires that innovative technology solutions are delivered, such as digital radio, PeopleSoft, mobility, public facing applications (including website), crime reporting line for non-emergency events/incidents and preparation for e-court.

13.1 National Intelligence Application (NIA)

- 426. NIA is the basic repository for all information on Police dealings with individuals as victims, complainants, and witnesses. NIA is also the central data base for all aspects of crime and incident recording, including statistics arising from police work interactions The application is also the basis of file recording, assignment and transiting.
- 427. An incident becomes a case when an offence has occurred and an offence code can be assigned. It is essential for effective case management that the offence report be entered in NIA as close as possible to reporting time. This enables cases to be tracked against service standards and be screened and prioritised early.
- 428. Paperwork, particularly repetitive paperwork, is still a major problem in Police. Automation of paper work is designed to reduce this. The CRL project has illustrated that police can process and manage electronic files.
- 429. The custody module is under trial in CMD and leads into the preparation of the prosecution file. Therefore the preparation of a prosecution file set where forms are pre-populated from a single data entry point is a key element of current NIA development. This must be aligned with the Criminal Disclosure Bill that comes into effect on 1 July 2009. NIA developers are providing this functionality which links in with the case management programme and the Criminal Justices Improvement Programme. The model will be designed to reduce the time to process arrests and produce prosecution files. For example instead of entering the name, address, date of birth and occupation of the offender and charge details 9 times, the information is only entered once and pre-populates.

13.2 Public Facing Initiative (PFI)

- 430. This initiative is designed to improve the interaction and the range of interaction methodologies between the police and the community. It extends beyond the telephone to e reporting and text messaging. PFI will have a direct link to police districts. It has not been determined yet whether that will be through the North Comm Centre or some other district capacity. Issues will be how to get video clips, email and photographs etc from public, particularly items that could constitute evidence.
- 431. The initiative is about how police can better utilises modern technology such as Bebo and Facebook to facilitate the community communicating with policing and personally filling in, on line, a range of forms for such features as minor crime, license applications, and vetting. In line with current business practice where the efficiency arises through public entering the details themselves. Much same as online booking

and seat selection for airline travel. There will be ability to fill in forms on the Web with the community able to enter the required data themselves.

432. The Service First initiative is a programme designed to improve police service response following the six drivers of satisfaction identified by the State Services Commission research. Part of this programme is to provide faster more efficient service at a police station through direct entry into NIA at the public counter.

13.3 PDA

- 433. The use a PDA (like a Blackberry) provides an operational member with the ability to communicate directly with police applications by internet for example to carryout vehicle checks, check on "wanteds" or even perhaps a fingerprint check from the field. Currently a member can wait up to one hour to gain access because of radio traffic etc. The use of PDA will speed the process and reduce radio traffic.
- 434. From 30 June 2009 this will be trialled in Wellington District for electronic ticketing for traffic offences. There is potential to introduce the capability into CMD in due course.

13.4 Car as a Police Station

- 435. The use of Automatic Vehicle Location (AVL) identifies the location of police vehicles. Mobile Data Terminals (MDT) or computers in police vehicles provide direct access to police applications. The use of a car "as a police station" has the potential for members to maintain a visible police presence while completing paperwork and other administrative tasks.
- 436. Police are already trialling 95 in metro Auckland including CMD. An active Business Case seeks an additional 125 units at \$15,000. The trial has not revealed universal support for the units. A majority of members support the units while a minority have reservations regarding the benefits. Supervisors need to ensure constant use of the technology to optimise the benefits.
- 437. The CMD Mobile Police Station is an extension of the concept.

13.5 Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR)

- 438. ANPR is a technology that allows vehicles observed by a video camera to have their number plates read. The technology can read up to 3,000 transactions per minute. It is able to be linked to NIA and provides information to, and seeks information from, that application. It provides a means of using technology to detect disrupt and challenge criminals using roads.
- 439. Criminals obviously use roads to travel to and from crime scenes and those who repeatedly commit serious traffic offences are likely to show a similar offending profile to mainstream criminal offending. The use of the technology has a significant proactive component in creating concern in the mind of criminals that they will be identified, stopped and arrested. The technology also has benefits in terms of recording criminal movements particularly on arterial routes.
- 440. It has been trialled in New Zealand with success.

- 441. ANPR is well suited to 'booze bus' or other road check point situations with one operating in each direction. Traffic speed is reduced approaching check points which provides more time to read plates and act on them.
- 442. The provision of four units at a cost \$20,000 each would be beneficial in CMD with the movement of a high number of vehicles of interest. Staff are required to process hits and use of the technology could have a downstream impact in terms of impounded vehicles.

13.6 Other

- 443. CCTV is operating in CMD. Extension of its use should be considered.
- 444. The introduction of digital radio is scheduled to commence in Wellington in June 2009. This will be followed by Canterbury in 2010 and then possibly Metro Auckland.

PART 3: POLICING MODEL

14 POLICING MODEL

14.1 Overview

- 445. Recommended refinements to the CMD policing model are about ensuring that the benefits of the additional staff are optimised.
- 446. The principal need is to improve the performance of the district in the medium to long term. The allocation of the additional staff across operational groups during 2009 and 2010, while important as a starting point will govern medium to long term performance less than ensuring the CMD is well managed and effectively led.
- 447. There will be a need for reallocation of resources across reassurance, the addressing of organised crime, gangs and drugs, operational response, investigation and the national productivity improvement models. This is best achieved by developing a Transitional Plan then resourcing the plan; refer14.7.
- 448. It will be critical that recommendations are based on the key directions that govern policing nationally, including the Police Strategic Plan, the Statement of Intent and the National Business Plan. It is important that all the recommendations are implemented and to achieve this, the process should commence by imbedding the recommendations in the CMD Business Plan.
- 449. The Policing Model will address :
 - Management processes.
 - Structured operational planning framework.
 - Key staff allocation criteria.
 - Integration of national productivity improvement models.
 - CMD HQ structure.
 - A formal Change Management Programme.
 - A Major Step Change to a defined future state.
 - Specific Recommendations
- 450. The recommended model is designed to comply with the constraints contained in the Terms of Reference and in particular the requirement to make no changes in the basic nature of the existing district structure and to avoid a one size fits all districts approach.

14.2 Management Processes

451. Overwhelming pressure of work over a sustained period together with a belief that the district is under resourced has tended to develop a number of prevailing management features that require to be addressed if the benefits of the additional staff are to be optimised. These issues are explained in more detail later but in brief terms include:

- A firm district belief that capacity must exceed current demand for reactive services before pro-active policing strategies can be implemented. This view does not take sufficient cognisance of the consequences to the community, the benefits of reassurance policing or that capacity will forever be chasing demand.
- The focus on meeting the current demand for reactive services over this
 prolonged period has resulted in a reduced staff focus on strategies and
 outcomes defined in NZ Police Strategic Plan. Staff have a reduced <u>sense</u> of
 strategy.
- A diminished sense of accountability for either results or optimising productivity. Managers do not <u>feel</u> accountable. They feel able to rationalise results as a consequence of, and indeed further evidence of, under resourcing.
- Securing additional staff to meet demand for reactive services has assumed greater importance than improving the productivity of existing resources. Unassigned files and sub optimal response times for example are publicly quoted. While considerable progress in the development of productivity improvements is apparent at a national level it is not so apparent locally, particularly in managerial focus or awareness of productivity issues.
- The ease with which groups are able to secure 'outside' assistance, either from other CMD groups or from other districts is not conducive to generating a focus on productivity. Additionally the constant draw off of staff from a unit relieves accountability for the performance of that unit because it does not have unfettered use of its resources.
- A district move further towards fact based management has the potential to assist in the management of productivity. Fact based management, accountability and management of productivity need to be underpinned with a structured, set of KPI and adequate underlying management information data on which to analyse and improve productivity. This process will be assisted greatly by the Case Management Model.
- There is a tendency towards a traditional task orientation in the district; a carry
 over from the traditional command and control model. Multiple individual units are
 deployed to carryout prescribed functions rather than fully coordinated units
 specifically deployed to clearly articulated plans and outputs/outcomes. It is
 probable that alignment and synergies are not being optimised and that the
 approach is contributing to the development of silos.
- The development of parochial silos may be further reducing productivity. Staff interviews recounted examples of relationships between units being less than fully cooperative in operational matters. Silos are not necessarily dysfunctional but may fail where they are not fully integrated within a structured planning framework directed at shared outcomes.
- It is noticeable that there is considerable variation in the tactics adopted in each Area to address identical issues. For example each Area deploys different youth groups with different tactics. No "best practice" appears to have been identified or developed and no overall youth plan is evident. This is more readily facilitated by the absence of operational plans with measurable process and output KPIs. There is potential to benefit from the benchmarking of best practice, results and the drivers of productivity across the four Areas.
- The length of experience of staff in the district is lower than that in other districts due to staff retention difficulties. Strategies need to be developed to rectify this situation.

- 452. There is a danger that the provision of the additional 300 staff will further reinforce the wisdom of the strategy of focussing on additional resources rather than productivity.
- 453. CMD has been addressing issues relating to the district culture since 2004 and have made some progress.
- 454. With the allocation of 300 additional staff it is highly unlikely that the mind sets and the management features indicated above will naturally and automatically change. Appropriate changes in management processes supported by a formal change facilitation programme will be required to ensure optimisation of the additional staff

(a) **Proactive Policing**

- 455. It is apparent from staff interviews that members feel under pressure to meet current demand for reactive services and have developed a firm view that the district needs to raise capacity to exceed demand before being able to become involved in proactively reducing that demand. Some of the consequences of this mindset are indicated above.
- 456. This mindset is entrenched and it is also apparent from interviews that some groups were vague on the manner in which they would engage in proactive policing even with sufficient staff. Absence of clearly articulated proactive plans and identified outputs contributes to this vagueness and does little to promote a focus on proactive policing.

(b) Reduced focus on strategy and longer term outcomes

- 457. The sustained period of pressure on the district to meet the requirements of "now" has been inhibiting focus on issues other than completing prescribed tasks. Staff would benefit from a greater sense of the link between their activities and longer term outcomes and the link between the activities and reassurance policing.
- 458. The diminished *sense* of strategy is also linked to the task orientation. Staff need a better understanding of where they fit into the big picture and "where they are making a difference". Without this, staff "engagement" is also likely to be lower.
- 459. As indicated in Section 3 above staff may be receiving mixed messages. The label "Response" Group strongly conveys one message while the strategic intent promotes a wider role reassurance policing.
- 460. District Business Plans are in the nature of one size fits all districts and the same Business Plan could be applied to other districts. It would be beneficial if these plans provided a stronger district flavour and also greater clarity to staff in relation to where they are making a difference in relation to outcomes in *their* district.
- 461. Similarly, documented operational plans linking activities to measurable outputs and the outputs through to longer term outcomes would be beneficial. See Figures 5, 6 & 7 below.

(c) Task Focus to Process Focus

462. The district deploys more than 130 individual operational policing units. These do not appear to be well aligned. The units are attached to different groups in the four policing Areas and would perform the same functions regardless of where they are placed in the structure. They are essentially self contained units or cells. A loss of synergies is likely.

- 463. The traditional functional mindset tends to reinforce a task focus and traditional command and control behaviour. Conversely, a process view is goal-oriented and focused on the outcome of work rather than on work as an end in itself. It transcends individual activities and concentrates instead on how activities fit together to achieve the key outcomes. Outcomes are achieved by replacing a collection of individual units with a seamless web of strategically aligned, collaborative units working together for a unified purpose as indicated in Figure 4 below.
- 464. This can be taken further by bringing staff together (proactive and reactive) to discuss the manner in which their different Areas of expertise can contribute (the output mix) to achieving NZ Police outcomes. This will enable them to better appreciate and value each others contributions and work through the sequencing of their respective outputs to get the best possible results. It is an easy step then to looking at processes rather than treating tasks individually; refer 14.2(j), "Staff Engagement and Retention" and 14.2(d), "Silos to Synergy".

(d) Silos to Synergy

- 465. Interviewees consistently recounted examples of parochial silos with less than optimal cooperation between units on operational matters. This is generating an obvious reduction in the productivity of the units.
- 466. Silos are a product of decentralised management where units have the potential to morph into silos; where individualism predominates and unit interests assume precedence over organisational goals. This is exacerbated in a situation where district units are focused on meeting immediate demand for reactive services and operational plans are not evident.
- 467. Silos are not necessarily dysfunctional and do provide value in terms of greater control, sharper focus, specialisation, less complexity and a sense of identity. The answer is not in abandoning the decentralised model or dismantling the silos but in management processes that give silos their own identity while ensuring clarity of common goals to be jointly achieved. Outputs and outcomes need to be clearly articulated, the planning framework established and the units directly involved in joint planning within common planning frameworks; refer Figures 4 6 below.

(e) Diminished sense of Accountability

- 468. It appeared at interview that managers do not actually *feel* accountable. They see it as accepted within the police structure and the CMD community that they are not sufficiently resourced to be held accountable. Rather than feel accountable for unassigned files or sub optimal response times or resolution rates they openly quote them as evidence of the fact that they need more resources.
- 469. The ability to hold managers accountable is further reduced where staff are constantly drawn from managers to assist in response functions or serious crime investigations.
- 470. Management processes and management information systems need to be strengthened further to ensure greater accountability for managing productivity, outputs and outcomes. KPI for these features are more readily developed for a structured set of operational strategies or plans as suggested in Figure 4 below.
- 471. The concepts in Figures 4 & 5 present the framework and mechanisms in which to develop accountability but more is required to achieve actual accountability. There must be management "buy in" to being accountable. Ultimately the district has to be ready and able to accept accountability, and to benefit from the emotional ownership that comes with a new accountability culture.

- 472. Managers and staff need to be held more rigorously accountable not only for results but equally importantly to be accountable to their duty to scrutinise cost-effectiveness, resource use and optimisation of productivity.
- 473. A formal change facilitation programme, including training and coaching, will be needed to reinforce the required changes.

(f) Fact Based Management

- 474. Briefing papers and interviews indicated a tendency towards reliance on 'generalities' and intuition rather than on a management information system that supports 'fact based management'.
- 475. A move further towards fact based management is required as a foundation for the management of outputs, productivity and accountability. Identifying data needs and ensuring this is delivered from the Case Management Mode', Business Objects and CARD will be important.
- 476. District staff may need to be up-skilled to use data to assess and improve operational performance. Clear processes should compare and benchmark data between Areas and hold managers and staff accountable. A concerted effort will need to identify best practice and poor performance against productivity and cost data, and drive improvement where necessary.

(g) Productivity

- 477. Considerable work has been carried out at national level in relation to developing a range of business process enhancements designed specifically to improve productivity.
- 478. Due to the lack of management information data the project team is not in a position to comment on the productivity of individual CMD units. Observations are directed at managerial focus and awareness of productivity issues which emerged during interviews and analysis. This focus is potentially reduced by the ease with which operational groups are able to secure outside assistance and also by the absence of fact based management. It is also possible that a focus on productivity is not so readily facilitated with the current large number of task oriented units in the district.
- 479. A clear strategic productivity improvement agenda needs to be adopted in the district. The integration of the national productivity improvement models will assist this process. Harder-edged requirements relating to accountability will be required.
- 480. Improving the capacity to deliver cost-effectively will need to be driven consistently across the full range of levers. But the district will not deliver on the potential of any of this reform agenda unless it is matched in parallel by a strategic, concerted and sustained effort to improve resource management and operational productivity across the district.
- 481. This will demand much more detailed understanding of how to drive increased performance from core processes, tighter productivity measures and more detailed evidence of what works. This is particularly so in relation to proactive strategies. These need to be focused around identified outputs and improving the impact of people and resources in strategic activities.
- 482. There needs to be an appetite to ask more incisive questions about where resource is deployed, the cost, and what benefits it is delivering. "What we are buying and at what cost"?

483. These questions and an enhanced understanding of productivity are better addressed within the planning framework rather than in relation to a large number of individual task oriented units.

(h) Enhanced Data Management

- 484. There is a need for enhanced data collection, enhanced data management and enhanced use of management data within a clear structured framework. Timely data are critical to any effort to drive significant value for money gains. Internal management information appears to be patchy and inconsistent in this regard. The district could make greater use of appropriate management information as a tool for exploring the variations and/or weaknesses in generating productivity. The Case Management Model has the potential to deliver the specific data, providing the data needs are identified early. It is important that this is recognised by the district as a critical and not just a technical issue. Without standardised, timely and detailed information it will be impossible to drive sustained improvement.
- 485. The district needs to engage in diagnostic exercises designed to identify the key processes and the required information to ensure Case Management mechanisms are gathering data and presenting appropriate productivity and value for money information.
- 486. While the availability of comparative cost and productivity data ought to provide its own impetus for improvement, a concerted effort will be needed to maximise the potential of benefits of the management information that will be made available.

(i) Best Practice and Benchmarking

- 487. In each Area there is a marked difference in approach and tactics deployed in relation to Youth, Communities and Tactical Groups in particular. Clearly they can not all be the best practice or tactics in each case. It is possible to engage in these different approaches where no measurable outputs, no benchmarking between Areas and limited accountabilities are applied.
- 488. With improved data potentially available from the Case Management Model and the use of aligned operational plans with clear output and productivity measures as indicated below, best practice can be identified. The opportunity should be taken to maximise the benefits by implementing benchmarking of best practice, productivity and results. The use of score cards and league tables would further benefit the process.

(j) Staff "Engagement" and Retention

- 489. People come to work to make a difference. Challenge, achievement, involvement, meaning, feedback and recognition are far more important once people have reasonable working conditions and pay. Making a difference is about improving the lot of communities, families and individuals by reducing crime and crash trauma; that is achieving Police outcomes. These are the elements that makes police work satisfying, gives it purpose and makes people give their discretionary effort.
- 490. Hence the critical need to move from the task orientation to involving members, in a substantive way, in the development of plans and the provision of clear links between their activities, outputs, district policing priorities and outcomes.
- 491. The provision of the additional staff, the implementation of the national models, a productivity improvement agenda, an enhanced sense of strategy and other features of the potential package of improvements should be used to create an image of an exciting and satisfying place to work and advance careers.

492. A vision for the district as a favourable workplace should be developed to replace the current negative image. This vision should be marketed internally.

14.3 Structured Operational Planning Framework

- 493. One of the more significant fundamental issues is that the district deploys more than 130 operational units with no operational plans to coordinate their activities or to create a sense of common purpose or instil operational members with a sense of strategy. Further, the absence of outputs and KPIs relating to outputs and productivity does not facilitate fact based management, accountability or a focus on improving productivity.
- 494. Enhancements to the management processes outlined in 14.2 need to be based on a clear operation planning framework that maximises synergies and provides a clear link between unit activities, productivity, outputs, district policing priorities and outcomes. This is applicable to both reactive and proactive plans.
- 495. Figures 4 7 in Appendix 3 present a suggested framework for the development of operational plans with identified outputs and KPIs together with a simple link to policing outcomes.

(a) Integrated and Aligned Plans

- 496. District policing priorities are set by the district within the terms of the Strategic Plan and Statement of Intent. Ideally the operational plans should be focused on the <u>drivers</u> <u>of district policing priorities</u>.
- 497. The operational plans need to be structured, well aligned and designed to optimise synergies. An 'Alcohol Plan', for example, has the potential to develop synergies in terms of violence, family violence, road trauma etc.
- 498. These notions are indicated in Figure 4, "Policing Priorities, Drivers and Operational Plans" [Appendix 3]. The priorities and plans presented in the figure are indicative only and designed to demonstrate the model. In Figure 4 the drivers of policing priorities run horizontally. The aligned operational plans run vertically and intersect with the drivers of the policing priorities. The column on the far left of the figure indicates drivers on which the police can have limited impact and are noted but not addressed.
- 499. The use of a concept such as this would ensure the district operational plans are aligned, integrated and focused on drivers and creating synergy.
- 500. The development of this web of integrated operational plans is the first step in breaking down silos and presenting operational members with a view of the big picture and their relationship to it. Their appreciation of the big picture is completed in Figures 5 and 6 [Appendix 3].
- 501. The range of plans needs to be identified by the district and many have been identified earlier in this document. The planning framework and desired outputs need to be prescribed by management but it is essential that those implementing the plans have a genuine (as distinct from pseudo) input into the development of the activities to be engaged in within the plan.
- 502. The Manager of the National Intelligence model confirms that to be fully effective the model needs to work in conjunction with a clear set of operational plans. The Intelligence Model is less effective addressing multiple units.

(b) Individual Plans, Outputs and KPI

- 503. Each plan can be taken individually and developed in a manner indicated in Figure 5. "Framework for development of Individual Operational Plan – Worksheet". This figure presents a format in which outputs may be identified together with output indicators which link to the strategic goals stated in the NZ Police Strategic Plan 2010. The model also facilitates development of process KPI in the form of key drivers of productivity.
- 504. The figure begins to develop the link between activities in the plan to district policing priorities and policing outcomes and begins to inform members executing an operational plan where their efforts are making a difference. The worksheet is designed to build on the information data available from Case Management, Business Object and CARD in developing fact based management and accountability.
- 505. A second tier of indicators is needed to enable managers to 'drill down' and be informed in relation to the causes of any abnormal KPI.
- 506. Figure 5 uses the "Response" Group as a worksheet sample. Outputs and KPI for both outputs and productivity are indicated in the figure. Organisational Performance Group will develop the KPIs and integrate this structured bottom up approach to KPIs with existing indicators.
- 507. It is suggested that the Case Management Project team be advised early of the KPI and second tier indicators to ensure the relevant data is captured.
- 508. The same outputs used in the sample are applicable to all reactive functions and plans. The output KPI will differentiate the plans and identify the role of the units. It is suggested that the same format be used in developing outputs and KPI for proactive plans.

(c) "Big Picture" View

- 509. The concept provides for the amalgamation of the individual operational plans as indicated in Figure 6, "Relationship of Operational Plans to Policing Outcomes". The figure is designed to show a more simple and direct link between activities and policing outcomes. The figure facilitates the development of an appreciation of the big picture; the manner in which plans contribute jointly to a common purpose and develop a sense of strategy for operational members in demonstrating the link between activities, outputs and the policing outcomes.
- 510. The national planning model is designed more for police reporting purposes than it is towards clarifying for operational members the link between their endeavours and policing outcomes.
- 511. Figure 7, "National Planning Model" has been developed in conjunction with the National Planning Group at PNHQ and shows the manner in which the plans would fit into the annual reporting framework. It also demonstrates the disconnection between individual endeavour and policing outcomes.
- 512. In fact, the pursuit of outcomes is more in the nature of a continual journey; a constant state of endeavour. The goal posts are continually pushed out as expectations are raised. The process is about a journey of 'continuous improvement', because so many external factors contribute to achievement of the outcome.
- 513. However organisations and teams can be held accountable for managing the way that enables an organisation or team to make progress towards the outcomes by using indicators to inform them whether they are on track or not. At intervals there is a need

to confirm whether the right mix of outputs are being delivered. Is there a better way? What does this mean for the mix of inputs that are being applied?

514. Hence the need to develop the linkages between activities, outputs and outcomes and to focus on the drivers of productivity.

14.4 Staff Allocation – Broader Considerations

- 515. It will be important to relieve pressure on activities that shape public perceptions of policing effectiveness. Two Areas that are likely to be particularly important in his regard are response to incidents and the investigation of serious crime. There will need to be confidence that the resources will be used productively and that extra resources can and will be supported by appropriate management processes.
- 516. Preclusion of the need to draw staff from other functions to support response or investigation of serious crimes is also critical. The current process is disruptive and costly and in relation to the units from which members are constantly drawn it tends to under-value those functions and reduce accountability within those units.
- 517. Adequate resourcing of the national productivity improvement models will be critical.
 - (a) The National Intelligence Model is the key driver of the policing model. Most of these staff will be drawn from existing Intelligence staff in the district.
 - (b) The Case Management Model provides a web through the policing model, not only in improving the productivity of all aspects of policing but also in developing the management information data for fact based management, productivity improvements and accountability.
- 518. The national models particularly the Case Management Model provides a vehicle for culture change within CMD Police.
- 519. A major focus on organised crime, gangs, drugs and alcohol is critical to curbing both volume crime and violent crime in the district; refer 9.1. There is significant potential for an enlarged Organised Crime, Gangs and Drugs unit to be effective in reducing crime at that formative level.
- 520. Additional staff to Response functions should not simply be added to existing shifts. It is important that they be allocated in a manner that moves rosters towards matching the pattern of supply with the pattern of demand. Introduction of improved rostering systems and improved management controls should work to reduce the abstraction rate to below 50%.

14.5 Integration of National Models

- 521. The national models are described in detail in Part Two of this report. The recommended policing model is designed to facilitate those models and also to maximise the potential benefits of the national models; refer also to 11.4, "Coordination and integration of PNHQ models]
- 522. The implementation of the National Intelligence model will be the first roll out of this model into a district and has already commenced. Elements of the Case Management Model have been tested in various districts as stand alone pilot projects. This will be the first roll out of the complete model. Similarly elements of the Access and Communications Strategy and the Mobility strategy have been implemented as 'stand alone' projects. Implementation of all of these models into CMD will represent the


inaugural implementation of a fully integrated model of the national productivity improvement models.

- 523. The individual models are designed to generate productivity improvements at varying levels which by themselves provide benefits. The synergies available in the integrated end to end models will provide potential for more significant increases in productivity in relation to both reactive and proactive services. These are designed to deliver more value for the tax dollar in keeping with the current economic climate. The pressure will be on managers to ensure that the potential of the combined models is optimised.
- 524. The policing model will be driven by the National Intelligence Model. The Intelligence model is looking for trends and patterns in crime and actively seeking to identity offenders. Ultimately the model seeks to provide some predictive capability in order to put in place proactive strategies to prevent crime. The National Intelligence model will work with the integrated Case Management Model at two levels.
 - (a) At the district level in the File Management Centre by scanning incoming crime reports, looking for trends and patterns and providing information on hot offenders to FMC and ISU staff.
 - (b) At the Area level, intelligence from the street is fed back to the FMC/ISU again looking for hot offender, hot locations and hot property. In CMD the District Intelligence Office will be co-located with the FMC and ISU which will add to efficiency and effectiveness.
- 525. Intelligence will also contributes at the supervisory level in an Area by allowing supervisors to prioritise their work again around hot locations, hot offenders and hot property.
- 526. The technology of the Access, Communications and Mobility Strategies will be designed to facilitate and support the exchange of information in real time across for all work groups in the district including Intelligence, Case Management and front line members.
- 527. It should be noted that the national models are mechanisms only. It will require the commitment of managers and staff to maximise the potential benefits of the models.

14.6 District HQ Structure

- 528. The National Manager of the Intelligence Model has made a special request that the District Intelligence Manager report directly to the District Commander for at least the first 12 months of operation to ensure effective roll out and implementation. This will increase the number of direct report to the Commander in the current structure to 15.
- 529. While the flat structure is to be admired, the large number of direct reports has the potential to divert the District Commanders attention to individual performance management and away from the strategic leadership of the district.
- 530. Also, due to this flat management structure there is not an easily recognisable District leadership group. There may be advantages in establishing a leadership focus by forming a relatively small leadership group of perhaps 6 7 commanders as indicated in Figure 8 below. This would provide a better focus for processes such as operational policy development and district performance management.
- 531. The broader issue of assisting the District improve its management effectiveness is also worth special planning focus. As well as having a clearly identifiable leadership group the District should be assisted to find means to place experienced and skilled staff in key leadership roles.

- 532. It is recommended that direct reports be confined to seven, comprising the four Area Commanders, an Operations Manager, Communities Services Manager and one senior manager of functions including Hr, Business Services, communications, Policing Development Group, professional standards etc. For a 12 month period the District Intelligence Manager should report to the District Commander as requested and thereafter report to the Manager: District Operations as indicated in Figure 8.
- 533. District Youth and Community Services are currently sited in an obscure position under Policing Development which does little to promote Youth and Community as mainstream policing functions. Consideration should be given to raising the position of manager of that group to the District Leadership group to present a higher profile and a stronger voice in strategy development for the district.
- 534. Crime Services may be considered as a direct report for two reasons, namely, (a) significant strategies are centred on serious crime and (b) the Manager District Operations may, from time to time, not have the skills and knowledge to add value to communications between the District Commander and the Manager Crime Services. Figure 7 indicates the proposed new structure.



14.7 A Major Step Change to a Defined Future State

- 535. The provision of additional staff may be viewed as a short term solution but with potential to be counter productive in the medium to longer term. There is a risk that the provision of the additional staff may be interpreted as confirming the wisdom of seeking additional staff rather than increasing productivity or decreasing demand. The additional staff could provide a period of short term comfort but, with failure to address demand or productivity, result in seeking more staff in the near future.
- 536. Given population growth in the district, the long term solution lies in taking this opportunity to make a major step change to appropriately position the district in the medium to long term.
- 537. It is essential that the situation not be viewed as simply one of continuing "business as usual" with the added comfort of extra staff.

- 538. Powerful messages need to signal to district staff that the additional staff will be accompanied by a major step change in district focus and productivity. A number of mediums are available for accomplishing this include:
 - (a) Defining target positions, in the form of stretch goals, in relation to a range of key results and key processes to be achieved by the 31 December 2011. This date has been agreed in consultation with the CMD District Commander.
 - (b) The District Commander needs to be able to demonstrate a marginal increase in productivity from the additional staff. This will be demonstrated in the improvement in district results, based on indicators listed below, in moving from the current state to the defined target position. Consideration should be given to having the District Commander enter into a contact with the Deputy Commissioner, in a Service Level Agreement, to achieve the targets.
 - (c) Consideration should also be given to having the direct reports to the District Commander entering into contracts with the District Commander through PMS to contribute to delivering the defining elements by due date.
 - (d) Developing a district vision and a clearly articulated plan for the transformation.
 - (e) Ensuring the elements of the intended transformation are imbedded in the District Business Plan.
 - (f) Implementation of a formal change facilitation programme.
- 539. In defining the desired future state it is noted that improved access and communication strategies will result in an increase in reported volume crime and P2 calls for assistance in the shorter term. In addition to the business as usual requirements of the National Business Plan, the following key <u>results</u> for example are used in defining the future state:
 - The rise or fall in reported violent crime will equal or better the national average.
 - Resolution rates for each offence category will equal or better national averages.
 - Serious crashes per 10,000 will be decreased by 20%
 - Fatal crashes will equal or better the district target as a proportion of the national target.
 - Road Policing infringement notices issued per 10,000 of population for the "fatal 5" will equal or better the national average.
 - Demand for P1 emergency calls per 10,000 population will equal or better the national average.
 - Response rates for P1 events will equal or better the national average.
 - Repeat family violence offences will be reduced from 38% to xx%.
 - Key Result Indicators be developed for monitoring and reporting the improved performance resulting from strategies directed at organised crime, gangs, drugs and alcohol abuse.

- Increase the level of overall satisfaction with police services to equal or better the national average.
- Increase the level of public trust and confidence in CMD police to equal or better the national average.
- 540. In addition to the business as usual requirements of the National Business Plan the following key *processes* for example may require to be implemented by due date:
 - The national productivity improvement models listed in sections 11 13 will be fully implemented and potential productivity benefits maximised.
 - A strategic productivity improvement agenda outlined in the following recommendations will be implemented.
 - Operational plans with appropriately measured outputs and productivity KPIs will be implemented for all key functions. The plans will be focused on the drivers of policing priorities and are aligned to optimise synergies.
 - Parochial silos will be removed and a sense of strategy will be development in operational staff by clarifying the links between the activities of units, outputs, district policing priorities and policing outcomes.
 - The capacity of Case Management, NIA and CARD to provide management information data:
 - In relation to Area and District results, fact based management and support to accountability mechanisms will be maximised.
 - Facilitating management scrutiny of cost effectiveness and the drivers of productivity is maximised.
 - Tactics and deployment of units across policing Areas is consistent; is driven by the principles of "best practice" and are benchmarked across the Areas.
 - The elements of the policing model are imbedded in the District's Business Plans.
 - A successful formal Change Facilitation Programme has been implemented and a demonstrable culture change effected.

14.8 Change Management

- 541. CMD has introduced a number of initiatives over recent years, including in particular an Intelligence model, a File Management Centre, an Investigation Support Unit and in selected Areas, Criminal Justice Support Units. The district is well placed to implement and optimise the new productivity models.
- 542. Key changes required in relation to the district culture will be more problematic. These are indicated in Table 21. It should be noted that these changes do not represent a move from black to white but more a movement along a continuum in relation to each element.

	Table 21
KEY CHANGES	IN CULTURE
From:	To:

Reactive	Proactive/Reactive
Resource focused	Productivity focused
Activity focussed	Output and outcome focussed
Task oriented	Strategy oriented
A tendency towards Intuitive management	Fact based management
Lower levels of accountability	A high level of accountability

- 543. These changes are considered to be more difficult to accomplish in a command and control management model. A formal Change Facilitation Program will need to be developed and implemented.
- 544. Implementation of the integrated package of national productivity improvement models, and more particularly the Case Management Model, will be useful vehicles for change.
- 545. Change will need to the subject of visible and demonstrable high level support and be driven by the CM District Commander.
- 546. Dynamic and innovative transformational leadership will be a critical and integral component for creating the required change. There will be a need to develop and communicate a clear and compelling purpose and vision and forge alignment and sustained commitment of staff to the common goals.
- 547. An initial requirement will be to convince staff of the need for change. This will require effective leadership and support from key managers and staff within the district together with the provision of accurate reliable information on which staff can make informed and intelligent judgement in relation to the need for change. Information will need to be disseminated as widely and fully as possible.
- 548. At all levels there must be openness, transparency and honesty. Staff, and where necessary key stakeholders, should be included in genuine participation. Feedback must be encouraged and heeded. Feedback and review of progress will need to be constant and readjustments made to the change programme where necessary.
- 549. Leadership of the change will be aided by the identification of effective change leaders from throughout the district. The ability to bring together a team of influential members and work as a core transformation team, continuing to build urgency and momentum around the need for change will be important. Baseline data and progressive milestones will need to be established.
- 550. The leadership group will need anticipate and manage resistance to change and remove barriers to the change process.
- 551. Disruption in the delivery of services must be minimised, public confidence in the police retained and the confidence of police members in the change programme created and maintained.
- 552. Stakeholders will need to be kept informed on a continuous basis.
- 553. Management discussions in CMD, led by the District Commander and based on the initial draft of this document, have been positive and some innovative responses to the recommendations are already emerging.

15 RISK AND RISK MANAGEMENT

554. Risks will be monitored throughout the implementation programme and swift remedial action taken when needed. The following risks and mitigation strategies are indicated.

RISK	MITIGATION STRATEGIES
Business as Usual Additional staff allocated and nothing changes. Continue with business as usual. Productivity levels are not increased. Proactive policing is not fully embraced. Crime & demand rises. Another large addition to staff required in 2- 3 years time.	Powerful signals to be sent that this is a major step change and not business as usual. Reinforced by the initiatives listed in 14.7 above and Change Facilitation Programme.
 Short term Comfort Provision of a large number of additional staff provides comfort. Short term view taken by staff. Relax. Confirms wisdom of seeking additional staff rather than increasing productivity or reducing demand. Staff fail to accept vision for December 2011. Productivity agenda not embraced. Culture Change That the culture is heavily engrained. Fail to effect the required culture change. 	 Communication: Help staff develop own understanding of need for change. Sufficient information for staff to make informed intelligent judgement re need for change. Adequate, accurate, timely information. Participation and Involvement. Genuine participation. Staff understanding of need for change and feel part of the programme from the beginning and have less uncertainty about the impact on them and their activities. Staff are often specialists in their own Area of work and able to make valuable contributions. Case Management Model will provide a vehicle for culture change.
Management Skills Staff do may not have the management skills to address the required changes in management processes.	 Education. Will assist in creating understanding of the need for change but also equip with new skills required. Facilitation and Support Training in new skills together with "at elbow" support.
Failure to resource all elements of Plan The transformation plan is an integrated package with dependencies between initiatives. Failure to resource all elements of the plan may cause a breakdown in dependencies.	Many initiatives in the package do not require additional resourcing Care will need to be taken to ensure that initiatives that do require additional resources are accurately resourced.

16 RECOMMENDATIONS

16.1 Overview

- 555. The recommendations are aligned with the three strategic goals of Community Reassurance, Policing with Confidence and Organisational Development and with outcomes of confident, safe and secure communities, less actual crime and road trauma, fewer victims and a world class Police service, referred to in 2.7.
- 556. Also noted in 2.7 is reference in the Strategic Plan to terms including "best practice", "best use of current resources", "more effective and efficient", "better understanding of Police processes", "trust and confidence in us" and "sound return on investment".
- 557. In accordance with the principles indicated in Figure 1, paragraph 37, the model adopts a three fold approach to solutions. Initiatives are specifically tailored to address the present CMD circumstances and are not a 'one size fits all districts' design. CMD population is increasing at a faster rate than the remainder of New Zealand. The three fold approach is designed to address the longer term needs of the district.
- 558. The package of initiatives designed to achieve the desired state indicated in 14.9 above has been agreed to by the CMD District Commander. The recommended plan is in the form of an integrated package of initiatives, all of which interact and support each other to develop synergies. Not all of the initiatives require additional resourcing. There is no single solution to the situation and to resource one or two strands of the plan would not be helpful. The approach adopted has been to develop a detailed plan then accurately resource that plan.
- 559. Details of recommended staffing allocations and implementation of the recommendations will be presented in phase two of this project in accordance with the Terms of Reference.

16.2 Specific Recommendations

- 560. The recommendations are designed to build on the initiatives already in place in the district and upon the commitment and good will of CMD staff. The district is well placed for the implementation of the recommended three-fold approach to improving performance.
- 561. There will be a need for commitment to derive the full benefits from the wide range of potential features inherent in the national productivity models.
- 562. Specific recommendations are presented in the schedule below. In relation to each item in the schedule, reference is made to the section of the report that provides further explanation of the recommendation. The schedule also indicates with an "X" the initiatives that require additional staffing.
- 563. The recommendations are presented in the form of a detailed Transition Plan.

Recommendations:	Refer.	Add Staff	Accept Rec?
IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT:			
1. A future state for the CMD be defined in terms of results and management processes to be achieved by the 31 December 2011.	14.7		YES / NO
2. A District Vision for future state December 2011 be developed.	14.7		YES / NO
 A three-fold approach be adopted for achieving the future state, namely by (a) increasing productivity (b)reducing demand and (c) provision of additional staff. 	14.7		YES / NO
4. The CMD District Commander enters into a SLA contract with the Deputy Commissioner to deliver the desired future state by due date in consideration of the provision of the additional staff	14.7		YES / NO
5. Senior CMD Managers enter into PMS contracts with the CMD District Commander to deliver relevant elements of the future state by due date.	14.7		YES / NO
A clear messages be sent to staff that this is not "business as usual" with the comfort of extra staff but is in fact a major step change.	14.7		YES / NO
	447		
7. A concerted Strategic Productivity Improvement Agenda be launched.	14.7 14.2		YES / NO
 (a) Increase managerial awareness and focus on productivity (b) Divide on the initiative elements in the element of the element of CMD staff. 	14.2		
(b) Build on the initiatives already in place in the district and the goodwill and commitment of CMD staff			
(c) Roll out of National Intelligence Model to drive CMD policing I, improve the focus on serious offenders, locations and targets, improve the sharing of information and break down silos.	11, 14.5		
(d) Complete implementation of the Case Management Model. Ensure the potential of the model to increase productivity & support the Productivity Agenda with management information data is maximised.	12		

Recommendations:	Refer.	Add Staff	Accept Rec?
Crime Reporting Line: Focus on maximising the productivity improvement potential	12.1		
Case screening and Prioritisation Model: """"""	12.2		
File Management Centre:	12.3	X	YES / NO
Investigation Support Unit: " " " " "	12.4	X	YES / NO
Criminal Justice Support Unit: " " " " "	12.5	X	YES / NO
Management Information – identification and generation of relevant data to support the new management model	12.6		
Identification of precise management data requirements in relation to results and the drivers of productivity	14.2(k)		
Early collaboration with Case Management Project team to design required reports to support the agenda	14.2(k)		
Improve the collection, management and utilisation of relevant data	14.2(h)		
(e) Case Management to act as vehicle for the significant step change.	14.6		
(f) Optimise the effectiveness of the Access and Communications Strategy	13		
Extend the National Intelligence Application capability in reducing repetitive and bureaucratic work	13		
Optimise the Public Facing Initiative	13		
(g) Optimise the effectiveness of the Mobility Strategy	13		
Introduction of PDA to facilitate direct communication with police applications	13		
Extend the "Car as police Station" concept to increase officer time on the road and in the community	13		
(h) Increase effectiveness of Field Technology and in particular Automatic Number Plate Recognition	13		
(i) Develop Operational Plans for all key operational functions (proactive and reactive)	14.3		
Coordinate the activities of more than 130 operational units and remove parochial silos.	14.3		
Operational plans to be focused on drivers of district policing priorities and aligned to optimise synergies	14.3, Fig 4		
• Develop outputs for each plan together with process and output KPIs (Process KPI focus on drivers of productivity)	14.3, Fig 5		
Provide operational staff with a sense of strategy and common purpose and remove parochial silos	14.2(d)		
Plans linking activities with outputs, district priorities and policing outcomes. Shared goals	14.3, Fig 6		

Recommendations:	Refer.	Add Staff	Accept Rec?
 Operational staff implementing operational plan to be involved in the development of the plan 	14.2(d)		
Move from a traditional command & control management style with task orientation to a process orientation	14.2(c)		
(j) Improve accountability and district accountability mechanisms	14.2(e)		
Accountability for results	14.2(e)		
 Accountability for managerial duty to scrutinise cost effectiveness and maximise productivity 	14.2(e)		
Develop a district culture of accountability. Move staff mindset from seeking additional resources to productivity	14.2		
Optimise the collection and management of management information data through Case Management	14.2(h)		
• Facilitate accountability by providing managers with unfettered use of their own resources – reduce draw off.	14.2(e)		
(k) Move towards fact based management	14.2(f)		
Optimise capabilities of Case Management, NIA and Business Objects to provide management of data	14.2(h)		
Identify best practices and develop consistency of tactics and deployment across policing Areas	5.6		
Bench-marking of best practice across Areas	5.6		
(I) Shift staff mindset from reactive policing to proactive/reactive policing	14.2		
(m) Lower district staff abstraction rates	3.1		
(n) Reduce the rotation of staff through units to ensure rotation is not exacerbating problems relating to staff inexperience.	2.9		
(o) Improve the productivity of specific functions as listed in recommendations 10 – 19 below	13.6		
 In relation to the "Response" Group, improve the role clarity, the productivity and the capacity to reduced demand for reactive services. 			YES / NO
(a) Provide additional staffing		X	YES / NO
(b) Improve the productivity of the Group by optimising the benefits of the Productivity Improvement Agenda [7 above] and more specifically to this Group:	3.5-3.7		
 Deploy the additional staff to 'special' shifts in a manner designed to (a) move towards matching supply with pattern of demand and (b) increase their focus on elements of Community Reassurance listed in Section 7. 	3.8 & 7		

Recommendations:	Refer.	Add Staff	Accept Rec?
Redesign existing rosters to deliver a pattern of supply that more closely resembles the pattern of demand	3.5		
Create a better balance between summer and winter leave to more approximately match higher summer demand	"		
Move from using minimum standards to a requirement to maximise the number of 'car units' produced per shift	"		
Define process KPI focused on the drivers of productivity and benchmarking these across district policing Areas	"		
Optimise the benefits of improved case management generated by the Case Management Model	"		
Create a better balance of Constable experience between "Response" and "Non Response" groups in the district	"		
 Use CARD, Business Objects and Case Management data to increase understanding of the response process, particularly capacity, capacity headroom and patterns of demand. 	3.5		
 Using the electronic data to support fact based management and accountability in relation to the group 	"		
(c) Improve clarity in relation to the wider role of this group in Community Policing and Community Reassurance.	3.8		
Label the group with a name other than "Response" that more accurately reflects the intended wider proactive role of the group in relation to Community Reassurance.	"		
 Develop output KPIs that accurately define the wider role of the group, and with KPIs focussing on the drivers of productivity. 	" & Fig 5		
(d) Improve clarity in relation to the management/leadership of the group to facilitate accountability for results and productivity improvement and stronger more effective leadership of the group	3.1		
9. In relation to CMD investigation services, increase the productivity of the reactive and proactive elements.			YES / NO
(a) Optimise the benefits of the Productivity Improvement Agenda (7) and more specifically:			
Optimise the benefits of Case Management in the effective and efficient management of cases	12		
(b) Establishment of a Serious Crime Section in Crime Services to increase the relevant skills levels in a dedicated unit.	4.11	X	YES / NO
(c) Minimise draw off of staff from other investigative functions facilitating improved accountability in those functions	4.11		
(d) Rationalise categories of crime attended by District Crime Services and Area CIB using Case Management criteria	4.10		
(e) Increase staffing levels of Area GDB Inquiry offices with additional enquiry staff to each Area	"	X	YES / NO
(f) Rationalise categories of crime attended by Area CIB & Area Enquiry offices using Case Management criteria	"		
(g) Case Management to increase productivity of case management process in CIB and GDB Enquiry Offices	"		

	Recommendations:	Refer.	Add Staff	Accept Rec?
(h)	Reduce the regularity of rotation of staff through investigation units to improve experience levels	2.9		
(i)	Embrace the principles of Community Policing and Community Reassurance, for example:	4.13 & 7		
	More active involvement in Intel led "whole of policing" approach to identified community problems	4.13 & 6.2		
	Strategic use of high media profile following successful investigation to create community reassurance	4.13		
10.	Launch a rigorous offensive on CMD District Organised Crime, Gangs, Drugs and Alcohol Abuse			YES / NO
(a)	"Prevent, combat, reduce, disrupt & dismantle" organised crime, gangs and drugs (National Business Plan Theme)	9.1		
	 Implement relevant strategies including CHIS Strategy, Illicit Drug Strategy, the Police National Crime Strategy to 2011 and the Investigative Services Framework. 	"		
	Implement relevant parts of the Electronic Crime Strategy.	"		
	 Optimise the benefits of the National Intelligence Model to increase investigation effectiveness and improve information sharing between district and AMCOS 	"		
	Increase productivity of investigations using Case Management Model	12		
	Improve information sharing between AMCOS and CMD			
	Increase staffing of Organised Crime Unit to address Organised Crime, Gangs and Drugs	9.1	X	YES / NO
	Explore means of AMCOS Drugs and Organised Crime units providing greater support to level 2 operations	"		YES / NO
(b)	Reduce alcohol related harm by focusing on key intervention/preventative tools. (National Business Plan Theme)	9.2		
	 Develop District Alcohol Plan based on the Police Alcohol Action Plan and relevant revised sections of Policing Manual to minimise alcohol related crime/crashes. Plan to include outputs.(measurable to extent possible) 	"		
	Optimises the benefits of National Intelligence Model	11		
11.	The effectiveness of efforts to reduce Family Violence be improved			YES / NO
(a)	Prevent and reduce actual family violence (National Business Plan Theme)	8.3		
	Increase Area priority top 10 cases to top 20	"		

Recommendations:	Refer.	Add Staff	Accept Rec?
Increase Area capacity to deliver increase in top 20 priorities	"	Х	YES / NO
Extend ownership of the family violence problem beyond the dedicated units.			
Use additional staffing to improve the quality of initial attendance at family violence events	"		
Improve the quality of follow-up interventions	"		
 Develop District Family Violence Plan based on the national Prevention and Reduction of Families Violence Doc. Plan to include measurable outputs 	"		
Prepare for implementation of "on the spot protection orders".	"		
Address the strong linkages to themes such Alcohol misuse.	"		
12. The performance of District Road Policing Services be improved to equal or better national averages			YES / NO
(a) Increase staffing level for Serious Crash Unit to render the units self sufficient and accountable. Cease draw off of response and Area tactical groups to carry out follow-up serious crash investigations	8.1	X	YES / NO
(b) District Commander contracted to equal or better the national average in road policing performance [14.8]. D/C to decide whether current centralised/decentralised model or a centralised model will provide him with greatest confidence in achieving this.	"		
(c) Either centralise the Road Policing functions. District Road Policing Manager accountable for equalling or bettering the national average in road policing performance with full control of district road policing resources.	"		
OR			
(d) Retain decentralised Model and in relation to STU	"		
District Road Policing Manager to define strategic deployment and outputs	"		
District Commander and Road Policing Manager to review performance.	"		
 Area Commanders contracted to deliver percentage of target of equalling or bettering national averages on key performance indicators [14.7]. Increased Area accountability. 	14.7		
STU to be dedicated solely to road policing functions and deployed to road policing hot spots	8.1		
Identification of best_practice and benchmarking of key performance indicators across Areas	"		

Recommendations:	Refer.	Add Staff	Accept Rec?
 Reduce rotation of staff through STU. Optimise investment in training. Select members who are interested in Road Policing. 	ű		
13. Increase the impact of CMD Community Policing (CP) and Youth and Community Services on reducing demand for reactive services			YES / NO
(a) Promote the profile of Youth and Community (Y & C) to that of mainstream policing	6.2		
Consider appointment of Y & C Manager to the District Leadership Group	"		
Cease draw off of Y & C staff and vehicles to other functions.	"		
 Render the services more tangible with Operational Plans and defined outputs. 	"		
 Develop means of evaluating impact of Y & C services in reducing demand for reactive Services. 	"		
 Longer term placement of staff in Y & C staff. Increase community familiarity. Remove barriers to long term placement 	ű		
Change mindset towards proactive policing. Change facilitation programme. Promote CP vigorously in CMD	6.2 & 14.2		
(b) Increase visibility of district policing services as indicated in 7.4	7.4		
(c) More effective Community Policing and Y & C functions	6.2		
Y & C staff linked to tasking and coordination process in same manner as Tactical units	6.2		
Community Policing Teams comprising composite members of Youth, Community Constables and Ethnic Liaison Officers under a Y & C Sergeant Intel led and addressing identified community problems	6.2 & 7.8		
 Intel informed tasking and coordination of "whole of policing" teams (involving staff from a range of policing functions to problem solve an identified community issue 	"		
(d) Increased dedicated high visibility/problem solving capability	7.8		
Increase the resourcing of mobile police station.	"	X	YES / NO
Dedicated Problem Solving Teams (In preference to Beat Constables)	7.8(a)	X	
 Either an additional dedicated Community Policing Team (as described in "c" above) to each Policing Area and focused on geographic area or community of interest OR 	7.8 (b)		
 A dedicated Problem Solving Team attached to Tactical Group in each Area focused on problem type (eg Alcohol) and changing as priority crime or problem type changes. 	7.8 (c)		

Recommendations:	Refer.	Add Staff	Accept Rec?
 Team Policing to deploy as Intel led problem solving for 2 days in mid week 	8.3 & 7.8		
(e) Increase Airport Police staff to meet CAA Regulations and National Aviation Security Programme requirements and increase visibility to 12 Million travellers annually.	8.2	X	
(c) Maximise the opportunity to promote public assurance through proactive use of media	7.6		
(e) Maximise the benefits of the National Intelligence Model for receiving, processing and dispensing intelligence	7.5		
(f) Maximise the benefits of the Access and Communications models to improve access to Police services	13		
(g) Area Y & C services	6		
 Increase the opportunities for positive interactions with children and youth in the Community (Strong recommendation from Community focus group. Youth only see Police in an enforcement role) 	6.2		
 YES to press for entry into low decile schools that have not been receptive to YES visits 	"		
Develop consistency of service delivery across Areas. Identify best practice and benchmarking across Areas	"		
(h) Consider new recruits direct to Y&C Services for period rather than direct to reactive services	"		
(i) Appointment of Ethnic Liaison Officers to each Area. Deployment based on ethnicities in each Area	"	X	YES / NO
(j) Establish a Youth Action Team at Papakura. Currently the only Area without a team	"	X	YES / NO
(k) Additional Youth Aid officers will be required to cope with downstream impact of additional staff	6.5 & 10.1	X	YES / NO
14. The impact of the Area Tactical groups be enhanced.			YES / NO
(a) Improve the productivity of the Group by optimising the benefits of the Productivity Improvement Agenda (7) and more specifically to this Group			
(b) Minimise draw off of tactical staff to support response functions – facilitate increased accountability for unit functions	3.5 & 5.6		YES / NO
(c) Develop consistency of service delivery across Areas. Identify best practice. Benchmark across Areas. Supported by data from Case Management	5.6		
(e) Deploy dedicated Problem Solving Teams focused on problem types as listed in recommendation 13(d).			

Recommendations:	Refer.	Add Staff	Accept Rec?
15. A strategy be developed to improve staff "engagement" and retention.	14.2(j)		YES / NO
Potential improvements arising from the paper include:	"		
Presentation of a positive image of CMD workplace	"		
Vision of Transition Plan as an exciting place to work and advance career	"		
Task orientation to a more rewarding process orientation	"		
Staff able to see where they a making a difference. Clear simple link between activities and policing outcomes	"		
Market the district internally	"		
16. The downstream impact of the additional staff be addressed			
(a) Additional staffing for custodial services	10.1	X	
(b) Additional staffing for Police Prosecution Services	10.1	X	
(c) Additional staffing for Youth Aid Services (referred to in recommendation 13(k))	6.5		
17. The Transition Plan be effectively implemented.			YES / NO
(a) Develop and implement a formal Change Facilitation Programme	14.8		YES / NO
(b) Demonstrable and visible high level support for change and effective transformational leadership	"		
(c) Development of Communication Plans for staff, Partnerships and key stakeholders.	"		
(d) Adjust the District HQ Structure	"		YES / NO
 Intelligence Model to report directly to District Commander for first 12 months of operation 	"		YES / NO
Reduce direct reports from 14 to 7	"		YES / NO
Develop easily recognisable leadership group and allow District Commander leading change management	"		
(e) Use Case Management as a vehicle for change	"		
(f) Imbed the above initiatives into the 2009/10 CMD District Business Plan	"		YES / NO

APPENDICES

Appendix 1:	Terms of Reference
Appendix 2:	Additional Staff Placements over Last 3 Years
Appendix 3:	
Figure 4 -	Policing Priorities, Drivers and Operational Plans
Figure 5 -	Framework for Development of Individual Operational Plans
Figure 6 -	Relationship - Operational Plans to Policing Outcomes
Figure 7 -	Relationship - Operational Plans to National Planning Framework

APPENDIX 1

Terms of Reference

17 December 2008

PLANNING FOR MORE POLICE IN COUNTIES MANUKAU

Introduction

Counties Manukau District Police has received considerable investment in staff and resources in recent years. Since the year 2000 staff numbers have increased by over 40%. Innovations like the Criminal Justice Support Unit have helped the District to work more efficiently while initiatives like the introduction of a mobile police station and cross-agency work targeting at-risk youth and young offenders have made a difference. Despite this the District faces constant pressure from rising crime and urgent calls for service.

The Government has committed to provide a priority boost of 300 new frontline police to the Counties-Manukau district by the end of 2010.

In recognition of this, the Commissioner of Police has initiated a planning process to ensure Police management and staff are best placed to utilise the new resources and deliver on the high expectations the public rightly have of their police.

Overarching Purpose

In relation to the Counties Manukau policing environment, define the current state (A) in measurable terms; similarly define the desired state (B) and develop a policing model designed to move from state A to state B on a designated time line.

Objectives

Within the context of the strategic direction of the New Zealand Police and the distinctive external operating environment of the Counties Manukau district:

Phase One

- 1. Evaluate the extent to which the following features of the Counties Manukau policing model create value in addressing crime and social demands.
 - Operational strategies/programmes/initiatives (SPI) addressing policing priority including, police visibility, family violence, non domestic violence, youth, alcohol/drugs, community assurance and other priority areas that are identified.

- Joint government, local body and community partnership SPI addressing policing priorities
- Emergency and non urgent response SPI.
- Crime Services, crime tools and district utilisation of specialist functions including fingerprints and DNA.
- The implementation of national SPI including reassurance policing, the Intel model and access, communication and mobility issues.
- Supervision, management and the annual planning process.
- Resource allocation and optimisation.
- 2. Develop a recommended policing model, including an integrated operational plan, for the Counties Manukau District.

Phase Two

- 3. Secure the approval of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, Operations for the recommended Policing Model and Plan.
- 4. Develop a recommended resourcing and implementation plan for the approved Policing Model and Plan.

Background

- 4.1 Counties Manukau deliver policing services in an extremely complex operating environment where results are suboptimal on many performance metrics compared with other districts despite the committed efforts of staff. Crime in the district is increasing at a faster rate, or declining at a slower rate in some categories, than in other districts and resolution rates across all categories remain substantially below the national average. In particular, total crime has increased by 14.4% over the past 5 years against a national decrease of 2.3%. Violent crime has increased by 60% over the same period against a national increase of 26% and with a resolution rate of 70.6% against a national rate of 79.2%.
- 4.2 Family violence comprises 47.5% of all grievous assaults, 65.5% of serious assaults and generates 33% of the top 20 Priority 1 calls for service.
- 4.3 The last three years has seen a significant increase in the numbers of youth gangs and youth gang related crime with twelve youth gang related homicides and a significant number involving grievous bodily harm. This increase has resulted in significant community concern. Concern escalated this year with a number of homicides of vulnerable small retailers during robberies of dairies and liquor outlets and has been further exacerbated by an increased number of handbag robberies of women, one resulting in a homicide.

4.4 The high demand for priority 1 and 2 response places the District under huge pressure in terms of being able to respond to all requests for assistance in a timely manner The district experienced 24,689 P1 events in the past year - 17.5% of the national total. Comparative response times for P1 events are indicated in the following table.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE 2008 – CALENDER YEAR TO DATE				
Unit attend within 10 minUnit attend within 15 minUnit attend within 20 minNot attend within 20 min				within 20
Counties Manakau	54.8%	71.2%	79.5%	20.5%
National Ave	66.3%	81.4%	87.2%	12.2%

- 4.5 Currently 900 CIB investigation files and 100 child abuse files remain unassigned.
- 4.6 The district has the lowest average length of service nationally. Due to the volume of serious crime, Crime Squads are able to attend only the most serious incidents, leaving relatively inexperienced GDB staff to respond to incidents beyond their experience and generally with relatively inexperienced supervisors.
- 3.7 Over recent years it has been necessary for staff from other districts to assist the district with spikes in homicide investigations and also with the clearing of the resulting backlog of routine investigation files. It is of concern that this is a repetitive process.
- 4.8 Concern is expressed in relation to the standard staffing formulas when applied to a district operating in an environment with distinctive characteristics including:
 - Intergenerational unemployment
 - Intergenerational gang membership
 - High levels of alcohol and drug abuse and dependency
 - Rapidly growing youth population against the national trend.
 - Disproportionately high youth population.
 - 2.1 times the national percentage of decile 1 and 2 schools.
 - Poor levels of educational achievement. High truancy rates.
 - Youth inactivity and boredom.
 - More than 35,000 working aged residents receiving central govt funded benefits.
 - Strained resources amongst partner agencies.
 - Few social services and community support structures.
 - Family and individual involvement with multiple government agencies.
 - A population increasing at more than double the national rate.
 - Ethnic diversity, with only 60% of residents born in NZ, more than 1 in 4 identifying with pacific ethnic group (4 times the national average) and with twice the national average identifying as Asian.

Scope of Project

The project is about:	Project is not about:
Being outcome and value focussed	Cost cutting or reduction in resources
Police visibility	Changes in the basic nature of existing structures
 Community responsiveness, community engagement and partnerships. Optimising the utilisation of the skills and the potential for community involvement Community assurance, visibility and accessibility, Responsiveness to Maori, 	The personal commitment of staff
Establishing relevant metrics defining:The current Counties Manukau state A andThe required Counties Manukau state B.	One size fits all districts
• Developing a policing model for the district designed to move the metrics from A to B on a designated timeline.	Blaming others for lack of performance
 Recognising that: Value is a factor of quality and cost. Strategy is a process of value creation. 'Implementation' is the converter of strategy to value. Value creation is a continuous and adaptive process. Value is subjective and therefore must be viewed from the perspective of the community. 	Simplistic "silver bullet" solutions.
 Identifying/confirming policing priorities for the district and key drivers 	Recommending new strategies, policies or priorities simply to indicate the need for change.
 Identifying current district operating SPI Determining the clarity of focus, alignment & coordination of the operating SPI on specific policing priorities. Evaluating the value created by these SPI individually and collectively. 	Ignoring the flow-on effects of policing and any changes to policing on local government, ngo and central government agencies.
 Identifying current Community Policing (CP) SPI Determining the clarity of focus, alignment & coordination of the CP SPI on specific policing priorities. Evaluating the value created by these SPI individually and collectively. 	Reinventing the wheel on work done around the district components of the National Intelligence Centre
Alignment of operating and CP SPI,	Turning back the

 Integration & synergies. Confirming that existing resources are being optimised Clock on implementation of the crime Reporting Line for the district The development of optimum mixes of value creating district SPI (Operating & CP) focussing on specific identified policing priorities designed to move from state A to state B. Ensuring that the potential for the Intel Led Policing Strategy to create value in driving the policing model is optimised. Ensuring that the potential for national facilitating SPI to create value is optimised and integrated within the policing model. Ensuring that structures and processes maximise value creation in moving from state A to state B Precisely resourcing the policing model, including issues relating to marginal productivity at varying additional resourcing levels Precisely resourcing the policing model, including issues relating to marginal productivity at varying additional plans and that appropriate accountabilities are in place. Develop Outcome KPIs Develop Outcome KPIs Developing a structured set of strategy-based KPIs flowing from the outcome KPIs Ensuring that management, direction and coordination of the selected SPI is dynamic. Ensuring that management, direction and coordination of the selected SPI is dynamic. Insuring that management, direction and coordination of the selected SPI is dynamic. Simplicity, clarity, and focus. 		[_]
district SPI (Operating & CP) focussing on specific identified policing priorities designed to move from state A to state B.beyond those already committed or promised• Ensuring that the potential for the Intel Led Policing Strategy to create value in driving the policing model is optimised.Promoting processes at odds with the case management project now underway.• Ensuring that the potential for national facilitating SPI to create value is optimised and integrated within the policing model.Ignoring substantial place in recent years• Ensuring that structures and processes maximise value creation in moving from state A to state BPortraying current individual efforts as flat-footed• Precisely resourcing the policing model, including issues relating to marginal productivity at varying additional plans and that appropriate accountabilities are in place.Creating a report to sit on the shelf• Develop Outcome KPIs bevelop Outcome KPIsDevelop Outcome KPIsCreating a report to sit on the shelf• Ensuring that management, direction and coordination of the selected SPI is dynamic.Reference to the potential impact of additional prosecutions on downstream agencies		implementation of the Crime Reporting Line
Strategy to create value in driving the policing model is optimised.at odds with the case management project now underway.• Ensuring that the potential for national facilitating SPI to 	district SPI (Operating & CP) focussing on specific identified policing priorities designed to move from state	beyond those already committed or
create value is optimised and integrated within the policing model.plans and strategies that have been put in place in recent years• National SPI include Case Management Strategy and 	Strategy to create value in driving the policing model is	at odds with the case management project
creation in moving from state A to state Bindividual efforts as flat-footed• Precisely resourcing the policing model, including issues relating to marginal productivity at varying additional resourcing levelsCreating flow-on problems for other partners in the criminal justice sector.• Ensuring that the selected SPI are precisely coordinated and integrated within Business Plans and/or operational plans and that appropriate accountabilities are in place.Creating a report to sit on the shelf• Develop Outcome KPIs • Developing a structured set of strategy-based KPIs flowing from the outcome KPIsCreating and aligning resources and SPI to strategic results.• Ensuring that management, direction and coordination of the selected SPI is dynamic• Reference to the potential impact of additional prosecutions on downstream agencies.	create value is optimised and integrated within the policing model.National SPI include Case Management Strategy and	plans and strategies that have been put in
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and integrated within Business Plans and/or operational plans and that appropriate accountabilities are in place.sit on the shelf• Develop Outcome KPIs • Developing a structured set of strategy-based KPIs flowing from the outcome KPIs • KPIs linking and aligning resources and SPI to strategic results.sit on the shelf• Ensuring that management, direction and coordination of the selected SPI is dynamic.sit on the potential impact of additional prosecutions on downstream agencies	relating to marginal productivity at varying additional	problems for other partners in the criminal justice
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the selected SPI is dynamic. • Reference to the potential impact of additional prosecutions on downstream agencies	 Developing a structured set of strategy-based KPIs flowing from the outcome KPIs KPIs linking and aligning resources and SPI to strategic 	
prosecutions on downstream agencies		
Simplicity, clarity, and focus.	• •	•
	Simplicity, clarity, and focus.	

Project governance

Project sponsor:

Rob Pope, Deputy Commissioner, Operations

Project Steering Committee:

• Steve Shortland, Assistant Commissioner, Auckland

- Mike Bush, District Commander, Counties Manukau
- George Fraser, District Commander, Auckland
- Bill Searle, District Commander, Waitemata
- Ted Cox, Commander AMCOS
- Community Representative
- Police Association

Project team:

Neville Stokes, former Detective Superintendent: Project Manager

Contributors:

- Steve Hinds, Superintendent NHQ: Coordinator
- Nicole Frost, Strategic Analyst, CM: Problem and Causal Factors
- Matt Arnold-Kelly Senior Sergeant, CM: Police Interviews 15 19 Dec
- Denise Traill, Senior Sergeant, CM: Police interviews 15 19 Dec
- Hirone Waretini, Senior Sergeant Auck District: 15 19 Dec
- Heather Wells, Manager Road Policing CM: Road Policing
- Bruce Simpson, PNHQ: Optional staffing formula
- Mike Fulcher: Community Consultation COP & partnerships
- Jason Hewitt: Report on COP & community partnerships
- Win McDonald:External evaluation of district COP, partnerships and SPI

Support provided by:

- Gavin Jones: Case Management Programme of Work
- Murray Mitchell: Access and Communication Strategy and Mobility
- Mark Evans: Intel Led Policing
- Wayne Annan, GM:HR, PNHQ Liaison with service organisations

Project Plan Outline

The project will be carried out in four phases

Phase One: Project Set-up

Given the proximity to Christmas it has been necessary to commence the operation while completing the project set up.

- Securing/researching existing documentation and seeking additional briefing papers from selected groups to facilitate drill down in staff interviews in Phase Two. Briefing papers due 10 December.
- Commence community consultation process.
- Research to identify all existing district SPI and their relationship to existing policing priorities to facilitate staff interviews.
- Initial draft of problem definition, causal factors flowing to initial identification of policing priorities by 10 December to facilitate staff interviews. [Draft to be completed and formalised in Phase Two]

Phase Two: Data Gathering

- Individual and group interviews of a significant sample of CM district Police and the neighbouring district commanders between 15 – 19 December. Interviews not completed and those that are identified during analysis will be completed in January. Interviews carried out by N Stokes and three others.
- Completion of formal environmental scan report re problem definition, causal factors and policing priorities incorporating feedback from other activities in Phase two.
- Complete community consultation including results of 2008 "Citizen Satisfaction Survey". Completion of report re community consultation.
- Report identifying and describing all partnership SPI addressing each of the current district policing priorities and an initial assessment of the value created by each individually and collectively. Resources invested.
- Completion of detailed report re road policing
- Research re potential resourcing/staffing models.

Phase Three: Analysis and project report on policing model

- Receipt of report on district implementation of the COP strategy and partnership SPI. [Member best qualified to complete the report is not available prior to the 5 January.]
- Analysis and draft report on policing model
- Consultation re draft report
- Submission of final report

Phase Four: Resourcing and Implementation Plan

- Secure approval for policing model
- Develop draft Resourcing and Implementation plan for the policing model
- Consultation re draft Resourcing and Implementation plan
- Submission of report re Resourcing and Implementation plan

Note: It is envisaged that once the resourcing and implementation plan have been accepted and endorsed by the Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner then responsibility for implementation will be placed on District Commander, Counties Manukau under the oversight of the Assistant Commissioner Auckland, with regular progress reports to the Deputy Commissioner Operations.

Project Deliverables:

	Deliverable	Description	Schedule
1.	Project set-up complete	See Section 7, Phase One	10 December
2.	Completion of Data gathering	See Section 7, Phase Two [Report on optional resourcing/staffing models receive by 9 January]	23 December [2 weeks]
3	Analysis of data completed. Development of solutions	See Section 7, Phase Three	6 February [6 weeks] Less Xmas
4.	Draft report re policing model completed		27 February [3 weeks]
5	Consultation on draft completed [See also section 10 below]	Draft reported circulated to sponsor and steering committee for comment	6 March [1 week]
6	Final report on policing Model		13 March [1 week]
7	Approval for Policing	Approval by Commissioner and	20 March

	Deliverable	Description	Schedule
	Model	Deputy Commissioner	[1 week]
8	Completion of draft Resourcing and Implementation Plan		3 April [2 weeks]
9	Consultation on resourcing and Implementation Plan [See also Section 10]	Draft reported circulated to sponsor and steering committee for comment	10 April [1 week]
10	Final report on Resourcing and Implementation Plan submitted		17 April [1 week]
11	Resourcing and Implementation Plan approved	Approval by Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner	24 April [1 week]

Consultation with affected staff on Draft Reports

In the event that the recommendations from the project are likely to impact significantly on Counties Manukau district organisational structure, staffing or work practices affecting staff, additional time will be allowed in items 5 and 9 of the Project Deliverables to facilitate appropriate consultation with staff affected.

Reporting Plan

- Constant liaison with Sponsor and CM District Commander
- Report at 3 weekly intervals to Sponsor and Steering Committee on work completed in last 3 week period against milestones, work to be completed in next 3 week period against milestones, project issues and project risks.

Risk Management

Risk	Risk Mitigation
Misconceptions may arise in relation to the nature and intent of the project if left to informal staff communications channels	Early and effective Communications Plan
Resistance to the project: Staff concern for cost cutting, loss of resources, major structural changes or that the project will	Effective Communications Plan

Risk	Risk Mitigation
result in no significant improvement in the situation.	
Timing of completion of the project may not be consistent with potential resourcing opportunities	External expectations to be managed by Assistant Commissioner Auckland, District Commander Counties Manukau and Deputy Commissioner, Operations.
Failing to achieve milestones due to contributor reports not received by due date	Coordinator and District commander to monitor closely
Effectiveness of business as usual activities are compromised during the term of the project	 The project will place minimum burden on operational staff/activities during the interview process. Effective Communications Plan
Police member and community concern that their voice is not reflected in the project. Inability to consult with all staff and every community group within reasonable timeframe	 Interviews with key community partnerships will be completed District staff have considerable feedback from close ongoing liaison with the community A community survey, "Citizen Satisfaction Survey,2008" was completed earlier this year Availability of Gallup Police Engagement Survey results for District and Areas A significant sample of staff will be interviewed
Recommendations not achievable within current resourcing levels	 Recommendations to be based on precise assessments and evaluations. Resourcing options to be evaluated on receipt of report on policing model

Communications Plans

The following communications plans to be developed by Counties Manukau District Comms Manager in conjunction with Public Affairs Group, PNHQ:

- Internal Communication Plan addressing issues identified in risk analysis
- External Communications Plan

Approval

Sponsor:

R J Pope Deputy Commissioner, Operations 17 December 2008

APPENDIX 2: CMD GNI ALLOCATIONS LAST THREE YEARS

GNI Allocations	1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007	
Response & Invests	2x GDB investigators per Area	8
Organised Crime	2x Detectives Org Crime team	2
Child Abuse (CIB)	Cat team additions	2
Road Policing	Highway patrol	1
GDB	1x GDB for Let per Area	4
Crime Scene Attenders	4x W, 4x E, 3x C, 2x South	13
Family Violence	Area FV Coords	4
Area Tactical Coords	1x for each Area	4
Analyst	Assist. to DHQ Intell Manager	1
Problem Solving Team	Mobile Police Station	12
Patrol Group Const	2x W, 1x E, 1x C, 2x South	6
CIB	Additions to Crime Squad	5
Deployment Manager	1x Inspector position	1
Invest Support Unit	1x Admin Support position	1
Total GNI staff allocated 06/07		64

GNI Allocatio	ons 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008	
Community Policing	AimHi (Cops in Schools)	5
Community Policing	Youth Action Teams (YATs)	11
Community Policing	District Graffiti Officer	1
Invest Support Unit	Investigator	1
Road Policing	STU	1
Road Policing	Op Sniper (Boy Racer) Sgts	2
Road Policing	Camera car (Gnis ex Waitemata)	3
CJSU	Project implementation	7
Police employee	Admin Support	1
Total GNI staff allocated 07/08		32

GNI Allocatio	ns 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009	
Community Policing	ILO/PLO/ALO - Papakura	1
Youth Constables	YAS Officer - Papakura	1
Community Policing	Comm. Const Waiuku	2
Community Policing	O/C Station - S/Sgt or Sgt - Waiuku	1
Community Policing	Comm. Const Tuakau	1
Community Policing	Comm. Const Otara	1
Youth Constables	YAS Officer – Otara	1
Community Policing	Comm. Const Mangere East	1
Youth Constables	YAS Officer – YATs Otahuhu	2
Community Policing	Comm. Const Clendon	1
Youth Constables	YAS Officer - Manurewa	1
Community Policing	YATs Manurewa	2
Community Policing	South Asian (Indian) CLO - DHQ	1
Constables	SNEN Deployment Officers	2
Total GNI staff allocated 07/08		

