NEW ZEALAND POLICE
Ngā Pirihimana o Aotearoa

Armed Response Team Trial

Evaluation Report

EVIDENCE — BASED
POLICING • CENTRE

Authorship

Lead Author	Dr Robert Taylor, Evidence Based Policing Centre.
Contributing Authors	Staff across the Evidence Based Policing Centre.
Released by	Acting Assistant Commissioner Bruce O'Brien, Service Delivery.
Reviewed by	Acting Director Simon Williams, Evidence Based Policing Centre.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the following for their contributions to this report:

- The wider New Zealand public, who have given their feedback through the printed media, the Community Insights Survey, and the 'have your say' email address;
- AOS team members who took part in the trial, and provided feedback to the authors;
- PST, MRMs and AOS team members who took part in interviews and focus groups regarding the trial;
- Response and Operations Research and Evaluation (RORE) team, who provided data for the evaluation;
- Research First for facilitating the Community Insights Survey;
- The ART working group for their guidance;
- University of Waikato for their peer review of an earlier draft of this report;
- Communications Staff for their support of the trial; and
- Evidence Based Policing Centre (EBPC) for their support and guidance.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Table 4.8: Number of ART self-deployments broken down by priority code across the three trial districts.

Table 4.9: Number of tactics (not use of force) listed by ART members across the three trial districts.

Table 4.10: Number of other services ART provided broken down across deployment level.

Table 4.11: Number of other services ART provided broken down across deployment level.

Chapter 5

Table 5.1: Number of use of force events recorded in each of the three trial districts.

Table 5.2: Use of force events broken down by incident attended for each of the three trial districts.

Table 5.3: Number of use of force events involving each tactic type for each of the three trial districts.

Table 5.4: Firearm type used when presenting at offender for each of the three trial districts.

Table 5.5: Number of use of force events involving each ethnicity by tactic type.

Table 5.6: Number of use of force events involving each ethnicity for each of the three trial districts.

Chapter 6

Table 6.1: Officer Wellbeing Survey submissions broken down across district and workgroup. Only general duties staff from trial districts were expected to respond.

Chapter 7

Table 7.1: Number of media articles about Armed Response Team trials published online each month, including the total number of articles published, and the number of unique articles (excluding duplicate reprints).

Table 7.2: Breakdown of media article 'tone' by month. Note that some months include only a small number of articles published.

Table 7.3: Backgrounds of the key individuals providing contribution to the media articles. Percentage represents the proportion of all articles which included that contributor type. Note that as a single article could include multiple contributors, percentages do not add to 100.

Table 7.4: Frequency of themes across media articles. Percentage represents the proportion of all articles which included that theme. Note that as a single article could include multiple themes, percentages do not add to 100.

Chapter 8

Table 8.1: Percentage of individuals aware of the Armed Response Team trial by age and gender.

Table 8.2: Percentage of individuals that support the Armed Response Team trial by gender, region, and ethnicity.

Table 8.3: The effect the Armed Response Team trial had upon public trust and confidence by gender, region, ethnicity, and pre-existing level (percentage).

List of Figures

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Chapter 7

Chapter 8

List of Terms

Abbrev	Term	Definition
General		
AOS	Armed Offenders Squad	Specialist unit maintained in each police district to deal with people who are, or are believed to be, armed and a danger to themselves, the public or police.
ART	Armed Response Team	Team of specialist AOS personnel mobile and ready to respond with a range of tactical options to events where significant risk is posed to the public or police.
CAD	Computer Aided Dispatch	Computer systems used to record details of calls for service, and to dispatch and maintain the status or responding resources in the field.
CCA	Cordon, Contain, and Appeal	Main tactics used by AOS – cordon off the affected area, contain the offender(s), and appeal to them to surrender.
CARD	Communication and Resource Deployment System	Software, hardware, systems and infrastructure used by the New Zealand Police to provide resource deployment, operational communications and command and control services.
DAO	Duly Authorised Officer	Appropriately trained mental health professional authorised by Director of Area Mental Health Services to perform functions and exercise powers conferred by Mental Health Compulsory Assessment and Treatment Act.
DCC	District Command Centre	Operational command centre which ensures police staff are deployed to the right place at the right time to prevent crime and road trauma.
EBPC	Evidence Based Policing Centre	Joint partnership between New Zealand Police, the University of Waikato, ESR, and Vodafone New Zealand, which uses practitioner-based research, information, crime-science, theory, and problem-solving methods to inform practice, implement measures to prevent crime and improve allocation of police resources to better protect the public.
EoD	End of Deployment Form	Form designed for ART evaluation to collect additional information pertaining to the deployment activities of the ARTs, to be completed after each deployment.
GDB	General Duties Branch	Uniformed officers involved in general frontline policing duties.
GSMEAC	Ground, Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and Logistics, and Command and Signals	Process used for drafting written operation orders which can be used verbally in variety of emergency situations.
MPES	Māori, Pacific, and Ethnic Services	Division within New Zealand Police that works to enhance Police's leadership and commitment to responsive policy development and service delivery to Māori, Pacific, and Ethnic people.
NIA	National Intelligence Application	Main Police operational system for records and case management.
PCA	Perceived Cumulative Assessment	Officer's assessment, and continuous reassessment, of an incident based on information known about the situation and

		the subject's behaviour, using the TENR (Threat, Exposure, Necessity, Response) model.
PST	Public Safety Team	General Duties officers organised into teams to provide policing services within a District.
TOR	Tactical Options Report	Report of use of force/tactical options use(s), in accordance with reporting requirements.
3T	Turnover	Closure type code for incident involving vehicle or person stop.
Emergency Incident Priority Codes		
P1	Priority 1	Arrival time on scene within 10 minutes.
P2	Priority 2	Arrival time on scene within 30 minutes.
P3	Priority 3	Arrival time on scene within 24 hours.
Reportable Tactical Options Use		
	Firearm Presentation	Presenting a firearm at a person.
	Firearm Discharge	Discharge of a firearm at a person.
	Sponge Round	Point of aim, point of impact direct fire less lethal round.
	TASER Show	TASER presentation, laser painting or arcing
	TASER Discharge	TASER discharge with probes or contact stun.
	OC Spray	OC (Oleoresin Capsicum) spray bursts.
	Dog	Dog bites or other dog-related deployment injuries
	Baton	Baton strikes
	Empty Hand Tactics	Empty hand techniques (e.g., physical restraint, strikes) which can be used to distract or physically control a person, or for an officer to defend themselves or another.
Thresholds for Reasonable Use of Force		
	Cooperative	Willingly responds when approached.
	Passive Resistant	Refuses verbally or with physical inactivity.
	Active Resistant	Pulls away, pushes away, or runs away.
	Assaultive	Intent to cause harm, expressed verbally, through body language/physical action.
GBH	Grievous Bodily Harm or Death	Shows action intended to or likely to cause grievous bodily harm or death to any person.
AOS/ART Callout Levels		
	Blue Role	AOS/ART members wearing blue uniform in their business as usual (BAU) policing roles.
	Black Role	AOS/ART members in black uniform when operationally necessary. They must wear items of approved uniform to identify them to other police, members of the public and suspects.
Disposition Codes		

K1	Police Attendance Sufficient	Used for minor offences where there is no victim and no offender identified, and no further action is taken beyond attendance.
K3	No Offence	New information gathered before or at initial attendance provides evidence no offence occurred.
K6	Reported	Report to be taken related to offence, and at time no person had been arrested.
K9	Arrest	At least one person is arrested.
	Cancelled	Event closed without Police attendance due to change in circumstances.

Executive Summary

Introduction

New Zealand Police's Executive Leadership Board (ELB) approved a trial of Armed Response Teams (ARTs) across Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury on 30 August 2019; an initiative intended to improve safety, and feelings of safety, among the public and Police. The trial ran for a period of six months and was monitored by an ART Working Group established by the New Zealand Police National Response and Operations Group and made up of representatives from across the organisation.

This report provides an evaluation of the ART trial over the period 28 October 2019 (when ARTs became operational) to 23rd April 2020.

Evaluation Framework

The Evidence Based Policing Centre (EBPC) provides expertise in the development and application of evidence-based practice to drive improvements in policing. It was tasked with providing an evaluation of the ART trial independently from the National Response and Operations Group. The EBPC methodology and approach used in the preparation of this report has been independently peer reviewed, by the University of Waikato.

Evaluation of the ART trial focussed on the actual and perceived minimisation of risk to the public and New Zealand Police staff, while also assessing how ARTs were deployed and the tactics that were used. The evaluation adopted a mixed-method approach, drawing upon a range of quantitative and qualitative data. The core methods used included:

- Qualitative analyses of deployment data across districts and incidents responded to using unique 'End of Deployment' forms;
- Staff survey focussing on the real or perceived impact of ARTs on police safety;
- Staff survey focussing on the wellbeing of officers involved in, and supporting, ART deployment.
- Thematic analysis of written media, as an indirect measure of public opinion in order to identify themes and concerns from the public and community groups;
- A community insights survey to gauge wider knowledge of ARTs and their impact on trust and confidence in New Zealand Police;
- Internal focus groups with Police members across trial districts in order to examine perceptions and impacts of the trial within the operating environment;
- An overview of community feedback received through submissions made to New Zealand Police.

The evaluation focusses on quantifying, where possible, the actual and perceived minimisation of risk to the public and New Zealand Police staff, while also assessing how ARTs were deployed and the tactics that were used. It also considered, in a general sense, the wellbeing of general duties and ART members during the trial period. The core evaluation objectives were:

1. How were ARTs deployed and which tactics were used (Question 1 above);
2. What were the real or perceived impacts on officer safety in districts where ARTs were operating (Question 2 above);
3. What effect did the introduction of ARTs have upon general wellbeing in districts where ARTs were operating;
4. Was external trust and confidence impacted in districts where ARTs were operating (Question 3 above)?

Limitations

Before considering the main findings it is important to identify and acknowledge those factors that limit the scope of the evaluation.

Due to limited timeframes there are several caveats to be outlined. First, minimal lead in time limited the scope of the evaluation, the tools that were developed, and the breadth of surveying. Accordingly, some opportunities were missed to engage with community groups and key stakeholders. Notably absent from the evaluation is a satisfactorily detailed section on public and community experiences. Further work will be undertaken following release of this report and will involve significant investment in community focus groups across the three trial districts.

Second, application of a comprehensive Evidence-Based approach (a targeting, tracking, and testing framework) was not achievable in the trial timeframes. Chiefly, the trial was implemented based on an observed operational capability gap. Accordingly, it lacked clear and quantifiable metrics against which performance could be monitored. Moreover, where measures could be identified, significant time constraints imposed strict limits on what could be reasonably baselined and measured. Finally, the results were further impacted by low response rates against some of the evaluation tools. This reflects the complex and demanding operational environment our people work in but makes it challenging to draw firm conclusions from this data.

A complete list of key findings, as they relate to the central evaluation questions, are provided in **§ Key Findings and Observations.** A summary of the main findings is discussed next.

Summary of Main Findings

A number of key questions have been answered through this evaluation and are set out below:

How were ARTs deployed and which tactics were used?

In total, ARTs attended **8,629** incidents across the three trial districts. On average, it was found that **23%** of all incidents attended by ARTs were classified as critical (Priority 1) incidents, with the bulk of the attendances classified as Priority 2 events (**71%**). It was found that the average emergency response time for all ART units was **8 minutes**, though slightly longer response times were observed in Counties Manukau and Waikato which were likely an effect of deploying at times to incidents outside of their district and the geographical size of these Police Districts.

Firearms offences accounted for **2.6%** of all incidents attended by ARTs. On average **56%** of all firearms offences were coded as a critical incident. Firearm related demand did vary across the districts. In particular, firearms offences accounted for **6.6%** of all incidents attended in Counties Manukau, compared to **3.5%** of attendances in Canterbury, and **1.1%** of attendances in Waikato. Accordingly, Counties Manukau ART were nearly two times more likely to attend firearms related events than Canterbury ART, and over six times more likely than Waikato ART.

A quarter of all incidents attended by ARTs were 3T vehicle turnovers (**25%**) with a further **9%** accounted for by 5K: Bail Checks. Notably, of all 3T and bail check events attended by team across the three ART districts, Waikato ART initiated **84%** and **94%** of attendances, respectively. Next to these, the most attended incidents were 5F family harm investigations, which on average accounted for **8.6%** of all ART deployments.

Examination of end of deployment forms revealed that, on average, **67%** of ARTs deployed in an Assist Role - i.e., roles requiring no use of special tactics. Instead, teams most often provided general support to frontline

staff – which could simply be for safety and reassurance purposes – or the undertaking of general duties and prevention activities.

It was further discovered that ARTs self-deployed to incidents **66%** of the time, on average. However, self-initiated deployments were, in part, explained by requests from frontline staff and incidents where minimal frontline units were available to attend. Specifically, it was found that while frontline requests accounted for **15%** of all end-of-deployment submissions they accounted for **21%** of self-initiated deployments reported by ART Team Leaders. ARTs also responded to incidents where there were minimal - or in some cases no - frontline units available, self-initiating to attend these incidents **77%** of the time. In addition, it was found that approximately **10%** of ART Role deployments reported through end of deployment reports likely prevented an AOS callout.

In addition to their primary roles data indicated that ARTs served a number of additional operational purposes. Through examination of Team Leader comments it was found that ART members provided medical or trauma care in approximately **2% (n=35)** of all reported incidents. Evident also was that support from ARTs went beyond reassurance but that members also took the time to coach, mentor and instruct frontline staff.

Examination of use of force data revealed three critical findings. First, ART members used a reportable level of force on less than one percent (**0.57%;** n = 49) of all incidents attended. Accordingly, use of force by ART members was evidently rare. Second, ART members did not discharge a firearm at all. A total of five presentations were recorded: a Glock was presented on 3 occasions with an M4 Rifle presented on 2 occasions. Finally, TASER was the most common tactic used (**52%;** n = 29) though were only discharged on **2** occasions thereby indicating that TASER was predominantly used as a visual deterrent. Overall, the level of force applied by ART members tended to be toward the lower end of the tactical options spectrum. Statistically, Māori (**53%**; n = 26) and New Zealand Europeans (**41%**; n = 20) were represented in similar proportions when examining ART use of force data.

What were the real or perceived impacts on officer safety?

It is first noted that a formal impact assessment is not possible given the lack of comprehensive data available. Overall it was found that **82%** of Public Safety Team (PST) officers surveyed generally perceived incidents as safer when ARTs were present, with **85%** of ART members surveyed generally agreeing that they felt safer at the incidents they attended. However, it was also found that PST staff more strongly endorsed their perceptions of safety. Notably, it was found that **68%** of PST staff strongly agreed that they personally felt safer at incidents where ARTs were in attendance, though only **47%** of ART members responded similarly. Officers often linked the availability of additional staff that were tactically trained and knowledgeable to their enhanced perceptions of safety and efficiency. Moreover, these factors appear to have influenced how incidents were perceived to be have been handled, with **83%** PST officers noting that jobs were handled more efficiently with ARTs in attendance.

It was further found that de-escalation was not necessarily associated with safer and more efficient outcomes. Specifically, though **52%** of PST staff surveyed agreed that that ARTs de-escalated incidents, **37%** of officers neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement, with a further **10%** generally disagreeing. Similarly, **56%** of ART members generally agreed that the incident was de-escalated, though **41%** of ART members surveyed neither agreed nor disagreed. Detailed analysis of the data suggests that a primary factor driving increased perceptions of safety was principally the availability of additional skilled frontline resources and highly trained personnel rather than the specific tactical options available through the ARTs.

What effect did the introduction of ARTs have upon general staff wellbeing?

It was found that wellbeing was generally good throughout the trial. Overall, both AOS/ART members and PST staff reported low to mild levels of burnout, psychological distress, and perceived stress, with fairly high levels of general wellbeing. Furthermore, it was found that ART/AOS members and PST staff reported decreasing levels of burnout over the course of the trial, relative to baseline. One possible explanation for this effect is a general uncertainty and anxiety around the pending changes prior to the initiation of the trial that abated once officers became familiar with their new roles.

However, it cannot be concluded definitively that the trial did not have some effect upon officer wellbeing. For example, specific changes in wellbeing may not necessarily manifest (early) along the small number of dimensions considered here, and some effects may have been missed because of this. It is also the case that the small sample size limits the ability to conduct meaningful analysis.

What impact did ARTs have upon external trust and confidence in trial districts?

A national survey undertaken in February 2020 spoke to 574 individuals about their understanding and support for ARTs. Overall, **72%** of the participants surveyed nationally generally supported the ART trial, though support was split among those who strongly supported the initiative (**38%**) and those who simply supported the trial (**34%**). It was found that **7%** did not generally support the trial. However, a sizeable proportion of individuals were ambivalent about the trial (**14%**) with a further **8%** not knowing how they felt about it.

It was found that the deployment of ARTs *increased* trust and confidence in those who participated in the community insights survey. In total, **38%** reported having increased trust and confidence in New Zealand police after learning about the ART trial, with only **10%** reporting a decrease in trust and confidence. However, the majority of participants surveyed (**52%**) reported no change in their trust and confidence. Notably, those living in ART regions were more likely to support the trial (**76%**) than those living in non-trial districts (**68%**). Additionally, they reported having increased trust and confidence with New Zealand Police more often (**41%**) than those living in the rest of New Zealand (**36%**). Māori were more likely to feel less trust and confidence following the beginning of the trial. It was also found that those that typically had higher levels of trust and confidence more often reported increased feelings of trust, whereas those who had comparatively lower trust and confidence tended to report decreases in trust.

Although the sample was nationally representative, the overall size of the sample was small (n = 574). Accordingly, the resolution of the data was low which has necessarily precluded reliable comparisons being made between different groups and limited the ability to generate deeper insights in respect of some communities. In addition, survey data was collected using an online panel and survey tool which means only those who have access to a computer and are regularly connected to the internet could participate. Critically, the true impact of the trial on sentiment across all communities is difficult owing to the absence of a baseline survey conducted before the trial got underway, and the lack of insights available from specific groups that arguably felt most impacted by the trial. Ideally, gauging perceptions and levels of trust and confidence would have been measured 'before and after'. Instead, changes in trust and confidence were elicited on a retrospective basis and should be treated with some caution.

Summary of Additional Findings

A summary of additional findings that emerged throughout the evaluation is provided which further highlight lessons that can be drawn from the ART trial.

The operating environment

There was a consistent theme that ARTs brought greater experience and more 'tools' to call-outs which enabled them to be resolved faster and more safely. Data also suggests that ARTs likely prevented AOS callouts, highlighting the potential need for a faster tactical response, particularly in metropolitan areas. Furthermore, it is evident that frontline officers benefited from having ARTs in attendance as evidenced by the increased feelings of safety expressed by these officers. Indeed, feelings of safety were linked to having others present that possessed advanced knowledge and tactical capabilities. It was further found that ARTs offered mentorship and guidance to frontline officers. So while there were some concerns raised that frontline staff may become overly reliant upon ARTs, what generally emerged was an apparent desire for additional knowledge and professional development as a way of lifting staff confidence in their own capabilities.

Public Perceptions and Concerns

There has been ongoing public interest in the trial since it commenced in October 2019. Thematic analysis of media articles written during the trial period placed an additional lens over the trial and helped shape some of the public's perspective on the trial.

A central theme that emerged through the course of the trial was the lack of consultation, particularly with those Māori and Pasifika communities that felt they would be most impacted. It is clear from feedback received that many viewed the lack of early and meaningful consultation with the public, Iwi, and community groups as a significant issue, a threat to police legitimacy and a potential cause of future community tensions.

Additionally, the operational need for ARTs was regularly questioned by some members of the public, with many viewing the exact threat from firearms as a questionable operational justification. Some also did not view the Christchurch Mosque shootings as a justifiable reason for the implementation of ARTs. Others pointed out that the communities the police were supposed to be protecting had not been asked whether they wanted armed police patrolling their streets. In addition, concerns were regularly raised around the safety of those in mental health crisis, and the safety of Māori and Pasifika communities in particular.

Deployment Criteria

A principal finding was that the deployment criteria for ARTs was not sufficiently constrained nor clearly communicated to the public. Examination of the deployment data did not suggest that ARTs deviated from the criteria *per se*. What was evident is that high risk incidents and active armed offender incidents consumed a comparatively small proportion of ART resources, leaving open the question of how teams are deployed when not responding to such events. Though there was a desire to maximise the operational use of the units, the deployment criteria and standard operating principles were potentially drawn too widely, which meant the teams were often used in ways that did not align with their original intent, and the expectations of some members of the New Zealand public.

Some commentators felt the jobs that ART were attending were inappropriate and concerns were raised about ARTs being used for 'low risk' proactive patrolling and road policing, which appeared to contravene the originally stated function of ARTs.

This is consistent with evidence that indicates that the remit of ARTs had not been effectively communicated to the public. Of note, it was revealed that there was a general lack of public understanding around the parameters of the trial.

Concluding Remarks and Key Observations

Based upon the evidence collated throughout the evaluation process it is clear that ARTs were not a style of policing that some of the New Zealand public were comfortable with. These exist despite some clear and obvious operational and perceived safety benefits ARTs provided to frontline officers. Officers felt safer, they felt that incidents were dealt with more efficiently, they felt supported and received mentorship, and they perceived ARTs as a critical capability.

There were procedural and methodological limitations that severely limited any measurement of the actual impact ARTs had. Nevertheless, lessons can be taken away from the implementation of the ART trial and thereby provide future learning opportunities:

- There is no doubt that frontline staff felt safer and more confident in dealing with a range of crimes and critical incidents. ARTs played a critical role in this regard and in their absence alternative tactical options need to be explored. To ensure legitimacy and transparency, any alternative initiatives that explore frontline tactical options should be consulted on early with key external stakeholders and community representatives;

- The trial has further highlighted the need for effective communication when New Zealand Police are developing proposals that are likely to generate strong public interest. For example, the advantages of having additional police staff deployed permanently to the frontline with enhanced skills – for example in conflict resolution and first aid – has not been fully reflected in the public commentary that has accompanied this initiative;

- The ART trial has highlighted that the strong public interest in such matters is an opportunity to strengthen existing, and build new, partnerships;

- The trial impressed the need for ongoing engagement and consultation with subject matter experts in the planning, evaluation and implementation of police initiatives. Doing so will facilitate the identification of appropriate metrics and measures, the collection and establishment of baseline data, the ability to build comprehensive and robust evaluation frameworks, and appropriate tracking and monitoring of key performance measures;

- The trial further revealed the need for solid evidence-based frameworks when wanting to measure and/or determine the impact of an intervention/initiative. The evidence-based policing principles of targeting, testing and tracking were missing from the trial and it is recommended that this approach is more firmly adopted in setting up and implementing future operational trials.

Key Findings

Provided below is a list of the key findings as they relate to the central evaluation questions.

How were ARTs deployed and which tactics were used?

Key Finding 1: Over the trial period ARTs attended **8,629** incidents across the three trial districts.

Key Finding 2: ARTs were generally busiest during the weekend periods – particularly between the hours 2200 – 0100 – with busier periods also observed during 0900 – 1100.

Key Finding 3: Emergency (Priority 1) events accounted for **23%** of all incidents attended by ARTs.

Key Finding 4: The average emergency response time for all ART units was **8 minutes.**

Key Finding 5: Firearms offences accounted for **2.6%** of all incidents attended by ARTs, on average, with 56% of all firearms offences coded as an emergency event.

Key Finding 6: 3T: Turnovers accounted for **25%** of all ART attendances and 5K: Bail Checks accounted for **9%**.

Key Finding 7 The overall End of Deployment form compliance rate – with the exclusion of 3T and 5K incidents – was **34%**. Approximately one in every three incidents attended therefore had an associated EoD form. This does not mean details of individual deployments are missing, but detailed information, necessary to conduct a proper evaluation, are incomplete.

Key Finding 8: On average, **67%** of deployments reported through end of deployment reports were Assist Roles, with ARTs supporting general duties and prevention activities.

Key Finding 9: ARTs self-deployed to **66%** of the incidents reported on through end of deployment reports.

Key Finding 10: On average, **21%** of self-initiated deployments were because members were requested to attend by frontline units.

Key Finding 11: ARTs responded to events where there were minimal - or in some cases no - frontline units available, self-initiating to attend these events **77%** of the time.

Key Finding 12: Approximately **10%** of ART Role deployments reported through end of deployment reports likely prevented an AOS callout.

Key Finding 13: ART members provided medical or trauma care in approximately **2% (n=35)** of all incidents.

Key Finding 14: ART members provided frontline officers with tactical and technical training, indicating that their attendance extended beyond reassurance on some occasions.

Key Finding 15: ART attendances often provided assistance and reassurance to frontline officers and the demand for more advanced capabilities was fairly modest.

Key Finding 16: ART members used a reportable level of force on less than one percent (**0.57%**) of all incidents attended.

Key Finding 17: ART members did not discharge a firearm though **5** firearm presentations were recorded: a Glock was presented on **3** occasions with an M4 Rifle presented on **2** occasions.

Key Finding 18: A TASER was the most common tactic used (**52%**) though discharges were reported on only **2** occasions, thereby indicating that TASER was predominantly used as a visual deterrent.

Key Finding 19: The level of force applied by ART members appeared justified, proportionate, and tended toward the lower end of the tactical options spectrum.

Key Finding 20: It was found that ART Team Leaders exercised discretion in the carriage of firearms, opting to stow their Glocks when attending some incidents.

Key Finding 21: It was found that Māori and New Zealand Europeans were represented in similar proportions within the use of force data examined.

What were the real or perceived impacts on officer safety?

Key Finding 22: It was found that the sample sizes for both the Armed Response Team Officer survey and the Public Safety Team Officer survey were unsatisfactory given the timeframes available for completion (**§ 6.1. Officer Perception Surveys**).

Key Finding 23: The majority (**80%**) of respondents to the Armed Response Team Officer survey were from the Waikato district. Thereby, the sample for this survey was not adequately representative of all trial districts.

Key Finding 24: Of the PST officers surveyed, **82%** generally perceived incidents as safer when ARTs were present with **85%** of ART members surveyed generally agreeing that they felt safer at the incidents they attended.

Key Finding 25: Of the PST officers surveyed, **83%** generally agreed that jobs were handled more efficiently with ARTs in attendance.

Key Finding 26: It was found that de-escalation contributed toward, but was not a primary determinant of, increased perceptions of safety. Instead, the availability of additional tactical resources and highly trained personnel appeared to be a significant factor.

What effect did the introduction of ARTs have upon general wellbeing?

Key Finding 27: It was found that the number of Officer Wellbeing Survey responses from trial districts was variable - both from ART officers themselves and from frontline staff in those districts – which produced insufficiently representative samples for each group.

Key Finding 28: It was found that general wellbeing was good, with both AOS/ART members and PST staff reporting low to mild levels of burnout, psychological distress, and perceived stress, with fairly high levels of general wellbeing.

Key Finding 29: It was found that ART/AOS members and PST staff decreasing levels of burnout over the course of the trial, relative to baseline.

What impact did ARTs have upon external trust and confidence impacted in trial districts?

Key Finding 30: The deployment of ARTs *increased* trust and confidence in those who participated in the community insights survey which included participants from ART districts.

Key Finding 31: Māori were more likely to feel *less* trust and confidence following the beginning of the trial.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter Summary

This chapter provides a brief synopsis and background details around the Armed Response Team (ART) trial. The trial ran for a period of 6 months, starting 28 October 2019 and ending 26 April 2020, and was monitored by an ART Working group established by National Response and Operations. The Evidence Based Policing Centre (EBPC) was tasked with providing an evaluation of the trial independently from New Zealand Police's National Response and Operations Group. In essence, the trial adapted an armed response model similar to that used in the United Kingdom that saw mobile Armed Offenders Squad (AOS) members operating across Counties Manakau, Waikato, and Canterbury. The trial accordingly intended to investigate whether ARTs improve operational responsiveness, and the subsequent safety of both the communities and officers they protect.

The Christchurch mosque attacks surpassed the 1990 Aramoana Massacre as New Zealand's deadliest mass shooting. Despite the low frequency of such extreme events, it is essential that New Zealand Police remain capable to respond to critical incidents while also ensuring that communities feel safe. Perceptions of safety, along with the capability of police to reduce real or perceived threats, are critical in maintaining trust and legitimacy between communities and the Police. For these reasons, the requirement of highly trained specialists to respond, both quickly and effectively, to incidents that pose a significant threat to life is a legitimate one.

The operational demands of frontline staff are also shifting, particularly around encountering firearms. New Zealand Police is one of only four countries in the OECD that do not routinely carry firearms (the United Kingdom – excluding Northern Ireland – and Norway make up the others). Nevertheless, the decision to arm frontline officers has been the subject of ongoing debate and remains a controversial issue (Anonymous, 2019a, 2019b; Barry, 2019; Cook & Russell, 2019). Though similar debates have occurred throughout the United Kingdom and Norway, the discourse in New Zealand has predominantly been couched as a matter of police health and safety (Hendy, 2012).

In New Zealand, this issue has largely played out in the public arena and there is a frustrating lack of empirical research investigating how these factors interact. The research that is available, however, has not focussed on evaluating whether the arming of police represents the best approach to effectively reduce crime. This is largely compounded by most police forces throughout the world already bearing arms, providing little opportunity to observe and measure how changes in arming polices affect crime statistics. Instead, research has centred more upon the public response to firearms use and how this affects trust and confidence (Hendy, 2012; HMICS, 2014; Yesberg & Bradford, 2018). With respect to the latter, the literature is less equivocal. There is evidence that the increasing militarisation of police forces does not necessarily increase feelings of safety, particularly within ethnic and minority communities (Mummolo, 2018). In addition, there is the suggestion that armed police do not ensure that the public and police are safer (Cook & Russell, 2019) and evidence that armed police will resort to more extreme tactical options simply because they are available (Ariel et al., 2019).

Fundamentally, there are two issues that must be considered. The first is the need for Police to meet changing operational demands and address perceived issues of safety. The second concerns how any policy change around the use and/or carriage of firearms affects the relationship with the public and their perceptions

around safety. It is important to realise that these issues are intrinsically linked. The ability to provide an effective response will of course build trust and confidence with the public; however, if a change is made to the way New Zealand Police operate then it is absolutely necessary to consider how it might be perceived by the public.

1.1. Armed Response Team Trial

On 30th August, 2019, the Executive Leadership Board (ELB) approved a trial for Armed Response Teams (ARTs) in New Zealand. In principle, the trial sought to investigate whether ARTs improve operational responsiveness, and the subsequent safety of New Zealand communities and the Police officers who protect them.

A rapid and highly mobile response to critical, and potentially life threatening, incidents is a core operational capability for several international police forces. In essence, the integration of ARTs within the operating environment was based upon an armed response model similar to that used in the United Kingdom. Much like New Zealand, forces in the United Kingdom are unarmed, though employ specialist firearms officers capable of responding to high risk events. These officers are deployed in Armed Response Vehicles (ARV) which are on routine patrol throughout metropolitan areas. Within the New Zealand context, the trial proposed a slight reconfiguration to the operating procedures of New Zealand Police's armed branch (i.e., the AOS; the Special Tactics Group (STG) reflect a separate unit that are unaffected by the ART trial), having these officers on rostered mobile patrols rather than on call.

Historically, use of ARV-like capabilities in New Zealand have been limited. Since 2016 a quasi-ARV was operating across Canterbury wherein AOS members – embedded within Offender Prevention Team (OPT) – provided a number of supporting roles to frontline units, which included tactical assistance at high risk search warrants and for high risk offenders. In response to the March 15th events it was this quasi-ARV unit that enabled AOS members to rapidly arrive on the scene after first reports were received.

In the aftermath of the shootings, public perceptions around the ongoing deployment of the quasi-ARV were largely positive, and increased feelings of safety were experienced by police staff (New Zealand Police, 2019). Moreover, the deployment of quasi-ARVs produced examples that highlighted how less-than-lethal force can be used to resolve an incident; tactics that ordinarily are not available to frontline staff. These experiences may instil an intuitive sense that ARTs will improve Police response capabilities and safety; however, the use of ARVs in New Zealand to date have not been systematically evaluated by either New Zealand Police or any external body.

The necessity for the trial was, in part, driven by perceived changes in the operating environment. The New Zealand Police Association continue to call for the routine arming of Police as a matter of health and safety, citing the influx of illegal firearms throughout the country as a real and present threat to frontline staff (Anonymous, 2019a). The association's 2017 member survey indicated that, between the years 2015-2017, the number of officers threatened with a firearm rose by 38%. The survey further indicated that during the year 2017, one in five frontline officers were threatened with a firearm (21%); however, officers who were threatened did not report the incident approximately 36% of the time. Reported incidents rates will therefore underestimate the prevalence of gun crime in New Zealand.

Recent initiatives (e.g., Operation Gun Safe) have started to better quantify the prevalence of firearms in New Zealand, attempting to correct discrepancies between the reporting and recording of firearms related incidents within the National Intelligence Application (NIA; New Zealand Police Association, 2018). Since its inception in March 2019, over 2,200 events have been lodged, with approximately 40% of events resulting in the seizure of a firearm. In particular, the number of seizures from vehicle stops, search warrants, and family harm incidents, tended to corroborate previously anecdotal evidence that frontline staff increasingly

encounter firearms at these events (NZ Police, 2018a). Indeed, based upon the initial data it was found that Counties Manakau, Waikato, and Christchurch Canterbury accounted for 50% of all Operation Gun Safe notifications (i.e., notifications of seizures).

1.2. Overview of Trial

This section outlines parameters pertaining to the implementation of the trial. The overarching role of ARTs was to provide enhanced tactical support to frontline staff while also ensuring that districts continue to receive AOS support. The expectation was that ARTs assist in the apprehension of offenders that pose a significant risk to the public or staff.

1.2.1 Trial Locations & Time Frame

Armed Response Teams operated across three districts: Counties Manakau, Waikato, and Canterbury. These districts were selected because, collectively, they accounted for more than 50% of all Operation Gun Safe notifications (i.e., notifications of seizures). The trial ran for a period of **6 months**, beginning 28 October 2019 and ending 26 April 2020.

1.2.2 Team Configuration

ART vehicles were crewed by teams of 2-3 AOS trained officers. The ART role differed from the conventional AOS role in that ART members did not have to split their time with regular policing duties. That is, the ART role was a full time position whereas AOS operators work on a part time basis in their AOS role. However, although ART members were permanently deployed in their ART role, they were expected to conduct prevention activities in line with general duties policing. Additionally, ART members wore standard blue uniforms – as opposed to the black uniforms typically worn by AOS members – along with standard accoutrements. ART members, unlike frontline officers, had a standing authority for the carriage of a Glock 17 pistol. Members were also fitted with the Stab Resistant Board Armour (SRBA) with Body Armour Suit (BAS).

Unlike PST patrol cars, ART vehicles carried all AOS tactical options – this included 40mm eXact sponge round which are unavailable to frontline staff – along with a defibrillator and other emergency/first aid equipment to provide an improved level of immediate trauma response if required. However, in contrast to standard AOS practice, Bushmaster M4 rifles were not routinely carried on their person and were instead secured in the vehicles mobile armoury.

1.2.3 Deployment Criteria

The following roles and duties were expected to guide ART deployment activities:

1. Active Armed Offenders (AAO);
2. High risk events where a person poses a significant risk to the public, staff, or themselves;
3. High profile public events with an associated risk profile (e.g., APEC) or where appropriate and proportionate (in limited circumstances this may include events outside of the trial Districts at the discretion of the Commissioner of Police);
4. Apprehension of high-risk offenders and parole recall warrants;
5. Supporting staff in pre-planned and high-risk search warrants;
6. Emergencies where an enhanced trauma response is required;
7. Preventative policing activities; and
8. Daily tasking that had been assigned.

Unlike the UK's approved professional practice for deployment of authorised firearms officers, including mobile ARV units, criteria for this trial was broadly defined to maximise the value and support capability of ARTs.

1.2.4 Command and Control

It is expected that all ART staff report through to the ART Team Leader (TL), who in turn reports to the AOS Commander. The AOS Commander accordingly approves all tactical decision-making in accordance with current AOS protocols. However, ART TLs do have delegated authority from the AOS Commander to approve basic blue role deployments and are further authorised to undertake urgent action to prevent loss of life. Accordingly, circumventing the requirement to consult with the AOS Commander allows ARTs to provide an appropriate tactical response, and potentially mitigates the requirement for a full AOS callout. Incidents requiring more complex tactics, or more staff, will require approval from the AOS Commander.

1.2.5 Handover Policy

Given the expressed purpose of ARTs is to provide a rapid armed response capability it was necessary to ensure that teams remained available to attend to high risk events. Accordingly, ART staff were not expected to routinely undertake certain operational/administrative roles, such as: scene guards, file holders as investigators, completion of Traffic Crash Reports (TCRs), or hold ownership of high priority offenders.

1.2.6 Officer Training

It was expected that ARTs operate in accordance with the AOS standard operating procedures (SOPs). Given this expectation, all team members were required to have a current AOS qualification. No additional training was required beyond this.

1.2.7 Use of Force

All ART members must adhere to the use of force policy set out by New Zealand Police. Application of force should be guided by an officer's threat assessment (TENR) and Perceived Cumulative Assessment (PCA) with the level of force guided by the Tactical Options Framework (TOF). However, the legal authority to use force is governed by statute, and any force used must be necessary, proportionate and reasonable. Any use of force not authorised by law, or is excessive, cannot be legitimised by adherence to the TOF. All use of force events were reported in the Tactical Options Report (TOR) database.

1.3. Report Structure

The remainder of this report is structured as follows: **Chapter 2** outlines the key evaluation objectives and methodology; **Chapter 3** provides an analysis of deployment data and the incidents attended by ARTs; **Chapter 4** provides examines deployment data collected from team members; **Chapter 5** provides an analysis around use of force and tactical options data; **Chapter 6** discusses result from public perception survey and officer wellbeing surveys; **Chapter 7** provides a thematic analysis of media coverage and discusses result from public perception survey; **Chapter 8** discusses result from public surveys that examines whether the trial affected trust and confidence; **Chapter 9** covers data from focus groups held with ART members; and finally, **Chapter 10** concludes the report and summarises key findings in relation to each of the evaluation aims.

Chapter 2: Evaluation Framework & Methodology

Chapter Summary

Evaluation of the ART trial focussed on the actual and perceived minimisation of risk to the public and New Zealand Police staff, while also assessing how ARTs were deployed and the tactics that were used. The evaluation adopted a mixed-method approach, drawing upon a range of quantitative and qualitative data. These included analysis of deployment data and incidents attended by ART members, surveys and interviews with ART members and frontline staff in trial districts, analysis of media coverage, and a national survey to examine public opinion and knowledge around the ART trial. Although the evaluation considered a broad range of data sources a number of limitations preclude any strong conclusion being drawn about the effectiveness of ARTs. In particular, significant time constraints imposed strict limits on what could be reasonably baselined and measured nor could any recommendations around a national implementation of ARTs be made.

This chapter provides an overview of the methodologies used in the evaluation of the ART trial. It lists the intended aims of the evaluation, data sources, and collection methods used to address these aims.

2.1. Evaluation Scope, Aims, & Limitations

The underlying intent of the ART trial was to improve safety, and feelings of safety, among the public and police staff. Originally, it was intended that the evaluation consider the following five key points (New Zealand Police, 2019):

1. How were ARTs deployed and which tactics were used;
2. Whether officers felt safer in the districts where ARTs were operating;
3. Whether external trust and confidence was impacted in districts where ARTs were operating;
4. What would a fit for purpose ART model look like nationally; and
5. What were the impacts on key business targets for New Zealand Police?

The Evidence Based Policing Centre (EBPC) was tasked with providing an evaluation of the trial independent from New Zealand Police's National Response and Operations Group. Initial discussions with the ART Working Group, however, indicated the intended start date left little time to build a comprehensive evaluation framework around the trial and therefore could not robustly evaluate each of the key questions proposed above.

Application of a targeting, testing, and tracking framework (Sherman, 2013) was not feasible. Chiefly, the trial was based on a perceived operational necessity rather than a clearly targeted problem. Accordingly, the trial lacked clear and quantifiable metrics against which performance could be monitored. Moreover, where measures could be identified, significant time constraints imposed strict limits on what could be reasonably baselined and measured. It further lacked defined control and treatment groups.

These limitations mean the evidence attainable would be insufficient to justify a nationwide roll out of ARTs and the EBPC could not make any conclusions on the overall effectiveness of ARTs within the wider operational context. Examination of resource and staff allocations were also limited. Owing to personnel constraints it was expected that ART officers remain available for AOS deployments when not on ART shifts, should they be

required. However, the evaluation could not provide comment on what an optimal allocation of AOS staff and resources ought to look like. Additionally, the suitability of the ART vehicles was not evaluated.

Instead, the evaluation focusses on quantifying, where possible, the actual and perceived minimisation of risk to the public and New Zealand Police staff, while also assessing how ARTs were deployed and the tactics that were used. It also considered, in a general sense, the wellbeing of general duties and ART members during the trial period. Accordingly, the evaluation is best viewed as a descriptive device that places a lens over the trial, thereby providing an opportunity to reflect and potentially provide insights into how ARTs (or any replacement capability) could operate in the future.

With these in mind, the core evaluation objectives were:

5. How were ARTs deployed and which tactics were used (Question 1 above);
6. What were the real or perceived impacts on officer safety in districts where ARTs were operating (Question 2 above);
7. What effect did the introduction of ARTs have upon general wellbeing in districts where ARTs were operating;
8. Was external trust and confidence impacted in districts where ARTs were operating (Question 3 above)?

The sections that follow detail how these objectives were evaluated and the methods used to do so.

2.2. Framework Additions

During the course of the trial several *ad hoc* analyses were added to the evaluation framework. First, owing to the ongoing media attention the trial had gained, a thematic analysis of written media was undertaken. Though this can only indirectly measure public opinion, the intention was to identify particular themes – and indeed concerns – from the public and groups. Accordingly, it provides an additional narrative to help build context around how the trial was received by the public (**§ 2.2.6 Media Analysis**).

The second was a survey to gain community insights around the ART trial. This piece of work sought to gauge how knowledgeable individuals were about ARTs and whether the use of these teams affected their trust and confidence in New Zealand Police. It surveyed a representative sample of New Zealanders while also including a booster sample for Māori to ensure adequate numbers for this demographic were obtained (**§ 2.2.7 Community Insights Survey**). A series of focus group sessions were also conducted with internal groups across the three ART districts. This provided an opportunity to examine perceptions from those immediately involved in the trial, but also those who were not – e.g., Māori Responsiveness Managers (**§ 2.2.8 Focus Groups**).

Finally, during the course of the trial New Zealand Police offered the opportunity for individuals to have their say about ARTs by submitting emails to haveyoursay@police.govt.nz. Though it was not originally part of the evaluation framework, it was hoped that a text based analysis of the submissions could be completed for publication in the final report. However, owing to the overwhelming number of submissions received this was not possible given current timeframes. As of last count, some **~4,000** emails had been received – the bulk of which arrived following the end of the six month trial period – and they continue to arrive. An analysis of these submissions will be completed in the near future.

Methodology

The evaluation applied a mixed-methods approach, utilising robust statistical methods, where possible, along with qualitative data obtained through interviews and surveys. The intent was to provide as complete a picture of the trial as possible given the resources and data available.

The evaluation can be broken down into an *operational* and *perceptual* component. The operational component chiefly concerns ART deployment activities, including which tactics were used, on whom, and the events that created the highest demand for ARTs, for example. This component relied more heavily upon descriptive statistics and some statistical modelling of deployment data. The perceptual component focussed more upon feelings and attitudes toward safety and wellbeing and relied upon survey and interview data.

2.3.1 Incidents Attended

These records were supplied to the EBPC by the Response and Operations: Research and Evaluation (RORE) team. The records cover all unit deployments where the ID of the attending unit belonged to an ART. These records do not indicate the specific capacity in which the ART were deployed, only that the unit attended, or were dispatched to attend, the event. The data does permit a high level analysis around the type of incidents ARTs have attended and the priority of each event. It further allowed for a description of how deployments were distributed across days, weeks, and months. It is from this that potential high demand times can be identified which could be used to refine rostering of patrols in the future. The findings from this analysis are discussed in **Chapter 3**.

2.3.2 End of Deployment Form

The End of Deployment (EoD) form was designed to collect additional information pertaining to the deployment activities of ARTs over and above the basic information provided by CARD. In particular, it asked for details around the type of deployment, the role ARTs assumed, incident location, the type of tactics required, the Perceived Cumulative Assessment (PCA), and how the incident was resolved. Given the ART deployment criteria it was necessary to collate this information without having ART members complete a full AOS deployment report. Accordingly, the form was designed to have a similar look and feel to AOS deployment reports but collated operational information about deployments that historically would not have required submission of an AOS deployment report.

For all non-AOS jobs; i.e., jobs where ARTs have subsumed that role or are providing tactical support and assistance – it was intended that ART TLs submit an EoD form in its entirety and provide full deployment details. If, however, ARTs attended an incident that reached the threshold for a Blue or full Black AOS callout then the EoD form collected only superficial information because full details could be obtained from the AOS deployment report.

All EoD event numbers were first cross-referenced with the list of incidents ARTs attended. For all matches – i.e., events that had both a CARD record and an EOD form – closure and result codes contained in the EOD form were changed to align with the CARD data. This ensured a degree of consistency between the two datasets. All matches were subsequently classified as *CARD validated*. For all non-matches, a manual search was required. Non-matches often occurred due to omission and/or transposition of figures contained within the CARD identification number. Accordingly, partial matches must instead be sought which took considerably more time[1]. This approach, albeit incremental, was usually successful. The findings from this analysis are discussed in **Chapter 4**.

2.3.3 Use of Force

Use of force data was provided by the Response and Operations: Research and Evaluation (RORE) team and was drawn from Tactical Options Report (TOR) database. Following any use of force ART officers were required to submit a TOR form. This form requires officers to self-report any use of force and consists of a combination of multi-select options and free text fields. It asks for details around the officers PCA, along with situational

[1] There were, however, a small number of submissions that simply could not be matched due to a) the supplied event number was not included in the deployment records; b) no event number was supplied in the EoD form at all; or c) the field had been populated with text that could not be used to match events.

details, including details of the offender, the location, and the officer's risk assessment. Given that the form does ask for offender demographic data some analysis may be undertaken around offender ethnicity. However, it must be noted that the tactical options report provides only a drop down menu that permits a singular choice from a limited number of options. Accordingly, ethnicity is officer-defined and should be treated with some caution. The findings from this analysis are discussed in **Chapter 5**.

2.3.4 Officer Perception Surveys

Officer perception surveys were designed to measure perceptions around officer safety and the effectiveness of ARTs. The survey was prepared by the EBPC and reviewed by the ART Working Group. Surveys were completed online and hosted on Survey Monkey. Each survey collected basic demographic information and consisted of a combination of closed-form questions, requiring a response on a 5-point Likert scale, and open-ended free text questions. Completed surveys were sent to the EBPC Evaluation Team for coding and analysis.

Initially, the surveys were intended for three separate workgroups: Armed Response Team officers, Public Safety Team officers, and communications staff involved in ART deployments. It was expected that, following the cessation of any ART deployment, or call for service, that a representative from each group fill out a survey. However, monitoring of survey submissions indicated that communications staff were not well represented. This was attributed to the role communications staff served which made collection of survey data quite impractical. Consequently this group was not included in the final analysis of survey data. The findings from this analysis are discussed in **Chapter 6**.

2.3.5 Officer Wellbeing Survey

The Officer Wellbeing Survey was primarily targeted toward ART and PST staff working in trial districts. That being said, it was expected that all AOS members – i.e., members within all districts – complete the survey so as to provide a comparison group. The intention therein was to compare the wellbeing of ART officers – who must also fulfil their AOS duties – against the wellbeing of AOS officer's in non-participating districts. Frontline officers in trial districts were also asked to complete the survey, providing a second comparison group.

It was important to track whether reported wellbeing changed in any substantive way over the course of the trial. To accommodate this, the survey was administered at three points in time:

1. A baseline survey implemented prior to the commencement of the trial;
2. An interim survey implemented at the mid-point of the trial period; and
3. A final survey implemented following the completion of the trial.

The Officer Wellbeing Survey was prepared by the EBPC and approved by the ART Working Group. Surveys were completed online and hosted on Survey Monkey. Each survey consisted of 30 questions designed to assess four dimensions relating to officer wellbeing: General Wellbeing, Psychological Distress, Burnout, and Perceived Stress. Each dimension was derived from the following existing inventories:

General Wellbeing

General wellbeing was measured using the World Health Organisation- Five Well-Being Index (WHO-5) and is a short self-reported measure of current mental wellbeing. Since its first publication in 1998, the WHO-5 has been translated into several languages and has been validated on a number of clinical and non-clinical populations. The scale has demonstrated validity as a screening tool for depression and has been reliably used as an outcome measure in both clinical trials and in applied research settings (see Topp et al., 2015).

Psychological Distress

The Kessler-10 (K10) is a short self-report measure of non-specific psychological distress in the general population, based on questions about the level of nervousness, agitation, psychological fatigue, and

depression. The measure has been validated on both clinical and non-clinical populations and has adequate reliability and validity (for example, see Furukawa et al., 2012).

Burnout

The Maslach Burnout Inventory (MBI) is a self-report measure relating to occupational burnout. It measures three dimensions of burnout, each measured using a single sub-scale: emotional exhaustion, depersonalisation, and personal accomplishment. The inventory has been used widely across a number of occupations and exists in various forms and has adequate reliability and validity (see Wheeler et al., 2011). For the present survey burnout is measured using a modified version of the emotional exhaustion subscale.

Perceived Stress

The Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-10) is a self-report measure that assesses the extent to which one's life is perceived as stressful. The scale has been broadly applied and is a common tool in the assessment of non-specific perceived stress. The scale was originally constructed with 14 items though the shorter 10 items version has satisfactory reliability and validity (see Taylor, 2015).

Completed surveys were sent to the EBPC Evaluation Team for coding and analysis. The findings from this analysis are discussed in **Chapter 6**.

2.3.6 Thematic Analysis

A thematic analysis of print media relating to the Armed Response Teams trial was undertaken to examine the arguments and opinions presented through media and provide additional context around how the public reacted to the trial. Methods and results relating to this piece of work are discussed in **Chapter 7**.

2.3.7 Community Insights Survey

New Zealand Police has an ongoing relationship with an external research group – Research First – who were contracted to conduct a national survey designed to assess the publics' knowledge and perceptions of the ART trial, along with external trust and confidence. This survey was designed in consultation with the EBPC and was undertaken during February 2020. Methods and results relating to this piece of work are discussed in **Chapter 8**.

2.3.8 Focus Group

The EBPC conducted a series of focus groups and interviews using a structured thematic framework. This approach encourages open discussion while focusing topic points to key evaluative themes. Research was undertaken in each of the districts where the trial took place to identify perceptions across the districts. The findings from this analysis are discussed in **Chapter 9**.

2.3. Data Collection

To facilitate data collection, links to the EoD form and Officer Perception Survey were provided within the Checkpoint Application, which can be installed on all New Zealand Police mobility devices. Wellbeing surveys were accessed via an emailed link and passcode that were sent out prior. The link remained valid for a period of one week, after which the survey closed.

2.4. Statistical Analyses

All analyses and figures were generated using the statistical software R (R Core Team, 2019), noting that the following packages were used relied upon heavily for analytical purposes: Tidyverse (Wickham et al., 2019); lme4 (Bates et al., 2015); ordinal (Christensen, 2019). Where applicable, statistical tests are detailed in the *Technical Appendix*. To maintain readability, only *p*-values are recorded within the main text; accordingly, full

statistical reporting is similarly left to the *Technical Appendix*. For all null hypothesis testing the threshold for significance was fixed at the conventional level of $\alpha = .05$. Bonferroni corrections were applied for multiple comparisons.

2.5. Ethical Considerations

The evaluation was guided by the Code of Professional Standards and Ethics set by Royal Society of New Zealand Te Aparangi. Where data was collected from participants – whether survey or interview – all were informed of their right not to participate, or to withdraw consent. Participants were further informed how their data would be used in the report. Participants were also informed that no identifying information would be used in any report published pertaining to the evaluation of the ART trial.

Chapter 3: Analysis of Deployment Data

Chapter Summary

This chapter summaries deployment data provided by RORE. Chiefly, the chapter focusses on incidents that were attended and whether deployment activities aligned with the deployment criteria set forth by the ART Working Group. It also considers deployment volume and demand across various event types. A breakdown of volume by time is also provided, highlighting points in time where demand was particularly high. In general, overall deployment volume varied considerably across the trial districts. A large proportion of ART activity involved preventative policing and family harm investigations, with road policing, enquiry/search warrants, and mental health events also driving demand. Emergency and high-risk events accounted for a smaller proportion of ART activity. Emergency responses were timely averaging 8 minutes across all districts. The gamut of incidents that ARTs attended was notably diverse though did not necessarily contravene the deployment criteria. Instead, the data suggest that district-wise application of the criteria was somewhat variable.

This chapter explores the deployment data provided by RORE. Principally, it attempts to characterise the deployment profile of ARTs while also examining whether their activities complied with the deployment criteria set forth by the ART Working Group (**§ 1.1.3 Deployment Criteria**).

3.1. Deployment Volume

This section considers the total number of events that ARTs attended during the trial period. This is defined as the number of unique CARD event numbers that have been listed against an ART call sign. **Table 1.1** provides a district breakdown of the total number incidents ARTs attended. In total, ARTs attended **8,629** incidents across the three trial districts. Deployment volume varied significantly across the three districts. Waikato ART attended **5,046 (58%)** incidents – the greatest number by some margin – with Canterbury and Counties Manukau attending **2,282 (26%)** and **1,301 (15%)** incidents, respectively.

Per month – with the exclusion of October 2019 as this was only a partial month – **1,200 – 1,500** incidents were attended by ARTs. On the aggregate, November 2019 – January 2020 recorded higher deployment numbers than the latter half of the trial period. Notably, deployment numbers were at their lowest during

Table 3.1: Number of incidents attended by ARTs and broken down across the three trial districts. Numbers are based upon the number of unique CARD event numbers.

Month	Canterbury	Counties Manukau	Waikato	Total
October 2019	61	33	178	**272**
November 2019	416	255	895	**1,566**
December 2019	374	278	915	**1,567**
January 2020	386	260	841	**1,487**
February 2020	356	165	705	**1,226**
March 2020	377	200	708	**1,285**
April 2020	312	110	804	**1,226**
Total	**2.282**	**1.301**	**5.046**	**8.629**



Figure 3.1: Time series of incidents attended by ARTs across each trial district. Light blue lines are the number of daily incidents attended. The dark blue lines denote the trend line fit using local regression. The shaded regions indicate the lockdown period imposed during the government response to COVID-19 pandemic.

April 2020; a likely effect of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, Waikato ART experienced an upturn in deployments during April relative to the previous two months (see **§ 2.2.15 COVID-19 Pandemic Response**).

A finer breakdown of the deployment data is provided in **Figure 3.1**. Here the number of incidents attended (daily) by each team is mapped out across time. The profiles for each district again vary considerably for example, during the first half of the trial, Waikato ART attended upwards of 60 incidents per day on three separate occasions. Similarly, Counties Manukau experienced peaks – albeit lower – during the same period. In general, both these districts attended a higher number of incidents during the first few months. However, the trend lines[2] in both districts appear to undergo a downturn during January 2020 which persisted into February. In Counties Manukau there was a fairly consistent decrease whereas Waikato dipped initially before flattening out.

Conversely, Canterbury were comparatively consistent across the trial period, varying between 10-20 incidents a day. Interestingly, during the COVID-19 lockdown Counties Manukau attended fewer incidents – initially dropping just after the beginning of lockdown – though Waikato ART were trending upwards during this period.

[2] The solid blue trend line was estimated using a locally weighted least squares (LOESS) regression with the span parameter fixed to .1.



Figure 3.2: Incident attended per hour, broken down across day of the week and each trial district. Light blue lines are the number of daily incidents attended. The dark blue lines denote the trend line fit using local regression. The bold horizontal lines indicate the average number of incidents attended for each weekday.

3.1.1 Peak Times

A further breakdown is provided in **Figure 3.2**. Here deployments have been broken down by day of the week and hour for each district. Examination of trend lines highlighted a regular peak that occurred in the morning. There was, however, a general tendency for the peak to shift slightly as the week progresses – from about 0800 earlier in the week to around 1000 later in the week. This peak was followed by a second, typically larger, peak in the afternoon. Similarly, this peak also shifted later in the week – from approximately 1500 to between 2000 – 0000 during the weekend period. In terms of volume, the secondary peaks during the weekend periods were observably larger in magnitude, relative to the earlier morning peaks.

In further assessing the effect of day, the horizontal lines in **Figure 3.2** denote the average number of incidents attended for each day of the week. Considering first Counties Manukau and Waikato, both attended a higher number of incidents over the weekend period. In Waikato the increase was mostly confined to Saturday and Sunday, with Counties Manukau also attending higher numbers on Friday. Each district also had evident lulls during the week though occurring at different times. Lower attendances were recorded over Monday and Tuesday in Counties Manukau whereas Waikato dipped over Thursday and Friday. Quite separately, Canterbury ART were consistent in their attendances throughout the week, dipping slightly on Thursday and elevating only on Sunday (these shifts likely reflect natural variation, though).

Table 3.2: Top ten incident codes attended by ARTs, broken down across the three trial districts. Codes are ordered with respect to grand totals. Numbers in parentheses indicate district-wise ordering.

Closure Type Code	Canterbury	Counties Manukau	Waikato	Total
3T: Turnover	297 (1)	64 (7)	1834 (1)	**2195**
5K: Bail Check	39 (-)	7 (-)	741 (2)	**787**
5F: Family Harm	253 (2)	181 (1)	312 (3)	**746**
2W: Arrest Warrant (Other)	185 (3)	76 (4)	205 (4)	**466**
1C: Car/Person Acting Suspiciously	164 (5)	108 (2)	134 (8)	**406**
4Q: Enquiry/Investigation	168 (4)	70 (5)	162 (6)	**400**
3530: Disorder	116 (6)	54 (9)	100 (9)	**270**
3M: Directed Patrol	11 (-)	56 (8)	194 (5)	**261**
1U: Traffic Offending	75 (8)	31 (-)	134 (7)	**240**
6820: Firearms Offences	79 (7)	86 (3)	58 (-)	**223**

It ought to be noted that these averages are a fairly crude index and belie the inherent cyclical patterns in the attendance data. Nevertheless, the data do suggest that ARTs were generally busier during the weekend periods – particularly between the hours 2200 – 0100 – with busier periods also observed during mid-to-late morning most days.

3.2. Incidents Attended

Table 3.2 lists the most common events attended by ARTs (a full breakdown of all incidents attended is provided in **Appendix A**). Event codes are ordered with respect to the aggregated totals (i.e., the far right column). Note that the numbers in parentheses indicate the district-wise ranking for each incident. Events with (-) next to it accordingly designate that the event was not among the top ten incidents attended within district. For example, bail checks were the second most attended event across all three districts (**9%**). However, these events were far less common in Canterbury and Counties Manukau. Instead, the overall ranking of this event was driven by Waikato ART who accounted for **94%** of all bail checks attended by ARTs. Alternatively, firearms offences were attended less often overall, yet it was the third most common event attended by Counties Manukau ART. **Figure 3.3** (on the next page) displays the top ten incidents attended within each district.

Both **Table 3.1** and **Figure 3.3** reveal a sizeable number of *field events*[3], particularly in Waikato. A quarter of all incidents attended by ARTs were 3T: Turnovers (**25%**), though **84%** of these were attended by Waikato ART. These events also accounted for over a third (**~36%**) of incidents attended in Waikato. Comparatively, 3Ts accounted for roughly **13%** and **5%** of the events attended by Canterbury and Counties Manukau, respectively. Also high among the incidents attended were family harm investigations. These events placed significant demands on all teams. Other frequently occurring incidents codes were 2W: Arrest Warrant, 1C: Car/Person Acting Suspiciously, 4Q: Enquires, and 3M: Directed patrol, though each occurred in different volumes across each district; accordingly, demand was fairly heterogeneous across the three trial sites.

3.2.1 Emergency Response Times

A core operational benefit for ARTs is the capacity to rapidly deploy to emergency events. **Table 3.3** provides a breakdown of ART deployment by event priority. While it is evident that the bulk of the incidents attended were classified as Priority 2 events (**71%**), one out of every five (**23%**) were emergency (Priority 1) events. The proportion of emergency events did vary among the trial districts. In particular, only **15%** of all events

[3] A field event is a self-initiated incident that is reported by field units. In principle, a field event can be created for any event type, though 3T is particularly common occurrence, along with 5K – Bail Checks, 4Q - Enquires, and Pursuits.



Figure 3.3: Top ten incidents attended by ART across the three trial districts. Percentages reflect the proportion of all incidents attended that each type accounted for.

Table 3.3: Incidents attended by highest priority and broken down across trial districts.

Highest Event Priority	Canterbury	Counties Manukau	Waikato	Total
Priority 1	722 (32%)	489 (36%)	751 (15%)	**1,962**
Priority 2	1,372 (60%)	725 (56%)	4,007 (79%)	**6,104**
Priority 3	188 (8%)	87 (7%)	288 (6%)	**563**
Total	**2,282**	**1,301**	**5,046**	**8,629**

attended by Waikato ART were classified as Priority 1 event, less than double the rate attended in Canterbury (**32%**) and Counties Manukau (**38%**).

An important performance metric is the *emergency response time*. Emergency response times reflect the number of seconds between when an incident was first coded as Priority 1 and arrival of the dispatched unit. Considered together, the median[4] response time for all ART units was **8 minutes.** Importantly, this implies that 50% of emergency response times fell below this threshold (i.e., the response took less than 8 minutes). When considered across the districts, Canterbury was slightly faster with an average of **7.5 minutes**. Counties Manukau and Waikato were slightly slower with an average of **8.7 minutes** and **8.1 minutes**, respectively.

It is important to note that both Counties Manukau and Waikato ART were deployed to incidents outside of their district (see **Appendix A**). Counties Manukau serviced the wider Tamaki Makaurau region while Waikato ART responded to incidents in the Bay of Plenty. Therefore, there are some results that relate to deployments to non-trial districts which will affect overall response times in these districts. These facts notwithstanding, response times were remarkably consistent across each trial district.

3.2.2 Emergency Incidents

A breakdown of the ten highest Priority 1 (P1) incidents is provided in **Table 3.4**. Similar to **Table 3.2** above, event codes are ordered with respect to the grand totals with the district-wise orderings contained in parentheses. **Figure 3.4** displays the ten highest incidents for each district (on next page).

[4] Response times data is typically right skewed which compromises the use of the arithmetic mean as summary statistic. It is sensitive to extreme values. The median is a more robust estimator and is less influenced by extreme data. It further defines the 50% percentile of the empirical distribution.

Table 3.4: Top ten Priority 1 incidents attended by ARTs, broken down across the three trial districts. Codes are ordered with respect to grand totals. Numbers in parentheses indicate district-wise ordering.

Closure Type Code	Canterbury	Counties Manukau	Waikato	Total
5F: Family Harm	176 (1)	131 (1)	221 (1)	**528**
3530: Disorder	75 (2)	40 (4)	67 (2)	**182**
1C: Car/Person Acting Suspiciously	55 (3)	54 (3)	43 (4)	**152**
6820: Firearms Offences	39 (5)	54 (2)	31 (7)	**124**
PURSUIT: Pursuit of Vehicle	25 (9)	39 (5)	56 (3)	**120**
1710: Intimidations / Threats	45 (4)	21 (6)	29 (8)	**95**
1510: Serious Assaults	34 (7)	20 (7)	37 (5)	**91**
1X: Threatens / Attempts Suicide	35 (6)	17 (9)	34 (6)	**86**
4120: Burglary	30 (8)	8 (-)	26 (10)	**64**
1R: Breach of the Peace	21 (10)	10 (-)	28 (9)	**59**

There is an expected change in the population of incident codes with more preventative and procedural incidents giving way to events that pose a higher potential risk. Notably, 5F: Family Harm, 3530: Disorder, 1C: Person/Car Acting Suspiciously, and 6820: Firearms Offences remain and account for a large number of emergency related activity. However, 1710: Intimidation / Threats and 1510: Serious Assaults are now among the common incidents attended and potential reflect the increased likelihood that an offender possesses a weapon at such events. Note also that 1X: Threatens / Attempts Suicide are also more prominent as are vehicle pursuits.

The number of P1 attendances in **Table 3.4** can further be expressed as a proportion of the total number of attendances recorded for each event type. For example, though family harm accounted for the largest number of emergency attendances (n = 528), these attendances accounted for approximately **71%** of all family harm incidents attended by ARTs (n = 746). Comparatively, **100%** of vehicle pursuits were coded as P1, yet they comprise a smaller total overall (n = 120). Similarly, **74%** of all serious assaults were P1 events and **63%** of intimidations / threats. A smaller proportion of firearms offences (**56%**) and mental health events (**51%**) were coded as P1 events.



Figure 3.4: Top ten Priority 1 incidents attended by ART across the three trial districts. Percentages reflect the proportion of all incidents attended that each type accounted for.

3.2.3 Family Harm Investigations

As discussed in the previous section, **71%** of all family harm incidents attended by ARTs were coded as emergency events (n = 528). This proportion did not deviate considerably within each district. Specifically, family harm emergencies accounted for **70%** of all family harm events attended in Canterbury (n = 176), with **72%** recorded in Counties Manukau (n = 131), and **71%** in Waikato (n = 221).

Overall, **8.6%** of all incidents attended by ARTs were family harm investigations (n = 746). However, both **Table 3.2** and **Figure 3.3** indicate that these events placed varying degrees of demand within each trial district. Specifically, family harm events accounted for approximately **14%** of incidents attended in Counties Manukau (n = 181); **5.4%** higher than the aggregate frequency of attendances. Similarly, attendances were notably higher in Canterbury, where **11%** of attendances in this district were attributed to family harm events (n = 253); a difference of **2.4%** relative to the aggregate. In comparison, Waikato attended relatively fewer family events and accounted for only **6%** of incidents attended in that district; falling **2.6%** below the aggregate.

3.2.4 Firearms Offences

Overall, firearms offences accounted for **2.6%** of all incidents attended by ARTs. However, in Counties Manukau, firearms offences accounted for **6.6%** of incidents attended (n = 86); **4%** higher than the aggregate. This contrasts sharply with Canterbury – where firearms offences accounted for **3.5%** of attendances (n = 79) – and quite markedly with Waikato where they accounted for only **1.1%** of events attended in that district (n = 58). This data does imply that the likelihood of attending a firearms event is much higher in Counties Manukau. Specifically, ARTs in Counties Manukau were nearly two times more likely to attend firearms related events than Canterbury ART, and over six times more likely than Waikato ART.

Given that not all firearms offences events were treated as emergencies it is informative to consider the relative proportion that were coded as a P1 event. As commented above, **56%** of all firearms offences were coded as an emergency event (n = 124). Again, these proportions did fluctuate within each districts. In particular, **63%** of firearms offences were classified an emergency event in Counties Manukau (n = 54); **7%** higher than the aggregate. Conversely, emergency firearms events accounted for **53%** of attendances in the Waikato (n = 31) and **49%** of attendances in Canterbury (n = 39).

However, it must be acknowledged that examination of firearms offence events (i.e., 6820 events) alone provides an imperfect proxy for the prevalence of firearms within each district. These events can also not be used to quantify the risk posed to ART members as it cannot be guaranteed that a firearm was present at all 6820 attendances. Moreover, firearms may be present across myriad event types. It further ignores those events where alerts for firearms possession and/or use were relevant. For example, ARTs may be dispatched to assist with an arrest warrant because the offender has a history of firearms use. Nevertheless, the relative differences between districts does reveal a contrasting picture of firearms related demand with Counties Manukau ART generally experiencing the highest.

3.2.5 Disorder

Disorder incidents were the second highest emergency event attended by ARTs. Overall, **67%** of disorder attendances were classified as emergency events (n = 182). The proportions did not vary widely across the districts, though Counties Manukau recorded the highest proportion of emergency disorder events with **74%** (n = 40). This was followed next by Waikato with **67%** (n = 67), and then Canterbury with **65%** (n = 75).

Overall, disorder accounted for **3.1%** of all incidents attended (n = 270). In Canterbury however, disorder attendances were elevated slightly, where they accounted for **5.1%** of all attendances (n = 116; an increase of **2%** over the aggregate). Attendances in Counties Manukau were also higher where they accounted for **4.2%** of

incidents attended in this district (n = 54). However, only **2%** of attendances were attributed to disorder events in Waikato (n = 100).

3.2.6 Suspicious Persons & Vehicles

A sizeable number of attendances were recorded for 1C: Car/Person Acting Suspiciously events. Overall, these events accounted for **4.7%** of all incidents attended by ARTs (n = 406). The aggregate, however, does belie an apparent skew in attendances recorded within each district. Notably, in Counties Manukau, these events accounted for **8.3%** of attendances (n = 108); **3.6%** above the aggregate number of attendances. Similarly, **7.2%** of attendances in Canterbury were attributed to 1C events (a difference of **2.5%** relative to the aggregate). In comparison, 1C events accounted for only **2.7%** of incidents attended in the Waikato (n = 134), a difference of **2%** relative to the aggregate attendance rate for this event.

Suspicious persons and vehicle events were also among the most frequent emergency events attended by ART members. Overall, **37%** of all 1C events were coded as a P1 event. Accordingly, these events appear to draw an emergency response less often, when compared to the family harm, firearm, and disorder events. That being said, emergency 1C events accounted for **50%** of 1C attendance in Counties Manukau (n = 54); **13%** higher than the aggregate. In comparison, only **34%** of 1C attendances were coded as an emergency in Canterbury (n = 55), and similarly **32%** in Waikato (n = 43).

3.2.7 Mental Health Events

In this section both 1M: Mental Health and 1X: Threatens/Attempts Suicide events are considered. **Table 3.5** shows how these events were broken down across each event type and across districts. Note that the percentages in parentheses (plain font) condition on the total number of ART attendances in each district (the bottom row). Accordingly, they reflect the percentages of attendances accounted for by each event within each ART district. The percentages in the far right column instead denote the overall frequency of event attendance, relative to all attendances.

Table 3.5: Breakdown of mental health events across trial districts. Numbers in parentheses indicate district-wise proportions (plain) and average proportions (bold).

Closure Type Code	Canterbury	Counties Manukau	Waikato	Total
1M: Mental Health	20 (0.9%)	14 (1.1%)	41 (0.8%)	**75 (0.9%)**
1X: Threatens/Attempts Suicide	69 (3.0%)	29 (2.2%)	69 (1.4%)	**167 (1.9%)**
Total	**2,282**	**1,301**	**5,046**	**8,629**

Overall, **2.8%** of all incidents attended were mental health related (n = 242). It is observed, however, the primary contributor are 1X events, which accounted for **1.9%** of all incidents attended (n = 167), with 1M: Mental Health events accounting for just **0.9%** of attendances (a relative difference of **76%**[5]). Owing to the higher prevalence of 1X events the remainder of this section will focus solely on these events.

Attendances at 1X events did vary somewhat within each district. Notably, **3%** of all incidents attended in Canterbury were 1X events (n = 69); just over a percent point higher than the aggregate. Attendances were slightly lower in Counties Manukau, where 1X events accounted for **2.2%** of attendances in this district (n = 29). Finally, 1X events accounted for **1.4%** of attendances in Waikato (n = 69).

[5] Given there is no reference group, *per se*, the relative difference is directionless and is calculated as follows

$$\Delta(p_1, p_2) = \frac{|p_2 - p_1|}{0.5 \cdot (p_1 + p_2)}$$

Like above, not all 1X incidents were coded as P1 events so it is informative to consider the relative proportion of emergency events. Overall, **51%** of 1X incidents were emergency events (n = 86; refer to **Table 3.4**). Notably, in Canterbury and Waikato the proportion of emergency 1X events was similar, accounting for **51%** and **49%**, respectively. However, in Counties Manukau, **59%** of 1X incidents were classified as a P1 event. This implies that 1X incidents were more often emergency events in Counties Manukau.

3.2.8 Road Policing

A breakdown of road policing incidents is provided in **Table 3.6**. Note that 3T events are not considered part of road policing and are considered in the next section. Collectively, **4.9%** of all incidents attended by ARTs were related to road policing (n = 423). Overall, **1.4%** of these incidents were vehicle pursuits (n = 120; all of which were P1 events, as discussed previously), though 1U: Traffic Offending accounted for **2.8%** of all attendances (n = 240).

Within the districts, **6.1%**[6] of events attended in Counties Manukau were road policing incidents (n = 80). Notably, vehicle pursuits accounted for **3%** of all attendances in this district (n = 39), with traffic offending forming a smaller majority, accounting for **2.4%** of attendances (n = 31). Accordingly, despite the comparative infrequency of vehicle pursuit attendances overall, these events were attended more frequently in Counties Manukau. Specifically, the proportion of vehicle pursuits attended in this district was **115%** higher relative to the aggregate (i.e., more than double the attendances across all districts).

In Canterbury, road policing accounted for **5.6%** of all attended events (n = 127). Traffic offending events accounted for **3.3%** of incidents attended (n = 75) with vehicle pursuits attended much less often, accounting for only **1.1%** of events attended (n = 25). Notably, vehicle collisions were only slightly higher at **1.2%** (n = 27). Finally, Waikato ART attended road policing events less frequently, with these events accounting for **4.3%** of events in this district (n = 216). Like Canterbury, vehicle offending was the most frequently attended event in Waikato, accounting for **2.7%** of incidents attended (n = 134), with vehicle pursuits also accounting for **1.1%** of incidents attended in this district (n = 56).

With respect to vehicle pursuits, the deployment criteria provided no specific directive that ARTs could not engage in the pursuit of a fleeing driver, though did state that vehicle specifications prohibited the use of non-compliant vehicle stops. It is also unknown the proportion of pursuits that were subsequently abandoned.

Table 3.6: Breakdown of road policing events across trial districts. Numbers in parentheses indicate district-wise proportions (plain) and average proportions (bold).

Closure Type Code	Canterbury	Counties Manukau	Waikato	Total
1U: Traffic Offending	75 (3.3%)	31 (2.4%)	134 (2.7%)	**240 (2.8%)**
1V: Vehicle Collision	27 (1.2%)	10 (0.8%)	26 (0.5%)	**63 (0.7%)**
PURSUIT: Pursuit of Vehicle	25 (1.1%)	39 (3.0%)	56 (1.1%)	**120 (1.4%)**
Totals	**2,282**	**1,301**	**5,046**	**8,629**

3.2.9 Preventative Activities

A breakdown of the most common prevention related activities is provided in **Table 3.7**. As discussed previously, 3T: Turnover events accounted for the bulk of prevention related events, comprising **25.4%** of all incidents attended (n = 2,195). Of note, 3Ts accounted for **36.3%** of attendances in Waikato. 3Ts also

[6] The column sums in Table 3.6 result in 6.2%. This is due to rounding error.

Table 3.7: Breakdown of common prevention events across trial districts. Numbers in parentheses indicate district-wise proportions (plain) and average proportions (bold).

Closure Type Code	Canterbury	Counties Manukau	Waikato	Total
3M: Directed Patrol	11 (0.5%)	56 (4.3%)	194 (3.8%)	**261 (3.0%)**
3T: Turnover	297 (13.0%)	64 (4.9%)	1,834 (36.3%)	**2,195 (25.4%)**
3W: Watching/Observations	23 (1.0%)	48 (3.7%)	8 (0.2%)	**79 (0.9%)**
Total	**2,282**	**1,301**	**5,046**	**8,629**

comprised **13%** of attendances in Canterbury (n = 297) – a non-trivial proportion – with these events only accounting for **4.9%** of attendances in Counties Manukau (n = 64).

The next highest incident attended was 3M: Directed Patrol which accounted for **3%** of all attendances (n = 261). Notably, directed patrols were often attended in Counties Manukau and Waikato, where they accounted for **4.3%** (n = 56) and **3.8%** (n = 194) of attendances, respectively. These events were attended infrequently in Canterbury, accounting for less than one percent of attendances (n = 11).

Finally, 3W: Watching/Observations accounted for less than **1%** of all events attended (n = 79), these events were attended frequently in Counties Manukau, where they accounted for **3.7%** of attendances in this district (n = 48).

3.2.10 Service Related Activities

Table 3.8 provides a breakdown of the most frequent service related incidents attended by ARTs. Overall, 2W: Arrest Warrant (Other) incidents were attended with some frequency, accounting for **5.4%** of all ART attendances (n = 466). Some variation is apparent within each district. For example, in Canterbury, 2W events comprised **8.1%** of all events attended (n = 185). Attendances in Counties Manukau were less frequent and accounted for **5.8%** of incidents attended. In the Waikato the frequency was again slightly lower, with 2W events accounting for **4.1%** of all attendances.

Conversely, 2I: Information incidents were attended less frequently overall, accounting for **1.9%** of all attendances (n = 162). However, attendances were more prevalent in Canterbury and Counties Manukau, accounting for **3.2%** (n = 72) and **2.5%** (n = 32) of attendances in these districts, respectively. In Waikato these events only comprised **1.1%** of attendances (n = 58).

Table 3.8: Breakdown of common service related events across trial districts. Numbers in parentheses indicate district-wise proportions (plain) and average proportions (bold).

Closure Type Code	Canterbury	Counties Manukau	Waikato	Total
2I: Information	72 (3.2%)	32 (2.5%)	58 (1.1%)	**162 (1.9%)**
2W: Arrest Warrant (Other)	185 (8.1%)	76 (5.8%)	205 (4.1%)	**466 (5.4%)**
Total	**2,282**	**1,301**	**5,046**	**8,629**

3.2.11 Other Services

Table 3.9 provides a breakdown of other common events attended during the trial period. Overall, 4Q: Enquiry/Investigation events accounted for **4.6%** of all ART attendances across the three districts. These events were attended more often in Canterbury, where they accounted for **7.4%** of events attended in that district (n

Table 3.9: Breakdown of common other service related events across trial districts. Numbers in parentheses indicate district-wise proportions (plain) and average proportions (bold).

Closure Type Code	Canterbury	Counties Manukau	Waikato	Total
4Q: Enquiry/Investigation	168 (7.4%)	70 (5.4%)	162 (3.2%)	**400 (4.6%)**
4X: Execute Search Warrant	38 (1.7%)	64 (4.9%)	49 (1.0%)	**151 (1.7%)**
Total	**2,282**	**1,301**	**5,046**	**8,629**

= 168). In Counties Manukau, 4Q events accounted for **5.4%** of all attendances (n = 70) and **3.2%** of attendances in the Waikato (n = 162).

A much smaller proportion of attendances were attributable to 4X: Execute Search Warrant. Overall, these events accounted for **1.7%** of attendances. However, 4X events were most frequently attended in Counties Manukau, where they accounted for **4.9%** of incidents attended. This contrast markedly with the attendances recorded Canterbury and Waikato, where 4X events accounted for only **1.7%** (n = 38) and **1%** (n = 49) of attendances.

3.2.12 COVID-19 Pandemic Response

Deployment data indicated that ARTs were involved in the COVID-19 response during the Alert Level 4 lockdown restrictions. **Table 3.10** provides a breakdown of pandemic related activity across the three trial districts (entries with a < denotes frequencies less than 0.01%). Note that the older pandemic codes (3MC and 6W) were also recorded against ART units before the switch to the 8 series codes. What the data clearly indicates is that Waikato ART were most active during the lockdown period. Overall, pandemic related activates accounted for **2.5%** of attendances in this district. Attendances in Canterbury and Counties Manukau were comparatively negligible. These deployments likely contribute significantly toward the increase in attendances observed during this period (refer to **Figure 3.1**).

Table 3.10: Breakdown of pandemic related events across trial districts. Numbers in parentheses indicate district-wise proportions (plain) and average proportions (bold).

Pandemic Related Activity	Canterbury	Counties Manukau	Waikato	Total
3MC	1 (<)	-	66 (1.3%)	**67 (0.7%)**
6W	-	-	8 (0.2%)	**8 (<)**
3518: Health Act Breach	2 (<)	4 (0.3%)	-	**6 (<)**
8P: Pandemic Response	7 (0.3%)	1 (<)	8 (0.2%)	**16 (0.2%)**
8PA: Pandemic 72hr Check	-	-	3 (<)	**3 (<)**
8PB: Pandemic Person Check	1 (<)	1 (<)	1 (<)	**3 (<)**
8PC: Pandemic Business Check	-	-	17 (0.3%)	**17 (0.2%)**
8PL: Directed Patrol	-	-	1 (<)	**1 (<)**
8PM: Reassurance Essential Facility	1 (<)	-	19 (0.4%)	**20 (0.2%)**
8PZ: Pandemic Education	-	-	1 (<)	**1 (<)**
Total	**2,282**	**1,301**	**5,046**	**8,629**

3.3. Summary

This chapter summarised the incidents that ARTs most often attended during the trial period. In total, ARTs attended **8,629** incidents across the three trial districts. There were, however, large differences across the trial districts with Waikato ART attending the greatest number by some margin. On average, it was found that **23%**

of all incidents attended by ARTs were classified as emergency (Priority 1) events with the bulk of the attendances classified as Priority 2 events (**71%**). Perhaps one of the more significant findings was that a large number of ART attendances were accounted for by field events. On average, a quarter of all incidents attended by ARTs were 3T: Turnovers (**25%**) with a further **9%** accounted for 5K: Bail Checks. Notably, **84%** of 3T events and **94%** of all bail checks by ARTs were attended by Waikato ART.

Across all districts, firearms offences were attended infrequently, though comparatively, Counties Manukau ART more often attended these events than Canterbury and Waikato. Firearms offence were also classified as Priority 1 events more than **60%** of the time, and accounted for approximately **6%** of all P1 events attended by ARTs. Interestingly, firearms offences were more often coded as emergency events in Waikato, despite this team's attending fewer such events overall. It may be tempting to infer from these results that there is a slightly higher potential for firearms exposure in Counties Manukau. Though that may be true, such a conclusion cannot be drawn from the data at hand. Examination of firearms offences attendances alone provides an imperfect proxy for the prevalence of firearms within each district and cannot be relied on completely to quantify the risk posed to ART members. Principally, it cannot be guaranteed that a firearm was present at all 6820 attendances and firearms may be present across a large number of event types.

When viewed collectively, the data suggests that 2W: Arrest Warrant (Other) and 4Q: Enquiry/Investigation were frequently attended events across all districts, though Counties Manukau attended a larger number of search warrant events. It is important to note that some of these events likely reflect pre-planned operations, though a proportion will also relate to requests for assistance. For example, ARTs may be asked to assist with enquires and or/warrants when the offender is known to be violent toward Police or may attempt to flee. Unfortunately, a distinction between these methods of deployment cannot be made based upon the data supplied by RORE (though see Chapter 4). Nevertheless, these findings do point toward slightly varying demand profiles across the three districts.

One of the more interesting findings was the emergency response times. It was found that the average emergency response time for all ART units was 8 minutes. When considered across the districts, Canterbury was slightly faster with an average of 7.5 minutes. Counties Manukau and Waikato were slightly slower with an average of 8.7 minutes and 8.1 minutes, respectively. The slightly longer response times observed in Counties Manukau and Waikato ART were likely an effect of having to deploy to incidents outside of their district.

The time it takes AOS to reach an incident (i.e., response times) are subject to a number of variables. These include (but are not limited to) the time of day the incident occurs, the distance each member must travel to reach the base, and the urgency of the situation. For example, following the shooting of Constable Len Snee in 2009, AOS officers deploying from the Napier base were on scene within 11 minutes (Weekes & Livingston, 2016). For such smaller provincial cities responses times will likely be faster than larger metropolitan areas where heavy traffic may need to be negotiated when traveling to base. In particularly urgent situations, response time may be reduced by members deploying straight from their homes, avoiding the squad room altogether and simply kitting up over their civilian dress. In addition, access to rural scenes may extend response times.

Such issues notwithstanding, on March 15 the AOS arrived on the scene within 10 minutes following the first emergency call (Kenny, 2019). However, the rapid response observed in Christchurch was facilitated by having AOS members mobile in a quasi-ARV capacity (New Zealand Police, 2019). These examples aside, AOS deployments have been estimated to fall anywhere between 30-60 minutes (R. Spooner, personal communication, August 21, 2019). Any combination of factors will mean that no single deployment will look the same, making it very difficult to determine what a "typical" AOS response is. Though it is difficult to determine whether these response times reflect an objective improvement over AOS response times, the ART response times are quite compelling.

Chapter 4: Analysis of End of Deployment Data

Chapter Summary

This chapter provides additional data around ART deployments and is based upon End of Deployment reports completed by ART Team Leaders. Assessment of End of Deployment form submission rates are provided along with conversion rates – a measure of reporting efficiency. Estimated conversion rates were moderate and data was provided for approximately one-fifth of all events attended. A key finding is that ARTs primarily provided assistance to the frontline, providing a number of general support functions. It was further found that ARTs self-deployed to a large number of events. However, further examination indicated that, in part, requests from frontline units, and the absence of available units, accounted for some of these deployments. Of note, ARTs were most often requested to assist with enquires and execution of warrants. Examination of tactical and resolution data collected in the form indicated that the demand for more advanced capabilities was fairly modest in volume. However, coding of deployment data suggested that ARTs likely prevented a number of AOS callouts. In addition, ART members were found to have provided emergency medical care on a number of occasions. A small qualitative analysis followed, wherein it was found that ARTs members provided reassurance to frontline units and contributed toward how safe staff felt. The chapter is concluded with a discussion on deployment criteria and potential issues.

The primary data collection tool for understanding ART deployment activity was the End of Deployment (EOD) form to be completed by all ART Team Leaders following the cessation of each ART call for service. This data only accounts for a fraction of all ART deployments completed during the trial period and should be treated as indicative only. Nevertheless, EoD forms provide additional deployment data to help build context around the types of jobs ARTs have attended.

4.1. Initial Reporting Issues

Preliminary evaluation of the first months data indicated that there was an over reporting of jobs requiring a “Blue Role” deployment. This largely reflected a misunderstanding around what formally constituted an AOS blue role deployment and those roles where ARTs provided enhanced tactical assistance to frontline officers. In such instances blue role tactics may well have been used though the job itself did not meet the threshold for an AOS call out. Originally, many of these jobs were classified as AOS blue roles though did not have an accompanying AOS callout report. This produced a mismatch between the volume of blue role deployments reported by ARTs (over reported) and the true number of AOS callouts.

This posed a problem for the evaluation because incomplete deployment data was being received for a large number of ART deployments. The reporting processes in place were meant to reduce the amount of administrative work for ART Team Leaders by avoiding doubling up on reporting. If a deployment was recorded as a blue or black role, the EOD form was significantly truncated in length and detail. The expectation was that such deployments have met the threshold for an AOS deployment and thereby would require an AOS callout report. Accordingly, the relevant deployment data could then be extracted from the AOS reports, the ramification being that, for the vast majority of jobs that were incorrectly registered as a blue role deployment, deployment data was incomplete for these events. Also missing from the data was an indicator of whether the event ordinarily would have met the threshold for an AOS deployment but was prevented because of the immediate availability of the ART.

To mitigate ambiguity around blue role deployments clarification was sought through discussion with New Zealand Police Executive Leadership Board and the ART Working Group to formally establish a criteria for the reporting of blue and block role deployments via the EOD form. The following set of criteria were subsequently established to guide the reporting of ART deployment roles:

1. All ART deployments are to be recorded in CheckPoint[7] via the EOD form;
2. Deployments should only be recorded as a 'blue role' or 'black role' in when completing the EoD form if a phone call has been required to the AOS Commander. Subsequently, these incidents must have a matching AOS Callout Report submitted;
3. Incidents where ARTs are attending specifically for their skills and tactics, e.g., incidents involving firearms, violence, knives, weapons, etc – are considered ART jobs and should be recorded as a "Neither" when completing EOD forms. Additionally, there should be accompanying notes from the TL as to whether or not the event would have, prior to the existence of ARTs, triggered an AOS callout (best judgement call);
4. Incidents where ARTs are responding in any other capacity – e.g., prevention or providing general support – are considered "PST-Assist" jobs and should be recorded as "Neither" when completing EoD forms. This includes 5F, 4X and all other offence codes (except 3T).

The criteria more clearly delineates deployments where ARTs may use blue role tactics in support of frontline officers – what will now be referred to as an *ART Role* – with formal blue, or black, AOS deployments. The ART role does, however, reflect a qualitatively distinct level of response than simpler support functions. Such a distinction was not initially captured by the EoD form. Unfortunately, amendments could not be made to the form which meant distinguishing between ART Roles and Assist Roles proceeded on an *ad hoc* basis[8].

4.2. Compliance

Compliance is defined to here as the submission of an EoD form following an ART call for service. It was intended that ART Team Leaders submit an end of deployment form following all ART deployments, but the nature of applied research ensure that this is rarely be the case. Moreover, monitoring of attendances during the trial further lead to the decision that – given the volume of attendances – that Team Leaders should not submit forms for 3T: Turnover and 5K: Bail Checks (some EoD forms were still submitted for these events, though comparatively fewer).

As a fraction of all incidents ART attended (n = 8,628) the number of submitted EoD forms reflects approximately **23%** of these attendances (n = 1,948). Accordingly, just over one-in-five incidents attended had an associated EoD form. Compliance did vary within each district as shown in **Table 4.1**. Of note, compliance in Waikato was markedly lower relative to both Canterbury and Counties Manukau, when conditioned on all incidents. However, owing to the volume of 3T and 5K attendances in the Waikato, inclusion of these events belies the actual rate of compliance for events Team Leaders were expected to report on.

Table 4.1: Compliance rate across the three trial districts, with and without 3T and 5K events.

Data	Canterbury	Counties Manukau	Waikato	Overall
All Incidents	37%	29%	14%	**23%**
3T and 5K Removed	43%	31%	29%	**34%**

[7] CheckPoint is a mobile phone application that was deployed to all Police mobility devices and give staff access to resources to support visits and interactions with our communities. For the evaluation links to deployment forms and surveys were embedded within the application to facilitate access and completion.
[8] See **Appendix H** for classification criteria.

Table 4.2: Most frequent incidents reported through EoD forms. Event code and description are ordered with respect to the grand totals. Percentages in parenthesis denote the event specific compliance rate.

Closure Type Code	Canterbury	Counties Manukau	Waikato	Total
5F: Family Harm Investigation	119 (47%)	65 (36%)	133 (43%)	**317 (42%)**
2W: Search Warrant (Other)	87 (47%)	28 (37%)	98 (48%)	**213 (46%)**
4Q: Enquiry/Investigation	58 (35%)	27 (39%)	37 (23%)	**122 (31%)**
6820: Firearm Offences	46 (58%)	39 (45%)	34 (59%)	**119 (53%)**
1C: Car/Person Acting Suspiciously	55 (34%)	24 (22%)	34 (25%)	**113 (28%)**
4X: Execute Search Warrant	31 (82%)	44 (69%)	34 (69%)	**109 (72%)**
3530: Disorder	50 (43%)	17 (31%)	32 (32%)	**99 (37%)**
1710: Intimidation/Threats	33 (47%)	11 (33%)	22 (47%)	**66 (44%)**
1X: Threatens / Attempts Suicide	29 (42%)	9 (31%)	24 (35%)	**62 (37%)**
1U: Traffic Offending	29 (39%)	1 (3%)	23 (17%)	**53 (22%)**

Accordingly, removal of these events from the district-wise attendances increased overall compliance to **34%**. Importantly, Waikato increased markedly to **29%**. Of the three district, Canterbury held the highest compliance rate with **43%**.

4.3. Incidents Reported

This section summarise the incidents that were reported on through EoD forms. **Table 4.2** contains the ten most frequent incidents reported on across the three trial districts (for a full breakdown consult **Appendix A**). Accordingly, the table is ordered with respect to the grand totals summed over all districts (far right column). District-wise columns, consequently, may not share the same ordering. The relative orderings for each district are displayed in **Figure 4.1**. Within each district, then, the largest proportion of EoD forms were submitted most often following attendances at 5F: Family Harm Investigation events. This is perhaps unsurprising given that this event was one of the most frequently attended.

Beyond this each district reported on different events to varying degrees. For example, 4X: Execute Search Warrant accounted for a larger proportion of all submissions in Counties Manukau (11.5%) than both Canterbury (3.7%) and Waikato (4.7%). Instead, 2W: Search Warrant (Other) was the next highest event in these districts, accounting for **10.3%** and **13.6%** of EoD submissions, respectively. Conversely, 6820: Firearms



Figure 4.1: Top ten incidents reported by ART across the three trial districts. Percentages reflect the proportion of all reported incidents for each event code.

Offences comprised a sizeable proportion of submissions in Counties Manukau (**10.2%**) though were less numerous in Canterbury and Waikato.

A better gauge on how often EoD forms were submitted can be obtained by considering the proportion of incidents attendances that had an associated EoD form. The percentages reported in **Table 4.2** reflect just that and, in effect, provide an index of *event specific compliance*. For example, the data indicate that EoD forms were frequently submitted following attendances at 4X: Execute Search Warrant incidents. For example, on average, **72%** of all 4X attendances had an associated EoD form; however, Canterbury ART submitted an EoD form over **80%** of the time despite the fact this team attended 4X events less often (cf. **Figure 3.3**). Alternatively, EoD forms were submitted following 6820: Firearm Offences **53%** of the time, on average. However, for these events, both Canterbury and Waikato submitted forms approximately **60%** of the time, whereas Counties Manukau did so less often, despite this team attending 6820 events more often (cf. **Figure 3.3**).

It can also be observed that the event codes populating **Table 4.2** share commonalities with the contents of **Table 3.4**, which lists the most frequently attended Priority 1 (P1) events. There is some suggestion, then, that ART Team Leaders may have submitted reports following those events where their tactical skills and capabilities were demonstrated. Accordingly, a comparison can be drawn between the actual rates of emergency attendances with the rate estimated from EoD submissions. Though the forms did ask Team leaders to register whether the event was an emergency deployment, this field was used inconsistently.

Instead, priority data for EoD submissions were found by cross referencing the EoD event ID with the attendance data. Though it was not possible to extract priority information for all EoD submissions, priority data was obtained for **92%** of submissions (n = 1,794). It had previously been found that, on average, **23%** of incidents attended by ARTs were classified as P1 events. Analysis of the EoD data instead revealed that **42%** [0.42 ± .011 SEM; 95% CI: 0.401 - .447] of the reported incidents were P1 events, on average. This reflects a statistically significant increase relative to the actual proportion of P1 attendances ($p < .001$).

Though interesting, little emphasis should be placed on these differences. What it demonstrates is a desire to highlight perceived successes and shed light on those instances where ARTs can provide enhanced capabilities. Thereby, the reports provide additional context around those case examples. Though more generally, the data examined thus far further reflect the diverse role ARTs played during the trial. As such, the following sections seek to build some additional context around ART deployment activities; details that are not possible from examination of raw deployment data alone.

4.4. ART Deployments

As discussed previously, ART deployments were broken down into levels that better reflect the operational function and role of the teams. **Table 4.3** provides a breakdown of deployment level across the trial districts. On average, **67%** of ARTs deployed in an Assist Role (n = 1,314) – i.e., roles requiring no use of special tactics. Instead, ART members most often provided general support to frontline staff – which could simply be for safety and reassurance purposes – or the undertaking of general duties and prevention activities.

Table 4.3: Levels of ART deployment across the three trial districts.

Deployment Level	Canterbury	Counties Manukau	Waikato	Total
Assist Role	615 (73%)	156 (41%)	543 (75%)	**1,314 (67%)**
ART Role	206 (24%)	209 (55%)	171 (24%)	**586 (30%)**
AOS Role	24 (3%)	16 (4%)	8 (1%)	**48 (2%)**
Total	**845**	**381**	**722**	**1,948**

Deployments at the ART Role level – which included the use of Blue Role tactics – accounted for **30%** of all deployments reported on (n = 586). The split between these two levels of deployment did differ within the trial districts. Specifically, **55%** of recorded deployments in Counties Manukau were listed as an ART Role (n = 209) with assist roles accounting for **41%** of reported deployments (n = 156). In comparison, only **24%** of deployments were recorded as an ART Role in both Canterbury (n = 206) and Waikato (n = 171). Instead, the majority of deployments in these districts were attributed to assist roles, accounting for **73%** (n = 615) and **75%** (n = 543) of reported deployments, respectively.

Within each trial district AOS Roles were less common[9]. On average these deployments accounted for approximately **2.5%** of all EoD forms (n = 48). The district-wise proportions did also exhibit some variation, with AOS Roles accounting for **4%** of EoD submissions in Counties Manukau (n = 16). Canterbury was next with **3%** (n = 24) and Waikato recorded the smallest proportion with **1%** (n = 8). These data suggest that elevation to a full AOS role was uncommon.

4.4.1 Prevention of AOS Callouts

A key point of interest was whether ART deployments reduced the necessity for full AOS callouts. Indeed, ARTs possess the capability to rapidly locate highly trained staff at incidents that may have ordinarily required an AOS response. Unfortunately, the EoD form was not built to explicitly measure this factor[10]; accordingly, a contingency process was put in place that required ART TLs to explicitly state whether their attendance would have likely prevented a full AOS callout. Following examination of all TL comments, reports were then coded by the EBPC to reflect whether the deployment likely prevented an AOS callout or not.

Noting that AOS preventions were only recorded against ART Role deployments, analysis of EoD data indicated that **10%** of such deployments likely prevented an AOS callout (n = 61). Of particular note, AOS preventions accounted for **12.6%** of ART role reports in Canterbury (n = 26) and **20.4%** in Waikato (n = 35). Remarkably, Team Leaders in Counties Manukau did not note any such instances. The absence of data from Counties Manukau may reflect ongoing reporting issues. For example, the larger proportion of AOS deployments recorded by Counties Manukau ART may well capture ART Roles where blue role tactics were used. However, it is difficult to say with any certainty that this is case. Nevertheless, given the relative proportion of ART Role deployments in Counties Manukau it seems almost improbable that some proportion of those attendances did not alleviate the necessity for an AOS callout.

Though the true proportion cannot be known exactly, for either district, the data provides some preliminary evidence that ARTs may have had a positive operational impact, at least in terms of AOS deployments[11]. However, without an appropriate baseline and/or comparison group it cannot be determined whether the ART configuration provided an enhanced response model over the standard AOS model.

4.4.2 Analysis of AOS Callout Data

In this section AOS deployment data is examined to discern whether a reduction in the number of callouts over the trial period was at all evident. **Table 4.4** provides a summary of the AOS deployments observed during the trial period. For context, deployments totals are provided for preceding years as well. The numbers in parenthesis denote the average number daily deployments – or *deployment rate per day*. This is found by simply summing the number of deployments recorded over a period of time, divided by the length of that period. For example, when determining the rate per day over a calendar year, the number of deployments

[9] To be included in this figure the EoD form must have had an associated AOS deployment report. Note also that both Blue and Black AOS roles are included in these figures.
[10] This was a further limitation stemming from insufficient preparation time and the absence of suitably defined key performance indicators.
[11] A number of officer perception surveys also indicated that, when asked how the presence of ARTs meant the incident was handled differently, noted that ART attendance likely prevented a full AOS callout (see Chapter 5 section 5.1.2).

Table 4.4: Number of AOS deployments broken across the three ART districts. Numbers in parentheses denote the average number of daily deployments.

Year	Canterbury	Counties Manukau	Waikato	Total
Trial Period	115 (.65)	22 (.12)	50 (.28)	**187 (1.06)**
2019[a]	247 (.83)	36 (.12)	185 (.62)	**468 (1.57)**
2018	172 (.47)	52 (.14)	112 (.31)	**336 (.92)**
2017	127 (.35)	37 (.10)	92 (.25)	**256 (.70)**
2016	129 (.35)	53 (.15)	66 (.18)	**248 (.68)**
2015	101 (.28)	34 (.09)	91 (.25)	**226 (.62)**

[a] Data for 2019 spans the period 1 January 2019 to 27th October 2019.

recorded in that year is divided by 365. For the years 2015 – 2018 this is how the rates were calculated. It can be seen from **Table 4.4** that the number of deployments per day has increased over the years (see rightmost column). This is generally reflected in the district-wise rates, though there is some variation from year to year.

Notably, the deployment rate observed during the period 1st January 2019 to 27th October 2019 (*m* = 1.57) increased considerably relative to the previous year's total (*m* = .92). These increases were evident in Canterbury and Waikato, though Counties Manukau decreased slightly. Comparatively, during the trial period there was an average decrease in daily deployments (*m* = 1.06). Again, decreases were seen in Canterbury and Waikato, with Counties Manukau remaining unchanged. **Figure 4.2**.provides a more detailed view around the number of AOS deployments recorded since 1st January 2019 in each ART district and helps contextualise the observed change in deployment rates. This figure reveals that, despite the clear effect of March 15 upon AOS deployments in Canterbury, deployments tracked quite similarly across both Canterbury and Waikato. It is clear, then, that the elevated rate listed for Canterbury during the 10 months of 2019 (*m* = .83) captures the sharp upturn in deployments post March 15. Nevertheless, there appeared to be a decline in the number of deployments recorded in Canterbury and Waikato during the trial period. In Canterbury, however, deployments did appear to rise again just prior to the COVID-19 Level 4 restrictions, though did drop again prior to the trial ending.



Figure 4.2: AOS deployments recorded within each ART district during calendar year 2019 and the first four months of 2020. Lines denote 14 day rolling averages. The vertical bars mark reference dates for the March 15 attack, the ART trial start date, and the beginning of COVID-19 L4 restrictions.

Table 4.5: Number of ART deployments broken down by dispatch type across the three trial districts.

Dispatched by	Canterbury	Counties Manukau	Waikato	Total
DCC	21 (2.0%)	10 (3.0%)	69 (10%)	**100 (5%)**
Comms	200 (24%)	122 (32%)	173 (24%)	**495 (25%)**
Self-Deployed	597 (71%)	216 (57%)	466 (65%)	**1,279 (66%)**
Other	27 (3.0%)	33 (9.0%)	14 (2.0%)	**74 (4%)**
Total	**845**	**381**	**722**	**1,948**

The influence of the March 15 attacks and the COVID-19 pandemic on AOS deployments make it difficult to reasonably compare rates observed during the trial period with the data collected during 2019. In addition, because the deployment rates appear to be increasing each year it is not sensible to compare trial period rates with figures recorded during the same period from previous years. Moreover, the reduction in numbers may well be an effect of regression to the mean. These issues notwithstanding, there is some indication that the introduction of ARTs were *associated* with a change in AOS deployments numbers. Though this cannot be stated with absolute certainty, it does provide some further, indirect, evidence that ART reduced the need for AOS callouts.

4.5. ART Deployment Method

Following attendance, the EoD form asked TLs to indicate how their unit was dispatched to the event. A breakdown of deployments methods is provided **Table 4.5** (top of next page). Evident from the numbers laid in the table is that on average, ARTs self-deployed **66%** of the time (n = 1,279). Self-initiated deployments varied within each district. For example, in Canterbury, **71%** of deployments were reported as self-initiated (n = 597). Comparatively, self-deployments accounted for only **57%** of reports submitted by Counties Manukau ART (n = 216), with Waikato falling partway between with **65%** (n = 466). Owing to the overall propensity of self-imitated deployments the next section attempts to further breakdown these deployments.

4.5.1 Self-Initiated Deployments

In further examining reported self-initiated deployments these instances were broken down as shown in **Table 4.6**. Accordingly, a couple of factors emerged that deserve attention.

Incidents Attended

Table 4.7 provides a breakdown of the incident types that ARTs most frequently self-deployed to. Note the entries have been sorted by numerical value; accordingly, the relative proportions – i.e., the percentage of those events where ARTs self-deployed – are not. For example, though 5F: Family Harm is listed on top – and thereby accounts for the largest proportion of all self-initiated attendances – as a fraction of all 5F events attended, self-initiated deployments accounted for only **67%** of attendances reported on (n = 213). Instead, it

Table 4.6: Number of ART self-deployments broken down by type across the three trial districts.

Deployment Mode	Canterbury	Counties Manukau	Waikato	Total
Self-Deployed	485 (81%)	150 (69%)	365 (78%)	**1,000 (78%)**
Self-Discovered	2 (0.3%)	1 (0.4%)	5 (1.0%)	**8 (0.6%)**
Requested	110 (18%)	65 (30%)	96 (21%)	**271 (21%)**
Total	**597**	**216**	**466**	**1,279**

Table 4.7: Number of ART self-deployments broken down by type and most frequent event code across the three trial districts. Percentages in parenthesis indicate proportion of all reported events that were self-initiated.

Closure Type Code	No. Low Staff Availability (%)	No. Frontline Requests (%)	Total (%)
5F: Family Harm Investigation	28	19	213 (67%)
2W: Search Warrant (Other)	4	53	162 (76%)
4Q: Enquiry/Investigation	1	60	100 (82%)
1C: Car/Person Acting Suspiciously	4	10	73 (65%)
4X: Execute Search Warrant	-	60	73 (67%)
1U: Traffic Offending	1	2	49 (93%)
3530: Disorder	4	1	48 (49%)
1X: Threatens / Attempts Suicide	1	5	44 (71%)
1510: Serious Assaults	-	3	32 (65%)
1710: Intimidation/Threats	2	4	31 (47%)

can be seen that ART self-initiated to 4Q: Enquiry/Investigation events more frequently, with **82%** of reported attendances (n = 100). The largest proportion was accounted for by 1U: Traffic Offending with **93%** (n = 49).

It is then of interest to consider two other common road policing events that were not included in the table. Specifically, while 1V: Vehicle Collision events accounted for **1.2%** of the reported events (n = 24), it was found that **88%** (n = 24) of those instances were recorded as self-deployments. Similarly, vehicle pursuits comprised just **1.6%** (n = 33) of all EoD submissions but were also recorded as self-deployments **88%** of the time (n = 29). In coding this data, it was found that vehicle pursuits were abandoned on **36%** of occasions (n = 12; this is over both self-deployments and other dispatches). Across all three events (n = 110), ARTs self-deployed **90%** of the time, on average.

Of the other incidents codes listed in **Table 4.7**, self-deployments were common for 1X: Threatens / Attempts Suicide. Of all 1X attendances reported on, ARTs self-deployed **71%** (n = 44) of the time. Note that frontline requests and low unit available were not salient contributory factors for these events. Additionally, ARTs self-deployed to 1C: Car/Person Acting Suspiciously (n = 73) and 1510: Serious Assaults (n = 32) on **65%** of attendances at both events. For these events – where there is potentially a higher risk of harm to the public and/or the individual themselves – ARTs appear to be self-deploying to mitigate probable harm.

Frontline Requests

Frontline request data was not specifically captured in the EoD form, though team leaders would often indicate whether they were requested to attend. Submissions were coded to reflect whether this was the case or not. Overall, frontline requests were attributable to **15%** of all EoD submissions (n = 297). **Table 4.6** further shows that **21%** of self-initiated deployments were via requests for ART attendance (n = 271), with a smaller proportion being officer-discovered (i.e., events that ART officers happened upon whilst on patrol). Accordingly, **91%** of all frontline requests resulted in a self-initiated ART deployment.

Table 4.7 provides the number of self-initiated deployments that were due to frontline unit request, broken down across incident type. Of note, **82%** (n = 60) of self-deployments to 4X: Execute Search Warrant events were via frontline requests. ARTs were also requested to attend **60%** of 4Q: Enquiry/Investigation events (n = 60). In addition, **33%** (n = 53) of attendances at 2W: Search Warrant (Other) incidents were because of frontline requests. Collectively, these three events accounted for **64%** of all instances where ARTs were requested to attended and self-deployed in response.

It was further found that ARTs responded in an Assist Role **57%** of the time; that is, over half the time ARTs were requested to provide reassurance and general support to the frontline units, with the remaining **43%** accounting for more tactical and/or specialist assistance. It was further observed that Public Safety Team (PST) requested assistance most often, being responsible for **44%** of reported self-deployments, with the Criminal Investigations Branch (CIB) accounting for **27%** of requests.

Limited Staff Availability

Coding of EoD data further revealed that ARTs deployed to reduce demand on frontline staff. Accordingly, additional coding was undertaken to denote such occasions and provide additional context around ART self-deployments. Specifically, it was found that on approximately **5%** (n = 91) of all reported deployments there was mention that ARTs deployed because there were minimal – or in some cases no – frontline units available However, of those instances, it was noted that ART self-deployed to the event **77%** of the time (n = 70). Notably, of those self-initiated deployments, ART were listed as the sole attendee on **61%** of occasions (n = 43). This implies that, when ARTs responded to an incident because there were minimal units available to do so, they were often the only unit attendance. Note that is possible that an ART was requested because there were no frontline units available, though occurred on only five occasions (< 1% of all reported self-deployments).

Examination of the event code breakdown provided in **Table 4.7** indicated that a factor resulting in self deploying to 5F events was when PST staff were fully committed to other critical incidents. That is, of those instances where ARTs specifically self-deployed because of lack of staff, **40%** of those deployments were accounted for by family harm events. However, low unit availability accounted for only **13%** of all 5F self-deployments. However, it would appear that ARTs attempted to support frontline units by reducing demand.

Emergency Deployments

Table 4.8 provides a further breakdown of the self-deployment data, this time with respect to event priority (enumerating over all ART districts). Note that priority data was not available for all events where ART Team Leaders reported a self-deployment. It is evident that ARTs self-deployed to Priority 1 events **96%** (n = 434) of the time, with frontline requests account for the remaining **4%** of deployments. Self-initiated deployments to Priority 2 events were also quite frequent, occurring on **74%** of occasions, though frontline requests also contributed toward **25%** of attendances at these events (n = 151). Accordingly, ARTs would often self-deploy to high risk and life threatening events, but a significant proportion of attendances at lower risk events were also self-initiated.

Table 4.8: Number of ART self-deployments broken down by priority code across the three trial districts.

Deployment Mode	Priority 1	Priority 2	Priority 3	Total
Self-Deployed	434 (96%)	452 (74%)	50 (45%)	**936 (79.7%)**
Self-Discovered	-	7 (1.0%)	-	**7 (0.6%)**
Requested	19 (4.0%)	151 (25%)	62 (55%)	**232 (19.7%)**
Total	**453**	**610**	**112**	**1,175**

4.6. Tactical Response and Resolution

This section provides a general descriptive analysis around the tactical response and resolutions following ART attendance. As alluded to previously, the EoD form was somewhat limited in depth, leaving it unable to capture sufficiently detailed information around ART deployments. In part this was necessary to avoid overburdening team leaders with administrative duties, though the form design perhaps did not fully

Table 4.9: Number of tactics (not use of force) listed by ART members across the three trial districts.

Specified Tactic	Assist Role	ART Role	AOS Role	Total
Announced Forced Entry	8 (0.5%)	9 (1.1%)	-	**17 (0.7%)**
Breach and Hold	7 (0.5%)	17 (2.2%)	4 (5.7%)	**28 (1.2%)**
Cordon and Contain	121 (8.0%)	153 (19.8%)	27 (38.6%)	**301 (12.8%)**
Cover Port	1 (<0.1%)	2 (0.3%)	1 (1.4%)	**4 (0.2%)**
Door Knock/Direct Approach	720 (47.8%)	374 (48.4%)	22 (31.4%)	**1,116 (47.6%)**
Emergency Action	16 (1.1%)	15 (1.9%)	1 (1.4%)	**32 (1.4%)**
Open Air Arrests	118 (8%)	60 (7.8%)	9 (12.9%)	**187 (8.0%)**
Other	389 (25.8%)	89 (11.5%)	3 (4.3%)	**481 (20.5%)**
Ruse/Deception	3 (0.2%)	8 (1.0%)	1 (1.4%)	**12 (0.5%)**
Unannounced Forced Entry	1 (<0.1%)	1 (<0.1%)	-	**2 (<0.1%)**
Vehicle Stop: Compliant	117 (7.8%)	39 (5.1%)	2 (2.9%)	**158 (6.7%)**
Vehicle Stop: Non-compliant	4 (0.3%)	5 (0.6%)	-	**9 (0.4%)**
Total	**1,505**	**772**	**70**	**2,347**

anticipate just how diversely these teams would be applied. However, even in its current state, it necessarily relied upon user input which can compromise the accuracy of data entered, particularly when the user is busy. Accordingly, attempts to map the end to end process from deployment through to tactic use, resolutions, and dispositions were imperfect and produced incoherent mappings in some cases. For these reasons the following sections simply pool data across districts to provide a more aggregated view rather than trying to provide deep district-wise breakdowns. Note that use of force and tactical options data will not be covered in this section. It is instead covered in the following chapter.

4.6.1 Specified Tactics

Table 4.9 provides a breakdown of some of the tactics recorded by ART team leaders. Note also that multiple tactics could be listed for each event attended meaning the total number of tactics used can exceed the number of the events attended. Based upon this data, the primary tactic applied was Door knock/Direct Approach and accounted for **48%** of all recorded tactics (n = 1,116). There was little-to-no variation in the use of this tactic within each deployment role. For both Assist Roles (n = 720) and ART Roles (n = 374), Door knock/Direct Approach accounted for **48%** of all tactics reported.

It was noticed that in some instances, where Door knock/Direct Approach was listed as a tactic, ART members were not always directly involved. At some, for example, ART members simply oversaw the approach made by the frontline unit, offering advice and support when needed. In others, ART members executed the door knock themselves before handing off to the attending units. This was simply observational and no coding was made to delineate these cases.

One tactic that was not captured by the EoD form, though did occur somewhat frequently, were Clearance and Rescue Tactics (CRT). During coding of EoD data it was found that approximately **11%** (n = 216) of all reported events mentioned using CRT as a tactic. Much like above, however, it was evident that ART members, on occasion, simply oversaw the execution of the premises clearance. Similarly, this is merely included as an observation and no formal delineation was made between whether it was ARTs that executed the clearance or not.

The principals of cordon, contain, and appeal (CCA) are an essential part of any AOS response. As such, CCA formed a core part of the ART tactical toolkit. Overall, **12.8%** (n = 301) of events reported on listed Cordon and

Table 4.10: Number of other services ART provided broken down across deployment level.

Defined Tactic	Assist Role	ART Role	AOS Role	Total
Presence	119 (38.9%)	11 (33.3%)	-	**130 (38.0%)**
Area Patrols/Enquires/Cordons	84 (27.5%)	7 (21.2%)	-	**91 (26.6%)**
Transport Assist	17 (5.6%)	-	-	**17 (5.0%)**
Other	86 (28.1%)	15 (45.5%)	3 (100%)	**104 (30.4%)**
Total	**306**	**33**	**3**	**342**

Contain as a tactical option. Notably, the frequency with which it was used varied depending upon the deployment level. When ARTs were serving in an Assist Role, Cordon and Contain accounted for **8%** (n = 121) of all reported tactics. Conversely, when responding in an ART Role, the same tactic was applied **19.8%** of the time (n = 153), an increase of more than double.

On occasions where "Other" had been specified team leaders were expected to elaborate on the tactics that were used. Overall, this response accounted for **20%** (n = 481) of all reported tactics, though it accounted for **26%** of reported tactics when ARTs were responding in an Assist Role (n = 389). Conversely, this tactic was listed on only **12%** (n = 89) of ART Role deployments. Attempts were made to break these events down into a definable tactical response, based upon comments left by team leaders. These are provided in **Table 4.10** (on the next page). Note that the listed entries do not account for all events where "Other" was listed as a tactic.

Of the events where a tactic could be reasonably defined (n = 342), the majority were associated with an Assist Role deployment and accounted for **89%** (n = 306) of these events. Overall, it was found on **38%** of these occasions (n = 130) ARTs simply attended the event, providing both reassurance and security to frontline staff. When conditioning on tactic type (as opposed to deployment level), Assist Roles accounted for **92%** of these events (n = 119). Area Patrols/Enquires/Cordons accounted for a further **27%** (n = 91) of these tactics with Assist Roles also accounting for the largest proportion, with **92%** (n = 84). In these instances, ART members assisted in conducting areas enquires and establishing cordons. They also conducted mobile and foot patrols. A smaller proportion of events were related to transport, accounting for just **5%** (n = 17) of all event; however, these events occurred exclusively during Assist Role deployments. Here, ART members assisted with the transport of an offender, particularly if the offender had been difficult to deal with.

4.6.2 Event Resolution

Table 4.11 provides a breakdown of how reported incidents were resolved across the different levels of response. Across all levels of deployment, "Tactical Only" was the most common method of resolution, accounting for **23%** (n = 450) of all reported resolution. However, within each level of deployment the relative

Table 4.11: Number of other services ART provided broken down across deployment level.

Incident Resolved By	Assist Role	ART Role	AOS Role	Total
Combined Negotiation/Tactical	140 (10.7%)	126 (21.5%)	11 (22.9%)	**277 (14.2%)**
Negotiation Only	292 (22.2%)	85 (14.5%)	4 (8.3%)	**381 (19.6%)**
Offender not contacted/located	219 (16.7%)	122 (20.8%)	10 (20.8%)	**351 (18.0%)**
Other	347 (26.4%)	45 (7.7%)	3 (6.2%)	**395 (20.3%)**
Prior to Negotiation	10 (0.8%)	20 (3.4%)	1 (2.1%)	**31 (1.6%)**
Tactical Only	253 (19.3%)	178 (30.4%)	19 (39.6%)	**450 (23.1%)**
Not Specified	53 (4.0%)	10 (1.7%)	-	**63 (3.2%)**
Total	**1,314**	**586**	**48**	**1,948**

frequency of "Tactical Only" varies. Specifically, when responding in an Assist Role only **19%** (n = 253) of incidents were resolved this. Conversely, **30%** (n = 178) of incidents were resolved with tactics only when deploying in an ART Role, with the percentage even higher – **40%** (n = 19) – for AOS Role deployments. Intuitively, the observed increase in tactical usage across response levels maps onto the intrinsic threat implied by each.

Next, **20.2%** (n = 395) of incidents were resolved through other means. Note that the numbers alongside this option do not quite match the totals listed in **Table 4.10.** This implies that a proportion of events where a tactic was specified were subsequently reported as being resolved by alternative means (i.e., incident resolved was reported as 'Other"). As prefaced at the beginning of this section, such cases likely reflect inconsistencies in from completion. Nevertheless, the distribution of these cases across each level of deployment are complementary to use of tactics only. Following Assist Role deployments, **26%** (n = 347) of events were resolved using alternative tactics. Conversely, only **8%** (n = 45) of ART Role deployments were resolved in this way, with a smaller **6%** (n = 3) of AOS deployments being similarly resolved.

A similar proportion of events were resolved via a negotiation only. On average, **19.5%** (n = 381) of events were resolved using this particular approach, though it accounted for **22.2%** (n = 292) of the reported resolutions following Assist Role deployments. In an analogous fashion, negotiation was applied less often following ART Role deployments, where they accounted for just **14.5%** (n = 85) of reported resolutions. Approximately **8%** (n = 4) of AOS role deployments were resolved through negotiation only.

4.6.3 Disposition Codes and Clearances

Disposition codes were collected through EoD forms. Each submission was also cross referenced with deployment data listed in CARD and codes were changed to match those records if discrepancies were found. However, the data are not particularly informative as it is unclear whether ARTs were the unit responsible for the file. Though ARTs were listed as the arresting unit on **45%** of occasions, the completion of these fields may not have been entirely reliable, meaning it cannot be determined exactly how many arrests ARTs themselves completed. Additionally, the mapping between disposition codes (e.g., K9) and clearances (e.g., Arrested – charged) suffer from similar inconsistencies and cannot be interrogated with any certainty.

These issues are further compounded by the handover policy outlined in the deployment criteria. Specifically, handover of files and scenes is essential to ensure that ARTs remain free for rapid deployment. Accordingly, a large swathe of events are likely cleared after ARTs have departed. This fact was conveyed through the EoD forms, where several remarked about the need for a K8 closure code. Any future reporting line ought to consider this need and make provisions around the recording of this information.

4.7. Qualitative Analysis

The foregoing has made mention of various efforts to examine and code remarks left by ART Team Leaders. Though not a formal part of the evaluation framework *per se*, coding of the EoD data did reveal some additional details that provide a more nuanced view around the events the teams attended. Moreover, these details add, in part, to the overall assessment of the current deployment criteria. Thereby, this section summarise these additional findings.

Though some quantitative data is included, it is mostly qualitative in nature. However, it must be noted that this section does not provide a comprehensive thematic analysis of the comments provided. Rather, it provides some small vignettes and case examples to accentuate the more applied roles ARTs that have been documented by Team Leaders over the trial period.

4.6.4 Medical Assistance

Perhaps one of the more applied applications of ART members training was in the provision of medical treatment. All AOS members must complete first aid training and tactical combat casualty care. Selected members may receive further training to a pre-hospital medical care level. Accordingly, ARTs are well placed to serve as first responders to medical emergencies and incidents. Overall, examination of the Team leader comments indicated that ART members provided medical or trauma care on approximately **2%** (n = 35) of all reported incidents, though this is likely to be an underestimate. For example, one Team Leader remarked that

> "ART proved extremely valuable as the trained medic on squad was able to use the AOS trauma kit to provide immediate assistance to the victim who had been stabbed four times. He had tried to intervene when he saw a taxing [robbery or theft] taking place and one male with a pistol in his waist band."

In another instance the ART happened across an incident, as described below:

> "ART came across a 1V where a female cyclist had clipped a car wing mirror and crashed onto the foot path. The female cyclist was initially unconscious but woke up on ART attendance although she presented as being likely concussed. ART member provided first aid including reassuring the cyclist, conducting a primary survey and ascertaining her level of responsiveness. ART also provided a hand over to the attending ambo unit. No other Police unit attended. Female was transport to hospital by ambo."

4.6.5 Discretionary Firearm Carriage

Of particular note were a couple of instances where ART members exercised discretion in the carriage of their firearms. The decision to stow weapons, however, lies with the discretion of the team leader though the decision to do so must be guided by an appropriate threat assessment. In one reported case, ART members opted against carriage of their firearm when dealing with a large number of party goers:

> "ART assisted PST units attending out of control party. Landlord requested people be removed. Excess of 100 people at address. ART units removed Glocks and assisted PST in pushing party goers away from the address in skirmish line. Number of arrests made by PST assisted by ART."

In another case, ART members decided against carrying firearms within a hospital to complete an arrest. As the team leader commented:

> "We elected to park the [response vehicle] further away [from] the hospital and drop our Glocks from our kit for entry to the hospital."

4.6.6 Reassurance and Safety

The analyses so far completed in this chapter have indicated that ARTs often provide reassurance to frontline staff. In principle, this can often lead to frontline staff feeling safer, as well as more supported, though the deployment data could not determine whether this was so with any certainty. As such, the following comments provided by Team Leaders help illustrate this. As one team leader noted:

> "Sgt grateful for assistance and suggestions on tactics. Staff grateful for ART attendance and stated they felt safer with ART being there. Coaching provided to staff to deal with aggressive K9 during transport situations … "

Perceptions around safety appeared to stem, at least in part, by having increased staff numbers in attendance, as the following example demonstrate:

> "… ART staff increased the police response by five members making the execution of the search warrant safer for all involved. ART provided additional tactical options in the form of a shield and 40mm launcher. Local staff appreciated the ART assistance"

> "The presence of ART boosted local numbers and the level of training added to the safety of those attending."

Another potential mechanism for increasing safety was through de-escalation, thereby mitigating the necessity for force. As described by one team leader:

> "Plastic Shield utilised with 40mm and Tasers taken to front door, male called upon and exits address, sees overwhelming display of preparedness and complies immediately with no further issue or force being applied. Tactics used prevented any requirement for any further force to be applied."

Another team leader noted that one offender was compliant during their arrest and stated that "I saw your guns so gave up".

4.6.7 Tactic Guidance and Support

An example above illustrated how ART members may provide coaching and guidance to frontline staff. In some cases ART members went beyond simple advice and instead provided full scale tactical planning for staff. As one team leader remarked:

> "A good example of the assistance we can offer PST … [t]here was no supervisor in attendance and staff were unsure what to do. Initial ART staff [p]rovided guidance and then supervisor from ART arriving was able to formulate a plan and carry out the action required to locate the source of the believed shot. Local staff then completed Enquiries freeing up ART."

4.6.8 Public Relations

Examination of the EoD data also revealed that ARTs were, at times, tasked to undertake public relations exercise. In one particular case ARTs assisted with a new weapons recognition system being tested at Al Noor Mosque (see also Bayer, 2019). In another, ART assisted with a distressed mother who had locked her key in the car along with her baby. As the team leader noted: "It's not all about guns, it's building trust and confidence with the public".

However, not all interactions with the public were favourably received, as the following comments demonstrate:

> "ART [w]ere verbally abused by members of the public after they saw the blue vehicle claiming that they were being harassed by armed police"

> "[the] [o]ffender [was] quickly taken control of by ART operators upon arrival. PST had tried negotiating with him for a long period of time [so our] operators moved swiftly upon arrival and K9'd him. Offenders mother … wasn't happy with the tactics used by us taking him to ground and quickly gaining control upon our arrival. Explained to her the reason for our tactics after lengthy negotiation that hadn't worked. Still wasn't happy."

4.8. Summary

The purpose of the EoD forms was to collate additional data to help build context around the types of events ARTs have attended. Furthermore, it can be viewed alongside the data presented in **Chapter 3** to better understand deployment behaviours. However, it must be noted that this data alone should not be viewed as a wholly accurate reflection of ART trial. Instead, the data ought to be treated as a sample only. To that end, a number of limitations must also be acknowledged. Foremost, the data reported through EoD forms only

captured around a fifth of all incidents attended. Additionally, the event specific compliance rates further suggested that some incidents were reported more frequently than other. Moreover, the data contained a significantly larger proportion of emergency (Priority 1) attendances. Accordingly, any inferences based upon this data must keep this properties in mind.

These discrepancies notwithstanding, examination of deployment data indicated that a large proportion of ART attendances were to provide assistance to frontline officers. The level of response, however, largely dictated the nature of the support team members offered. Specifically, Assist Role deployments were generally associated with lower level tactics with ARTs providing a number of assist functions. These included overseeing execution of door knock and clearances, establishing cordons, conducting area patrols, and assistance in transporting offenders. Observations further indicated that support also came by way of training and mentorship, along with assistance in tactical planning.

Conversely, ART Role deployments (and AOS Roles, although less frequent) typically required greater tactical support from ART members. In these cases, CCA and CRT methods were more often reported. Notably, use of force was not typically used (though this is explored more fully in the next chapter). The general impression gleaned from the data, then, is one where advanced tactics were less relied on by ART members. Instead, reassurance and experience appear to have formed a major part of the ART tactical toolkit. This is not to undermine, nor understate, the inherent value of their tactical training. The point being made is that – at least based upon the data available – the demand for more advanced capabilities was fairly modest in volume.

It was also found that a large number of attendances by ARTs were self-initiated. Though perhaps unsurprising, this observation does confirm what was likely intuited from the attendance data explored in the previous chapter. However, closer examination of those event did highlight some particularities. First, the data indicated that it was not uncommon for ARTs to be requested by frontline units (**§ 4.5.1 Self-Initiated Deployments**). Predominantly, ARTs were asked to provide support during enquires and executions of warrants, though it was found that teams most often provided general assistance in these instances, rather than tactical support. That being said, their presence ostensibly provided reassurance and, in some cases, produce increased feelings of safety among frontline staff (**§ 4.7.3 Reassurance and Safety**).

Second, PST units committed to other critical incidents meant that frontline staff were not always immediately available to attend some events. To address this ARTs were found to self-deploy in these cases. This was particularly the case for family harm events – though frontline requests did also contribute toward the number of self-initiated deployments. Also, ARTs were less often requested to attended Priority 1 events – instead unilaterally self-deploying to those events – with the majority associated with Priority 2 events. These insights help build some understanding around the operational factors that underlie the need for self-deployment; however, a large number of non-emergency self-deployments could not be accounted for by frontline requests or low unit availability.

What the EoD data has certainly demonstrated is that the ART role is multifaceted and members have been used for a diverse set of needs. Of particular note, ART members did assists with a number of medical emergencies, thereby highlighting the more applied use of their skills as emergency first responders (**§ 4.7.1 Medical Assistance**).

Chapter 5: Tactical Options & Use of Force

Chapter Summary

This chapter examines tactical options and use of force data collected throughout the ART trial. This data was provided to the EBPC by Response & Operations: Research and Evaluation (RORE). Chiefly, the data indicates that use of force was used rarely over the course of the trial. Moreover, no firearms were discharged by Armed Response Team members, though a small number of presentations were noted. Instead, presentation of TASER was the primary option with discharges recorded on only two occasions. In all instances ART members' use of TASER was found to be consistent with the tactical options framework. Overall, the level of force applied by ART officers was reviewed by a senior police officer and found to be justifiable, appropriate, proportionate and necessary, tending to be toward the lower end of the tactical options spectrum. In addition, some *ad hoc* analyses were considered that attempted to address, where possible, specific concerns that Armed Response Team members may use excessive force against Māori and Pasifika people and those suffering from mental illness. However, the presence of any bias – or lack thereof – cannot be unambiguously determined based upon the data available. Moreover, any larger scale analyses were beyond the scope of the evaluation framework.

The use of force against a subject is the highest level of intrusion against a person's rights that Police might take. Accordingly, use of force is governed by statute and members of New Zealand Police are criminally liable for any excessive use of force[12]. On occasions where force has been applied officers are required to submit a form within the Tactical Options Reporting (TOR) database. This chapter accordingly examines those instances where a reportable use of force was applied by an ART member.

5.1. Summary of Tactical Options

During the pilot period ARTs attended **41** incidents that resulted in a reportable use of force (i.e., that required the submission of a Tactical Options Report). Note that a single report is from one officer, for one or more subjects at the same incident. Accordingly, a single incident may involve multiple *use of force events* – defined as a use of force by one officer against one subject – each of which must be reported. When counted this way, **49** use of force events were attributable to ART members. As a proportion, this number amounts to **~0.6%** of all incidents attended (i.e., less than **1%** of all ART attendances), or approximately six use of force events per 1000 incidents attended by ARTs.

District breakdowns are laid out in **Table 5.1** (found on the top of the next page) along with the total number of incidents each group attended. Of note, use of force events were more frequent in Canterbury, accounting for **1.22%** (n = 28) of all incidents attended, or approximately 1.2 use of force events per 1000 incidents

Table 5.1: Number of use of force events recorded in each of the three trial districts.

Number	Canterbury	Counties Manukau	Waikato	Total
Use of force events	28 (1.22%)	2 (0.15%)	19 (0.38%)	**49 (0.57%)**
No. incidents attended	2,282	1,300	5,046	**8,628**

[12] The police use of firearms is governed by Crimes Act 1961.

attended. In comparison, Counties Manukau ARTs use of force was considerably lower, accounting for just **0.15%** (n = 2) of events attended. This translate to approximately 1.5 use of force events per 1000 incidents attended. Finally, Waikato ART fell partway between with **0.38%** (n = 19), or 3.8 use of force events per 1000 incidents attended. Notably, the odds of force being used are 8 times higher in Canterbury when compared to Counties Manukau, and 3 times higher when compared to Waikato. Moreover, the exceedingly rare use of force in Counties Manukau is noteworthy, yet it is unclear precisely why such marked differences exist.

One possible explanation is that these events simply went unrecorded. ART operations were governed by the same operating procedures guiding AOS deployments. Relevant here are policies stating that AOS and STG (Special Tactics Group) members are not required to submit a TOR following firearm and TASER presentations. It is possible, then, that a stricter adherence to this policy was adopted in Counties Manukau, thereby underestimating the frequency with which certain tactical options were applied. However, the requirement to report any discharges remained, regardless of workgroup.

5.1.1 Use of Force Incidents

Tactical Options Reporting (TOR) forms provide a field to enter incident code data. However, the offence codes listed against TOR data can conflict with the codes recorded in NIA for the same incidents. Accordingly, for all incidents where a use of force was applied (n = 41; considering only unique incidents and not specific use of force event) event codes correspond with those recorded in NIA. These are listed in **Table 5.2**. Shown also are the numbers recorded within each district.

On average, use of force events occurred most often at 5F: Family Harm Investigation events, accounting for **14.6%** (n = 6) of all incidents where force was used. However, as fraction of all 5F event attended (n = 746), use of force was used on **0.8%** of attendances. This implies that a use of force is expected once out of every 124 attendances at a 5F event. The next highest incident was 3530: Disorder which accounted for **12.2%** (n = 5).

Table 5.2: Use of force events broken down by incident attended for each of the three trial districts.

Incident Code	Canterbury	Counties Manukau	Waikato	Total
5F	2	1	3	**6 (14.6%)**
3530	2	1	2	**5 (12.2%)**
1510	2	-	1	**3 (7.3%)**
1710	3	-	-	**3 (7.3%)**
1C	1	-	2	**3 (7.3%)**
2W	-	-	3	**3 (7.3%)**
PURSUIT	3	-	-	**3 (7.3%)**
1X	1	-	1	**2 (4.9%)**
2I	2	-	-	**2 (4.9%)**
1R	1	-	-	**1 (2.3%)**
3T	1	-	-	**1 (2.3%)**
3W	1	-	-	**1 (2.3%)**
4211	1	-	-	**1 (2.3%)**
4X	-	-	1	**1 (2.3%)**
5M	1	-	-	**1 (2.3%)**
6D	1	-	-	**1 (2.3%)**
7130	-	-	1	**1 (2.3%)**
8P	1	-	-	**1 (2.3%)**
Unknown	1	-	1	**2 (4.9%)**
Total	**24**	**2**	**15**	**41**

Similarly, when considered relative to all 3530: Disorder events (n = 270) attended by ART members, use of force occurred at **1.9%** of attendances. That is, for every 100 incidents attended it is expected that two of those will result in a use of force. Accordingly, use of force were over two times more likely to occur at these events, in comparison

5.1.2 Tactic Type

Table 5.3 summarises the tactical options that were used across all use of force events. Note that because more than one tactic can be used during a use of force event, the total is greater than the total number of use of force events. The critical figure is the use of firearms by ART members. During the trial period ART members did not discharge a firearm though five presentations were recorded, accounting for approximately **9%** of all tactics used in use of force events. A breakdown of which firearm was presented is provided in **Table 5.4**.

Instead, it was found that TASER the most common tactic used, accounting for **52%** (n = 29) of all recorded tactic types in use of force events. Use of TASER is broken down into two categories: Use and Show. *TASER Use* counts the number of discharges with probes and the number of contact stuns. *TASER Show* includes all presentations, laser painting and arcing. A TASER discharge, then, reflects the highest level of deployment for this particular tactic. Notably, discharges were rare, accounting for approximately **4%** (n = 2) of all tactics used, with TASER Show accounting for the remaining **48%** (n = 27). OC Spray was the next most used option, accounting for **18%** (n = 10) of use of force events. Within district, TASER show accounted for **60%** of the tactics used in Canterbury (n = 18) and **8%** of tactics used in Waikato (n = 9) use of force events. This implies that, though Canterbury accounted for a larger number of use of force events, the level of force applied was low in the majority of cases.

It was observed that use of the 40mm eXact impact sponge round was negligible. This tactic permits the incapacitation of an offender without requiring an officer to be proximal to the target, though it may be used in conjunction with TASER to effect an arrest. Events where this option was used are included under “other”.

Table 5.3: Number of use of force events involving each tactic type for each of the three trial districts.

Tactic type used	Canterbury	Counties/Manukau	Waikato	Total
Firearm Presentation	3	-	2	**5**
Firearm Discharge	-	-	-	**0**
TASER Show	18	-	9	**27**
TASER Use	-	1	1	**2**
OC Spray	3	1	6	**10**
Other	1	-	2	**3**
Dog	-	-	-	**0**
Baton	1	-	-	**1**
Empty Hand Tactics	4	-	4	**8**
Total	**30**	**2**	**24**	**56**

Table 5.4: Firearm type used when presenting at offender for each of the three trial districts.

Firearm presented	Canterbury	Counties/Manukau	Waikato	Total
Glock	2	-	1	**3**
M4 Rifle	1	-	1	**2**



Figure 5.1: Highest Perceived Cumulative Assessment (PCA) associated with each use of force event. Counts are collapsed across all districts.

While circumstances, and indeed experience, will necessarily dictate which tactical option is the most appropriate it is noteworthy that the sponge round was deployed only once throughout the course of the pilot[13].

5.2. Adherence to Tactical Options Framework

The use of TASER has received ongoing criticism since it was announced in 2015 that all frontline officers will routinely carry them (Hunt, 2015). Indeed, recent academic research out of the United Kingdom has suggested that providing access to TASERs is associated with an increase in their use (Ariel et al., 2019). Concerns around the potential for excessive use are also common. In New Zealand, examples can be found where usage was unjustified and excessive (IPCA; 2014, 2017, 2018, 2019). In addition, concerns are often raised that force will be used against the most vulnerable, particularly those experiencing mental health issues (O'Brien et al., 2010). Despite these concerns the present data indicates that ART members used force sparingly.

The decision to use force is guided by the Tactical Options Framework (TOF) which assists officers to appropriately decide when, how, and at what level to use a tactical option(s). The perceived cumulative assessment (PCA) provides a situational basis upon which the decision to use a particular tactic is based. In essence, the PCA is a subjective assessment, and continuous reassessment, of an incident, using the TENR model, based on information known about the situation and the subject's behaviour. Any tactic used must be proportionate[14] given all the circumstances known at the time. The legal authority to use force, however, is necessarily derived from law and excessive use of force is not legitimised by adherence to the TOF. It is then important to consider how the usage of TASER by ART members compared. **Figure 5.1** illustrates the highest PCA reported for each use of force event involving ART members.

New Zealand Police provide detailed instructions that outline circumstances in which various tactics may be used. With respect to TASER use, these instructions are explicit that TASER not be used – i.e., discharged or contact stun – in situations below the Assaultive range. It was found that, for both cases of TASER use recorded by ART members, the offender was reported as being in the Assaultive range. Additionally, on **78%** (n = 21) of TASER Show events the offender was also perceived as Assaultive. It was, however, observed that on six occasions a TASER was shown to an offender who fell below the Assaultive threshold (five were perceived as Active Resistant and one perceived as Passive Resistant).

[13] The remaining tactics listed under "other" were "plastic shield" and "vehicle".
[14] New Zealand case law suggests that *reasonable* force includes force that is necessary and proportionate, given all the circumstances known at the time. Excessive force is not reasonable force. This is the definition adopted by New Zealand Police.

These events, however, do not directly contravene the directives laid out under the TOF. Specifically, the TOF states that presentation of a TASER – which includes laser painting and arcing – may be used as a visual deterrent during events where the offender is placed below the Assaultive range, but there is the potential for the offender to escalate beyond the assaultive threshold. Finally, it is noted that for all events involving presentation of a firearm the offender was placed in the GBH range.

Based upon the use of force data reported by ART members there are no clear and obvious protocol violations. Accordingly, ART officers appear to have been compliant with the TOF and appeared both judicious and proportionate in their use of force. Though it cannot be stated with absolute certainty, it is reasonable to intuit that the extensive training undertaken by ART members significantly differentiates how these officers perceive risk – when compared to their frontline counterparts – and the perceived necessity for particular tactical options. In essence, ART members may possess a higher risk threshold and thereby require a greater degree of non-compliance before a tactical option is applied. Moreover, in cases where use of force is applied, the data suggests that ARTs applied a relatively low degree of force.

5.3. Tactical Options at Mental Health Incidents

During the ART trial concerns were raised by the public around the potential for those suffering from mental illness to be disproportionally affected and placed at an increased risk of harm (Mental Health Foundation, 2019; O'Brien et al., 2010). Given that this was not part of the formal evaluation framework this analysis is necessarily *ad hoc*. However, the issue merits consideration; accordingly, this section summarises those events where ARTs were required to use force at mental health related incidents.

The data contained in **Table 5.2** shows that use of force was used on two occasions when attending a 1X: Threatens/Attempts Suicide. On average, then, force was necessary at just over **1%** of all 1X attendances (total 1X attendances = 167). No use of force events were recorded following attendances at 1M: Mental Health incidents. However, mental health can also be a relevant factor when confronting individuals at any event. To that end, it was noted that **27%** (n = 13) of use of force events reported mental health as a relevant factor. At these events, it was found that TASER presentation was the most commonly used tactic, accounting for **69%** of all reported tactics (n = 9). However, a TASER was discharged on one occasion. Empty hand tactics were used on two occasions, with Plastic Shield and 40mm sponge round each used once (recall multiple tactics may have been used during a single use of force event). Indeed, the level of force applied – with the exception of the single TASER show event, and perhaps the 40mm sponge round – does not appear excessive.

5.1.3 Disproportionate Use of Force

To address whether force is disproportionally used during mental health incidents it is necessary to condition on group membership. In practice, this requires answering the question of whether belonging to a particular group affects the probability that force is used. In the present case, this first requires an understanding of how often mental health is a relevant factor across all police interactions and the complementary proportion of interactions where mental health is not relevant[15]. Once this is known, it can then be determined how often force was applied during those interactions where mental health was – and critically, *was not* – a factor. The analysis also requires knowing how often force was, and was not, applied during those interactions where mental health was not relevant. Only then can a test be undertaken to determine whether the two events – mental health status and use of force – are statistically independent (i.e., mental health status does not affect

[15] Colloquially this is referred to as the *base rate*. Base rate information is important because it describes how often a particular event occurs in nature. If an event occurs with a high probability then a larger number of observations will result even when randomly sampling. Without this knowledge it can becomes difficult to determine whether observed proportions differ between particular events, or groups, because of some systematic influence – e.g., a bias – or simply because the events naturally occur with unequal probabilities.

whether use of force is more or less applied). Accordingly, it cannot be determined whether force is differentially applied when only interactions where force has already been applied are known.

5.4. Tactical Options & Ethnicity

Concerns for the safety of Māori and Pacific Peoples were raised throughout the course of trial, prompting calls for the immediate cessation of the trial (Mental Health Foundation, 2019). As above, this was not part of the formal evaluation framework but requires consideration herein. Accordingly, this section provides an *ad hoc* assessment of use of force across ethnic groups.

A breakdown of use of force events recorded across ethnicity is provided in **Table 5.5**. Note that because more than one tactic can be used during a use of force event, the total is greater than the total number of use of force events. It can be seen that when a use of force event had occurred over half of the subjects – **53%** (n = 26) – have been recorded as Māori. New Zealand Europeans were involved in **41%** (n = 20) of cases, with Pacific Peoples accounting for **4%** (n = 2). Numerically, then, when conditioning on use of force events, Māori comprised the largest ethnic group. A further breakdown is provided in **Table 5.6** and summarises the tactical options used by ethnicity.

It can be seen that TASER Show was the tactic most often used with both Māori and New Zealand Europeans in use of force events. Notably, it accounted for **52%** (n = 12) of all tactics used with New Zealand Europeans and **50%** (n = 15) of all reported tactic used with Māori in use of force events. OC Spray was also used with Māori on **27%** (n = 8) of use of force events. Alternatively, empty hand tactics accounted for **22%** (n = 5) of tactics used with New Zealand Europeans. Finally, Māori were the subject of a firearms presentation on **7%** of cases

Table 5.5: Number of use of force events involving each ethnicity for each of the three ART districts.

Ethnicity	Canterbury	Counties/Manukau	Waikato	Total
European	15	-	5	**20**
Māori	13	1	12	**26**
Pacific Peoples	-	1	1	**2**
Other / Unknown	-	-	1	**1**
Total	**28**	**2**	**19**	**49**

Table 5.6: Number of use of force events involving each ethnicity by tactic type.

Tactic type used	European	Māori	Pacific Peoples	Other / Unknown	Total
Firearm Presentation	3	2	-	-	**5**
Firearm Discharge	-	-	-	-	**0**
TASER Show	12	15	-	-	**27**
TASER Use	-	1	1	-	**2**
OC Spray	1	8	-	1	**10**
Other	1	2	-	-	**3**
Dog	-	-	-	-	**0**
Baton	1	-	-	-	**1**
Empty Hand Tactics	5	2	1		**8**
Total	**23**	**30**	**2**	**1**	**56**

(n = 2) and the same tactics accounting for **13%** of reported tactics with New Zealand Europeans in use of force events. However, it should be recognised that these figures are quite small and should be treated with caution.

5.1.4 Disproportionate Use of Force

It is important to acknowledge that use of force data is drawn from a sample that is not reflective of the population. Police interact with a smaller population group that does not reflect the population prevalence statistics. Because of this, Māori are more likely to be represented in use of force data than simple population prevalence statistics would suggest. It is further acknowledged that there are known fundamental historical, societal, and systemic factors that result in Māori being overrepresented in crime statistics and data. Moreover, as discussed earlier, due to Police policy in reporting certain levels of force within AOS and STG groups, of which ART are aligned, there is potential for under-reporting of some use of force tactics. As such, any observations regarding of use of force data must be interpreted with caution.

Table 5.5 above indicates that Māori were, numerically, more likely to be represented within the use of force data. It is possible to statistically compare the relative proportions of Māori and New Zealand Europeans and, in fact, doing so revealed no statistically significant differences ($p = .25$). Accordingly, when examining only those events where a use of force had occurred, Māori and New Zealand Europeans were represented in similar proportions.

It is important to recognise that these proportions consider only those events where force had already been applied. As discussed previously, these comparisons are not appropriate to examine whether any biases exists as they ignore the base rates associated with the substantive groups of interest. Moreover, the absence of this base rate information makes it unclear exactly what the expected proportion of Māori and New Zealand Europeans should be when testing the use of force data. The statistical test above sought to verify whether the proportion of use of force events were evenly distributed across the two ethnicity groups. However, it is unclear whether such a test is appropriate as is whether the two proportions should be expected to be equivalent.

It might be argued that the distribution of ethnicity across the entire population provides the relevant baseline information. However, as noted above this would be inappropriate, as there are a number of widely impacting systemic factors at play for Māori. In addition, doing so imposes the tacit assumption that police interactions with all members of the population provide an equal opportunity for application of force. Instead, considerations might be given to all police interactions with both Māori and New Zealand Europeans offenders that did, and did not, result in a use of force event. Unfortunately, such an approach would again make the assumption that all offender-police interactions provide equal opportunity for force. Furthermore, difficulties arise when attempting to precisely identify those interactions that should comprise the counterfactual - i.e., instances where force could have been applied but was not – because data is not typically collected around the potential for use of force.

Arrest data could serve as a useful alternative because it could be argued that such interactions are more likely to result in a use of force event. However, these interactions ignore those cases where force might have been applied to prevent loss of life. It also ignores other relevant factors, such as the potential for non-offenders to act as an aggressor, and situational factors impacting an offender such as alcohol and drug use.

5.5. Qualitative Analysis

Examination of raw numbers and counts has so far suggested that ARTs have used force somewhat sparingly when attending mental health incidents and adopted lower levels of force when necessary. To provide additional context around these events a few cases examples were extracted from the comments left by Team Leaders in the End of Deployment forms.

5.1.5 Suicide-By-Cop

A significant risk to police are occasions where an offender attempts suicide-by-cop. These events typically involve an offender knowingly and deliberating escalating the threat posed to the public, and the Police, to such an extent that officers are left with no other alternative other than to discharge their firearms. ART Team Leaders noted three separate occasions where an individual attempted to coax ART members into using lethal force. Though the nature of the events varied, as did the state of the subject, in each case the subject attempted to create a tactical impasse. As one team leader describes during an incident involving an intoxicated subject armed with a knife:

> *[the] sergeant attended with other staff and tried to negotiate but [the] male refused to comply … [and the sergeant] advised [that the subject] is threatening to force police to shoot him if they try to K9 him.*

In response to this ART established and executed a plan, with the team leader noting:

> *[the] [p]lan [was] implemented with [the subject] becoming aggressive towards staff when approach made (puffed chest, aggressive stance, fists clenched and yelling out "I'm not going anywhere!"). [The subject] was advised he was under arrest and due to his assaultive demeanour … O/C spray was deployed. This was very effective and [the subject] was taken into custody.*

At another similar event involving a subject armed with a knife the team leader noted that

> *It was obvious that offender was trying suicide by cop as he was saying ["shoot me"] whilst holding the knife.*

Despite this, the incident was resolved without a shot being fired, as the team leader further describes:

> *[the initial] response was with the 40mm. This caused the offender to become agitated and try and entice police to "shoot him". Exact impact round considered but due to the size of the offender, his demeanour and the single shot nature and being in [TASER] distance police transitioned to X2 [TASER]. Upon seeing the [TASER] being presented [the] offender dropped the knife*.

Following an arrest the subject was transported to hospital for a mental health assessment.

Another team leader, having previously dealt with the subject previously, took a cautious approach when dealing with a potential suicide-by-cop scenario:

> *[ART] communicated to staff that it was possible that [the subject] was drawing armed staff into the area to provoke a "suicide by cop" incident. Staff warned off making a direct approach on [the subject].*

In this case, upon communicating with the subject it was determined no threat was present.

5.6. Summary

This chapter examined the use of tactical options by ART members. Principally, examination of tactical option reports indicated that use of force was rare among ART staff. On average, six use of force events were recorded for every 1000 incidents attended, though this value did vary across individual districts. Critically, ART members did not discharge a firearm though presentations were made on five occasions. Instead, the preferred use of force was TASER show – i.e., presentation, laser painting, or arcing. TASER use was conservative with only two recorded instances of discharge. Use of force at mental health events was

considerably rare, accounting for just over 1% of all incidents attended. In addition, use of force during incidents where mental health was a factor largely relied on visual deterrence through TASER presentation. In all instances ART members' use of TASER was found to be consistent with the tactical options framework. Overall, the level of force applied appeared judicious and tended toward the lower end of the tactical options spectrum.

Throughout the trial concerns were often raised about the potential for Māori, those suffering from mental illness, to be disproportionally affected. Though indeed topical, provisions were not be made to accommodate a fuller analysis of these issues and were beyond the scope of the current evaluation framework, though Māori and New Zealand Europeans were observed to have been represented equivalently across use of force events. Nevertheless, the presence of any bias – or lack thereof – cannot be unambiguously determined based upon the data available. The narrative nevertheless touches on critical concepts that are essential for any formal examination of bias. Examination of behavioural biases is inherently complex and encompass a number of historical and societal factors that deserve careful and detailed examination; factors that were obviously lacking herein.

Chapter 6: Police Survey Analyses

Chapter Summary

This chapter address two key evaluation questions. The first concerns the perceived impacts on officer safety in districts where ARTs were operating. Data to evaluate this was collected by having officers from various workgroups complete the Officer Perception Survey. The surveys were intended for three separate workgroups: Armed Response Team officers, Public Safety Team officers, and communications staff involved in ART deployments. However, low response rates from communications staff lead to the removal of this group. Overall, frontline officers surveyed indicated they felt safer with ARTs in attendance. This feeling is varied among responders, though in part, perceptions of safety were associated with the sense that ART possess skills that allow incidents to be resolved more efficiently. The second key question concerns the effect the trial had upon general officer wellbeing in districts where ARTs were operating. Data to evaluate this was collected by having officers complete the Officer Wellbeing Survey. Survey data suggested that officers' overall wellbeing was generally good. AOS staff nationwide reported low to mild levels of burnout, psychological distress, and perceived stress, with fairly high levels of general wellbeing. This was true of general duties staff, too. However, overall engagement with all survey tools was low to moderate and results may not be sufficiently generalizable. In particular, wellbeing data from Counties Manukau is absent in some survey waves and perception data from ART members was not adequately representative.

This chapter address two key evaluation questions. The first concerns the perceived impacts on officer safety in districts where ARTs were operating. The second concerns the effect the trial had upon general officer wellbeing in those same districts. The primary means of evaluating these questions were surveys that were sent out to various workgroups. The sections that following examine the data collated from these surveys.

6.1. Officer Perception Surveys

These surveys were intended toward evaluating attitudes around how safe an officer felt when attending an incident. In principle, it was expected that a survey was completed following all ART operations and calls for service. However, it is understood that there are practical limitations that limit the number of surveys that are ultimately submitted. Though true, engagement with the surveys was not particularly high and, given the size of the observational window – i.e., six months – the samples sizes obtain for both ART and PST surveys were disappointingly small. Further limitations identified are discussed in the sections to come.

The sections detailing the results from the ART and PST survey data are split into two subsections. The first examines the responses to questions collated using Likert Scale ratings. Here responses proportions are examined for substantive questions. The second section examines responses to open ended questions. It must be noted that analysis of that data was not comprehensive and a full thematic analysis was not undertaken. Instead, it provides some useful case examples that help contextualise perceptions, and in some cases issues that officers may have had (see **Appendix E** and **Appendix F** for survey questions). However, it is observational in nature.

6.1.1 Armed Response Team Officer Surveys

Across the trial period a total of **139** surveys were submitted to the EBPC. Many of the surveys were only partially completed meaning there was a varying number of responses for each survey question. For all closed-end questions the responses rates varied between **69% - 100%.** However, the distribution of responses across

trial districts was highly skewed. Particularly, the vast majority of submissions were received from Waikato and accounted for **86%** (n = 120) of all submissions. Comparatively, Counties Manukau and Canterbury made a contribution of just **8%** (n = 11) and **4%** (n = 6), respectively[16]. Unfortunately, given the overrepresentation of data from Waikato, the sample is not sufficiently heterogeneous to make any meaningful generalisations. Instead, the data predominantly reflect the attitudes of officers from a single geographical region. Furthermore, this prevents and meaningful comparisons being made between the different workgroups.

Yes/No Questions

Overall, **69%** of submissions indicated that the team had been requested to attend the incident (n = 139, 95% CI: 0.61 – 0.76, $p < .001$). This implies that surveys were more often submitted following a request for service. Of those instances, ART members perceived their response as timely and efficient **93%** of the time (n = 89, 95% CI: 0.85 – 0.97, $p < .001$). Members noted that lack timeliness was primarily due to the team not being immediately available which delayed their response time, though distance to travel was also noted. When asked whether the job would have been handled differently without ART in attendance, **76%** (n = 103) of ART members agreed (N = 135, 95% CI: 0.68 – 0.83, $p < .001$).

Likert Questions

The response distribution for select questions are laid out in **Figure 6.1** (see **Appendix C** for full results). Overall, **47%** (n = 64) of ART members strongly agreed that they felt safer at the incidents they attended, with **38%** (n = 51) agreeing. Combined this indicates that **85%** (n = 115) of ART staff generally agreed that they felt safer at the incidents they attended[17] (N = 135, 95% CI: 0.79 – 0.91, $p < .001$). When members were asked



Figure 6.1: Responses proportions from the Armed Response Team Officers survey.

[16] Two submissions contained no district information.

[17] There were four submissions that strongly disagreed. Subsequent examination of the data revealed that not all questions were fully considered, and instead answer were provided only to the questions the respondent deemed most relevant. For example, five of these submission strongly agreed that ARTs had a deescalating effect and provided examples.

whether they thought the incident was dealt with more efficiently, **50%** (n = 67) strongly agreed, with a further **36%** (n = 49) agreeing. Accordingly, **86%** (n = 116) of individuals surveys generally agreed that incidents were dealt with more efficiently with ART in attendance (N = 135, 95% CI: 0.79 – 0.91, $p < .001$). However, when asked whether the presence of ARTs deescalated the incident, only **23%** (n = 31) of respondents strongly agreed, with **33%** (n = 45) tending to agree. Thereby, overall agreement was comparatively modest with **56%** (n = 76) generally agreeing (N = 135, 95% CI: 0.48 – 0.65, $p = .17$). Notably, **41%** (n = 55) of officers neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement (with approximately **5%** generally disagreeing).

The absence of a significant majority may owe to the fact that not all incidents will necessarily require de-escalation. Given the varying nature of events – and indeed the supporting role played by ARTs – teams may have a quelling effect some cases, with their presence largely inconsequential in others. It should also be noted that this question was answered from the perspective of ARTs officers themselves (albeit from one district predominantly). Accordingly, perceptions around de-escalation may vary between ART and PST officers. Unfortunately, no comparisons can be made between these workgroups (as discussed earlier). The next section examines some of the responses and feedback provided by survey responders.

Open Ended Questions and Feedback

Responders were asked to elaborate on how jobs were perceived to have been handled differently. Common among the explanations provided by ART members was that staff availability was low, noting that, without their attendance, some jobs would were unlikely to have been completed at all. This is consistent with earlier analyses that revealed ART would sometimes self-deploy to replenish a diminished frontline (**§ 4.5.1 Self-Initiated Deployments**). Moreover, members noted that it meant jobs could be completed without delay, as the following demonstrate:

> "The inquiry would not have been completed without us as they only had two staff working so it would have been delayed"
>
> "No staff available so would likely have continued not dealt with for some hours"
>
> "Delays, staff without the same capability through equipment and experience"
>
> "There would have been delays in being able to get enough staff to safely make the [ar]rest at the address"

ART members also highlighted that their tactical experience and knowledge contributed toward more efficient outcomes. Though perceived efficiencies were also accredited to proficiency in the planning and execution of tactics. This in general were seen to increase both the safety of the staff in attendance the overall efficiency of implementation, as the following demonstrate:

> "[the situation] [w]ould have required more staff and may not have been as a successful outcome as gained by ART presence. ART presence ensured situation was resolved quickly."
>
> "It was much more efficient with ART. The I-car would have been overpowered by all persons present"
>
> "[PST had] Less staff. [PST had] Less tactical options. [PST had] Less tactical experience. [With ART present] Risk minimised."

Finally, ART members remarked that their presence likely prevented an AOS callout. As such, their immediate availability, along with access to additional tactical options, permitted jobs to be dealt with sooner. These

sentiments add further to the comments provided by Team Leaders through end of deployment reporting (**§ 3.4.1 Prevention of AOS Callouts**).

As indicated in **Figure 6.1** there was little disagreement from ART members around questions of efficiency and safety. However, a small proportion of officers did not agree that de-escalation was a factor. Where ART members had indicated disagreement about their presence de-escalating the incident, members indicated that in these cases the situation had already been resolved upon their arrival. In another case the observer had already decamped the scene when the team arrived:

> "He had already left so was de-escalated prior to arrival, so we can't claim that one!"

6.1.2 Public Safety Team Officer Surveys

Across the trial period a total of **160** surveys were submitted to the EBPC. Many of the surveys were only partially completed meaning there was a varying number of responses for each survey question. For all closed-end questions the responses rates varied between **65% - 100%.** There was a good distribution of submissions from across the trial districts. Though the majority of submissions were received from Waikato – accounting for **41%** (n = 65) of submissions – Counties Manukau and Canterbury were better represented, accounting for **39%** (n = 62) and **20%** (n = 32) of responders, respectively[18].

Yes/No Questions

Overall, **66%** (n = 105) of responses indicated that the attending ART had been requested (N = 160, 95% CI: 0.58 – 0.73, $p < .001$). Of those instances, PST staff perceived the response of the ART as timely and efficient **91%** (n = 96) of the time (n = 105, 95% CI: 0.84 – 0.96, $p < .001$). The primary reason provided for lack of timeliness was that ARTs were unavailable at the time of request. This was often due to being at another job when the request came in, meaning they were either significantly delayed or were unable to attend at all. When asked whether the job would have been handled differently without ART in attendance, **69%** (n = 107) of PST members agreed (N = 155, 95% CI: 0.61 – 0.76, $p < .001$).

Likert Questions

The response distribution for select questions are laid out in **Figure 6.2** (see **Appendix C** for full results). Overall, **68%** (n = 105) of PST staff strongly agreed that they felt safer at incidents where ARTs were in attendance, with a further **14%** (n = 22) agreeing that this was the case. Collectively, **82%** (n = 127) of responders generally perceived incidents as safer when ARTs were present (N = 155, 95% CI: 0.75 – 0.87, $p < .001$). Notably, though the aggregate proportion in agreement were similar among ART and PST responders, a larger portion of PST staff strongly agreed. Though a formal test cannot be made between these proportions (the ART sample is not adequately representative) it does suggest that PST staffs' sense of safety was benefitted when ARTs were present.

When officers were asked whether they felt the incident was dealt with more efficiently with ARTs in attendance **72%** (n = 111) strongly agreed, with a further **12%** (n = 8) agreeing. Overall, **83%** (n = 129) of PST staff felt that incidents were more efficient with ARTs present (N = 155, 95% CI: 0.76 – 0.89, $p < .001$). Furthermore, the proportion of responders strongly agreeing was again larger among PST staff when compared to ART responders. However, when asked whether the presence of the ART deescalated the incident, only **29%** (n = 45) of PST officers strongly agreed, with a **23%** (n = 35) agreeing that this as the case. Thereby, overall agreement was comparatively modest with **52%** (n = 80) generally agreeing (N = 155, 95% CI:

[18] There was one submission with no district information.



Figure 6.2: Responses proportions from the Public Safety Team Officers survey.

0.43 – 0.60, *p* = .75). Notably, **37%** (n = 57) of officers neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement, with a further **10%** (n = 16) generally disagreeing.

Finally, when officers were asked whether they were satisfied with the assistance provided by the ART, **77%** (n = 117) of officers strongly agreed, with an additional **11%** (n = 17) agreeing. Overall, **88%** (n = 134) of PST staff were satisfied with the assistance provided by ARTs (N = 152, 95% CI: 0.82 – 0.93, *p* < .001). Moreover, **79%** (n = 120) of officers strongly agreed when asked whether they are likely to request assistance from ARTs again in the future, with another **10%** (n = 15) also agreeing. Accordingly, **89%** (n = 135) of PAT staff surveyed indicated that they would likely request an ART again in the future (N = 152, 95% CI: 0.82 – 0.93, *p* < .001).

Open Ended Questions and Feedback

Like above, officers were asked to elaborate on how jobs were perceived to have been handled differently. It was observed that officers frequently commented on how there was an increased sense of safety among frontline staff with ARTs present. The reassurance provided by ART members ostensibly changed the overall perception of the incident and "[t]he confidence was increased amongst police with the presence of ART".

Some officers linked this perception, in part, to simply have greater numbers in attendance, though the tactical and experience the teams possess were also commented on, as the following demonstrates:

> "It doesn't take long to realise they [ART] are trained to a higher level and have honed there [*sic*] tactics well. Due to this without ART the efforts on the ground would prove less professional on a tactical scale for example room clearance."

> "Less staff would have been a struggle dealing with the incident. Also there would have been a lack of experience dealing with that particular incident"

> "Less staff with less training forced to either clear a house or wait for a prolonged period of time for full AOS call out. This would have placed staff at undue risk."

Notably, PST staff also remarked that the incident was handled differently because the attendance of ARTs likely prevented a full AOS callout.

Similar sentiments were observed when PST staff were asked to elaborate why they thought the incident was dealt with more efficiently, though some comment was made that experience ARTs possess lead to faster resolutions, as the following illustrate:

> "ART where able to get their staff into position quickly and efficiently. This resulted in a timely and safe apprehension of the offender despite his attempt to flee"

> "ART provided extra tactical options and were well integrated into a frontline role to deal with potentially armed subjects at the address"

> "They were able to quickly go through the aspects of GSMEAC with the help of the incident controller and attending staff members."

Some officers made a point of acknowledging the training and guidance ART members provided:

> "Having ART team during the search warrant was fantastic. Immediately staff felt secured when they found out that ART is involved. The ART team leader also suggested ways on how to make the execution of the warrant better in regards to staff safety. On arrival, they've handled the occupants professionally and the occupants didn't even noticed that they were armed."

When asked how ARTs de-escalated the situation many officers reiterated that ARTs bring a level of experience that likely lead to better outcomes all round, though this is not necessarily due to a de-escalation *per se*. However, there were some instances where this did appear to be the case. One officer noted that "their [ART] presence was a strong deterrent to the suspect". Another commented that:

> "The presence of ART ensured that the suspected offender at the time remained calm during their interactions with police and was safely located. This allowed police to build a good rapport with him which ultimately led to him being identified as the victim in the family harm incident rather than the offender".

Potential Issues

The feedback examined thus far certainly paints an optimistic picture and indeed suggests that ARTs offer critical support to frontline staff. However, it must be noted that **11%** of officers generally disagreed that ART attendance lead to greater efficiencies and **10%** disagreed that ARTs de-escalated the incident. Accordingly, it is important to balance the narrative with comments that reflect the full range of opinions.

One particular issue observed in comments left by PST staff related to the ownership and handing over of the scene and file, as the following examples illustrate:

> "ART have responded to a car being broken into where no PST units were available … I have arranged for my staff to take over after ART has made minimal enquires to ID the offender and compiled nothing evidential and requested a unit. Them [sic] self-assigning then declining to take an investigation file effects [sic] my capabilities to respond and hand out other taskings files etc. [B]ecause they are in attendance therefore it forces my hand to provide staff to a less pressing incident. ART waited almost an hour to get PST staff to attend where they could have taken statements etc within that time. If they put their hand up to attend they should be prepared to take the file as PST did not request their assistance."

> "There [*sic*] unwillingness to continue with what they started has caused issues with the process. There was no operational requirement [f]or them to hand over the incident. There was no critical incident happening at the time"

Officers also remarked that when ARTs self-assigned to incidents it sometimes created uncertainties and lead to inefficiencies, as the following demonstrate:

> "[ARTs] complicated the situation and it took longer than required due to their attendance".

> "ART self-assigned took over the briefing and was unclear if they where [*sic*] taking over or wanted PST staff to conduct the enquiry. Ultimately PST staff did the enquiry and ART did nothing but complicate and interfere in a plan they where [*sic*] not required for".

Some officers also expressed concern that frontline staff may rely on ARTs too heavily:

> "They [ART] are a valuable resource to have in the right setting but I feel it's making some PST idle in their TENR"

> "ART has become default call for anything out of the ordinary. This job was a possible 1X with firearm. Comms called ART (understandably) but no call to PNT. A mistaken belief is present that ART have negotiation capability and answer on PNT behalf. They don't."

6.2. Summary: Officer Perception Surveys

Before considering the results from these surveys it is necessary to outline a number of limitations associated with the analyses which should contextualise the findings discussed shortly. Principally, the measures used to quantify staff perceptions were undermined by a lack of response from officers involved in the trial, with small sample sizes obtained from surveys despite a 6 month window, and the large number of incidents attended by officers (**§ Chapter 3**). In part, this reflects the operational environment officers work in though small datasets make it difficult to draw generalizable conclusions from this data set.

Issues around the representativeness of the data, however, were further compounded by an overrepresentation of data from only one of the trial districts. It must be noted that efforts undertaken by ART members in Waikato to engage with the surveys was commendable, particularly given their very low response rates observed over the initial few months of the trial. However, it is unknown why response rates were so low from Canterbury and Counties Manukau. Finally, limitations around sample sizes were also an issues with responses from frontline officers, though data were more reasonably distributed across the trial districts. For these reasons, a rigorous impact assessment cannot be made.

Overall, both ART and PST staff indicated that they felt safer at those incidents where they jointly attended. Additionally, officers from both groups generally agreed that incidents were resolved more efficiently with ARTs in attendance. Of note, it was observed that PST staff more strongly endorsed these feelings than did their ART counterparts. It might be reasonably intuited that part of this apparent difference is driven by the varying experience and skills each group possess. Indeed, some of the broader themes that emerged from the comments left by officers referenced this point, linking the availability of additional staff that were tactically trained and knowledgeable to enhanced perceptions of safety and efficiency. Moreover, these factors appear to have influenced how incidents were perceived to be have been handled, with officers noting that jobs were handled more effectively, and safely, with ARTs in attendance. Others also remarked that the availability of ARTs meant that an AOS callout was mitigated. In addition, both groups made note of the training and guidance that ART members were able to provide.

Both groups, however, did not generally agree that ARTs de-escalated the situation. Of course, de-escalation is not the only means through which an event can be made safer, and it appears that this was not always a mechanism attributable to the overall treatment and resolution those incidents attended. The evaluation has revealed that ARTs often assisted and supported the frontline by simply being present. It is possible that this alone had an effect on how the frontline themselves ultimately dealt with the situation.

It was found that the majority of surveys were submitted following a request for service. A number were also submitted following self-initiated deployments, some of which provided feedback that was a little more critical. Broadly speaking, this ostensibly related to the handover policy (**§ Deployment Criteria**) with officers expressing some frustration with ART members over file and scene ownership. Other also remarked that ARTs may be too heavily relied on. This issues notwithstanding, from a service delivery perspective ARTs were generally perceived as responsive and timely. Moreover, a large percentage of PST staff stated that they were satisfied with the assistance provided and that they would ask for assistance again in the future.

6.3. Officer Wellbeing Surveys

The Officer Wellbeing Survey was designed to assess four dimensions relating to officer wellbeing: General mental wellbeing, Psychological distress, Burnout, and Perceived stress. It was intended that all AOS members, across all districts, complete the survey at each time point. This is so comparisons can be made between ART members and AOS operators in districts where the trial is not running. It was also expected that PST staff from participating districts participate in the survey to assess the effect, if any, of having AOS staff move into full-time ART roles.

6.3.1. Submissions and Demographics

Prior to analysis survey submission were checked for duplicates and cleaned. There were a small number of instances where multiple submissions were received from the same individual during a survey wave. These submissions often contained conflicting response profiles and were removed from the analysis. Submission were next cross referenced against New Zealand Police databases to identify responses from current AOS members. Once matched, QIDs were encrypted and could not be used for identification purposes. It was intended that only AOS members from non-participating districts complete the wellbeing survey; accordingly, all non-matches found amongst the submission from non-participating districts were discarded.

In total, The EBPC received a total of **596** submissions from a total of **411** individuals across the three survey waves. The average age of the cohort was 39 years (SD = 9.2) and participants had approximately 12 years (SD = 8.61) of service behind them on average. In terms of gender, **87%** (n = 359) of submissions came from males. Of the 49 females that did participate only **18%** (n = 9) were identified as AOS members. However, it is worth noting that there tend to be lower numbers of female officers in some specialist roles such as AOS.

Table 6.1: Officer Wellbeing Survey submissions broken down across district and workgroup. Only general duties staff from trial districts were expected to respond.

	ART/AOS Members			General Duties Staff			
District	**T_0**	**T_1**	**T_2**	**T_0**	**T_1**	**T_2**	**Total**
Auckland	5	-	8	-	-	-	**13**
Bay of Plenty	13	13	15	-	-	-	**41**
Canterbury	19	26	23	5	7	24	**104**
Central	22	17	18	-	-	-	**57**
Counties Manukau	5	-	6	-	-	2	**13**
Eastern	12	-	6	-	-	-	**18**
Northland	9	-	-	-	-	-	**9**
Southern	12	7	22	-	-	-	**41**
Tasman	11	1	19	-	-	-	**31**
Unknown	-	-	1	-	-	-	**1**
Waikato	11	24	22	35	36	97	**225**
Waitematä	2	-	2	-	-	-	**4**
Wellington	19	19	1	-	-	-	**39**
Total	**140**	**107**	**143**	**49**	**43**	**123**	**596**

A district breakdown of submissions is provided in **Table 6.1**. Apparent from the table is a notable lack of submissions – from both ART/AOS members and general duties staff – from Counties Manukau. In particular, no data were received from ART/AOS during the second survey wave (T_1) and no data obtained from general duties staff across waves one and two. Where data was available the numbers were almost negligible. Data from general duties staff in Canterbury was also low, though did increase during wave three. Comparatively, Waikato were the most consistent providers of data, for both groups surveyed. Unfortunate, again, is that this variable level of engagement produced insufficiently representative samples. Specifically, data from the Waikato dominate the general duties sample whereas Counties Manukau is significantly underrepresented in both samples.

6.3.2. ART versus AOS Wellbeing

In this section wellbeing is compared between AOS officers working in non-participating districts with those currently working within a participating district, many of whom are working specifically as ART members. Given the sampling issues discussed above the analysis was simplified by aggregating all responses from ART officers into a single group. The same was done for responses from all AOS staff in non-trial districts. However, it must be kept in mind that Counties Manukau are not well represented in the ART group and any findings based upon these comparisons may not generalise to that particular district.

Each wellbeing dimensions comprises a varying number of questions (see **Appendix G**). The dimension averaged response provides a general index of the experienced, or perceived, level of each dimensional attribute and is calculated by simply averaging responses across all dimension specific questions. The estimates for each dimension are displayed in **Figure 6.3**[19]. Each dimension is considered in turn next.

[19] Formal tests were conducted using the log odds of the response data – for which confidence intervals can be calculated – though back transformation of these values to the response scale is not always reliable. In addition, log odds are not an intuitive measure to report when dealing with Likert data. For these reasons the figures presented in the following sections do not display confidence intervals and are intended to illustrate the overall trend of the data.



Figure 6.3: Dimension averaged response for each wellbeing dimension across the three survey waves. Armed Response Team members are denoted by light blue bars with Armed Offenders Squad members denoted by the dark blue bars.

Burnout

Low values on this dimension are suggestive of low levels of experienced burnout. The dimension averaged responses fell between the ratings of one (some of the time) and two (less than half the time) and are indicative of low levels of burnout.

There was a reliable relationship between levels of reported burnout and survey wave ($p < .001$; see Technical Appendix for more detail). Specifically, average burnout levels declined linearly in time ($b = -.31$, $p < .001$). Furthermore, while AOS members in non-trial districts (dark blue bars) reported slightly higher levels of burnout than did members in trial districts, on average there were no statistically significant differences between the two groups ($p = .98$). Accordingly, relative to baseline, all AOS/ART members – regardless of whether they belonged to a trial district or not – reported experiencing lower levels of burnout at the end of the trial period.

Psychological Distress

Low values on this dimension are suggestive of low levels of experienced psychological distress. The dimension averaged responses fell between the ratings of one (some of the time) and two (less than half the time) and are indicative of low levels. Note that this scores on this dimension were lower when compared to both burnout and perceived stress.

On average, there were no statistically significant effects detected for either survey wave ($p = .88$) nor district ($p = .10$). This indicates that reported levels of psychological distress did not deviate from baseline for all responders, remaining invariant in time.

Perceived Stress

Low values on this dimension are suggestive of low levels of perceived stress. The dimension averaged responses fell between the ratings of one (some of the time) and two (less than half the time) and are indicative of low levels of stress.



Figure 6.4: Dimension averaged response for each wellbeing dimension across the three survey waves. Armed Response Team members are denoted by light blue bars with General Duties staff denoted by the dark blue bars.

There was a detectable relationship between levels of perceived stress and survey wave (p = .03). However, follow-up tests revealed no reliable pairwise differences which suggests the effect is not reliable (likely a Type I Error). No differences were found between responses received from members in trial districts and non-trial districts. These results indicate that perceived levels of stress remained invariant over the course of the trial period.

General Wellbeing

High values on this dimension are suggestive of high levels of general wellbeing. The dimension averaged responses fell between the ratings of four (most of the time) and five (all of the time) and are indicative of good general wellbeing.

While there appeared to be a slight increase in reported levels of wellbeing across survey waves this effect was not statistically significant (p = .43). No differences were found between responses received from members in trial districts and non-trial districts (p = .51). Accordingly, all responders reported experiencing similar levels of wellbeing throughout the trial period.

6.3.3. ART Members versus General Duties Wellbeing

In this section wellbeing is compared between AOS officers and General Duties/PST staff working in trial districts only. Unlike the data analysis above, only the three trial districts were relevant for analytical purposes. As above, the analysis was similarly simplified by aggregating all responses from ART officers into a single group and doing the same for data from general duties staff. The same caveats apply, however. Like above, the analysis concerns the dimension averaged responses which are displayed in **Figure 6.4**.

Burnout

Levels of burnout fell between the ratings of one (some of the time) and two (less than half the time) and are indicative of low levels of burnout.

Analogous the above, there was a reliable relationship between levels of reported burnout and survey wave ($p < .01$) with average burnout levels declined linearly in time ($b = -.32$, $p < .001$). There were no statistically significant differences between ART members and general duties staff in reported levels of burnout ($p = .50$). Accordingly, both ART members and general duties staff reported lower levels of burnout at the end of the trial, relative to baseline.

Psychological Distress

Reported levels of distress were low between the work groups and fell between the ratings of one (some of the time) and two (less than half the time).

There was a reliable relationship between the average levels of reported distress and survey wave ($p < .01$). This effect was driven by an average decrease in reported levels of distress during the second wave of data collection ($p < .01$), which returned to baseline levels during wave three ($p = .34$). However, the average levels of reported distress did not differ between ART members and general duties staff ($p = .20$), with each group reporting similar levels across time.

Perceived Stress

Reported levels of perceived stress were low and fell between the ratings of one (some of the time) and two (less than half the time).

Despite there being a numerical increase in the levels of perceived stress reported by general duties staff (dark blue bars) there were no statistically significant effects detected for between the groups ($p = .10$) nor across survey waves ($p = .11$). Accordingly, perceived stress remained unchanged for both groups over the course of the trial.

General Wellbeing

Like above, both groups reported high levels of general wellbeing with ratings falling between four (most of the time) and five (all of the time).

On average, there was some indication that levels of wellbeing increased linearly across survey waves ($b = .18$, $p = .04$) though the overall effect of time was not statistically significant ($p = .17$). In addition, there were no differences between ART members and general duties staff in reported levels of wellbeing ($p = .43$). Accordingly, both workgroups reported experiencing similar levels of wellbeing throughout the trial period.

6.3.4. Summary: Officer Wellbeing Survey

The results examined above indicated that officers' overall wellbeing was good. In general, AOS staff nationwide reported low to mild levels of burnout, psychological distress, and perceived stress, with fairly high levels of general wellbeing. This was also true of general duties staff.

Analysis of dimension specific responses highlighted a general decrease in reported levels of burnout over the course of the trial, relative to the baseline survey conducted just prior to trial commencement. One possible explanation for this effect is a general uncertainty and anxiety around the pending changes prior to the initiation of the trial. This being true for both those AOS members transitioning into ART roles and general duties staff potentially having to assume more responsibilities if backfilling was not possible. However, as time passed individuals likely adjusted, becoming more comfortable with their new roles, thereby allowing those initial feelings of apprehension to abate. While possible in theory, this explanation remains more speculation than fact and requires formal follow up with officers to determine whether this was indeed the case.

When comparing ART members and general duties/PST wellbeing there was some variation along the psychological distress dimension across survey waves. Specifically, reported levels of distress dipped during

the second wave, though returned to baseline levels during wave three. It is likely that this reflects nothing more than sampling variability and is not indicative of anything systematic. Moreover, these results must be treated with some caution and not over interpreted. For this particular comparison, the combination of the smaller sample size obtained during the second wave, along with numbers in the general duties/PST group inherently being smaller than the comparison group, means that random noise is a reasonable explanation for the observed decrease.

Chapter 7: Thematic Analysis of Media Articles

Chapter Summary

This chapter describes results from an analysis of print media released since the announcement of the Armed Response Team trial in October 2019. The intention was to examine the arguments and opinions presented through media to provide additional context around how some of the public reacted to the trial. Quantitative analysis of articles has shown the majority of printed media were against the idea of ARTs. Qualitative thematic analysis has shown a number of reasons why media commentators may feel this way, including a lack of consultation by Police about starting the trial, leading to loss of trust; reasoning for the need for ARTs which did not hold true for commentators; poor communication of what the ARTs role is, and subsequent changes to it; and the impact of ARTs on minorities and vulnerable people – in particular Tangata Whenua. For New Zealand Police, the results of the thematic analysis represent a number of important lessons in working with and for the public. In particular, some of the lessons drawn from the analysis were: Voice was important to commentators, and the ability to be consulted as a community or by elected representatives (parliament); honesty and transparency, the feeling that the ART role continued to expand through the trial; safety, that not all people associate the Police with safety; and that the commitment to the Treaty – which is one of the core Police values, feels missing in this trial.

This chapter presents a summary of a thematic analysis of print media relating to the Armed Response Teams trial. The aim was to examine the arguments and opinions presented through media since the announcement of the trial by previous Commissioner of Police Mike Bush in October 2019. Additionally, it provides some context how the public reacted to the trial and provides opportunities to learn where the implementation of the initiative was not as intended.

7.1. Methodology

A media search was conducted using the Google search engine. Search terms included (New Zealand OR NZ OR Aotearoa OR Kiwi) AND (Armed Response Team) OR (Armed Offenders) OR (Armed Police) OR (Armed Cops) OR (Police AND Armed Patrol) OR (Police AND Armed Unit) OR (Armoured Vehicle) OR (Police Gun) OR (Police Pistol) OR (Police Rifle). The search results were refined by limiting to the 'News' results, and were restricted to freely accessible print media. Results were further limited to 'Past Year', to ensure the time period was of relevance to the Armed Response Team trial.

The results of the media search were scanned for relevance. News articles which did not make reference to the Armed Response Team or whose only reference was to state that the Armed Response Team had been present at an incident were excluded. Results which met this initial relevance scan were collated for subsequent analyses, and a spreadsheet of metadata was created which included the article name, date of print, organisational source, and a web link to the original data source.

Thematic analysis was conducted by two coders, following a process similar to that outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006). A subset of articles were selected for familiarisation with the data by selecting the first article of each month, which ensured that the sample was representative across the timeframe of relevance, and captured any changes which may have occurred across the duration of the Armed Response Team trials. Both coders independently read the familiarisation subsample and generated initial codes based on interesting features identified in the data. The two coders then met to discuss the codes identified and collate them into a

set of themes which would be used for subsequent thematic coding for the remainder of the dataset. An 'Other' category was also included to allow for the identification of potential additional themes not initially identified in the data.

The remaining results not included in the initial thematic code generation were then divided evenly between the two coders, ensuring an even division of articles across the timeframe, and each was coded by one coder. During the coding process, each coder examined the written text to identify individual extracts of data, which were classified into one of the themes. Notable or representative quotes were also recorded. In addition to the thematic data, metadata information about the author, key individuals, and key sources of data was collected. Finally, the coder rated the overall 'tone' of the article, classifying whether it was 'Favourable' towards the Armed Response Team trial, 'Against' the Armed Response Team trial, presented a 'Balanced' view from both those favourable and against, or was 'Factual' with no overt views or opinions stated.

Following the thematic coding process, the data and themes extracted from the entire dataset were analysed and further refined to delineate the final themes and sub-themes for synthesis in the report. The final themes/sub-themes included:

1. Be safe, feel safe;
2. Operational need and evidence base;
3. Democracy, consultation, trust and concern;
4. Impact on minority groups;
5. Appropriate use of the Armed Response Teams;
6. New Zealand vs. the world;
7. March 15th attacks;
8. Expressions of opposition; and
9. Guns, violence and escalation

Quantitative analyses were also conducted on the metadata to explore key patterns and trends in the data.

7.1.1 Inter Coder Reliability

To ensure that the two coders were conducting the thematic analysis and coding the extracted data into themes in a commensurate way, an analysis of inter-coder reliability was conducted. To do this, each coder independently coded a sample of 10% of the results coded by the other (meaning 20% of the results were double coded in total), ensuring sampling was spread evenly across the relevant timeframe. Each result in the sample was then coded as to whether extracts were present or absent for each theme, with results collapsed across themes to reflect the final themes identified in the report.

A Cohen's Kappa analysis was conducted to measure inter-coder reliability for each theme as well as coding of the articles' 'tone'. A percentage agreement was also calculated to measure agreement across all coding combined. The Cohen's Kappa ranged from 0.52 – 1.0, with an average of 0.73, indicating a substantial level of agreement (Landis & Kotch, 1977). This was supported with an observed percentage agreement of 87% (values over 75% are interpreted as acceptable; Miles & Huberman, 1984).

7.2. Quantitative Analysis

A total of **108** articles were initially analysed in the thematic analysis. During the analysis, further articles which did not meet the relevance criteria were identified, leading to the removal of an additional 6 results. As such, the quantitative analysis and final thematic analysis was conducted on **102** identified articles.

Table 7.1: Number of media articles about Armed Response Team trials published online each month, including the total number of articles published, and the number of unique articles (excluding duplicate reprints).

Year	Month	Unique Articles	Total Articles
2019	October	33	**42**
	November	21	**26**
	December	5	**5**
2020	January	3	**3**
	February	4	**4**
	March	8	**14**
	April	6	**7**
	May	1	**1**

It is common practice in the media for a single article to be reprinted in different media sources. An analysis of the results found that of the 102 articles, there were **81** unique articles. In the quantitative analysis, both unique and non-unique articles were included to give an accurate representation of the quantity of information published online.

The time range of publishing for the articles was from 18 October 2019, the date the Armed Response Team trial was announced, to 5 May 2020 (the last date prior to the commencement of data collection). A breakdown of the number of articles published for each month is presented in **Table 7.1**.

7.2.1 "Tone" of Media

An examination of the 'tone' of the online media articles published is presented in **Figure 7.1**. As can be seen from the figure, the majority of articles were classified as presenting views or information against the use of Armed Response Teams, representing **60%** of media articles included in the analysis. In contrast, only **10%** of media articles presented a Favourable or Balanced view of the Armed Response Teams or trial. The remaining **30%** of articles were considered Factual.



Figure 7.1. Breakdown of article 'tone' as represented by the percentage of articles classified as Favourable (towards ARTs), Against (ARTs), articles which presented a Balanced range of views and opinions, and those which presented Factual information with no view/opinion expressed.

A breakdown of the 'tone' of the media articles across the relevant time period is presented in **Table 7.2**. As can be seen, articles classified as Factual represented a large proportion of those published online in the early months of the Armed Response Team Trial, and again near the end of the trial. Articles presenting views and opinions Against the Armed Response Teams and trial are found across almost all months (excluding December 2019). Articles presenting views and opinions Favourable to the Armed Response Teams and trial were only found in three of the eight months examined, and predominantly represented a small proportion of articles published compared other 'tones' when present.

7.2.2 Media Sources and Authors

The **102** articles published online came from **34** online media sources. The majority of these sources (**68%**) came from New Zealand-based websites/media outlets, with **32%** coming from international sources.

Almost **70%** of the media articles came from a total of 8 different websites/media outlets. Largest contributor for sources of articles included RNZ (**21%** of all articles), Stuff (**15%**), New Zealand Herald (**9%**), Otago Daily Times (**8%**) and The Daily Hub (**6%**). Regarding authorship, **32%** of the media articles did not have an author named in the by-line. Of those that did, a total of 47 different authors were identified. The majority of authors were named individuals, however, there were three organisational authors who published open letters or press releases – JustSpeak, The Mental Health Foundation, and People Against Prisons Aotearoa. Press releases and open letters were published with these organisations as named author, however, additional

Table 7.2: Breakdown of media article 'tone' by month. Note that some months include only a small number of articles published

Year	Month	Favourable	Against	Balanced	Factual	Total
2019	October	2	15	3	22	**42**
	November	-	23	2	1	**26**
	December	2	-	-	3	**5**
2020	January	-	1	-	2	**3**
	February	-	4	-	-	**4**
	March	1	13	-	-	**14**
	April	-	5	-	2	**7**
	May	-	1	-	-	**1**
Total	**-**	**5**	**62**	**5**	**30**	**102**

articles were authored by individuals associated with these organisations, either as a spokesperson for the organisation or on their own behalf. Excluding those articles with no named author, just under half of the articles had authors who contributed only one article (45% of authored articles, 30% of total articles). A total of 13 individuals contributed authorship to more than one article, and were responsible for 37% of all media articles published.

7.2.3 Key Individuals and Sources of Content

A total of 68 individuals or organisations were identified as providing information, opinion or comment in the media articles. Of those, 33 (49% of individuals/organisations) were key sources of content for more than one article. A total of 12 individuals each appeared in at least 5% of the media articles. Of those 12, 7 (58% of highly repeated individuals, 10% of all individuals) presented views which were generally Against the Armed Response Teams and trials. The remaining 5 individuals (42% of highly repeated individuals, 7% of all

Table 7.3: Backgrounds of the key individuals providing contribution to the media articles. Percentage represents the proportion of all articles which included that contributor type. Note that as a single article could include multiple contributors, percentages do not add to 100.

Affiliation	Contributor Background	Percentage of Articles
Non-police	Organisation / spokesperson	22
	Ex-police	18
	Politician	15
	University	15
	Law and/or justice society	13
	Media	10
	Public	8
	Local Government	6
	Community Group	4
	Islamic Community	2
Police	Commissioner of Police	20
	Minister	17
	Frontline	10
	National Commander	6
	Association	5
	Deputy Commissioner	4

individuals) were associated with the police in some capacity (members of the Police or the Minister of Police), contributing Factual or Favourable information and comment.

Of the highly repeated key individuals, 4 were particularly regular sources of information or comment, each appearing in over 10% of articles. These included previous Commissioner of Police Mike Bush (18% of articles), and Minister of Police Stuart Nash (17% of articles), both of whom contributed Factual or Favourable information and comment; and former police officer Tim McKinnel (14% of articles), and criminology graduate and spokesperson for People Against Prisons Aotearoa Emilie Rākete (12% of articles), both of whom presented information or comments Against the Armed Response Teams.

The backgrounds of the key individuals who provided information, opinion or comment is presented in Table 2. As can be seen from **Table 7.3**, the contributors to the largest proportion of articles came from organisations or organisational spokespeople, followed by those with a police background (current or former). Politicians (including MPs, former MPs, and the Prime Minister) were also identified as key individuals in 15% of articles (excluding the Minister of Police, 31% with the Minister), representing Labour, National, the Green Party, and the Māori Party. University lecturers/researchers and lawyers/justice advocates also featured prominently as contributors of information or comment. Regarding contributions from the New Zealand Police, a total of 44% of all articles provided some information or comment from a Police representative. The 'voice' of New Zealand Police was mainly provided by the previous Commissioner of Police Mike Bush (18% of articles), Commissioner of Police Andrew Coster (2% of articles), and the Minister of Police.

While the majority of the articles included interviews or comments from key individuals as the contributing source of information, **28%** were classified as 'opinion' pieces, expressing the views and opinions of one individual or organisation. The backgrounds of the contributors to these opinion pieces spanned the range found in the total media dataset, including organisation/spokesperson and media (each 24% of all opinion piece articles, 10% of total articles), ex-police (10% of opinion pieces, 3% total articles), community group, law, university, politicians, Islamic community, and New Zealand Police Association (each 3% of opinion pieces, 1%

Table 7.4: Frequency of themes across media articles. Percentage represents the proportion of all articles which included that theme. Note that as a single article could include multiple themes, percentages do not add to 100.

Theme	Percentage of Articles
Be safe, feel safe	**45**
Operational need and evidence base	**68**
Democracy, consultation, trust, concern	**60**
Impact on minority groups	**63**
Appropriate use of ARTs	**50**
New Zealand versus the world	**34**
March 15 attacks	**34**
Expressions of opposition	**23**
Guns, violence, and escalation	**73**

total articles). Regarding the 'tone' of these opinion pieces, **90%** presented information, comments and opinions which were Against the Armed Response Team and trial, with only **10%** presenting a Favourable opinion.

7.2.4 Frequency of Themes

The frequency of each theme across the media articles which included each theme is presented in **Table 7.4**. As can be seen from Table 3, the most common themes included discussions and comments around guns, violence and escalation, the operational need and evidence on which the Armed Response Team trial was based, the potential impact of the Armed Response Teams on minority groups, and issues around democracy, consultation with the community, concerns around the Armed Response Teams, and trust in the teams and the New Zealand Police.

A Cramer's V correlation analysis (Cramer, 1946) was performed to examine whether there were any relationships between themes, and whether any themes tended to be discussed together within the same articles. The analysis revealed little strong relationship between the discussions of the themes within the media articles, meaning there was no tendency for certain themes to be commonly discussed together. A weak-moderate relationship (φ_c = .39) was found between Theme 3: Democracy, consultation, trust and concern and Theme 8: Expressions of opposition, with comments around consultation and concerns tending to appear in articles including information or comments about opposition to the Armed Response Teams and the trial. Theme 4: Impact on minority groups was weakly correlated with Theme 8: Expressions of opposition (φ_c = .32), Theme 6: New Zealand vs. the world (φ_c = .30), Theme 3: Democracy, consultation, trust and concern (φ_c = .28), and Theme 2: Operational need and evidence base (φ_c = .27).

7.3. Thematic Analysis

The thematic analysis below represents the opinions, judgements and research of the article authors and their interviewees. The following sections have attempted to present these opinions as fairly as possible.

7.3.1 Theme one: Be safe, feel safe

New Zealand Police want New Zealand communities to be safe, and to feel safe. As part of the Armed Response Team (ART) trials, the concepts of 'safety' and police and community roles in that were heavily debated. While those 'for' ARTs said police were responsible for keeping their staff and communities safe, those 'against' ARTs didn't feel safe at all. Throughout the media commentary of ARTs previous Commissioner

of Police Mike Bush gave two ways in which ARTs would impact on safety – they would increase community safety, and the safety of police officers. This point was echoed by Minister of Police, Stuart Nash, and the Head of the Police Association Chris Cahill.

However, some challenged the idea that ARTs made people feel safer at all. One article suggested that there was mixed evidence as to whether armed officers make communities feel safer, while others suggested that given not everyone sees police as 'a beacon of safety', having more of them around with firearms will make them feel less safe rather than more.

One article questioned whether police safety was the real driver of ARTs, but contended that it would come at the expense of community safety. Another stated that part of the role of police was to protect human life, and that this trial wouldn't do that.

> "The highest duty of police officers should be the protection of human life, but initiatives like this do not serve to protect life. More cops with guns means more people shot by police. It's up to us, as responsible citizens, to put a higher value on human life, and to not accept this." - Mark Hanna

Others questioned the role of 'community' in policing, and that policing in New Zealand is by consent of that same community. By that argument, sending ARTs into communities, was breaking that consent, as communities hadn't been asked if they wanted armed police, nor to be part of the trial.

Four articles mentioned police as 'first responders' or 'social workers' particularly for mental health call outs. There was both concern about police ability to do this in communities, and also about the need to move this need into the community, or better trained responders.

Suggestions were given as to ways police could better work with communities, including using the money from ARTs on community based programmes. Articles mentioned building better relationships with the community – including community lead policing, prevention and problem solving. Increasing volunteer groups like Māori Wardens, and using alternative resolutions were also mentioned.

> "Genuine and equitable public safety is co-created by police and community together. It cannot be coerced."- Tania Sawicki Mead

Lastly, one commentator, while understanding that ARTs caused some people concerns, still believed they were the best way to protect communities.

7.3.2 Theme two: Operational need and evidence base

The New Zealand Police felt there was enough operational need to move forward with the Armed Response Team trial, however many in the public felt that there was simply not enough of an evidence base to even trial the concept of routinely armed police.

Operational Need

Police, politicians, and commentators all put forward reasons why ARTs were needed. For Police the operational environment had changed, and March 15 2019 was part of that change. The risk to police officers and the public was from people with firearms, both terrorists, and those who engaged in organised crime, as well as the risk from those offenders fuelled by the methamphetamine problem in New Zealand.

In highlighting the perceived brevity of the problem, the previous Commissioner of Police Mike Bush, stated that between the terror attack and the announcement of the new ARTs, police had responded to 1350 firearms offences and had been shot at eight times. In choosing the districts to host the trials, the previous Commissioner had said those with the highest number of firearms seized, located, and surrendered to police.

The Police Association supported the notion of increased risk to police staff. In a 2017 survey of its members they found one in eight officers reported being threatened by firearm once or more in last year, a 38% increase on 2015 survey. While on the frontline, that figure jumps to 21% threatened at least once in 2017.

The Police Minster, Stuart Nash, also focussed on the number of incidents involving armed offenders as well as the number of firearms that were being seized by police. He also pointed out that the trial will be closely monitored, and that the trial did not mean police would be routinely arming. At the same time the Minister stated that arming police is an operational matter for the Commissioner of Police.

Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern, also pointed out that politicians couldn't tell the Commissioner of Police what to do operationally in terms of armed police officers, however she suggested that some politicians had spoken to the previous Commissioner of Police Mike Bush privately about the matter. The Prime Minister also clarified that the ARTs were Armed Offenders Squad staff who were more readily available on an ongoing basis.

The idea of being 'readily available' was also an idea that a number of articles mentioned. Cutting down response times to serious incidents involving firearms, that one former police officer mentioned might take up to an hour and a half under normal circumstances, was seen as a benefit of ARTs.

The commentator, Martyn Bradbury, suggested ARTs are a legitimate tactical decision where they are used to respond immediately to AOS type events which would typically have a lag in response. However, many more in the media argued that Police had little evidence on which to legitimise such a trial, and that the standard of evidence was well below what would be expected for such massive policy change.

Some pointed to statistics in order to point out that the trial had no evidence to support it.

- One Commentator pointed to New Zealand Police statistics on injury of staff members – noting that police report fewer injuries than bar tenders;
- Others (via OIA), that firearms were involved in less than 1% of assaults against police, and that number had been declining since 2015;
- Also noted was that firearms are involved in less than 1% of crimes in New Zealand, and that number has changed little since 2013; and
- As for 'presentations' of firearms to police (firearm threat/risk), one commentator pointed out that police have only been collecting the data on presentations of firearms since March 15, and thus they cannot say whether it has gotten better or worse.

For these commentators, New Zealand Police had failed to show that front line police officers and/or the public were at more risk now than in the past 5 years.

Other commentators queried whether ARTs where the right tactical solution to the 'problem', and for former Police Officer Tim McKinnel, the New Zealand Police had failed to show the need for and value of ARTs through evidence of a gap in their current tactical options framework. March 15 2019 showed how well such incidents could be handled by regular AOS members on call, and by police officers who have access to firearms locked in their vehicles.

Criminology lecturer Dr John Buttle questioned why New Zealand would militarise police for something that happens so rarely (terror attack), and that will not minimise the chance of another terror attack taking place.

> "It's like a self-fulfilling prophecy, you're doing exactly what the terrorist wants. Are you telling me he's not smiling about that?" - John Buttle

Lastly, even if New Zealand had an increased risk from gun crime, many commentators felt there was little if any evidence to support arming police as an appropriate solution. Some pointed to international evidence, showing that

- Everyone (including police) are safer when fewer firearms are in a community;
- Arming police increases crime and results in increased violence by the police against the public; and
- Police in cars with firearms make communities less safe, not more.

More international evidence is provided in the 'international theme'.

People Against Prisons Aotearoa (PAPA), believe that the fatal police shootings during the ART trial period (Tauranga, Papatoetoe, Kurow) are proof that ARTs are a dangerous mistake.

> "This is the third person the police have killed since they began trialling patrols of heavily-armed police commandos. The Armed Response Team trial has given police permission to shoot first and ask questions later" - PAPA

Evaluation

Throughout the six month Armed Response Team trial period police spokespeople mentioned that the trial would be evaluated.

At one point it was suggested that no formal consultation would take place, and that anyone who wanted to comment should email **haveyoursay@police.govt.nz** however, that was mid-November. Overall, the picture of what the evaluation would look like from police was a three part product which covered the

- Numbers and 'successfulness' of ART deployment;
- Consultation with community groups; and
- Consultation with police staff who took part in the trial.

The evaluation, which would be conducted by the Evidence Based Policing Centre, would then be reviewed and consultation would take place with key partners.

Police expected the trial to show that ARTs improve Police's ability to respond to rapidly evolving situations with skill, while minimising risk and enhancing safety of all communities. One commentator queried what the evaluation was going to include, who was conducting it and what the criteria for success would be. While another individual was concerned that ARTs were going to be preferred over something more considered and less violent.

7.3.3 Theme three: Democracy, consultation trust, and concern

Democracy, consultation, trust, and concern were all strong themes that came through in media articles.

Democracy and oversight

The majority of comments concerning democracy, stated that people were not given a choice in the introduction of ARTs i.e., a vote or choice of some kind – nor were their democratically elected representatives in parliament. Instead the choice was made by the previous Commissioner of Police Mike Bush. For some the decision to implement ARTs in New Zealand was in contrast with our policing tradition, which is policing by consent – or as one commentator put it – with the support of the population.

> "From my perspective, something like this is a fundamental change in the way we police, and I would've thought there would've been quite wide-ranging community consultation on something like that being implemented. As far as I can see, that's not what's happened" - Tim McKinnel

In addition, the level of accountability and oversight for the trial was questioned, with one commentator suggesting that the Independent Police Conduct Authority watchdog was too underfunded to keep police accountable.

> "This has been a screaming failure and an obscene abuse of power and the only watchdog over the police don't have the funding to keep up with complaints against the police!" - Martyn Bradbury

A political or an operational choice?

There was some contention over the trial period as to whether the ART trial was or should be an operational or political decision. This was in particular in regard to Stewart Nash's comments that the decision to have the trial was an operational matter, and thus the domain of the Commissioner of Police.

> "My personal view is I'd be very uncomfortable with general arming, but it's actually a call that the Commissioner has to make" - Stuart Nash

Some argued that the arming of police is a political decision. Therefore the Police Minister should have some authority in this regard, or the Prime Minister and Parliament as representatives of the people.

> "Minister Nash is the responsible Minister. The Police Commissioner reports to him. As such, there is no reason why the Minister cannot request that the Commissioner at least fully account for and explain this decision – or reverse it." - Human Rights Foundation

Consultation and trust

To many the introduction of the Armed Response Teams trial was a surprise as there had been no public consultation in the lead-up to the announcement. The lack of consultation, with the decision to proceed with ARTs was a major cause for concern for commentators, who had expectations that such a decision would require community consultation.

> "When the Crown established an unarmed civilian police in 1886, it was with the conviction that New Zealand would become a civilised nation, ruled not by fear, but through allowing citizens a voice in how they should be policed. The principle of 'policing by consent' has been breached, and trust in the police has taken a massive hit." - Sir Kim Workman

The lack of consultation was a particular issue for Māori commentators. Māori Justice Advocates submitted an urgent Waitangi Tribunal claim over the failure of the Crown to inform Māori about the ART trial. The Tribunal claim said that the Crown had failed to work in partnership with, consult, or inform Māori about the trial.

In addition one commentator mentioned the positive work Police had been doing in building their relationship with Māori over the Turning of the Tide Strategy formed in 2012, as well as the same updated strategy launched soon after the ART trials began. This contrasted with feelings of betrayal that police had failed to ask for any input into the launch of ARTs.

A couple of commentators mentioned lower levels of trust in the police by Māori; through recent historical events, such as the 2007 Urewera raids, and Ihumātao; and because of over-representation of Māori in the criminal justice system. One commentator questioned why, if trust in the police by Māori is so low, would we arm a police force that Māori don't trust?

With one of New Zealand Police's goals at the time to achieve 90% trust and confidence in their service one commentator questioned the decision to develop ARTs, given that 'militarising' police erodes trust and confidence. Another suggested that because New Zealand Police are highly regarded overseas for their levels of trust and confidence – and frightening people is not a way to achieve that – there are doubts that ARTs will become a permanent part of policing.

While ex-MP Chester Borrows did not believe police would have started the trial if they didn't believe they were going to carry on with it.

It was also suggested that more transparency by New Zealand Police over ARTs would help alleviate some of the fear and concern of the public.

Fear and concern

The main fear from commentators was that ARTs would lead to more members of the public being shot. Many felt that having firearms close at hand would lead to police using them as the primary option, over other less lethal tactics. This was a very strong feeling – with addition points including

- Accountability of police for shootings in the past;
- Risk to everyone of inappropriate presentation of firearms and escalating risk for all concerned;
- Some people would be less likely to call police for family violence events as they don't want them to arrive with firearms;
- What might happen if a police officer was having a 'bad day'?; and
- Police kill enough people with the flawed 'chase policy', and that it shouldn't be expanded to shootings too.

> "The police man is just a person at the end of the day and he might be having a bad day and we don't want anyone to be having a bad day with a firearm. Some people don't do their jobs right either" - Kourtney Waitarehu

There was also specific fear and concern from minority groups which is further discussed in the minority groups theme. One commentator noted that the 'look' of AOS type teams is very scary for many, and that balaclavas and semi-automatics do not make you feel safe. Whereas, another mentioned that the elderly in South Auckland – where there are frequent shootings – felt safer having ARTs in their communities.

> "Our elderly people, they're the ones who're feeling threatened in their communities are too frightened to speak out. We don't want any of our elderly people to feel unsafe" - Thomas Henry

Police, felt that the public should feel confident if they see ARTs that the right people are doing the job, and they shouldn't be alarmed. The Minister of Police stated that the increased police presence should be taken as a reassuring sign that police are prioritising the safety of the community.

The Police Association acknowledged that there is need for balance between having ARTs to protect and make the public feel safe, but not scaring them. As the trial came to an end Police expressed the importance of how the public felt about the trial, as they police with the consent of the public.

> "How the public feels is important as we police with consent of the public, and that is a privilege," – Commissioner of Police, Andrew Coster

7.3.4 Theme four: Impact on Minority Groups

Fifty out of eighty-one unique articles had something to say about the impact of Armed Response Teams on minority groups. The two main topics of conversation for commentators was the impact for those in mental health crisis, and the impact for Māori and Pasifika.

Mental Health

The Mental Health Foundation stated it opposed greater arming of police due to concerns they would be disproportionately used against people suffering a mental health crisis.

> "The potential introduction of guns to these interactions can only decrease the safety and likelihood of a good outcome for both those who are mentally unwell and for police themselves." - Shaun Robinson

Using the introduction of TASERs (which they also opposed) as an example, they pointed out that in 2016 police discharged TASERs in 25% of cases where an individual was suffering with a mental illness, and only 16% of cases where they were not. Therefore they expect that more armed officers would result in more deaths and injuries for people experiencing mental health crises.

> "There is no doubt that more armed officers will result in more deaths and injuries for people experiencing mental health crises. Now, as well as shooting people with Tasers the police will be shooting them with guns." - Shaun Robinson

Societal prejudices about the dangerousness of those with mental illness was said by one commentator to drive the disproportionate use of force against those in mental health crisis. The Mental Health Foundation were also worried about the impact of ARTs on Māori who are disproportionately represented in mental health and suicide statistics.

Māori and Pasifika

The impact of Armed Response Teams on Māori and Pasifika fell into four broad categories: The effect of bias and racism; the statistics that show inequality, the relationship with Police and the Crown, and community fears.

Bias and racism. While some commentators noted that the acknowledgement of bias in policing in 2015 was an encouraging step, and that police have started trying to be less racist and more culturally diverse, there was still much concern about racial bias in Armed Response Teams.

Moana Jackson, in reference to the Turning of the Tide Strategy, pointed out that doing great community engagement, and then being aggressive and biased toward Māori don't go together. Concerns particularly were around the biased way in which policing occurs, with the implication that biased police officers with firearms will result in disproportionately more Māori and Pasifika being shot.

Concern also that ARTs were going into communities which were largely Māori and Pasifika, who already experience a disproportionate number of encounters with the Criminal Justice System.

> "Bringing guns regularly into communities, especially with the well-known racially disproportionate effects of the criminal justice system writ large - the fact that these guns will almost inevitably be disproportionately used is something that means that this may seem like a small decision, but actually it's probably quite a big one." - Simon Mackenzie

Police were accused of not considering the effects of armament on incidents of police violence against Māori or Pasifika who were already more likely to experience being Tasered or shot. One commentator also reported

a source saying that police had admitted that ARTs hadn't had racial bias training needed to effectively work in diverse populations.

Statistics. Many commentators pointed to the New Zealand Police's own statistics to make the point that Māori and Pasifika were already more likely to experience force by police, citing a number of statistics, including numbers drawn from the 2018 Tactical Options Report 2018. Commentators felt these statistics showed not just that there is bias against Māori and Pasifika in the way tactical options are used by police; but that this has massive implications for ARTs in that the risk to Māori is disproportionately greater.

> "Is it a leap to suggest that more people are likely to be shot — and that a disproportionate number of them are likely to be brown?" - Moana Maniapoto

Relationship. The relationship between Police and Māori and Pasifika communities had, according to commentators, changed a lot since past injustices such as the Dawn Raids of the 1970's; with one commentator described the relationships as not always being easy – and that mainstream policing hadn't always been inviting to Māori or Pasifika.

However one commentator described the Armed Response Teams as a 'step-back'. Another described their feeling that the police as just bringing out the 'Māori strategy' every so often, then put it back on the shelf. Another pointed to the sentiments of Minister for Police Stuart Nash, who had highlighted the fact that all police work needs to live up to the Treaty in terms of Partnership, Participation, and Protection.

There was some strong feeling about what the intentions of the trial were; with one commentator stating that the focus had gone from a single white perpetrator in Christchurch, to policing the non-white community, and that of the 17 Police officers shot and killed on duty, the majority were by white offenders.

Another suggested that the ART trial was about the social control of Māori, and Pasifika, and that 'high crime' areas were simply places where 'poor brown people' live.

> "What are labelled and characterised as high-crime areas which are just areas where, really, brown poor people live." – Julia Whaipooti

Community fear. The overall concern for commentators was that ARTs would lead to more Māori and Pacific Islanders being shot, and potentially killed. This fear was based on police bias, and statistics showing higher levels of force being used by police on Māori and Pasifika. In addition was the fear that ARTs would be patrolling in high crime areas within the trial districts which is disproportionately where Māori and Pasifika live, bringing them invariably into more contact with each other.

There was further concern by two commentators over the choices some people may take because they were fearful of police with firearms. One pointed to Māori women who are three times more likely to be killed by their partner – but that some of those women would choose the violence of their partner, over police with firearms. Another commentator spoke of a survey showing that 91% of Māori and Pasifika people would not call the police if they knew they had firearms.

Police. Police acknowledged that Māori are over-represented as both victims and offenders in the Criminal Justice System, and that they were committed to reducing this over-representation. In particular police stated they are committed to reducing Māori re-offending by 25% by 2025 as part of the refreshed Turning of the Tide - Te Huringa o Te Tai strategy. On the Tactical Options report, police noted that the report reflected the over-representation of Māori in the criminal justice system, and that would continue to work with communities, partners and the justice system to change this.

While acknowledging some level of bias in policing the Police Associated stated that if the ART had to be called out the offender must have already been failed by other public services.

Other. There were few other groups mentioned in less detail by commentators which ARTs were said to have a differential impact on, which included: those with disabilities; those who are deaf; those who are neuro-diverse; those battling addiction; those living in poverty; gang communities; and young people.

7.3.5 Theme five: Appropriate use of ARTs

Overall, commentators felt the way police used ARTs changed over the period of the trial, from a very specific to a much broader remit.

Announcement of the trial

In launching the Armed Response Teams, the previous Commissioner of Police Mike Bush stated in the media that they would be focused on a) events that posed a significant risk to the public or police; b) support execution of pre-planned and high-risk search warrants; c) high-profile public events, and d) prevention activities. The ARTs would support the frontline with any events or incidents that required enhanced tactical capabilities. They were intended to reduce the response time to critical firearms incidents.

Mission Creep

There was some initial concern from commentators about potential 'mission creep' of the ARTs – with one commentator questioning the use of ARTs for search warrants, as police could arm themselves prior to arrival.

> "It doesn't seem to be what the teams' brief was at the start of the project. It seems there's been some sort of mission creep." - Chester Borrows

The shooting of a police officer's residence, and the police station in Wairoa was the first incident where media commentators began to start questioning the role of ARTs. The concern was that an ART had been called to 'patrol' the area after the incident had happened (which was out of the trial area) and while it was being investigated.

Following this, an event in Christchurch where a rapist escaped from a rehabilitation centre, and ARTs were reportedly used in the search for the individual. One commentator described the ARTs involvement with this as 'adding to the list' of things they could be used for; stating that police had 'sold' the idea of ARTs as responding to firearms incidents.

The incident with the largest commentator response was over the arrest of a Hamilton man who had been pulled over while driving by an ART. Police stated that the arrest (for breaching conditions) by the ART was appropriate as the person was flagged for carrying weapons. In addition the police had previously stated that ARTs would be used for preventative patrols. The Police Association also felt that the response to the Hamilton incident was appropriate and contended that people wouldn't expect officers to sit around doing nothing; and that there are plenty of lower risk things that ARTs can do that are still risk events and are appropriate for them to do.

There was concern from commentators that ARTs were being used for 'low risk' proactive patrolling – which some felt was not what they were led to believe at the beginning of the trial. Commentators did not see the arrest of the Hamilton man as the type of dangerous situation which would necessitate the use of ARTs. A couple of commentators stated that the police response in Hamilton was like using a sledgehammer to crack a nut. Another that it was 'overkill'. While one commentator suggested that the extension of what ARTs could define as a threat was simply justification for the cost of the teams.

Police contended their ‘prevention activities’ involved preventative patrolling of ‘high risk crime hotspots’. This ‘expansion of remit’ as seen by commentators was a justification for some of their original concerns.

> "When we consider that the historical crime data used to determine where these patrols will go is tainted by decades of institutional racism, the picture that emerges is ugly. More police guns in Māori communities will mean more police bullets in Māori bodies" – Emilie Rākete

One commentator described the justification of ARTs going from the terrorist attack in Christchurch, to patrolling places where firearms may be present, to stopping unarmed people as a prevention measure.

Day-to-day activities

From February 2020 the response of an Official Information Act (OIA) request into the activities undertaken by the ARTs was discussed by commentators.

The OIA showed that ARTs were deployed on average 75 times a day in first 5 weeks which was 50 times the rate the Armed Offenders Squad were called out the previous year. It also showed the top call-out for all three districts involved in the trial was vehicle stops.

> "If police are in fact undertaking general duties, such as traffic stops, not targeted specifically at gangs and high risk persons, then they should be questioned as to why they need to be armed." - Stuart Smith

ARTs were criticized by commentators for doing what appeared to be routine policing, with one commentator suggesting that there is a danger to having a resource like ARTs in that you want to use them more and more.

> "This is one of the fears with them; once you introduce them then you're forced to use them. In practical terms, once you have these full-time armed teams, you want to be using them more and more and more". - Tim McKinnel

Commentators contrasted the work ARTs were actually doing, such as traffic stops, with what the public had been told by the previous Commissioner of Police Mike Bush at the beginning of the trial; that ARTs would be used in high-risk situations and high risk events. One commentator felt preventative patrolling showed that the ARTs were never intended as a precaution against high risk events.

There were also concerns that ARTs were being used outside their trial districts.

Police responded that they didn’t want ARTs sitting in the car doing nothing, also that district borders were arbitrary and that ARTs could be proactive and cross borders for a job. They also stated that while ARTs would do a wide range of jobs their focus would still be on high risk events.

> "They will also be undertaking quite a lot of proactive activity, because we wouldn't want people to be sitting in a vehicle just waiting for a specific incident to come in. We'd want them to be occupied all of the time," – Inspector Freda Grace

Ex-MP Chester Borrows, warned that using armed police to routinely patrol high risk high crime communities could have serious impacts for the relationship between those communities and the police.

7.3.6 Theme six: New Zealand versus the World

Many commentators looked overseas in expressing their concern about ARTs. The comments fell into two areas, the potential change in culture of policing in New Zealand, and evidence from overseas that shows arming police doesn’t work.

The Americanisation of New Zealand Police

There were at least 14 different comments relating to what commentators often called the 'Americanisation' of the New Zealand Police within the media articles. This concern for many related to an extreme where armed police shot people who were doing nothing wrong, particularly people of colour. Some were especially concerned about this for Māori and Pasifika people.

> "It is a recipe for trigger happy cops to go all American on our domestic population and we all know that will mean more young Māori and Pasifika men getting shot." - Martyn Bradbury

> "This [ARTs] is a step towards the Americanisation of law enforcement in New Zealand, a step that isn't based on evidence and that nobody asked for." - Emilie Rākete

One commentator suggested that even suspicion of a firearm in a 111 could potentially lead to a tense or deadly situation. Another commentator compared what they saw as police self-protection to America where the police are 'running scared'.

However the Police Association argues that New Zealand is not like the US as we have a single Police Service that is all trained in the same way.

A world of evidence

Media articles relayed evidence from a number of different studies from overseas which had reportedly shown armed police types teams being ineffectual, damaging, or both. In summary the evidence put forward suggested that:

- These types of armed police units tend to be most often deployed in non-emergency situations and failed to improve community or officer safety;
- Similar militarised units have been ineffective in decreasing crime and protecting police and may weaken the public's image of the police;
- Focussing on cures rather than punishment has helped in two cities;
- In the UK the presence of a TASER was causally linked to a 48% higher incidence of force being used by police, also assaults on police doubled when they had a TASER;
- In the US mutual escalation between police and offenders has become a problem;
- When these types of units move from emergency to routine policing there is an escalation in the number of people killed by police in those countries;
- In the US the disproportionate number of black people shot by police is explained not only by bias, but because of over-exposure to police i.e., more contact with police and by being over-policed;
- These types of units are disproportionately deployed against racial minorities;
- That militarised police tactics (including use of firearms) fuel historic tensions between police and marginalised communities; and
- In the US, the risk of being killed while being approached or stopped by police is 16 times higher for those with mental health problems.

From these points commentators contended that the overseas experience shows armed police units are not an effective solution to the problem, and thus should not be used in New Zealand.

> 'It is as far away as you can get from evidence based policing, given that the carrying of weapons is likely to increase police aggression, decrease community safety and undermine trust in police.' - Tania Sawicki Mead

7.3.7 Theme seven: March 15 Attacks

The terrorist attacks in Christchurch on March 15, 2019 was one of the reasons given by police to trial Armed Response Teams. Following the events of March 15, the previous Commissioner of Police Mike Bush, stated that the operational environment for policing had changed. However, some commentators questioned the link between the new ARTs and the attack in Christchurch. Some pointed out that the quick and heroic response to events in Christchurch showed that police could already respond quickly and appropriately to a firearm threat without the need for a permanently armed team.

> "In many ways, I think the response to 15 March undermines police's link between the attacks and the introduction of ARTs. It could be that the events of the Christchurch laid bare vulnerabilities with current tactical response capabilities, but that's not a claim I've seen Commissioner Bush or any officer make since 15 March" – Tim McKinnel

Another said that the Mosque shootings had nothing to do with the arming of police, as on the 1st March Superintendent John Price has issued orders for the general arming of Canterbury police officers due to an alleged threat. A couple of commentators questioned whether ARTs were an appropriate response to Christchurch, with one suggested that March 15 didn't really change anything for police, and another suggesting that instead the ARTs were a policy response to gang war.

There were some also who were unhappy that the ARTs were put forward as a response to the Mosque shootings. One commentator suggested that the response should be proportional, and not change people's lives for the worse. Another suggested police had exploited the tragedy as a reason for the trials which distracts from building social cohesions. Lastly, a commentator was dismayed that the ARTs were linked to the shooting, saying that this had created a wedge between Muslim communities and Māori, Pasifika, and other minority communities.

7.3.8 Theme eight: Expression of opposition

Throughout the ART trial period there were outward expressions of opposition to the trial, this included rallies, a petition, open letters, and a Treaty of Waitangi claim. Commentators either picked up and published information about these events, interviewed people involved, or were themselves the organisers.

The first rally was the 'Rally to End Armed Police Patrols' organised by People Against Prisons Aotearoa (PAPA). This was a small rally of 60 people in Manukau square Auckland. At around the same time as this rally, Pasifika mother Melissa Lama launched a petition to stop the ART trial. The petition reportedly gained thousands of signatures.

Following this the Waikato Community Stakeholders Group publically asked for the reinstatement of a Hui between themselves and the Acting Waikato district commander. The meeting which was to be with Inspector Andrew Mortimore had been cancelled. The group stated that they had identified the Crown acted or had an omission or is inconsistent with the principles of Te Tiriti and had submitted a Waitangi Tribunal Claim.

At the beginning of March 2020 the 'Arms Down Coalition' called for a nationwide rally after data from an OIA into ART day-to-day activities showed they had mostly been used for routine activities.

In mid-March Sir Kim Workman and Julia Whaipooti sought an urgent Tribunal hearing to stop ARTs. The claim stated that the Crown had breached the Treaty of Waitangi by failing to consult, partner with, or inform Māori about the trial. Claimants are reportedly now working with police on this issue.

At the beginning of April JustSpeak, a youth-led transformative justice group, wrote an open letter asking that the ARTs not continue. The letter was undersigned by 45 prominent organisations, individuals, and groups from throughout New Zealand society.

7.3.9 Theme nine: Guns, violence, and escalation

Post March 15 the New Zealand Government banned military-style semi-automatic and other high-calibre firearms, with more than 29,000 firearms collected in the firearm amnesty and buy-back scheme.

For Police the number and use of firearms in New Zealand presented a very real threat, which was captured in a number of media articles. Overall police felt there had been a culture shift, and that some people were becoming more violent. They also believed that police officers were having firearms presented at them with increasing frequency. Therefore, police needed additional weaponry because of increasingly more violent criminals. They reported that in the last six months firearms were seized at 40% of firearm callouts, a total of 1200 firearms. The Police Association also pointed out police officer concern at the number of firearms incidents they are being called to, and the increasing number of firearms being presented at police. They also stated that officers had warned for years about increasingly aggressive armed offenders.

The previous Commissioner of Police Mike Bush was unable to verify the increase in events where firearms had been presented at officers due to lack of data gathering of this metric. However he did state that police believed the number had increased. Police were able to point out that there had been 1350 reported firearms offences since March, and that police had been shot at 8 times.

Some commentators supported the point that the police were dealing with increasingly violent events. Both a National Party, and Labour Party spokesperson stated that police were dealing with increasing violence that was putting the public in danger, with National also mentioning an increase in gang membership of 31% over the past two years. Also mentioned was the approximate 1.5 million firearms in New Zealand, and the threat of those firearms which hadn't been turned in during the firearm amnesty and buy-back scheme.

One councillor mentioned that while they didn't want armed police patrolling the streets, they did support ARTs patrolling in areas considered high-risk.

Not all Commentators were happy with police having increased access to firearms however. One Commentator described it as hypocritical for police to routinely carry arms when the number of firearms the public had access to was reducing.

> "At a time when police are seeking greater restrictions on gun use by the public through the Arms Legislation Bill, it's hypocritical that they are increasing their own freedom to use them." – Anjum Rahman

One commentator pointed to police statistics showing that in the past two years when police used firearms, in more than a quarter of those cases police presented firearms at those who were below the 'assaultive level in the tactical options framework. Also that in in 18 months between July 2016 and December 2017 police presented or used Tasers against people below the assaultive threshold 307 times.

The ART model

Police positioned the ARTs often in reference to AOS in order to explain their make-up. Police stated that AOS had an increase in callouts over the past few years, and that the balance of their work had changed to incorporate more planned events. They also said that police were targeting more high risk offenders.

Police stated that ART staff are trained and experienced AOS staff who know how to de-escalate situations and can provide support to the frontline. The teams are a minimum of three officers who each have a Glock and a Taser on person, and Bushmaster rifles locked in the rear of the vehicle.

The Police Association also pointed out that ART are simply specialised officers, and that regular police officers also have access to firearms in their vehicles. The Prime Minister also stated that what the previous Commissioner of Police Mike Bush was announcing was not a general arming of police, but rather that the AOS team would be ready on a routine basis.

Other Commentators also pointed out the difference between AOS and ART, stating that AOS officers have general duties and have to go back to their station to retrieve their gear before attending a call out. In contrast ART will not have to go back to station, and thus would be able to reach events more quickly.

> "If somebody's in my street with a firearm, I would rather the armed response team get there quicker, just to save more lives" - Alf Filipaina

> "Rural communities seem to be getting more and more of these incidents due to methamphetamine cooking and stuff like that, because we're isolated and it's easy enough to let it happen out there. So if it can help the response times, because AOS can take up to an hour to assemble and get out there. It's good from a farmer point of view but also probably good from a police point of view" - Andrew McGiven

However many commentators pointed out that New Zealand police officers already had access to firearms in the rear of their vehicles – and have access to them when needed. While some believed there were circumstances which required police officers to have access to firearms, they did not support ARTs.

While one commentator considered ARTs as an escalation of police armament; another felt it was better to have something (ARTs) and not need it, than to need it and not have it.

Mutual escalation

Many commentators were concerned about what they called 'mutual escalation'. Whereby, an increase in armament by police would be matched by an increase in armament by offenders, which would lead to an increase in firearms in communities. Lead could lead to a normalisation of firearms for some communities. Also, more firearms would mean more shootings, thus putting everyone at more risk of being shot.

> "My concern about this is that it's sort of ramping it up and it's in certain communities where that response will be inevitable and that will lead to, not only more arming by police, but even more arming by criminals. So we'll see more police shot and probably more public shot by police." - Chester Borrows

Some commentators also mentioned the 'weapons effect' a phenomenon where carrying a weapon effects a person's behaviour, increasing aggressive responses. The concern is that permanently armed officers will behave more aggressively in their responses to events, and that offenders in turn will respond aggressively.

Police safety

Police felt that they needed to be equipped to do their job safely, so that they could keep the community safe. This meant regularly reviewing tools and training to make sure it was fit for purpose. With ARTs they wanted the right people with the right skills 'there' at the right time. They also stated that police use of force is proportional to a person's violent or life endangering behaviour.

The Police Association stated that police had been wanting 'this' (ARTs) for a while, and that a Police Association survey found 61% of the public in favour of general arming of police. They also stated that police officers need to be prepared in order to stay safe, if they never know if someone has a firearm until they see it. It was also pointed out by one commentator that the Police Association had been wanting general arming of Police since 2009.

There was some comment that police officers needed to conduct their work safely;

> "And a gun, as much as we might like to hope otherwise, is a tool of the job. It is what is required to be effective. And from the dark side of what they're dealing with, it brings a level of respect, if not fear"– Mike Hosking

However, others were less supportive of the ART initiative. One commentator pointed out that firearms were used in less than 1% of assaults on police, and that number was declining. Another that policing is not a safe job, and that you essentially sign up to be put in harm's way. While you still need to manage risks there comes a point when what protects the police may put the public at more risk.

Another comment suggested that police become safer through preventing violence in the first place rather than increasing the number of weapons they have. Similarly, another commentator suggested police should take a public health approach and focus on primary prevention and a whole systems approach.

Chapter 8: Community Insights Survey

Chapter Summary

This chapter describes results from the Community Insights Survey conducted by Research First[20] in February 2020. The survey assessed public perceptions of the Armed Response Teams (ART) Trial, and how these relate to trust and confidence in the New Zealand Police. Overall, **62%** of the participants were aware of the ART Trial and **72%** of the participants supported the ART initiative. When participants were asked with prompts about which incidents the ART should attend, **91%** thought it was appropriate for the ART to attend high risk events and those involving firearms and **76%** thought it was appropriate for the ART to attend urgent and active events where people are being victimised but the presence of weapons is unknown. On the other hand, **75%** of the participants reported that it was not appropriate for the ART to attend general road policing activity and traffic stops and **73%** reported that it was not appropriate for the ART to attend general policing duties that are not urgent, but that are normal events for frontline officers to attend. Learning about the ART initiative was not associated with a sharp decrease in trust and confidence in New Zealand Police. Māori were more likely than all the other grouped ethnicities to not support the initiative, to disagree that they felt safer knowing ARTs are operating in New Zealand and in their community, to feel less trust and confidence in Police after they heard about the trial, and to be more concerned about vulnerable groups being unfairly targeted.

The Armed Response Teams Community Insights survey was commissioned by New Zealand Police and conducted by Research First in February 2020. The survey was part of the broader evaluation of the Armed Response Teams (ART) Trial and assessed how the New Zealand public perceived the use of Armed Response Teams, and how this perception related to trust and confidence in New Zealand Police.

In order to achieve this goal, the survey targeted: 1) general trust and confidence in New Zealand Police; 2) public perception of the Police; 3) public perception of ARTs; and 4) public perception of when it is appropriate to use ARTs. It is important to mention that the ART Trial had already started when the survey was conducted and there were already media pieces about the trial which might have affected public perception of it.

8.1. Methodology

The survey included both quantitative and qualitative questions and was conducted using an online survey tool. The sample was gathered using an online panel including 300,000 New Zealand citizens and permanent residents, and a quota management system. Thus, the national sample included in the survey was representative of the New Zealand population, but not randomly selected. Yes/no questions and questions including five-point type Likert scales were used to quantitatively assess participants' perception.

It is important to mention that online surveys and online panels fail to include those who do not have regular access to computers and to the internet. This is a general limitation of this type of data collection.

8.1.1 Sampling

Overall, the sample included **574** participants who lived in New Zealand at the time. The sample included both a nationally representative sample (n = 382), and booster samples targeting regions included in the ART Trial

[20] Research First is an independent consultancy providing policy, research, and development services.

(Manukau, Waikato, and Canterbury; n = 173) and Māori (n = 19). The nationally representative sample matched the broader New Zealand population in age, gender, and regional location. The error margin for this sample was +/-5%.

8.1.2 Analysis

Statistical tests were undertaken to assess quantitative differences between groups (e.g., those living in a region where the ART Trial is happening versus those living in other regions; see **2.5. Statistical Analyses**). When comparing groups scale extremes were generally grouped (e.g., 'support' and 'strongly support' grouped into 'support'). Gender and age comparisons were conducted using the nationally representative sample, while region and ethnicity comparisons were conducted using both the nationally representative sample and the booster samples.

The survey also included open-ended questions. Responses to these questions were coded and categorised before they could be entered in the main analyses. Open-ended answers were coded both manually (when a quantitative measure of qualitative answers was required – i.e., when it was important to assess how many participants answered a specific category in an open-ended question), and using a text analytics tool (Ipiphany) which relies on artificial intelligence and can measure the association between the coded categories and other measures included in the survey. Research First acknowledges that this text analytics tool is not yet perfect and makes qualitative (and not statistical) inferences.

As such, the results reported herein focus more upon the quantitative analyses and are not an exhaustive overview of all the work completed by Research First. However, the full report produced by Research First is available in **Appendix J**.

8.2. Results

This section examines the survey responses. First, the perceptions the public have of New Zealand Police are examined. This is then followed by several sections relating to public perception of the ART trial specifically.

8.2.1 Perceptions of New Zealand Police

The initial part of the survey focused on participants' perception of New Zealand Police. Overall, participants reported high trust and confidence in Police (mean = **3.9**[21]). Among those who described their expectations of New Zealand Police, **33%** expected New Zealand Police to protect and keep New Zealanders safe and **17%** expected New Zealand Police to serve and help the public.

When participants were asked about the priorities of New Zealand Police, **39%** said the priority is public safety, **27%** said crime and criminals, and **17%** said law, order, and justice. When participants were asked about the priorities New Zealand Police should have, **40%** replied that public safety should be a priority, **28%** replied crime and criminals should be a priority, and **16%** replied law, order, and justice should be a priority. Notably, there is consistency between the perceived priorities New Zealand Police currently have versus the priorities the public think New Zealand Police *ought* to have.

Regarding suggested improvements, **13%** suggested that New Zealand Police should continue doing their job as they are in order to increase trust and confidence, **11%** suggested that more Police and better presence would increase trust and confidence, and **10%** suggested that New Zealand Police should be more honest and less corrupt or have a bigger focus on crime and criminals in order to increase trust and confidence.

8.2.2 Public Awareness of the Armed Response Team Trial

Awareness is broken down into several groups and are displayed in **Table 8.1**. Males were statistically more likely than females to know about the trial ($p < .001$). Those aged 55 to 64 years old were also statistically

[21] On scale from 1: No trust in confidence in the New Zealand Police to 5: Full trust and confidence in New Zealand Police.



Figure 8.1: Initial reactions to the ART trial broken by category. Bars denote percentage per category

Table 8.1: Percentage of individuals aware of the Armed Response Team trial by age and gender.

Group	Yes	No	Don't Know	Total
Male	71	15	13	**196**
Female	51	32	17	**185**
18 – 24 years	43	35	22	**69**
25 – 34 years	51	35	14	**72**
35 – 44 years	47	35	18	**55**
45 – 54 years	70	16	14	**74**
55 – 64 years	84	6	10	**68**
65+ years	75	14	11	**44**

more likely than other age groups to know about the trial ($p < .001$), while those who were 18 to 24 years old were statistically less likely than all the remaining age groups to know about the ART Trial ($p < .001$). No statistical differences were found between participants based in ART trial regions and the national representative sample, or between Māori and the total sample. The initial reaction to the ART trial was also generally positive, with **26%** of participants pointing out that it is a good initiative or they approve of it (see **Figure 8.1**).

Participants were asked a series of questions on their knowledge of how the Armed Response Teams operated. Across these items between **30%** and **62%** of respondents could not provide an answer (see **Figure 8.2**), suggesting that a large proportion of participants did not know how the ARTs operated during the trial. The majority of participants answered correctly that an ART is a vehicle of 3-4 highly trained staff focused on high risk offenders and events involving firearms (**61%**) and that ART staff carry a firearm at all times (**57%**). On the other hand, a large percentage of participants answered incorrectly that ARTs have been introduced in every major city across New Zealand (**44%**) and that ARTs are normal frontline police that respond to all types of police call outs, but are carrying firearms (**33%**). These findings suggest that there is still some misunderstanding about ARTs among the population.

Sources of Information

Overall, **68%** of the participants first learned about the ART initiative via news coverage and the majority only knew a few details about the trial (**47%**) or had not followed it at all (**26%**) on social media or the news. Among



Figure 8.2: Knowledge about the ART trial broken by item. Bars denote percentage per item. Note that only the bottom two items were factually correct. Thereby, a "yes" responses to these questions are considered a correct response.

those who had followed ART, **65%** followed it via television news, **46%** followed it via online news articles, **27%** followed it via Facebook, and **23%** followed it via radio.

8.2.3 Level of Support for the Armed Response Team Trial

In general, **72%** of the participants surveyed supported the ART initiative, while **7%** did not generally support the trial. It must be noted that general support reflects an amalgam of those who strongly support the initiative (**38%**) and those who simply support (**34%**). Though the balance of support tends to favour the ART trial, a sizeable proportion of individuals were ambivalent about the trial (**14%**) with a further **8%** not knowing how they felt about it. Combined, more than a quarter of those surveyed (**28%**) did not explicitly express support.

Table 8.2 provides a further breakdown of support across varying groups. Note that support/strongly support and do not support at all / do not support are collapsed into single groups reflecting general support and no support. Females were statistically more likely than males to support the ART initiative ($p < .05$), while males

Table 8.2: Percentage of individuals that support the Armed Response Team trial by gender, region, and ethnicity.

Group	No Support	Ambivalent	Support	Total
Male	9	17	67	**196**
Female	5	10	77	**185**
ART Region	5	12	76	**302**
Non-ART Region	7	15	68	**272**
Māori	11	16	64	**122**
All non-Māori	4	13	75	**452**



Figure 8.3: Support for ART attendances at particular events broken by category (unprompted). Bars denote percentage per category.

were statistically more likely than females to feel ambivalent about it (p <.05). No significant statistical differences between age groups were found, but this may be due to the small sample size when the sample was divided by age group. Participants from regions in which ART had been implemented were more likely than participants in other regions to support the ART initiative (p < .05). When considering different ethnicities, all other grouped ethnicities were more likely than Māori to support the initiative (p < .05), while Māori were more likely than all the other grouped ethnicities to not support it (p < .05).

Overall, **75%** of participants supported ARTs being implemented in all major cities and **70%** perceived that the ART trial is a good use of Police resources. Those who were over 55 years were statistically more supportive of the ART trial being implemented in all major cities and the ART being a good use of Police resources than those younger (p <.001). Māori were significantly less supportive of the ART trial being implemented in all major cities and the ART being a good use of Police resources than the remaining grouped ethnicities (p < .05). Further analyses also showed that support for the ART trial being implemented in all major cities and the ART trial being a good use of Police resources increased as pre-existing trust in Police increased, with those with higher pre-existing trust in Police showing greater levels of support for the trial.

8.2.4 Incidents Attended during the Armed Response Team Trial

When participants were asked without any prompts about which incidents the ART should attend, **35%** mentioned armed offender/ active shooter incidents, **18%** mentioned higher risk incidents or searches where offenders are believed to have weapons or firearms, and **14%** mentioned terrorism-related incidents (see **Figure 8.3**). However, when participants were asked *with prompts* about which incidents the ART should attend, **91%** thought it was appropriate for the ART to attend high risk events and those involving firearms and **76%** thought it was appropriate for the ART to attend urgent and active events where people are being victimised but the presence of weapons is unknown (see **Figure 8.4**). The remaining prompts had considerably less support.



Figure 8.4: Support for ART attendances at particular events broken by category (prompted). Bars denote percentage per category.

8.2.5 Perceptions of Safety around the Armed Response Team Trial

When considering safety concerns, **68%** of the participants reported feeling safer knowing ARTs are operating in New Zealand, **64%** reported feeling safer knowing ARTs are in their community, and **33%** reported being worried about vulnerable groups being unfairly targeted by ARTs. These findings suggest that about one third of the participants do not feel they or those around them are safer because of ARTs.

Māori (when compared to other grouped ethnicities; $p < .001$), females (when compared to males; $p < .05$), those who were younger (when compared to those who were older; $p < .001$), and those with lower pre-existing trust in Police (when compared to those with higher levels of trust in Police; $p < .001$) were statistically more concerned about vulnerable groups being unfairly targeted. Māori (when compared to other grouped ethnicities; $p < .05$) and those with lower pre-existing levels of trust in Police (when compared to those with higher levels of trust in Police; $p < .001$) were also more likely to disagree that they felt safer knowing ARTs are operating in their community and in New Zealand.

When considering general statements around arming Police, **56%** of the participants agreed that ARTs are probably the first step toward general arming of Police in New Zealand, **49%** agreed that general frontline police officers should not routinely carry firearms, and **48%** agreed that if ARTs are assisting with general

policing activity between high risk events, they should be required to remove their firearm. Further analyses investigating differences between gender, age, and ethnicity groups did not suggest any significant differences.

Table 8.3: The effect the Armed Response Team trial had upon public trust and confidence by gender, region, ethnicity, and pre-existing level (percentage).

Group	Decreased T&C	Same as before	Increased T&C	Total
Male	14	49	37	**193**
Female	7	54	39	**182**
ART Region	5	54	41	**292**
Non-ART Region	13	51	36	**269**
Māori	16	50	34	**119**
All non-Māori	7	53	40	**442**
Low T & C	41	46	12	**41**
Some T & C	7	59	34	**87**
High T & C	7	50	43	**242**

8.2.6 Effects on Public Trust and Confidence

Overall, after hearing about the ART initiative, **52%** of the participants reported that their trust and confidence in New Zealand Police remained the same as before, **38%** reported that their trust and confidence increased, and **10%** reported their trust and confidence decreased. The finding suggests that the ART initiative has not generally been associated to a decrease in trust and confidence in New Zealand Police, though amongst those with lower levels of trust and confidence already, the initiative appears to have further weakened support.

Table 8.3 provides a breakdown of how trust and confidence was affected after hearing about the ART trial. Note that "a lot/a little more trust and confidence" and "a lot/a little less trust and confidence" are collapsed into single groups reflecting general increase and decrease in trust and confidence.

Males were more likely than females to have less trust and confidence in Police since they heard about the ART initiative ($p < .05$). Participants in other regions of New Zealand were more likely than those based in ART Trial locations to feel less confidence and trust in Police after they heard about the trial ($p < .05$). Māori were also more likely than the other grouped ethnicities to feel less trust and confidence in Police after they heard about the trial ($p < .05$).

When considering pre-existing levels of trust and confidence in Police, those with high pre-existing trust and confidence in Police were more likely to have more trust and confidence in Police since they heard about the trial than those who had some or little trust and confidence in Police ($p <.05$). On the other hand, those who had lower pre-existing levels of trust and confidence in Police were more likely to have less trust and confidence in Police after hearing about the trial than those with some or high trust and confidence in Police ($p < .001$).

Additionally, **19%** of the participants who mentioned that their trust and confidence in Police had not changed after hearing about the ART initiative, mentioned that they already trusted/did not trust Police and/or the ART trial had not changed anything. Fourteen percent of the participants who mentioned that their trust and confidence increased after hearing about the ART initiative, mentioned leading to a safer community as the reason for their belief.

8.3. Summary

Overall, participants supported the deployment of Armed Response Teams (ART) when attending high risk events, those involving firearms, and when attending urgent and active events where people are being

victimised but the presence of weapons is unknown. Also, the ART initiative has not generally been associated to a decrease in trust and confidence in New Zealand Police, particularly for those living in ART trial regions.

However, findings also suggested that Māori were more likely than all the other grouped ethnicities to not support the initiative, to disagree that they felt safer knowing ARTs are operating in New Zealand and in their community, to feel less trust and confidence in Police after they heard about the trial, and to be more concerned about vulnerable groups being unfairly targeted. This finding highlights how important it is for New Zealand Police to liaise with Māori and Iwi in future steps of the ART initiative, keeping them informed and consulting before major decisions.

Additionally, 30 to 62% of the participants did not know about specific features of the ART initiative, and 33% thought incorrectly that ARTs are normal frontline police that respond to all police call outs, but carry firearms. This finding shows that the population could benefit from more information about ART being communicated to them, what would enable a better public understanding of the trial and might, with time, improve public perception of ARTs.

The community insights survey reviewed in this chapter provides valuable insights on a difficult topic. Nevertheless, as with all pieces of research, it includes limitations. At times, group sizes became too small to enable reliable comparisons between groups, and the way in which the data was collected (using an online panel and survey tool) may have biased the sample towards participants who have access to a computer and are regularly connected to the internet. Finally, it would have been interesting to have conducted a baseline survey to assess public perception of the trial before it took place, to enable comparisons across time, possibly even considering the same participants before and after the trial.

Chapter 9: Police Focus Groups and Interviews

Chapter Summary

This chapter represents the views and opinions of Police staff directly and indirectly associated with the ART trial. Every attempt has been made to represent these views with fairness and balance while preserving the privacy of those involved. This chapter does not examine the impact of the trial or its operational efficiency and does not represent the views, opinions or ideas of our communities. This report is not about the operations of the Armed Offenders Squad (AOS). The ART trial was conducted in the Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury Districts and each of these districts took a slightly different approach to the implementation and management of their ART, which means direct comparisons between districts are not always possible. Examples include the functions conducted by each ART and whether ART members were backfilled. The trial evolved as it took place and efficiencies were gained and operational practices amended. COVID-19 lockdown occurred during this trial and this resulted in some necessary operational changes that may have impacted the views of participants. An opportunity is identified for New Zealand Police to work with the public, community representatives, the frontline and Police Executive to identify the challenges faced and ideate on how they can best be met.

9.1. Methodology

The Evidence Based Policing Service Design team conducted a series of **13** focus groups and nine interviews across three Districts using a semi-structured thematic framework. This approach involved ensuring the answers to specific questions were obtained while encouraging open discussion about the topic point and evaluative themes. Please see **Appendix I** for a list of questions and topics. Research was undertaken in each of the districts where the trial took place to identify perceptions across the districts. Participants were arranged by Districts at the request of Evidence Based Policing. We spoke to over **150** people from various workgroups who took part in, or had exposure to the trial.

9.1.1 Research Participants

The views of the following groups or individuals were gathered:

- Police ART leaders
- Police ART members
- Police frontline leaders
- Police frontline including PST and CIB
- Police District Commanders
- Police Māori Responsiveness Managers
- Police Pacifica Responsiveness Manager
- Police Intelligence
- Police Communication Centres
- Police Family Harm Team

Table 9.1: Themes derived from focus groups and interviews

Themes
Identity
Engagement and Communication
Bridging the Gap
Safety of Our People and Our Communities
Trust and Confidence
Deployment and Responsiveness
Operation and Structure

9.1.2 Discussion Topics

Participants were asked to tell us their own views and not those of the organisation on the following topics:

- Challenges and problems the trial was trying to address
- Impact on trust and confidence
- Keeping our communities safe
- Police safety
- Activities performed and support provided
- Changes to how AOS or STG functioned
- Training
- Equipment and vehicles used
- What does good look like?

Participants were promised anonymity and confidentiality and any original recordings or notes were destroyed in line with this commitment. It should be noted that the information in this report is a representation of what the researchers heard and not the opinion or view of the Evidence Based Policing Centre nor New Zealand Police. Participants were very keen for their voices to be heard.

9.2. Results

We asked participants what they thought the aims of the trial were, and if these aims had been met by the ART's. The responses were varied but most felt that the trial successfully achieved these aims which participants thought important:

1. Enabling a better response to the increasing prevalence of illegal firearms
2. Providing mentoring and upskilling to the frontline
3. Reducing the ever increasing risks to the public and Police from dangerous situations
4. Providing appropriately trained and experienced people to deescalate dangerous situations
5. Ensuring that the right tools and equipment are available including appropriate non-lethal options
6. Improving Trust and Confidence of New Zealanders in Police
7. Providing the right sized response to any given event
8. Decreasing the response time for appropriate responses to serious events

Table 9.1 lists the themes derived from the focus groups and interviews. These themes represent the views, opinions and feelings most commonly expressed by participants.

9.2.1 Theme One: Identity

The Name

There was consensus around the appropriateness of the name "Armed Response Team". Participants thought the name did not reflect the purpose and capabilities or the team, and therefore the word 'armed' should not have been used. We asked participants what name they thought best described the role of ARTs, suggestions included:

- Rapid Response Team (RRT)
- Critical Response Team (CRT)
- Tactical Response Team (TRT)
- Tactical Support Group (TSG)
- Community Response Team (CRT)

The Look

The majority of participants were happy that ARTs shared the same blue uniform worn by the PST. Participants said the blue uniform lessened the negative impact on Police Trust and Confidence because it was less intimidating than the black AOS uniform. Participants also told us if ARTs wore different uniforms, offenders might target members of the frontline as being the weak link.

> *"You know, it's like offenders see us and think we won't play with these guys in black but we'll have a crack at the guys in blue."*

Some participants believed that the blue uniforms allowed them to be more flexible in their approach than wearing a non-standard Police uniform.

> *"When you put on blacks you have a different mind-set, but when you put on blue you have flexibility."*

Counter to this, some participants highlighted the benefit of how a different uniform can help de-escalate critical incidents. Offenders respond differently with officers that turn up to a scene who are highly skilled.

There was a lot of discussion around the look of the vehicles selected for the trial. Some participants liked that the vehicle was easily identifiable as an ART vehicle as this meant their presence in hot spot areas would help deter criminal behaviour. However, other participants thought the vehicles should have had standard Police livery as they would not have been identified as ARTs while undertaking normal police duties such as traffic stops, as well as, not having their location shared to warn frequent offenders of their whereabouts.

Purpose and Perception

> *"We need to de-Americanise this!"*

Participants felt that the way the ART trial was publicised in the media focused unduly on the 'flashy cars' and firearms, it did not highlight the fact that the group represented advanced and usually non-lethal tactical options, specialised training, and years of experience. They expressed how they did not feel supported by the organisation regarding their image and purpose during the trial.

> *"The ART team were much more than gun slingers in cars – they bring so much more, and they saved lives."*

There is an opportunity for further discovery to identify if specialist teams are more effective with similar looking uniforms and vehicles to the frontline or uniforms and vehicles that look different. We have summarised the views and opinions most commonly expressed by participants into the following *'How Might We…?'* questions for further exploration.

How Might We…

Ensure that the vision New Zealand Police establish for the future does not evolve into something undesirable?

Ensure New Zealand Police teams have sufficient diversity to represent our communities?

Ensure the public do not feel intimidated by our people and the equipment they use?

9.2.2 Theme Two: Engagement and Consultation

"The disconnect between what people think police do and the reality is growing"

Overall, participants felt that poor community engagement and how the purpose of ART was communicated had hampered the trial. A strong theme across districts was the desire for greater and earlier engagement and communication. Participants said that as the trial was being run they had to reassure their people and their communities about why the ART model was being trialled and what it entailed.

> *"It was one of those situations where we were flying the plane as we were building it. It was right on our doorstep and we were scrambling to have those conversations, we were on the back foot, and it put us in a disarmed position. It brought a lot of distrust."*

Internal Communication

Participants felt there was a lack of communication from the top of the organisation to our people about the ART trial, and that no one clearly explained to them the decisions made and why.

Participants felt that, there were no clear 'Business Rules' explaining the operational parameters of ART, and that there was a lack of direction in the implementation. Roles and responsibilities were not defined and there was limited visibility around what was expected of each team, which caused a lack of cohesion between Policing teams.

Community Engagement

All districts felt strongly there was a lack of initial community engagement and consultation around the ART trial. They felt this resulted in the public not fully understanding the reality of the trial, misinformation and negative press presenting strong views that lacked evidence.

Districts felt constrained in their ability to engage early, and to properly explain the 'Why', due to communications being managed from National Headquarters. Participants told us that communities needed to be engaged sooner, with greater lead-times to establish better support for achieving the objectives. As a consequence, Iwi and community views were neutral at best, but more often sceptical and unfavourable.

> *"To have a robust conversation with Māori they need to be properly briefed. Concerns could have been mitigated with proper communication of the "why" from the start."*

We heard that some Māori communities did not see information about why the ART trial was set up and what the trial was trying to achieve which made it hard for Māori leadership to respond. Participants said people needed to be informed about the information and statistics around:

- the numbers of firearms on the street and the number of firearms Police encounter;
- the numbers of AOS callouts;
- why the AOS model didn't always work and a different capability was needed; and
- ART members years of experience compared with much of frontline having only 0-18 months experience.

With the lack of information available to Māori, participants expressed that Māori probably felt more unsafe with ARTs presence. Participants explained that our communities were not told and didn't understand that the premise of having ARTs meant their communities and our people were safer due to the extensive training, experience and equipment this team brought with them.

> *"They didn't understand we had a reduction of force because we had this highly skilled team jogging on the spot ready to respond and support our frontline."*

> *"We need to take the time to explain to those communities who are affected so they're informed with the right information and not relying on what's in the media/gangs for information about it. Get the ART's in front of these communities, on the marae, have a hui and discuss the benefits and role of ART, help them understand, explain the WHY to them."*

Participants expressed frustration that the media focus was all about the firearms, making some communities feel unsafe and fear New Zealand was becoming a Police state. Participants also felt that the information communicated about ARTs should have been about the tactical skillset, the less lethal options, their ability to de-escalate critical situations quickly and their superior medical first aid training.

We heard that in one district St John would sometimes request for ART to respond to an incident that they were struggling to attend. ART's attended attempted suicides and other events in which they utilised the medical training and equipment they have. None of these capabilities were shared or communicated to the public.

There was a lot of discussion about the negative press actively run by gangs opposing ART's. Participants felt that this was one of the reasons for a vocal group of people on Social Media who would warn gangs of their whereabouts. We were told that Districts had to quell a lot of publicity fires on their own - *"it was like passing around a hot potato".* Participants expressed frustration that New Zealand Police didn't do enough to proactively counteract the negative and damaging publicity.

> *"The media thinks it's about shooting people, but it is about having different options"*

Each district felt they should have been able to leverage their good relationships with local community groups and media to tell the good stories about what ARTs were doing. In some districts, ART members attended community events and Maraes to introduce themselves and talk to people. They said this helped build a stronger relationship between Police and the community and showed that the members of ARTs were just everyday people trying to make the community safer for everyone.

Participants in Canterbury shared examples of what good communication and community involvement looks like. They talked about the Eagle trial, and said its purpose was well communicated to Iwi and communities, to the point where Ngāi Tahu were so on board they wanted to offer a helicopter. A second example included the roll out of Tasers for New Zealand Police which was well communicated and demonstrated to communities.

> *"Police are a part of this community and we should not be doing things to the community."*

There is an opportunity to explore ways New Zealand Police can improve our consultation with our communities to understand their views and opinions about the challenges we all face. There is also the potential to further explore ways New Zealand Police can work with our communities on potential solutions. We have summarised the views and opinions most commonly expressed by participants into the following *'How Might We…?'* questions for further exploration.

How Might We…

Engage with communities about issues like illegal firearms and increasing gang presence?

Ensure the public understand the environment New Zealand Police operate in and the challenges this may bring?

Enable our communities to participate in developing solutions to the challenges we all face?

Ensure that planning and communications are given sufficient priority and time so that they are done optimally?

Ensure our communities understand the reasons why Police try new and different approaches to challenges?

Ensure our communities understand the true scope and scale of what Police are doing?

Better communicate changes and expectations to 'Our People'?

9.2.3 Theme Three: Bridging the Gap

Upskilling and Mentoring

A common theme was how ARTs enhanced the capability of frontline staff through mentoring and modelling good operational practices such as demonstrating how to plan and safely execute house clearing or establishing cordons. Participants expressed concerns about the lack of experience and practical knowledge of some frontline staff, especially around how to manage high-risk incidents that may involve firearms. They said the upskilling of frontline supervisors and officers on tactical, legal and administrative policing was invaluable in keeping our communities and our people safe.

"The numbers of firearms out there is frightening, people are driving around with guns in the boots of their cars."

"ART brought their knowledge and expertise to every job they went to which was great for junior staff. PST became better at preparing plans and debriefing with ART involvement."

ARTs had the flexibility to provide on job training and reassurance to frontline staff on how to safely de-escalate critical incidents in a way that kept offenders, police and the public safe. Participants told us that ARTs often gave immediate debriefs and were good at discussing jobs and providing feedback.

Districts had noticed an improvement in skills and professionalism within their frontline teams that had exposure to ARTs. It was noticed that frontline staff had started to mimic the good policing practice they had seen or being shown.

"By the end of the trial you could see Counties Manakau staff improving."

The majority of participants said ART was more accessible and readily available to frontline staff due to the relationships formed or the co-location of teams. They also felt it was easier to ask ART leaders and members for advice on incidents that did not meet the AOS threshold than it was to contact an AOS leader about them.

"We got a guy back from ART and it's been awesome – so helpful for everything."

We were told that more frontline staff are interested in developing better tactical skills, notably non-lethal approaches. Indeed within some districts, having regular interactions between ART (AOS trained officers) and frontline staff has resulted in the largest amount of applicants for the AOS District Selection in several years.

Potential Deskilling of Staff

Some participants expressed concerns that ARTs may have a 'dumbing-down' effect on frontline staff by routinely undertaking the difficult tasks.

> *"Having them around meant our staff weren't exposed to the hard stuff so it takes longer for them to learn, or if you do know, you become rusty."*

Junior staff sometimes felt they were missing out on experience and opportunities when ARTs took charge and they were often stuck on a cordon. They were concerned if ARTs did all the risky work, they would never learn how to react under stressful circumstances.

> *"How can we learn how to react under stress if we are never put under stress?"*

Participants told us that over time, some frontline staff became too reliant on ARTs and would wait for ARTs to arrive at an incident before taking any action.

Leadership and Experience

During the focus groups and interviews with participants, we noticed a theme around bridging the gap of leadership and experience in the frontline. Participants repeatedly mentioned how ARTs were staffed with experienced and well trained officers who brought years of experience, specialist skills and resources the frontline would not otherwise have had.

> *"ART brought knowledge and experience to jobs."*

> *"It was great to be in a team where everyone is high quality."*

Participants said that ART leaders and members:

- had a high level of tenure;
- provided triage of events to decide the appropriate response;
- provided better management of a scene;
- enhanced command and control provided by PST NCO's at critical incidents; and
- took pressure of DCC's and dog handlers.

Team Culture

Team culture varied between districts, with a mix of positive and negative views from participants. The majority of participants felt their frontline staff got to know the ARTs leaders and members well, which resulted in better communication and working relationships. In some districts participants talked about how co-locating ART staff with frontline staff helped to build a strong team culture.

> *"I miss seeing the ART team around here."*

However, in one district some participants said ART became more of a separate 'group' and kept to themselves. They said that ART could disrupt the management and control of a scene. Some felt ARTs were intimidating at times and would undermine staff at jobs which made frontline staff doubt their own decision making.

> *"Other police functions show up as a support unit, ART show up and it's scary. I'd get nervous around them and hope we'd get to the job first."*

> *"They'd bugger off and leave us with the mess. At times we were belittled by ART, it will be a hard culture to change."*

Some participants told us they were often left to do the paperwork, and that ART would do jobs at inconvenient times creating more work for frontline staff, tying up valuable resources and creating additional unplanned overtime for the frontline. They also felt ARTs would at times cherry pick jobs and were not always team players.

> *"ART would show up to jobs that weren't urgent and then request an i-car to do the paperwork side and that took up PST resource that didn't need to be taken."*

> *"It's a 70/30 percent split of ART being prepared to help, it depends on who you get. Some ART guys were great and incredibly supportive and others weren't. It was probably a personality trait thing."*

Some participants felt that additional and double up of work occurred because ARTs and the frontline did not have clarity around their roles and what was expected from each other. ARTs would at times attend a job without doing the paperwork, leaving the PST to redo the work.

> *"ART would turn up to a 5F and do no paperwork, we would arrive after and would have to re-interview everyone involved at that event which was very frustrating for those people having to repeat details to us again."*

Because ART were a response team, they were not tied down to one job, some participants said it meant they were working with different staff all the time, which was good for learning skills but took longer for staff to build relationships with each other.

There is an opportunity to explore ways New Zealand Police can provide more hands on training to frontline staff in special tactics. Further explore ways New Zealand Police can provide tailored unconscious bias training relevant to the New Zealand environment. We have summarised the views and opinions most commonly expressed by participants into the following *'How Might We…?'* questions for further exploration.

How Might We…

Create more opportunities for the frontline to learn through mentoring from more experienced colleagues?

Ensure our frontline staff have the appropriate training?

Ensure that there are sufficient qualified and experienced leaders and supervisors to manage dangerous situations?

Ensure understanding of cultural awareness and considerations?

9.2.4 Theme Four: Safety of Our People and Our Communities

> *"There's not a single thing that will provide the safety blanket that we need."*

Universally participants believe that the ART trial was not just about firearms. ARTs were teams of experienced officers that were extensively trained and had a range of additional non-lethal tactical options available, and participants felt this made our people and communities safer.

Safety of our People

> *"The worst days of my life are when staff don't return home safe – physically and mentally. And we need to enable our people to be safe."*

Participants talked about the serious issue of more illegal firearms in our communities. They said it is becoming more dangerous for our frontline staff to do their jobs, as they are dealing with more offenders who have weapons or are dangerous. One example we heard a lot was the increasing number of vehicle stops (3T's) where loaded firearms are found.

> *"There is a clear lack of knowledge coming over the radio from frontline staff doing high risk 3T's who may have firearms and high on meth. These happen every shift, and our new cops shake with fear."*

Each district expressed concerns around the safety of their frontline staff, having officers with extensive experience and training out on the street to support our frontline made them safer. Participants talked about how the PST would benefit from more training before joining the frontline and don't yet have the confidence or experience to deal with high-risk incidents. However, during the ART trial, the frontline didn't feel as worried knowing there was a highly-skilled and experienced team available to mentor and support them and keep their staff safe when needed.

Some participants talked about how offenders would stand up to and take on PST and CIB officers, but not ART. Frontline participants said they felt safer when ART turned up, as their presence alone would de-escalate a situation. Participants overwhelmingly preferred having a model like ART over having routinely armed police. They said something different is needed to tackle the increasing number of high-risk incidents involving gangs and firearms, and that more tactical options and experience are needed to help support their frontline staff.

Safety of our Communities

This section represents the views and opinions of the Police people involved in the focus groups and not necessarily the public or our communities.

The majority of participants felt ARTs supported the frontline in making safer decisions during a serious incident. They said the ability for highly trained and experienced staff with enhanced tactical capability to attend high-risk incidents quickly and resolve them safely was invaluable, and this made individuals in communities safer by preventing incidents getting out of control.

In almost all of the focus groups and interviews participants talked about how even after the firearm buyback the public have no idea how often firearms (often loaded) are being found. They said this was a daily event and felt it was a growing danger to the safety of the people in their communities.

> *"Firearms incidents occur daily in this district."*

Participants said if an offender was threatening with a firearm, the only options frontline staff have to use are pepper spray, then a Taser, and last a firearm. A junior officer may be forced to use their firearm and that offender or officer would potentially be injured or dead. If ARTs attended the same incident, they bring with them additional tactical skills and non-lethal options, such as sponge rounds which could be enough to hit the offender hard, disarm and apprehended them without causing significant harm. Indeed participants told us that they had not themselves shot anyone during the trial.

> *"Jesus, you need this capability, because who knows what will happen next weekend? Gangs are having shoot outs a lot, and in good neighbourhoods, to get AOS on scene it can take 1 hour and 15 minutes and sometimes that's too late"*

Participants in one district highlighted that kids situated within an incident were affected when ART showed up. They said the kids would see ART equipped with firearms and non-lethal arms and would get distressed.

Some participants talked about how ARTs had superior medical skills, they could show up on scene before an ambulance and manage the first aid. They shared a story where ARTs saved people using their advanced first aid skills – "The ART had great medical skills, they could show up on scene before an ambulance and manage the first aid. An example I can think of, there was a [person] …. [who attempted suicide] …, and the ART team were able to keep [them]….. alive so that [their] …. family could say goodbye and that's something truly special." – They said there were many examples of incidents like this where ARTs could apply expertise to all kinds of jobs. It wasn't all about them having firearms or being armed.

> *"ART haven't shot anyone here. In fact they have saved lives here. That's not communicated though."*

There is an opportunity for further discovery to identify more non-lethal tactical options for high-risk situations posing a risk to our people in the public. Further explore ways New Zealand Police can deploy the right people to reduce the risk of harm to the public. We have summarised the views and opinions most commonly expressed by participants into the following *'How Might We…?'* questions for further exploration.

How Might We…

Protect our people and our communities from harm associated with the increased amount of firearms in communities?

Enhance our frontline capabilities with more non-lethal options?

Ensure that there is sufficient experience and knowledge on our frontline to keep our people and communities safe?

9.2.5 Theme Five: Trust and Confidence

Trust and Confidence of 'Our People"

Focus group participants were close to unanimous in saying their confidence increased knowing ARTs were available and could quickly and safely get a situation under control.

> *"I had confidence knowing ART were available. Knowing it's under control."*

> *"ART boosted our Trust and Confidence. They got to scenes FAST and they were the right people at the right time. Sometimes one minute can feel like an hour so having them meant we didn't worry as much."*

However, now that the ART trial has ended, participants are concerned that trust and confidence has "eroded" for some frontline staff. Many frontline staff told us they want ARTs or something similar back. They shared stories of recent high-risk incidents in their districts after the ART trial ended, stating that those incidents would have been resolved faster and much safer if ARTs had been available.

> *"The end of ART has left a big hole for us and our response. Trust and confidence among cops on the street has eroded a bit."*

Many participants expressed concerns that amongst their people, trust and confidence in the Police Executive team has dropped. They are worried that the Police Executive will not roll out an ART like solution or explore other "tactical response team" options to help them mitigate the growing amount of high-risk incidents occurring in their districts.

> *"If this does not go ahead, we will lose some trust of our people."*

Trust and Confidence of 'Our Communities"

The views around whether the ART Trial impacted the trust and confidence in our communities varied between districts. Some participants thought trust and confidence had increased, while others felt it had decreased.

The participants who believed the ART trial had a negative impact on trust and confidence within their communities said there has always been a misconception about the frontline and firearms, such as the perception that the frontline are not armed – many officers told us they have access to firearms when they need them as each police car carries gun safes with a number of firearms. They believed this misconception is due to Police not properly communicating the current state of things.

> *"You have regular police out there with guns, but the public were all up in arms about having the skilled guys out there – the best trained, a police shooting is heavily mitigated with experts involved. It was a highly emotional response from the public."*

Participants were concerned that the public did not understand the prevalence of illegal firearms in their communities and the frequency in which Police encounter loaded weapons, especially in vehicle stops and dealings with gang members.

> *"Our Māori people weren't given the information and, the statistics around the numbers of firearms on the street."*

Participants felt there were segments in the community that had a lot to say, particularly on social media, they said these were sometimes people who were adversely impacted by ARTs, such as gangs. They also felt young people are more negative towards ARTs. The participants expressed concerns that the public backlash will be a lasting effect.

> *"Not everyone likes the idea of an armed police force, and I think that's connected to our trust and confidence. People don't think we need guns."*

> *"Gangs will make page one and two in newspapers and that has added a drop to our T and C because the public think we can't manage it"*

The participants who thought trust and confidence had increased often mentioned instances where the public had face to face contact with the ARTs which they described as positive and supportive.

> *"No member of the public ever criticised ART's presence (well, not to our face)."*

Some of the participants said ART really worked hard to be accepted by the community. ART members attended public events to help rebuild trust and confidence with community groups who were anti the ART trial.

> *"Our guys attended local community and sports events to show who they are – normal people, normal cops."*

> *"Lots of members of the public stopped and chatted to the team. People asked lots of questions about the car."*

Participants from one district said they had great statistics around trust and confidence, with one group stating the trust and confidence was above the national average. They said they have received a lot of mail from supporters expressing "thanks for keeping us safe". They also shared an example where they received a letter from the Mongrel Mob saying how cool ARTs gear was, and thanking them for keeping their people safe.

"I would say our T and C was high, people trusted us to keep them safe. We have very strong relationships with other parties. I spoke to Iwi leaders, visited maraes and there was no real push back, but also it's the environment here, people are used to seeing firearms here."

In one district participants believed the senior members of the Muslim community felt Police were using the mosque shootings as a reason to arm police, however once the purpose of ARTs was explained they understood and became more supportive. In another district participants felt the Muslim community loved ARTs and they would often request ARTs to come when they had certain events on at their mosque.

"The Muslim communities here bloody love ART, our ARTs have been regularly invited to mosques."

Participants in another district, felt their Pasifika communities seemed less opposed than other community groups. Some participants said Pacific communities have lots of people in the Police force and want us to protect them.

Overall, most participants we spoke to had a sense that a large majority of people they dealt with didn't realise they were armed. They explained that because the ARTs wore blue, the public saw professional police and this helped with trust and confidence in their communities.

"90 percent of those I dealt with didn't even know I was armed."

"Because we wore blue, the public just saw good professional police."

There is an opportunity to consider a governance structure made up of Iwi, local government, Māori, Pasifika and Ethnic Services (MPES), and District Commanders who together review a monthly sample of cases where our teams have attended jobs. We have summarised the views and opinions most commonly expressed by participants into the following *'How Might We…?'* questions for further exploration.

How Might We…

Ensure there is a national approach to the challenges New Zealand Police face and collaboratively work with our partners to ideate solutions?

Enable effective community governance of what New Zealand Police do?

Ensure New Zealand Police bring our communities on a journey?

9.2.6 Theme Six: Deployment and Responsiveness

Deployment and Resources

There was a general agreement across all three districts that ARTs were able to respond faster to critical incidents than an AOS deployment. AOS typically deploy in anywhere between 30 to 60 minutes plus, whereas because ARTs were "jogging on the spot" and did not need to go to the AOS base to gather together and get equipment they could be deployed much faster. Participants also said they had seen the number AOS callouts significantly reduce during trial.

"We had an excellent resource to deploy and we could deploy them quickly."

"It's the first time we've been able to deploy the right people at the right time."

"They could go everywhere – you could send them anywhere."

Participants said having ARTs available to respond to high-risk incidents meant they didn't have to deploy as many frontline resources, which freed up more of their frontline teams to do their normal roles. Participants also said they spent less time trying to locate experienced people to help with high-risk incidents.

Some participants thought having dedicated vehicles already loaded for an AOS type of deployment greatly helped reduce the response time for emergency callouts. In some districts, participants mentioned that ARTs had access to 'Responder' which meant they could scan and self-assign to incidents occurring across their district before Comm's had dispatched them. The benefit was, ART could often get to incidents quicker than the frontline. However, the downside to this was that sometimes Comm's would not know where the ARTs were. ARTs would apparently sometimes bypass the standard Comm's systems and use their own secure Comm's.

> *"Sometimes ART would cut Comm's out of the loop and they needed to stay on the main channels to better support PST and also so we knew what was happening, we could hear things, but had no idea what was going on."*

> *"Sometimes we only knew where they were when we saw them on the Eagle download."*

Some participants felt ARTs were underutilised by their district's District Command Centre's (DCC's) and that there was ambiguity as to when ARTs should be involved and what their role was. They said there was no district led training organised for ARTs to assist frontline staff in downtime, which would have been beneficial. Some training did often occur, but was only due to individual Sergeant's reaching out to ART staff.

> *"As a PTT Sergeant who used to have an ART embedded, I did not enjoy the ART at times as they were not always available for high risk offenders! This meant we watched high risk offenders get away."*

Participants highlighted that now the ART trial is over, they have noticed a substantial gap in their ability to respond. During the trial, Comm's explained they could send ARTs to resolve an incident, but since the trial has ended, they are back to sending out three i-cars. Having to deploy multiple frontline teams takes more time and also means those resources are tied up for hours.

> *"You can send one ART team to resolve an event – without them you need to send out three odd i-cars which takes time and means those resources are tied up for hours."*

> *"When the trial and Eagle ended, it was a double whammy, it left a noticeable hole in our ability to respond."*

> *"Feels empty and several events lately could have used their expertise"*

Right Sized Response

Overall participants said they are noticing more incidents occurring that are too big for the frontline staff to deal with on their own, but are too small for a full AOS callout. Participants felt the nature of AOS callouts has changed and they expressed that there is a need, especially in metro areas, for a faster and leaner tactical response than AOS.

Some participants talked about how ARTs often became a 'go to' for potentially dangerous incidents. They said the immediate availability of ARTs meant that some frontline staff and investigations workgroups would contact ARTs for assistance in situations that would not usually warrant full AOS involvement, but where they could benefit from additional tactical resources and experience. This meant incidents could often be resolved at an earlier stage and mitigate the need for a full AOS callout. Participants believed this reduced the number of AOS and STG callouts, which overtime also reduced TOIL (time off in lieu) accrual.

"AOS call outs drastically fell away because most of the work was being done by ART."

However, not all participants felt the same. Some participants felt that the ARTs sometimes over reacted and made an incident bigger than it should have. One participant shared a story where ART entered a situation using shields when they believed just talking would have worked.

"From a Police point of view some incidences could have been dealt with by PST, leaving members of public/clients happier with the way they had been dealt with."

Attend and Resolve

Some participants were frustrated that ARTs sometimes lacked ownership of the incident they managed. They said ART would "pawn off" unfinished jobs to i-cars, which created more work for the frontline staff, dispatch issues and added stress to an already stressful job.

Some of those participants were also frustrated that the lack of ownership resulted in poor case files. They said that PST and investigation teams were left to fill-in the gaps and complete the case files on their own, even if they weren't the first respondents and often without full information of what happened.

"*PST were burning out and ART were told to stop, they were creating too much work for the investigation work that followed."*

"ART would show up to jobs that weren't urgent and then request an i-car to do the paperwork side and that took up PST resource that didn't need to be taken."

In some districts, some ART members said they had no extra time to factor in administration activities and no space available for them to complete work administration and paperwork.

"We only had one computer in the AOS Squad Room and no dedicated area for ART staff to complete correspondence."

There is an opportunity for further discovery around establishing specialised teams to target high risk incidents. Further explore different options of deploying specialised teams and establish a known and agreed threshold for deployment. We have summarised the views and opinions most commonly expressed by participants into the following *'How Might We…?'* questions for further exploration.

How Might We…

Ensure New Zealand Police can deploy the right resources at the right time to high risk incidents?

Ensure our specialist teams have access to appropriate intel to conduct their functions?

9.2.7 Theme Seven: Operations and Structure

Roles and Responsibilities

Participants from all districts expressed frustration around how there were no clear 'Business Rules' explaining the operational parameters of ARTs. Some participants felt there was a lack of direction in the way ART was implemented, and this created a lack of cohesion between teams while attending jobs.

"We made it work because that's the kind of people we are."

Participants felt strongly that there needed to be a clearer definition of roles and responsibilities with visibility around what was expected of each team. This would have created a better understanding of how ARTs could support other workgroups and how these workgroups could have supported the ARTs. They explained how

there was sometimes confusion as to who was in charge or who had what role at incidents, for example, who was responsible for completing paperwork such as case files.

People Management

There were mixed views around staffing numbers and rostering, which was increased by the different approaches to staffing and backfill adopted across the Districts involved.

The majority of participants thought the roster in their district was good. Especially with staff being able to have breaks from being on-call on Rostered Days Off's (RDO's). They felt this gave staff the much needed opportunity to actually relax when not working and enjoy a better work / life balance. The majority of ART officers were also AOS officers and they told us that during the trial, they didn't feel as burnt out. There was also less Time off in Lieu (TOIL) due to a reduced number of callouts. However participants said the AOS reserves who were not part of the ART trial were not called out as often and subsequently had less opportunities to keep their skills up to date.

In some districts participants said the number of staff available to take part in the ART trial was insufficient. Managing leave balances and needing to constantly call in reserves to cover shortages caused problems.

Participants talked about how ART was not a 24 hour operation and said it was frustrating for staff to discover incidents occurring outside of ARTs shift times where ART assistance would have been beneficial. They also said, pre-planned warrants generally did not fit into ARTs shift time as these often require 04:00hr starts.

Participants felt the ART sections were too small for AOS clearances, for example, gaining access to a property or clearing a house. At full capacity ARTs had four officers in each team, but the team was not always at full capacity and this meant frontline staff were utilised which decreased staff safety at high risk clearances.

The Vehicles

There was a lot of discussion about the vehicle selected for the trial. A large majority of participants felt it wasn't fit for purpose, and was only suitable to drive sedately around streets. Participants said the response vehicle could not handle the weight of three or four adults and the ART kit, especially during urgent duty driving. It experienced regular engine, suspension and brake issues and was often off the road for repairs and maintenance.

> *"After one pursuit the brakes failed."*
>
> *"The vehicle was off the road a lot and wore out quickly."*

With the vehicle out of action on a regular basis, secondary vehicles were required. However, the vehicles supplied for the ART trial were well-worn and could not carry all the required gear, as well as, carry three to four adults. Some participants felt the specially painted vehicles impacted community perceptions more than was needed, and they felt they should have been either standard Police branded or unmarked.

> *"There was no real evidence base for choosing to have a different vehicle, for some reason it was coloured the same as the eagle but this was never articulated to us on the why."*

The Equipment

The majority of participants highlighted that the standard PST uniform was restrictive and not suitable for tactical policing.

Participants said many ART members had to get physiotherapy or similar treatment for back, knee and ankle issues due to wearing the standard PST boots and the weight and comfort of the PST Body Armour System (BAS) when worn with permanent bulletproof inserts. They said AOS vests are much lighter and more

comfortable. They felt that the standard boots were unsuitable when wearing 15kg of armour. Many of the ART members told us they personally purchased boots with softer soles which they said made a big difference.

Participants also said the standard forage cap was not suitable for tactical policing. It would often fall off or cause trouble when using the tactical gear and weapons.

Participants generally liked wearing uniforms that made them look like the rest of the frontline, but wanted the additional utility the AOS uniforms provided such as additional Modular Lightweight Load-carrying Equipment (MOLLE) and additional storage.

Training

All ART members were highly trained AOS members but participants felt that in practice ART training was done in silos and this meant fewer opportunities for the whole AOS squad to train together. Participants said the AOS reserves who were not part of the ART trial weren't able to keep up with their usual training during the trial as there were limited AOS squad members available for trainings. Previously there had been two full AOS squad trainings per month.

Universally participants believe there were inconsistencies in ART training between the districts. They told us while they were properly trained there was no set mandated training guide for them as individual teams and training was left to individual districts and often individual ARTs to organise. This was an issue for one district who did not have a dedicated firearms instructor, which meant organising to use firearms instructors from other districts. Training for both ARTs and AOS were also impacted by Covid-19 and the resulting restrictions.

Chapter 10: Conclusions & Key Observations

Chapter Summary

This chapter provides a summary of the findings synthesised from the varying data sources and methods used over the trial period. The key evaluation questions are first addressed – along with some additional areas associated with each – which is then followed by some general discussion and concluding remarks that draw upon the insights and lessons learned from the trial.

The principal goal of this evaluation was to determine how ARTs were deployed during the trial, measure perceptions of staff safety and wellbeing, and gauge public opinion around the use of ARTs. Specifically, the evaluated addressed the following key questions:

1. How were ARTs deployed and which tactics were used;
2. What were the real or perceived impacts on officer safety in districts where ARTs were operating;
3. What effect did the introduction of ARTs have upon general wellbeing in districts where ARTs were operating;
4. Was external trust and confidence impacted in districts where ARTs were operating?

This final chapter summarises the evaluation findings in relation to each of these aims, and provides some overall conclusions about the public opinion of ARTs and media analysis. This final chapter summarises the evaluation findings in relation to each of these aims, and provides some overall conclusions and recommendations.

10.1. How were ARTs deployed and which tactics were used?

This section synthesises the findings from several chapters and relates them to the key evaluation aim set out above.

10.1.1 Deployments and Incidents Attended

Analysis of this data was provided in **Chapter 3**. In total, ARTs attended **8,629** incidents across the three trial districts (**Key Finding 1**). There were, however, large differences across the trial districts. Waikato ART attended **5,046** incidents – the greatest number by some margin – with Canterbury and Counties Manukau attending **2,282** and **1,301** incidents, respectively. This amounts to approximately 28 deployments a day in Waikato, 13 deployments a day in Canterbury, and 7 deployments a day in Counties Manukau. It was further noted that ARTs were generally busier during the weekend periods – particularly between the hours 2200 – 0100 – with busier periods also observed during 0900 – 1100 (**Key Finding 2**).

On average, it was found that **23%** of all incidents attended by ARTs were classified as emergency (Priority 1) events (**Key Finding 3**), with the bulk of the attendances classified as Priority 2 events (**71%**). However, it was found that the average emergency response time for all ART units was **8 minutes** (**Key Finding 4**). When considered across the districts, Canterbury was slightly faster with an average of **7.5 minutes**. Counties Manukau and Waikato were slightly slower with an average of **8.7 minutes** and **8.1 minutes**, respectively. The slightly longer response times observed in Counties Manukau and Waikato ART were likely an effect of having to deploy to incidents outside of their district.

Though it is difficult to determine whether these response times reflect an objective improvement over AOS response times, survey data at least suggests that ART response times were perceived as timely. Specifically, PST staff perceived the response of the ART as timely and efficient **91%** of the time, with ART members sharing a similar view, viewing their response as timely and efficient **93%** of the time (note that this applied only to occasion where ARTs had been requested to attend; see **10.1.2 Deployment Level and Method** below).

Firearms offences accounted for **2.6%** of all incidents attended by ARTs, on average, with **56%** of all firearms offences were coded as an emergency event (**Key Finding 5**). Firearm related demand did vary across the districts. In particular, firearms offences accounted for **6.6%** of all incidents attended in Counties Manukau, compared to only **3.5%** of attendances in Canterbury, and **1.1%** of attendances in Waikato. Accordingly, Counties Manukau ART were nearly two times more likely to attend firearms related events than Canterbury ART, and over six times more likely than Waikato ART. Moreover, **63%** of firearms offences were classified an emergency event in Counties Manukau. Conversely, emergency firearms events accounted for **53%** of attendances in the Waikato and **49%** of attendances in Canterbury.

It may be tempting to infer from these results that there is a slightly higher potential for firearms exposure in Counties Manukau. Though that may be true, such a conclusion cannot be drawn from the data in hand. Examination of firearms offences attendances alone provides an imperfect proxy for the prevalence of firearms within each district and cannot be relied on completely to quantify the risk posed to ART members. Principally, it cannot be guaranteed that a firearm was present at all firearm offences (6820) attendances and firearms may be present across a large number of event types.

Nevertheless, these findings do point toward slightly varying demand profiles across the three districts. For example, though 3W: Watching/Observations accounted for less than **1%** of all events attended, these events were attended quite frequently in Counties Manukau, accounting for **3.7%** of attendances in this district. Similarly, 4X: Execute Search Warrant incidents accounted for **1.7%** of attendances on average, yet they comprised **4.9%** of incidents attended in Counties Manukau. Conversely, 4Q: Enquiry/Investigation events accounted for **4.6%** of all ART attendances, yet in Canterbury they accounted for **7.4%** of events attended in that district.

Perhaps one of the more significant findings was that a large number of ART attendances were accounted for by field events. On average, a quarter of all incidents attended by ARTs were 3T: Turnovers (**25%**) with a further **9%** accounted for 5K: Bail Checks (**Key Finding 6**). Notably, **84%** of 3T events and **94%** of all bail checks were attended by Waikato ART. It is important to acknowledge that there was considerable deviation in how often these events were attended within each district. Accordingly, when assessing district specific attendances, 3T events accounted for over a third (**~36%**) of all incidents attended in Waikato, though only **13%** and **5%** of the events attended by Canterbury and Counties Manukau, respectively. In addition, bail checks accounted for approximately **15%** of all events attended in the Waikato. Next to these events, the most attended incidents were family harm investigations, which accounted for **8.6%** of all incidents attended by ARTs, on average.

10.1.2 Deployment Level and Method

This data was largely drawn from End of Deployment form data that were discussed in in **Chapter 4**. Before considering this data, it is first noted that the overall compliance rate for EoD submission was **34%.** As such, approximately one in every three incidents attended had an associated EoD form (**Key Finding 7**). Further, this rate is relative to the exclusion of 3T and 5K incidents, as it was not a requirement to report on these events. However, relative to all incidents attended, the compliance rate was **23%**.

From examination of the end of deployment data, it was found that, on average, **67%** of ARTs deployed in an Assist Role (**Key Finding 8**). It was observed that this role often involved ART members providing general

support to frontline staff – which could simply be for safety and reassurance purposes – or the undertaking of general duties and prevention activities, which require no use of special tactics. This finding further corroborates the large number of preventative tasks undertaken by ARTs (**§ 3.2 Incidents Attended**).

It was also found that ARTs self-deployed to incidents **66%** of the time, on average (**Key Finding 9**). However, self-initiated deployments were, in part, explained by requests from frontline staff and cases where minimal frontline units were available to attend. Specifically, it was found that while frontline requests accounted for **15%** of all EoD submissions they accounted for **21%** of self-initiated deployments reported by ART Team Leaders (**Key Finding 10**). In relation to this finding, it was further observed Officer Perception Surveys were often submitted following a request for ARTs attendance. Specifically, **69%** of Armed Response Team survey submissions indicated that the team had been requested to attend the incident (**§ 6.1.1 Armed Response Team Officer Surveys**) whereas **66%** of Public Safety Team surveys indicated the same (**§ 6.1.2 Public Safety Team Officer Surveys**).

Data from end of deployment forms further revealed that ARTs were most often requested to attend and assist with 4X and 4Q events. Specifically, **82%** of self-deployments to 4X: Execute Search Warrant events were via frontline requests. ARTs were also requested to attend **60%** of 4Q: Enquiry/Investigation events. In addition, **33%** of attendances at 2W: Search Warrant (Other) incidents were because of frontline requests.

In addition, it was found that ARTs responded to events where there were minimal – or in some cases no – frontline units available, self-initiating to attend these events **77%** of the time (**Key Finding 11**). Moreover, ARTs were listed as the sole attendee at these incidents on **61%** of occasions. These insights help provide a more nuanced perspective around why ARTs self-deployed, though a large number of self-initiated deployments were not attributable in to these factors and were instead indicative of proactive policing.

10.1.3 Prevention of AOS Callouts

It was observed that approximately **10%** of ART Role deployments reported through end of deployment reports likely prevented an AOS callout (**Key Finding 12**), though it cannot be known for certain how much of an impact ARTs had on reducing AOS callouts. It was noted that ART Team Leaders in Counties Manukau recorded no such instances despite ART Roles occurring more frequently in this district. As such, the proportion estimated from end of deployment reporting is likely conservative. Data from the Public Safety Team and Armed Response Team Officer surveys further indicated that ART attendance likely avoided an AOS callout on several occasions. When officers were asked why incidents were handled more efficiently, or how incidents were handled differently, many pointed out that the immediate availability of ARTs meant that a full AOS callout was not necessary. This lead to faster – and reportedly safer – resolutions to potentially dangerous incidents (**§ Chapter 6**).

10.1.4 Applied Roles

In addition to their primary roles data indicated that ARTs served a number of applied purposes. Perhaps one of the more applied applications of ART members training was in the provision of medical treatment. Through examination of Team Leader comments it was found that ART members provided medical or trauma care on approximately **2%** of all reported incidents (**Key Finding 13**).

Evident from the comments left by Team Leaders was support from ARTs went beyond reassurance but that members also took the time to coach and instruct frontline staff (**Key Finding 14**). In some cases this involved providing guidance on clearance techniques, in other cases ART members provided full scale tactical planning for staff. Frontline officers also remarked on the guidance and mentorship that were provided by ART members via the Public Safety Team Officer survey.

10.1.5 Tactical Options and Use of Force

Discussions around tactical options and use of force were covered in **Chapter 4** and **Chapter 5**. Based upon data recorded through End of Deployment forms, it was found that a non-trivial proportion of ART attendances were to assist and reassure frontline officers and the demand for more advanced capabilities was fairly modest (**Key Finding 15**). Assist Role deployments – which were found to account for a larger portion of deployments – were generally associated with lower level tactics. Here ARTs often provided a number of assist functions. For example, though the primary tactic recorded across both Assist and ART roles was Door knock/Direct Approach (**48%**), it was observed that ARTs were simply present - providing reassurance and security to frontline staff – on **38%** of all incidents reported. Furthermore, **27%** of reports noted that ARTs assisted with area patrols and enquires, with members also providing assistance in the transport of offenders. Observations further indicated that support also came by way of training and mentorship, along with assistance in tactical planning. Conversely, ART Role deployments – which made up a smaller proportion of deployments – typically required more tactical support from ART members. For example, cordon, contain, and appeal (CCA) tactics were much more common when responding in an ART role (**19.8%**) compared to an Assist Role (**8%**).

The low demand for advanced tactics were also apparent from when examining use of force data. Examination of use of force data revealed three critical findings. First, it was observed that ART members used a reportable level of force on less than one percent (**0.57%**) of all incidents attended (**Key Finding 16**). Accordingly, use of force by ART members was evidently rare. Second, ART members did not discharge a firearm though five presentations were recorded: a Glock was presented on 3 occasions with an M4 Rifle presented on 2 occasions (**Key Finding 17**). Third, it was observed that TASER was the most common tactic used (**52%**) though were only discharged on **2** occasions thereby indicating that TASER was predominantly used as visual deterrent (**Key Finding 18**). Overall, the level of force applied by ART members appeared justified, proportionate, and tended toward the lower end of the tactical options spectrum Framework(**Key Finding 19**). In addition, examples were noted where ART Team Leaders exercised discretion in the carriage of firearms, opting to stow their Glocks when attending some incidents (**Key Finding 20**).

It was observed that just over half the subjects of a use of force were identified as Māori (**53%**), with New Zealand Europeans the subject in **41%** of events, and Pacific Peoples accounting for **4%**. Accordingly, though it was observed that, numerically, Māori comprised the largest ethnic group, statistically, Māori and New Zealand Europeans were represented in similar proportions (**Key Finding 21**). However, examination of these posterior probabilities cannot be used to formally address questions around whether use of force is disproportionate and/or biased. Missing from the data is critical base rate information which means that it cannot be determined whether use of force and ethnicity are statistically independent.

10.2. What were the real or perceived impacts on officer safety?

These survey results were covered in **Chapter 6**. First, it was found that the sample sizes for both the Armed Response Team Officer survey and the Public Safety Team Officer survey were unsatisfactory given the timeframes available for completion (**Key Finding 22**). The survey was open for the entire duration of the trial and could be access via a link contained within the CheckPoint application, which can be installed on all New Zealand Police mobility devices. This avenue was pursued because it was reasoned that this should facilitate engagement with the survey tools. Nevertheless, survey engagement remained low throughout the duration of the trial despite efforts to increase both the awareness of the surveys and stress their intrinsic importance to the overall evaluation.

It was further found that the majority (**80%**) of respondents to the Armed Response Team Officer survey were from the Waikato district. Thereby, the sample for this survey was not adequately representative of all trial districts (**Key Finding 23**). Unfortunately, the efforts undertaken by ART members in Waikato to contribute

data toward the evaluation were undermined by the comparatively low volumes of data received from Canterbury and Counties Manukau. Together, it must be concluded that there was an overall lack of engagement with these survey tools.

Given the data available it was found that **82%** of PST officers surveys generally perceived incidents as safer when ARTs were present with **85%** of ART members surveyed generally agreeing that they felt safer at the incidents they attended (**Key Finding 24**). However, it was also found that PST staff more strongly endorsed their perceptions of safety. Notably, it was found that **68%** of PST staff strongly agreed that they felt safer at incidents where ARTs were in attendance though only **47%** of ART members responded similarly; a large numerical difference. However, owing to the heterogeneity among the groups formal comparisons were precluded.

Nevertheless, the difference could reasonably reflect the varying experience and skills across the groups. Indeed, some of the broader themes (not identified through for a formal thematic analysis, however) that emerged from the comments left by officers referenced this point, linking the availability of additional staff that were tactically trained and knowledgeable to enhanced perceptions of safety and efficiency. Moreover, these factors appear to have influenced how incidents were perceived to be have been handled, with **83%** PST officers noting that jobs were handled more efficiently with ARTs in attendance (**Key Finding 25**).

It was further found that de-escalation was not necessarily associated with safer and efficient outcomes. Specifically, though **52%** of PST staff surveyed agreed that that ARTs de-escalated the incidents, **37%** of officers neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement, with a further **10%** generally disagreeing. Similarly, **56%** of ART members generally agreed that the incident was de-escalated, though **41%** of ART members surveyed neither agreed nor disagreed. Instead, the data imply that a primary factor driving increased perceptions of safety was the availability of additional tactical resources and highly trained personnel (**Key Finding 26**).

10.3. What effect did the introduction of ARTs have upon general wellbeing?

The survey results for officer wellbeing were covered in **Chapter 6**. First, it was found that, though the overall sample size was moderate, the number of survey responses from trial districts were lacking, both from ART officers themselves and from frontline staff in those districts. This variable level of engagement produced insufficiently representative samples (**Key Finding 27**). Specifically, it was observed that Counties Manukau did not fully engage with the wellbeing survey. In fact, no data were received from ART members in this district during the second wave of the survey, with only a negligible number of responses observed during waves one and three. Moreover, only two surveys were received from PST staff in Counties Manukau over the entire course of the trial. Data from general duties staff in Canterbury was low during waves one and two, though improved significantly during wave three. It was found that Waikato were the most consistent providers of frontline survey data, for both ART members and PST staff. Accordingly, data from the Waikato dominated the general duties sample whereas Counties Manukau is significantly underrepresented in both samples.

Based upon the data available it was found that wellbeing was generally good. Overall, both AOS/ART members and PST staff reporting low to mild levels of burnout, psychological distress, and perceived stress, with fairly high levels of general wellbeing (**Key Finding 28**). Furthermore, it was found that ART/AOS members and PST staff reported decreasing levels of burnout over the course of the trial, relative to baseline (**Key Finding 29**). One possible explanation for this effect is a general uncertainty and anxiety around the pending changes prior to the initiation of the trial that abated once officers became familiar with their new roles.

However, it cannot be concluded definitively that the trial did not have some effect upon officer wellbeing. For example, aberrations in wellbeing may not necessarily manifest along the small number of dimensions considered here and some effects may have been missed because of this. In addition, demand characteristics – i.e., responding to surveys and/or questions in a way that is desirable – may also be a factor. Officers may have

been unwilling to truthfully reflect any effects they may have been experiencing, choosing instead to respond positively. Accordingly, while wellbeing appeared to have remained largely unaffected – along the dimensions measured herein - these results should be treated only as indicative and considered alongside the limitations referenced above.

10.4. What impact did ARTs have upon external trust and confidence in trial districts?

The impacts on trust and confidence were predominantly assessed based upon the community insights survey discussed in **Chapter 8**. First, it was noted that, thought the sample was nationally representative, the overall size of the sample was small. Accordingly, the resolution of the data was low which necessarily precluded reliable comparisons being made between some groups owing to insufficient power (e.g., district wise comparisons). In addition, survey data was collected using an online panel and survey tool which means only those who have access to a computer and are regularly connected to the internet could participate.

Furthermore, evaluation of the true impact the trial is made difficult owing to the absence of a baseline survey. Ideally, gauging perceptions and levels of trust and confidence would have been measured prior to the commencement of the trial. This would better enable comparisons across time while also affording an opportunity to track changes – if any – using the same cohort. Instead, changes in trust and confidence were elicited on a retrospective basis.

These limitations notwithstanding, **72%** of the participants surveyed generally supported the ART trial, though support was split among those who strongly supported the initiative (**38%**) and those who simply supported the trial (**34%**). It was found that **7%** did not generally support the trial. However, a sizeable proportion of individuals were ambivalent about the trial (**14%**) with a further **8%** not knowing how they felt about it.

Overall, it was found that the deployment of ARTs *increased* trust and confidence in those who participated in the community insights survey (**Key Finding 30**). In total, **38%** reported having increased trust and confidence in New Zealand police after learning about the ART trial, with only **10%** reporting a decrease in trust and confidence. However, the majority of participants surveyed (**52%**) reported no change in their trust and confidence.

Notably, those living in ART regions were more likely to support the trial (**76%**) than those living in non-trial districts (**68%**) and also reported having increased trust and confidence with New Zealand Police more often (**41%**) than those living in the rest of New Zealand (**36%**). More importantly, though, Māori were more likely to feel less trust and confidence following the beginning of the trial (**Key Finding 31**). It was also found that those that typically had higher levels of trust and confidence more often reported increased feelings of trust, whereas those who had comparatively lower trust and confidence tended to report decreases in trust.

Finally, though a complete assessment of haveyoursay@police.govt.nz email submission was not possible it is important to note that sizeable number of submissions had been received (**~4,000**). An initial scan of subject lines made it quite clear that the vast majority of emails expressed concerns about, and opposition to, the ART trial. Though a large amount of internal feedback was also observed – praising the work of ARTs and how critical they had been to the frontline – these voices were considerably outnumbered by calls to end the ART trial. The amount of attention the trial generated revealed just how invested the New Zealand public are in policing matters and gratitude is expressed to all those who took the time to provide their thoughts and opinions on the trial.

10.5. Further Findings

This section draws upon the analyses and themes that were found in **Chapter 8** and **Chapter 9**. In **Chapter 8** a thematic analysis was completed on media articles relating to the trial and place a lens on how the trial was

perceived by the public. **Chapter 9** provided some insight into the how the trial was perceived, internally, from those who were directly involved.

10.5.1. The Operational Environment

There was a consistent theme that ART brought greater experience and more 'tools' to call-outs which enabling them to be resolved faster and more safely (**§ Chapter 9**). These sentiments were also echoed through the Officer Perception Surveys (**§ 6.1.2 Public Safety Team Officer Surveys**) and analysis of End of Deployment forms (**§ Chapter 4**). Furthermore, the immediate availability of highly trained staff were likely meant that a number of AOS callouts were avoided. The data also indicated that ARTs were able to respond quickly (**§ 3.2.1 Emergency Response Times**), thereby demonstrating that a faster tactical response can be achieved, particularly in metropolitan areas. This perception was shared across the districts, too, with members across all districts agreeing that response were timelier (**§ 9.2.6 Theme Six: Deployment and Responsiveness**).

That ARTs were often requested by frontline units is further evidence that (**§ 3.5.1 Self-Initiated Deployments**), from the perspective of those officers, that there is a gap between the jobs they are asked to do and the training they have received. In essence, PST staff do not have the experience and fuller tactical training sometimes necessary – nor all of the tactical options – and ARTs provided a tactical capability that bridged this gap (**§ 9.2.3 Theme Three: Bridging the Gap**). The data, however, indicated that an ART response was not necessarily "tactical" in nature – and in fact use of force was rare - but instead ART members often offered support, reassurance, and training to staff.

What emerged – both from EoD data and focus groups – is that ART members enhanced the capability of frontline staff through mentoring and modelling good operational practices such as demonstrating how to plan and safely execute house clearing or establishing cordons. Focus group participants expressed concerns about the lack of experience and practical knowledge of some frontline staff, especially around how to manage high-risk incidents that may involve firearms. Critically, ART were seen to have the flexibility to provide on job training and reassurance to frontline staff on how to safely de-escalate critical incidents in a way that kept offenders, police and the public safe. Indeed, improvements in frontline skills and professionalism had been observed over the trial period (**§ 9.2.3 Theme Three: Bridging the Gap**).

What cannot be understated are the increased feelings of safety expressed by frontline officers. Survey data provided by these officers provided strong indication that frontline officers benefited from having ARTs in attendance (**§ 6.1.2 Public Safety Team Officer Surveys**). Indeed, feelings of safety were linked to having officers with extensive experience and training out on the street to support our frontline made them safer (**§ 9.2.4 Theme Four: Safety of Our People and Our Communities**).

Though there were some concerns raised that frontline staff may become too reliant upon ARTs – by having these teams routine take on the difficult tasks - what generally emerged was an apparent desire for additional knowledge and professional development from frontline staff. Consideration might be given to whether broadening the capabilities of the frontline similarly increase their feelings of safety, though rather through an increased confidence in their own abilities and skill set. This potentially provides a reasonable alternative to the ART model and warrants consideration. What is clear, however, is that whatever decision is taken to tactically support, or enhance, the frontline, must be done transparently and in full consultation with both internal and external stakeholders.

10.5.2. Contrasting Perceptions of Safety

One of the core intentions behind the introduction of ARTs was to ensure that New Zealand communities continue to be safe, and to feel safe. However, the concepts of 'safety' and police and community roles in that

were heavily debated. While those 'for' ARTs said police were responsible for keeping their staff and communities safe, many against the trial challenged the idea that ARTs made people feel safer at all.

The overall concern for commentators was that ARTs would lead to more Māori and Pacific Islanders being shot, and potentially killed. This fear was based on perceptions of police bias, and statistics showing higher levels of force being used by police against Māori and Pasifika (**§ 7.3.4 Theme four: Impact on Minority Groups**). In addition was the fear that ARTs would be patrolling in high crime areas within the trial districts which is disproportionately where Māori and Pasifika live, bringing them invariably into more contact with each other. Moreover, it was pointed out that the communities the police were supposed to be protecting had not been asked whether they wanted armed policing patrolling their streets (**§ 7.3.1 Theme one: Be safe, feel safe**).

In addition, concerns were raised that ready access to firearms will result in more people being be shot (**§ 7.3.3 Theme three: Democracy, consultation trust, and concern**) and also around the safety for those in mental health crisis, and the safety for Māori and Pasifika (**§ 7.3.4 Theme four: Impact on Minority Groups**). The community insights surveys further revealed that a third of people surveyed were concerned about vulnerable groups being targeted by ARTs. These concerns were particularly prevalent among Māori, who were also more likely to disagree that they felt safer knowing ARTs were operating in their communities. (**§ 8.2.4 Perceptions of Safety around the Armed Response Team Trial**).

There were, however, pockets of support from the public. For example – though recognising that no one individual speaks for an entire community – it was observed that some elderly in South Auckland felt safer having ARTs in their communities (**§ 7.3.3 Theme three: Democracy, consultation trust, and concern**). In addition, some members of the Islamic community in South Auckland also expressed support for ARTs (though expression of concerns have also been received from these communities, too). Though it cannot be determined whether public safety was objectively improved during the trial period, the evidence that ARTs made the public feel safer is not particularly strong.

However, from the perspective of ART members, the presence of highly trained and experienced staff with enhanced tactical capability at high-risk incidents produced quicker and safer resolutions and this made individuals in communities safer by preventing incidents getting out of control (**§ 9.2.4 Theme Four: Safety of Our People and Our Communities**). In addition, their advanced medical training further contributes toward the safety of the communities they patrol (**§ 4.2.6 Medical Assistance**).

10.5.3. Consultation, Necessity, and Trust and Confidence

A central theme that emerged was a lack of consultation and democratic process. Though the decision around the implementation of ARTs was positioned as an operational matter, and thus the domain of the Commissioner of Police, many viewed the lack of consultation with the public, Iwi, and community groups as a significant failure on behalf of New Zealand police (**§ 7.3.3 Theme three: Democracy, consultation trust, and concern**). Moreover, the lack of consultation and acknowledgement for the concerns of Māori and Pasifika peoples was viewed as a further threat to police legitimacy and could potentially tension already strained relationships (**§ 7.3.4 Theme four: Impact on Minority Groups**). Māori Justice Advocates submitted an urgent Waitangi Tribunal claim over the failure of the Crown to inform Māori about the ART trial. The Tribunal claim said that the Crown had failed to work in partnership with, consult, or inform Māori about trial (**§ 7.3.3 Theme three: Democracy, consultation trust, and concern**).

Moreover, the operational need ARTs was regularly questioned by the public (**§ 7.2.4 Frequency of Themes**). In part, the number and use of firearms in New Zealand were cited as a very real threat, which was captured in a number of media articles. However, there was a notable lack of data to verify the increase in events where firearms had been presented at officers due to lack of data gathering of this metric. Accordingly, firearms

threat as an operational justification was viewed as somewhat questionable (**§ 7.3.9 Theme nine: Guns, violence, and escalation**). Additionally, the public did not view the Christchurch Mosque shootings as a justifiable reason for the implementation of ARTs (**§ 7.3.7 Theme seven: March 15 Attacks**). However, ART members themselves indicated that the threat of firearms is extant and the public are unaware of just how often firearms (often loaded) are being found (**§ 9.2.4 Theme Four: Safety of Our People and Our Communities**).

Lack of consultation was also remarked on by ART members themselves, nothing poor community engagement and how the purpose of ART was communicated likely hampered the trial. A strong theme across districts was the desire for greater and earlier engagement and communication (**§ 9.2.2 Theme Two: Engagement and Consultation**). Moreover, members felt this resulted in the public not fully understanding the reality of the trial and significantly constrained their abilities to effectively engage with communities and explain why the trial was being undertaken. In addition, members expressed concern that Māori communities had not seen information about why the ART trial was set up and what the trial was trying to achieve which made it hard for Māori leadership to respond (**§ 9.2.2 Theme Two: Engagement and Consultation**).

Though it cannot be exactly determined what effect the ART trial had on total trust and confidence, it is noteworthy that trust and confidence reportedly increased in trial districts – with those living in non-trial districts generally expressing less trust and confidence – despite the largely negative tone of media reports. Admittedly, this may have been an artefact of the sample that was surveyed and it is important to acknowledge that Māori were more likely to express less trust and confidence following the beginning of the trial. This finding cannot be discounted and should receive significantly more weight.

10.5.4. Deployment Criteria

A principal findings is that the deployment criteria for ARTs was not sufficiently constrained nor clearly communicated to the public. For example, it was revealed through the community insights survey that there was a general lack of awareness and understanding around the parameters of the trial. When asked various questions relating to the trial, **30% - 62%** of respondents could not provide an answer (**§ 8.2.2 Public Awareness of the Armed Response Team Trial**). More notably, commentators felt the jobs that ART were attending were not appropriate and concerns were raised about ARTs being used for 'low risk' proactive patrolling, and road policing, which appeared to contravene the stated use of ARTs (**§ 7.3.5 Theme five: Appropriate use of ARTs**).

A similar finding was also observed in the community insights surveys. In general, the public viewed high risk events – including those involving firearms – and urgent and active events where people are being victimised as appropriate incidents for ARTs to attend. However, activities like bail checks, road policing, and prevention duties – i.e., incidents that accounted for a large proportion the incidents attended – received considerably less support and were not viewed as appropriate activities (**§ 8.2.4 Incidents Attended during the Armed Response Team Trial**).

These perceptions notwithstanding, examination of the deployment data did not suggest that ARTs deviated from the criteria *per se*. What was evident, though, is that high risk events and active armed offenders consumed a comparatively small proportion of ART resources (**§ 3.2.1 Emergency Response Times**), leaving open the question of how teams ought to divide their time when not responding to such events. Though there was a desire to maximise the capability of these units, the deployment criteria was perhaps too broad – and somewhat ambiguous – to provide any clarity on this front, which put the teams at odds with the expectations of the New Zealand public.

Indeed, deployment data suggested that each district operated somewhat differently, despite ostensibly being guided by the same operating principles (consider the difference in volume of prevention activities across the

districts; **§ 3.4 ART Deployments**). Moreover, it was evident that a significant proportion of ART deployments were self-initiated (**§ 3.5.1 Self-Initiated Deployments**). Though the deployment criteria stipulated that Team Leaders had delegated authority to undertake urgent action in order to prevent loss of life, what was less clear were whether there were substantive provisions for self-initiated deployments to non-emergency and general duties events.

10.6. Concluding Remarks and Key Observations

The capability of police to reduce real or perceived threats are critical in maintaining trust and legitimacy between the police and the communities they protect. For these reasons, the requirement of highly trained specialists to respond, both quickly and effectively, to incidents that pose a significant threat to life is a legitimate one.

The ART model, in essence, attempted to strike a compromise by reconfiguring the AOS operating model, arming only those officers who were trained to AOS standards and having the teams ready on a routine basis, rather than on a callout basis. However many commentators pointed out that New Zealand police officers already had access to firearms in the rear of their vehicles and can readily access to them when needed. While some believed there were circumstances which required police officers to have access to firearms, they did not support ARTs (**§ 7.3.9 Theme nine: Guns, violence, and escalation**). The substantive sticking point is that there is absolutely no appetite for the general arming of *any* police officer in some sections of the community, and that includes those who are specifically trained in their carriage and use.

The model also missed the mark in the way the teams were presented. There was comment that the way the trial was publicised in the media focused more on ancillary aspects rather than highlighting the fact that the group represented advanced and usually non-lethal tactical options, specialised training, and years of experience (**§ 9.2.1 Theme One: Identity**). It was further remarked that had the vehicles displayed standard Police livery they would not have been as identifiable as ARTs when undertaking normal police duties such as traffic stops. Moreover, the name was not viewed as appropriate by staff because ART members brought more options; notably non-lethal options and superior first-aid skills to events (**§ 9.2.1 Theme One: Identity**). In addition, the militarised look and feel of ARTs did not sit well with some members of the public, with a few commentators viewing the trial as the 'Americanisation' of the New Zealand Police (**§ 7.3.6 Theme six: New Zealand versus the World**). Such issues could have been minimised or mitigated through consultation, both with internal and external stakeholders.

It is absolutely necessary that New Zealand Police continue to explore ways to better serve their communities and protect their staff. However, the model of policing in New Zealand is guided by the principle of *policing by consent* and striking the balance between the operational needs of police and the expectations of public has always been challenging. It can, however, be better informed by evidence. What the ART trial further revealed is the necessity for evidence-based approaches when developing, and implementing, new initiatives. Trust and legitimacy can be gained by clear communication and ensuring that the public have up to date, accurate information about particular methods and/or tactics that have been shown to work. This always needs to be combined with appropriate operational experience as a source of information,; taken together they provide a more solid platform against which considered decisions can be made – particularly around how initiatives are implemented and the tracking of key performance metrics.

There were procedural and methodological limitations that severely limited any measurement of the actual impact ARTs had. Nevertheless, lessons can be taken away from the implementation of the ART trial and thereby provide future learning opportunities:

- There is no doubt that frontline staff felt safer and more confident in dealing with a range of crimes and critical incidents. ARTs played a critical role in this regard and in their absence alternative tactical

options need to be explored as a priority. To ensure legitimacy and transparency, any alternative initiatives that explore frontline tactical options should be consulted on early with key external stakeholders and community representatives.

- The trial has further highlighted the need for effective communication when New Zealand Police are developing proposals that are likely to generate strong public interest. For example, the operational advantages of having additional police staff deployed permanently to the frontline with enhanced skills – for example in conflict resolution and first aid – has not been fully reflected in the public commentary that has accompanied this initiative.

- The ART trial has revealed just how invested the public is in such matters – and is an opportunity to strengthen existing, and build new, partnerships.

- The trial impressed the need for ongoing engagement and consultation with subject matter experts in the planning, evaluation, and implementation of police initiatives. Doing so will facilitate the identification of appropriate metrics and measures, the collection and establishment of baseline data, the ability to build comprehensive and robust evaluation frameworks, and appropriate tracking and monitoring of key performance measures.

- The trial further revealed the need for solid evidence-based frameworks when wanting to measure and/or determine the impact of an intervention/initiative. The evidence-based policing principles of targeting, testing and tracking were missing from the trial and it is recommended that this approach is more firmly adopted in future trials and trials of Police initiatives.

References

Anonymous. (2019a, March 4). Danger means arming police is where we're heading – Police Association. *Radio New Zealand*. Retrieved from https://www.rnz.co.nz/.

Anonymous. (2019b, March 1). Arming frontline staff will not be routine – Commissioner. *Radio New Zealand.* Retrieved from https://www.rnz.co.nz/.

Ariel, B., Lawes, D., Weinborn, C., Henry, R., Chen, K., & Brants Sabo, H. (2019). The "less-than-lethal weapons effect"—introducing TASERs to routine police operations in England and Wales: a randomized controlled trial. *Criminal Justice and Behavior, 46,* 280-300.

Barry, S. (2019, March 6). Routinely arming police. *Otago Daily Times.* Retrieved from https://www.odt.co.nz/.

Bates, D., Maechler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. (2015). Fitting Linear Mixed-Effects Models Using lme4. *Journal of Statistical Software, 67,* 1-48, doi:10.18637/jss.v067.i01.

Bayer, K. (2019). High-tech AI security system that detects weapons to be installed at Christchurch's Al Noor Mosque. *New Zealand Herald.* Retrieved from https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12228575

Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006) Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3*, 77-101.

Christensen, R. H. B. (2019). *Ordinal – regression models for ordinal data.* R Package version 2019.12-10. https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=ordinal.

Cramer, H. (1946). *Mathematical Methods of Statistics.* Princeton University Press.

Cook, H. & Russell, M. (2019, March 5). Arming police will not make police and the public safer. *Stuff.* Retrieved from https://www.stuff.co.nz.

Furukawa, T. A., Kessler, R. C., Slade, T., & Andrews, G. (2003). The performance of the K6 and K10 screening scales for psychological distress in the Australian National Survey of Mental Health and Well-Being. *Psychological Medicine, 33*, 357-362.

Hendy, R. E. (2012). *The strategic impact of arming the New Zealand police.* (Unpublished master's thesis). School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.

HMICS. (2014). *Review of Standing Firearms Authority for Armed Response Vehicles Crews within Police in Scotland*. Retrieved from https://www.hmics.scot/publications.

Hunt, T. (2015). New Zealand police to routinely carry Tasers. *Stuff.* Retrieved from https://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/70711858/new-zealand-police-to-routinely-carry-tasers

IPCA. (2014). Timaru officers failed to follow good policing practice during potential domestic incident. Retrieved from https://www.ipca.govt.nz/Site/publications-and-media/2014-Media-Releases/2014-Oct-09-Arrest-and-Prosecution-of-Troy-Reuben.aspx

IPCA. (2017). Use of a taser at the Hamilton District Court. Retrieved from https://www.ipca.govt.nz/Site/publications-and-media/2017-Media-Releases/2017-SEP-12-Taser-Hamilton-District-Court-.aspx

IPCA. (2018). Use of Taser during arrest in Auckland. Retrieved from https://www.ipca.govt.nz/site/publications-and-media/2018-reports-on-investigations/2018nov22-taser-auckland-arrest-disorder.aspx

IPCA. (2019). Officer not justified in tasering a man fleeing Police in Parnell. Retrieved from https://www.ipca.govt.nz/Site/publications-and-media/2019-media-releases/2019-oct-17-taser-unlawful-fleeing-arrest.aspx

Landis, J. R., & Koch, G. G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement for categorical data. *Biometrics, 33*, 159-174.

Mental Health Foundation. (2019). *Letter to Minister Nash – Stop armed police trials.* Retrieved from mentalhealth.org.nz/home/news/article/279/letter-to-minister-nash-stop-armed-police-trials.

Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1984). *Qualitative data analysis: An expanded sourcebook* (2nd ed.). Sage Publications.

Mummolo, J. (2018). Militarization fails to enhance police safety or reduce crime but may harm police reputation. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 115*, 9181-9186.

New Zealand Police. (2019). Executive Leadership Board (ELB) paper: Operating model enhancements including proof of concept trial for ARVs.

O'Brien, A. J., McKenna, B. G., Thom, K., Diesfeld, K., & Simpson, A. I. F. (2010). Use of Tasers on people with mental illness. A New Zealand database study. *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 34,* 39-43.

R Core Team (2019). *R: A language and environment for statistical computing.* R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. URL https://www.R-project.org/.

Sherman, L. W. (2013). The rise of evidence-based policing: Targeting, testing, and tracking. *Crime and Justice, 42,* 377-451.

Taylor, J. M. (2015). Psychometric analysis of the Ten-Item Perceived Stress Scale. *Psychological Assessment, 27*, 90.

Topp, C. W., Østergaard, S. D., Søndergaard, S., & Bech, P. (2015). The WHO-5 Well-Being Index: a systematic review of the literature. *Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 84,* 167-176.

Yesberg, J. & Bradford, B. (2018). Affect and trust as predictors of public support for armed police: evidence from London. *Policing & Society,* 1-19.

Wheeler, D. L., Vassar, M., Worley, J. A., & Barnes, L. L. (2011). A reliability generalization meta- analysis of coefficient alpha for the Maslach Burnout Inventory. *Educational and Psychological Measurement, 71,* 231-244.

Wickham et al., (2019). Welcome to the tidyverse. *Journal of Open Source Software, 4,* 1686, https://doi.org/10.21105/joss.01686.

Appendix A: Tables of Incidents Attended

Table A.1.: Number of incidents attended by ARTs broken down by incident type. Data sourced from CARD and provided by RORE.

Closure Type Code & Description	Auckland City	Bay Of Plenty	Canterbury	Counties Manukau	Waikato	Waitematā	Total
1110: Homicide				1	1		**2**
1210: Kidnapping And Abduction	1	1	2	1	2		**7**
1310: Robbery	12		18	12	23	2	**67**
1410: Grievous Assaults	3		4	9	7	1	**24**
1510: Serious Assaults	2	1	44	24	50	3	**124**
1640: Minor Assaults			9	11	8	1	**29**
1710: Intimidation/Threats	4		70	24	47	5	**150**
1A: Alarm	1		24	4	32		**61**
1B: Bomb Scare	1						**1**
1C: Car/Person Acting Suspiciously	17		164	79	134	12	**406**
1E: Emergency/Disaster/Spill			4		11		**15**
1F: Assist Fire/Ambulance/Traffic			26	5	10	1	**42**
1G: Solvent Abuse			1		1		**2**
1H: Drunk Home				1	3		**4**
1I: Blockage/Breakdown On Highway			4		4	1	**9**
1K: Drunk Custody/Detox Centre	1		8	4	8	1	**22**
1M: Mental Health	5		20	8	41	1	**75**
1N: Noise Control			3		5		**8**
1R: Breach Of The Peace	2		49	17	63	1	**132**
1S: Sudden Death			6	1	1		**8**
1U: Traffic Offending	2		75	26	134	3	**240**
1V: Vehicle Collision			27	8	26	2	**63**
1W: Water/Sea Rescue/Emergency			1				**1**
1X: Threatens/Attempts Suicide	5		69	22	69	2	**167**
1Z: Other Incident			3	1	7	1	**12**
2210: Sexual Affronts			2		2		**4**
2630: Sexual Attacks					1		**1**
2650: Rape			2				**2**
2A: Advise Relatives			1		2		**3**
2C: Civil Dispute			4	2	5		**11**
2I: Information	4		72	27	58	1	**162**
2K: Found Property				1	1		**2**
2M: Missing Person			7		4		**11**
2O: Court Orders			7	1	3		**11**
2P: Public Relations	4		31	26	34	1	**96**
2R: Recovery Motor Vehicle	1		17	14	23	1	**56**
2S: Summons		1	3		10		**14**
2T: Warrant To Arrest/Fines Enforce			4		3		**7**
2W: Arrest Warrant (Other)	5		185	69	205	2	**466**
2Z: Other Service Request/Response	1		4	1	4	1	**11**
3110: Drugs (Not Cannabis)		1	6		15	1	**23**
3210: Drugs (Cannabis Only)	1		5	1	15		**22**
3518: Health Act Breach	1		2	3			**6**
3530: Disorder	5		116	48	100	1	**270**
3850: Protection Order Breach			8		10	1	**19**

3C: Crime Prevention Advice				5	10		**15**
3F: Foot Patrol	1		3	2	11	1	**18**
3M: Directed Patrol	8		11	48	194		**261**
3MC: Directed Patrol Carpark			1		66		**67**
3R: Road Checkpoint			1		10		**11**
3T: Turnover	11		297	51	1834	2	**2195**
3W: Watching/Observations	2	1	23	46	7		**79**
3Z: Other Preventive Task	1		5		35		**41**
4120: Burglary	5		37	8	30	3	**83**
4211: Car Conversion			8	3	5	1	**17**
4220: Interference With Cars	1		13		9		**23**
4320: Theft Ex Shop			6	1	10		**17**
4340: Theft Ex Car			2	1	2		**5**
4370: General Theft			9	3	3		**15**
4410: Receiving			2				**2**
4C: Correspondence/Counter	13		1		2		**16**
4E: Escort Duty			2	2	6		**10**
4F: Forensic Examination				2	15	1	**18**
4G: Travel				1			**1**
4L: Logistics/Staff Transport			1		6		**7**
4P: Public Entertainment Duty			3				**3**
4Q: Enquiry/Investigation	9		168	48	162	13	**400**
4X: Execute Search Warrant	13		38	39	49	12	**151**
5110: Arson			2				**2**
5120: Wilful Damage			13	4	7		**24**
5134: Wilful Damage - Graffiti					1		**1**
5F: Family Harm	10		253	158	312	13	**746**
5K: Bail Check			39	6	741	1	**787**
5M: Parole Recall Warrant			22	3	25		**50**
5V: Second Hand Dealer Check					1		**1**
6110: Trespass	3		31	2	17	1	**54**
6390: Animal Welfare Offences					1		**1**
6550: Telephone Offences				3	2		**5**
6820: Firearms Offences	17		79	54	58	15	**223**
6D: Bail Breach	3		34	11	62	1	**111**
6E: EM Bail Breach	3		7	8	19		**37**
6I: Unauthorised Street And Drag Racing			1		4		**5**
6S: Police Safety Orders			2	1	2		**5**
6W: Operation Washington					8		**8**
6Y: Unaccompanied Child Or Young Person			4	2	3		**9**
7120: Justice Offences			3	2	3		**8**
7130: Escapes Custody			5	2	9		**16**
7420: Blood Samples					1		**1**
7610: Bylaw Breaches			1		1		**2**
7650: Dog Control			1		1		**2**
8P: Pandemic Response			7	1	8		**16**
8PA: Pandemic 72hr Check					3		**3**
8PB: Pandemic Person Check			1	1	1		**3**
8PC: Pandemic Business Check					17		**17**
8PL: Directed Patrol					1		**1**
8PM: Reassurance Essential Facility			1		19		**20**
8PZ: Pandemic Education					1		**1**
AMB2POL: Ambulance Request Police Assist	1		7	1	5	1	**15**

FIR2POL: Fire Request Police Assist			2	1			**3**
NSEC: No Speech Emergency Call			4	1	4		**9**
PURSUIT: Pursuit Of Vehicle	4	1	25	31	55	4	**120**
Total	**183**	**6**	**2282**	**1003**	**5040**	**114**	**8629**

Table A.2.: Number of incidents reported by ARTs broken down by incident type. Data sourced from EoD forms.

Closure Type Code & Description	Canterbury	Counties Manukau	Waikato	Total
1110: Homicide	-	1	-	1
1210: Kidnapping And Abduction	-	3	3	6
1310: Robbery	10	9	8	27
1410: Grievous Assaults	2	7	4	13
1510: Serious Assaults	18	11	20	49
1640: Minor Assaults	4	5	5	14
1710: Intimidation/Threats	33	11	22	66
1A: Alarm	10	1	2	13
1C: Car/Person Acting Suspiciously	55	24	34	113
1F: Assist Fire/Ambulance/Traffic	12	1	-	13
1G: Solvent Abuse	-	-	1	1
1H: Drunk Home	-	-	1	1
1K: Drunk Custody/Detox Centre	1	2	3	6
1M: Mental Health	6	8	20	34
1N: Noise Control	1	-	-	1
1R: Breach Of The Peace	17	6	14	37
1S: Sudden Death	4	-	-	4
1U: Traffic Offending	29	1	23	53
1V: Vehicle Collision	14	2	8	24
1W: Water/Sea Rescue/Emergency	1	-	-	1
1X: Threatens/Attempts Suicide	29	9	24	62
1Z: Other Incident	2	-	-	2
2210: Sexual Affronts	1	-	2	3
2630: Sexual Attacks	1	-	-	1
2C: Civil Dispute	-	-	1	1
2I: Information	25	4	14	43
2M: Missing Person	1	-	-	1
2O: Court Orders	1	1	2	4
2P: Public Relations	12	4	5	21
2R: Recovery Motor Vehicle	7	4	9	20
2S: Summons	1	-	-	1
2T: Warrant To Arrest/Fines Enforce	2	-	1	3
2W: Arrest Warrant (Other)	87	28	98	213
2Z: Other Service Request/Response	2	-	2	4
3110: Drugs (Not Cannabis)	1	1	6	8
3210: Drugs (Cannabis Only)	4	-	3	7
3518: Health Act Breach	1	-	-	1
3530: Disorder	50	17	32	99
3850: Protection Order Breach	6	1	4	11
3A: Attend Scene of Crime/Incident	-	-	1	1
3F: Foot Patrol	-	-	1	1
3M: Directed Patrol	-	1	1	2
3R: Road Checkpoint	-	-	1	1

3T: Turnover	14	1	10	25
3W: Watching/Observations	9	1	3	13
3Z: Other Preventive Task	1	-	-	1
4120: Burglary	17	4	6	27
4211: Car Conversion	6	2	1	9
4220: Interference With Cars	6	-	3	9
4320: Theft Ex Shop	2	1	2	5
4340: Theft Ex Car	1	-	-	1
4370: General Theft	2	-	-	2
4410: Receiving	1	-	-	1
4E: Escort Duty	-	1	-	1
4F: Forensic Examination	-	-	4	4
4Q: Enquiry/Investigation	58	27	37	122
4U: Lockup	-	2	-	2
4X: Execute Search Warrant	31	44	34	109
5110: Arson	2	-	-	2
5120: Wilful Damage	4	2	2	8
5F: Family Harm	119	65	133	317
5K: Bail Check	3	2	4	9
5M: Parole Recall Warrant	13	2	8	23
6110: Trespass	12	3	4	19
6390: Animal Welfare Offences	-	-	1	1
6550: Telephone Offences	-	2	-	2
6820: Firearms Offences	46	39	34	119
6D: Bail Breach	17	5	19	41
6E: EM Bail Breach	2	5	9	16
6I: Unauthorised Street And Drag Racing	-	-	2	2
6S: Police Safety Orders	2	-	1	3
6Y: Unaccompanied Child Or Young Person	1	-	1	2
7120: Justice Offences	2	-	-	2
7130: Escapes Custody	4	1	3	8
7610: Bylaw Breaches	1	-	-	1
7650: Dog Control	1	-	1	2
8P: Pandemic Response	2	-	-	2
AMB2POL: Ambulance Request Police Assist	1	-	3	4
FIR2POL: Fire Request Police Assist	1	1	-	2
NSEC: No Speech Emergency Call	1	-	-	1
PURSUIT: Pursuit Of Vehicle	10	5	18	33
Unknown	3	4	4	11
Total	**845**	**381**	**722**	**1,948**

Appendix B: Statistical Information

Reporting of Averages

Given the varying number of attendances between the three trial districts weighted averages – rather than simple arithmetic averages - are reported.

Officer Perception Surveys

Tests of group proportions were examined using a Chi Square one sample proportion test with continuity correction. For Likert responses of 4 or greater than 4 (i.e, agree and strongly agree) were collapsed into a single group, reflecting general agreement with the question. All other responses were treated as general disagreement. The results for each survey are tabulated below.

Public Safety Team Officer Survey

Question	$\hat{p}$	95% CI	χ^2	*df*	*p*
Was the assistance of the ART requested?	.66	.58 - .73	15.01	1	**< .001**
If yes, was the response of the ART timely?	.91	.84 - .96	70.44	1	**< .001**
Do you think the incident was likely to have been handled differently without the ART?	.69	.61 - .76	21.70	1	**< .001**
Overall, I felt safer at the incident.	.82	.75 - .87	61.96	1	**< .001**
I think the incident was dealt with more efficiently with the ART in attendance.	.83	.76 - .89	67.12	1	**< .001**
I think the presence of the ART de-escalated the incident.	.52	.43 - .60	.10	1	**.748**
Overall, I was satisfied with the assistance provided by the ART.	.88	.82 - .93	87.00	1	**< .001**
I am likely to request the assistance of the ART in the future.	.89	.82 - .93	90.06	1	**< .001**

Armed Response Team Officer Survey

Question	$\hat{p}$	95% CI	χ^2	*df*	*p*
Was the assistance of the ART requested?	.69	.61 - .76	19.45	1	**< .001**
If yes, was the response of the ART timely?	.93	.85 - .97	68.34	1	**< .001**
Do you think the incident was likely to have been handled differently without the ART?	.76	.68 - .83	36.30	1	**< .001**
Overall, I felt safer at the incident.	.85	.79 - .91	65.45	1	**< .001**
I think the incident was dealt with more efficiently with the ART in attendance.	.86	.79 - .91	68.27	1	**< .001**
I think the presence of the ART de-escalated the incident.	.56	.48 - .65	1.90	1	**.168**

Officer Wellbeing Survey

Officer wellbeing data was modelled using a Cumulative Link Model (CLM) with a logit link function (ordinal logit regression). Models were fit via maximum likelihood estimation and implemented using the Ordinal package in R. To simplify the analysis only the fixed effects were considered, through linear contrasts were applied to assess the effect of survey wave. Using a fixed effects model permitted analysis of deviance tables to be computed to test both main and interaction effects. Specifically, all model comparisons imposed the constraint that terms cannot be omitted if a higher order term depends upon its inclusion (thus obeying the marginality principle assumed when undertaking Type II sums of squares tests). The test statistic is defined using the ratio of the alternative model, M_1, and the nominal null model, M_0, and is written as $D = -2\ \log(\Lambda)$, where

$$\Lambda = \frac{\mathcal{L}(\ominus_0\,|M_0)}{\mathcal{L}(\ominus_1\,|M_1)}$$

is the likelihood ratio of the two models being compared. Note that the null model must be parameterised using a subset of the parameter space defining the alternative model; i.e., $\ominus_0 \subset \ominus_1$. In the limit the test statistic follows a Chi Square distribution with degrees of freedom is equal to the difference in the dimensionality of the two model (Type II Wald Chi - Square tests). A model was fit to the data for each dimension. All results are tabulated below. Each table presents the estimated coefficients from the fit of the regression model along with the analysis of deviance results for each main effect and the interaction.

ART Members versus General Duties Wellbeing

Burnout

Effect	*b*	SE	χ^2	*df*	*p*
Survey Wave	-.32	.07	20.75	2	**< .001**
Workgroup	.07	.04	3.14	1	**.076**
Survey Wave x Workgroup	.03	.07	.32	2	**.850**

Psychological Distress

Effect	*b*	SE	χ^2	*df*	*p*
Survey Wave	-.10	.07	10.33	2	**.006**
Workgroup	.08	.04	4.83	1	**.028**
Survey Wave x Workgroup	.03	.07	2.40	2	**.301**

Perceived Stress

Effect	*b*	SE	χ^2	*df*	*p*
Survey Wave	-.11	.07	4.14	2	**.125**
Workgroup	.10	.04	5.06	1	**.024**
Survey Wave x Workgroup	-.06	.07	1.54	2	**.462**

General Wellbeing

Effect	*b*	SE	χ^2	*df*	*p*
Survey Wave	.18	.09	4.82	2	**.089**
Workgroup	-.06	.05	1.14	1	**.285**
Survey Wave x Workgroup	.03	.09	.11	2	**.947**

ART versus AOS Wellbeing

Burnout

Effect	*b*	SE	χ^2	*df*	*p*
Survey Wave	-.31	.07	22.98	2	**< .001**
District	.06	.04	2.69	1	**.101**
Survey Wave x District	.03	.07	2.52	2	**.283**

Psychological Distress

Effect	*b*	SE	χ^2	*df*	*p*
Survey Wave	-.05	.07	.72	2	**.697**
District	-.03	.04	.63	1	**.426**
Survey Wave x District	.08	.07	1.98	2	**.370**

Perceived Stress

Effect	*b*	SE	χ^2	*df*	*p*
Survey Wave	-.09	.06	3.84	2	**.146**
District	.02	.04	.07	1	**.791**
Survey Wave x District	-.05	.06	4.77	2	**.092**

General Wellbeing

Effect	*b*	SE	χ^2	*df*	*p*
Survey Wave	.13	.08	2.92	2	**.232**
District	.04	.05	.63	1	**.427**
Survey Wave x District	-.03	.08	.11	2	**.946**

Community Insights Survey

Pearson's chi-square tests of independence, Independent samples *t*-tests and ANOVA tests were used to assess quantitative differences between groups (e.g., those living in a region where the ART Trial is happening versus those living in other regions). When comparing groups, scale extremes were generally grouped (e.g., 'support' and 'strongly support' grouped into 'support'). Gender and age comparisons were conducted using the nationally representative sample, while region and ethnicity comparisons were conducted using both the nationally representative sample and the booster samples. Full details and results are contained in **Appendix H**.

Appendix C: Officer Perception Survey Results

Armed Response Team Officer Survey

Yes/No Questions

Question	Yes	No	Total
Was the assistance of the ART requested?	96 (.69)	43 (.31)	**139**
If yes, was the response of the ART timely?	89 (.93)	7 (.07)	**96**
Do you think the incident was likely to have been handled differently without the ART?	103 (.76)	32 (.24)	**135**

Likert Questions

Question	1	2	3	4	5	N
Overall, I felt safer at the incident.	6 (.04)	-	14 (.10)	51 (.38)	64 (.47)	**135**
Overall, I felt that the command structure was clear.	5 (.04)	-	4 (.03)	45 (.33)	81 (.60)	**135**
Overall, I felt that communications were clear.	5 (.04)	-	3 (.02)	47 (.35)	80 (.59)	**135**
Overall, I understood my role within this incident.	5 (.04)	-	2 (.01)	40 (.30)	88 (.65)	**135**
I think the incident was dealt with more efficiently with the ART in attendance.	-	-	19 (.14)	49 (.36)	67 (.50)	**135**
I think the presence of the ART de-escalated the incident.	1 (<.01)	3 (.02)	55 (.41)	45 (.33)	31 (.23)	**135**
The vehicle enabled me to perform all the duties required of me.	1 (<.01)	3 (.02)	24 (.18)	85 (.65)	17 (.13)	**130**
The equipment I need is readily accessible and in good condition.	-	7 (.05)	9 (.07)	95 (.73)	19 (.15)	**130**
My personal equipment is not satisfactory for my safety and effectiveness.	6 (.05)	87 (.67)	15 (.12)	20 (.15)	2 (.02)	**130**
Vehicle limitations prevented me from performing my duties appropriately.	12 (.09)	99 (.76)	17 (.13)	1 (<.01)	1 (<.01)	**130**
The ART role makes good use of my training.	1 (<.01)	1 (<.01)	8 (.06)	38 (.29)	82 (.63)	**130**

Public Safety Team Officer Survey

Yes/No Questions

Question	Yes	No	Total
Was the assistance of the ART requested?	105 (.66)	55 (.34)	**160**
If yes, was the response of the ART timely?	96 (.91)	7 (.07)	**105***
Do you think the incident was likely to have been handled differently without the ART?	107 (.69)	48 (.31)	**155**

* Two respondents did not respond.

Likert Questions

Question	1	2	3	4	5	N
Overall, I felt safer at the incident.	6 (.04)	3 (.02)	19 (.12)	22 (.14)	105 (.68)	**155**
Overall, I felt that the command structure was clear.	10 (.06)	5 (.03)	10 (.06)	27 (.17)	103 (.66)	**155**
Overall, I felt that communications were clear.	10 (.06)	7 (.05)	6 (.04)	27 (.17)	105 (.68)	**155**
Overall, I understood my role within this incident.	5 (.03)	3 (.02)	3 (.02)	32 (.21)	112 (.72)	**155**
I think the incident was dealt with more efficiently with the ART in attendance.	12 (.08)	5 (.03)	9 (.06)	18 (.12)	111 (.72)	**155**
I think the presence of the ART de-escalated the incident.	8 (.05)	8 (.05)	57 (.37)	35 (.23)	45 (.29)	**153**
Overall, I was satisfied with the assistance provided by the ART.	6 (.04)	6 (.04)	6 (.04)	17 (.11)	117 (.77)	**152**
I am likely to request the assistance of the ART in the future.	3 (.02)	3 (.02)	11 (.07)	15 (.10)	120 (.79)	**152**
My training allowed me to support the ART efficiently.	4 (.03)	-	15 (.10)	65 (.43)	68 (.45)	**152**

Appendix D: End of Deployment (EoD) Form

This form should be completed by ART Team Leaders.

Where the event is escalated to an AOS black role or blue role deployment, then the AOS/PNT Deployment report is required. *It is of note that the items with an * (asterisk) below can therefore be excluded as the data will be provided in the AOS deployment report, please can you complete remaining items to support the evaluation process).*

As per normal a TOR is required in any ART attended event where a member uses force, or undertakes a show of force (Taser Laser painting / Firearms presentation).

Event/Incident Number	
*	Operation Start Date: Operation Start Time: Operation End Date: Operation End Time:
Deployed by:	◯ Deployed by Comms ◯ Self-deployed ◯ DCC ◯ Full AOS ◯ Other (Please specify):
*Deployment Type:	Deployment Request Declined Emergency Preplanned - Full Squad Preplanned - Partial Deployment
Deployment Role	◯ Command/Control ◯ Support/Assist ◯ Sole Attendee ◯ Other. Please specify:
Was the AOS Commander consulted?	◯ Yes ◯ No
*Type of Job (select one)	Combination Mobile Static
*Address/Location of Incident:	
*Offence Codes (High Level) (select as many as apply)	1100 Homicide 1200 Kidnapping 1300 Robbery 1400 Grievous Assaults **1500 Serious Assaults** **1600 Minor Assaults** 1700 Intimidation and Threats 1800 Group Assemblies 1M Mental Illness 1X Suicidal 2200 Sexual Affronts 2600 Sexual Attacks 2700 Abnormal Sex 2800 Immoral Behaviour 2900 Immoral Behaviour Misc

	3100 Drugs/Not Cannabis 3200 Drugs/Cannabis 3500 Disorder 3600 Vagrancy Offences 3700 Family Offences 3800 Family Offences 3900 Sale of Liquor Act 4100 Burglary 4200 Car Conversion 4300 Theft 4400 Receiving 4500 Fraud 4600 Computer Crime 4990 Accessory after the fact 5100 Destruction of Property 5200 Endangering 5800 Gambling Act 5900 New Drugs 6100 Trespass 6200 Littering 6300 Animals 6500 Postal Abuses **6800 Firearms Offences** 7100 Against Justice 7200 Birth/Deaths and Marriages 7300 Immigration 7400 Blood Samples/Racial 7500 Against National Interest 7600 By Law Breaches 7900 Justice (special) A-W Traffic Offences>
Incident Type that BEST DESCRIBES these events	◯ 1C ◯ 1K ◯ 1M ◯ 1R ◯ 1U ◯ 1V ◯ 1X ◯ 2T ◯ 2W ◯ 3A ◯ 3T ◯ 4U ◯ 5F ◯ 5K ◯ 6D ◯ 6E Other (please specify):

Tactical Options Report (TOR) submitted	◯ Yes (if yes, skip the sections with a ^) ◯ No
Key Tactics Used (select all that apply)	Announced Forced entry Breach and Hold Cordon/Contain/Appeal Cover Port Door knock/Direct approach to target Emergency action Open-air arrest Other (Describe in Team Leader comments): Ruse/deception Unannounced Forced entry

	Vehicle Stop - compliant Vehicle Stop - non compliant>
Incident resolved by	Prior to Negotiation Tactical Only Negotiation Only Combined Negotiation/Tactical Offender not contacted/located>
Result code	◯ K1 ◯ K3 ◯ K6 ◯ K9
^Resolution	Arrested – charged Arrested – no charge Released without charge Subject decamped scene Subject returned to caregiver Transport to hospital (medical) Transport to hospital (1M) CATT involvement Refer to Youth Aid Subject Escaped Police Disengaged Other
Who was the primary unit	◯ ART ◯ Other (please specify):
What primary unit was responsible for the arrest	◯ ART ◯ Other (please specify):

Team Leader Comments	
*Any other additional notes	Upload Images & Files Add Attachment: Browse... Free text

Appendix E: Public Safety Team (PST) Officer Survey

QID:		Rank:	
Age:		Gender:	
Years in Service:		District:	
Incident No.		Card Event No.	

Were you armed at any point during the incident? ◯ Yes ◯ No

Did you request the assistance of the ART? ◯ Yes ◯ No

If yes:

Was the response of the ART timely? ◯ Yes ◯ No

If no, why?

Do you think the incident was likely to have been handled differently without the ART? ◯ Yes ◯ No

If, yes, how?

Thinking about the incident you attended, please circle the response that **best** describes how much you agree with the following statements?

1 Strongly disagree	**2** Disagree	**3** Neither agree nor disagree	**4** Agree	**5** Strongly agree

Overall, I felt safer at the incident.	1	2	3	4	5
Overall, I felt that the command structure was clear.	1	2	3	4	5
Overall, I felt that communications were clear.	1	2	3	4	5
Overall, I understood my role within this incident.	1	2	3	4	5
I think the incident was dealt with more efficiently with the ART in attendance.	1	2	3	4	5

If Agree or Strongly Agree, **how** was the incident dealt with more efficiently?

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree, **why**?

I think the presence of the ART de-escalated the incident.	1	2	3	4	5

If Agree or Strongly Agree, **how** was the incident de-escalated?

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree, **why**?

Overall, I was satisfied with the assistance provided by the ART.	1	2	3	4	5
I am likely to request the assistance of the ART in the future.	1	2	3	4	5
My training allowed me to support the ART efficiently.	1	2	3	4	5

Appendix F: Armed Response Team (ART) Officer Survey

QID:		Rank:	
Age:		Gender:	
Years in Service:		District:	
Incident No.		Card Event No.	

Was the assistance of the ART requested? ◯ Yes ◯ No

If yes:
Was the response of the ART timely? ◯ Yes ◯ No
If no, why?

Do you think the incident was likely to have been handled differently without the ART? ◯ Yes ◯ No

If, yes, how?

Thinking about the incident you attended, please circle the response that **best** describes how much you agree with the following statements?

1 Strongly disagree	**2** Disagree	**3** Neither agree nor disagree	**4** Agree	**5** Strongly agree

Overall, I felt safer at the incident.	1	2	3	4	5
Overall, I felt that the command structure was clear.	1	2	3	4	5
Overall, I felt that communications were clear.	1	2	3	4	5
Overall, I understood my role within this incident.	1	2	3	4	5
I think the incident was dealt with more efficiently with the ART in attendance.	1	2	3	4	5

If Agree or Strongly Agree, **how** was the incident dealt with more efficiently?

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree, **why**?

I think the presence of the ART de-escalated the incident.	1	2	3	4	5

If Agree or Strongly Agree, **how** was the incident de-escalated?

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree, **why**?

The vehicle enabled me to perform all the duties required of me.	1	2	3	4	5
The equipment I need is readily accessible and in good condition.	1	2	3	4	5
My personal equipment is not satisfactory for my safety and effectiveness.	1	2	3	4	5
Vehicle limitations prevented me from performing my duties appropriately.	1	2	3	4	5
The ART role makes good use of my training.	1	2	3	4	5

Appendix G: Officer Wellbeing Survey

Thinking about how you felt over the last **30 days,** for each of the following statements circle the response that **best** describes how much of the time you felt that way.

	0 At no time	**1** Some of the time	**2** Less than half the time	**3** More than half the time	**4** Most of the time				**5** All the time	
1	I have felt cheerful and in good spirits				0	1	2	3	4	5
2	I have felt calm and relaxed				0	1	2	3	4	5
3	I have felt active and vigorous				0	1	2	3	4	5
4	I have felt refreshed when I wake up in the morning				0	1	2	3	4	5
5	I have felt that my daily life is filled with things that interest me				0	1	2	3	4	5
6	I have felt tired out for no good reason?				0	1	2	3	4	5
7	I have felt nervous?				0	1	2	3	4	5
8	I have felt so nervous that nothing could calm me down?				0	1	2	3	4	5
9	I have felt hopeless?				0	1	2	3	4	5
10	I have felt restless or fidgety?				0	1	2	3	4	5
11	I have felt so restless I could not sit still?				0	1	2	3	4	5
12	I have felt depressed?				0	1	2	3	4	5
13	I have felt that everything was an effort?				0	1	2	3	4	5
14	I have felt so sad that nothing could cheer me up?				0	1	2	3	4	5
15	I have felt worthless?				0	1	2	3	4	5
16	I have felt emotionally drained from my work				0	1	2	3	4	5
17	I have felt used up at the end of the work day				0	1	2	3	4	5
18	I have felt fatigued when I wake up in the morning				0	1	2	3	4	5
19	I have felt that working with people all day is a real strain				0	1	2	3	4	5
20	I have felt frustrated by my job				0	1	2	3	4	5
21	I have felt that I'm working too hard on my job				0	1	2	3	4	5
22	I have felt like I am at the end of my rope				0	1	2	3	4	5
23	I have felt upset because of something that happened unexpectedly				0	1	2	3	4	5
24	I have felt unable to control the important things in my life				0	1	2	3	4	5
25	I have felt confident in my ability to handle my personal problems				0	1	2	3	4	5
26	I have felt that things were going my way				0	1	2	3	4	5
27	I have felt unable to cope with all the things I had to do				0	1	2	3	4	5
28	I have felt unable to control irritations in my life				0	1	2	3	4	5
29	I have felt on top of things				0	1	2	3	4	5
30	I have felt angered by things that happened that were outside of my control				0	1	2	3	4	5

Appendix H: Reclassification of Deployment Types

To better describe the nature of ART deployments a retrospective application of the criteria outlined in **4.1. Initial Reporting Issues** was commenced to reclassify deployments as either an *ART Role* or *Assist Role*. The approach taken sought to minimise arbitrariness and leave the deployment data as untouched as possible. To do so, firm definitions were required to avoid ambiguity. Per the criteria, ART Roles were defined as jobs where ARTs attended, or were requested to attend, incidents specifically for their specialist skills and tactics, but the job did not met the threshold for an AOS callout. In comparison, *Assist Role* were defined as those where ARTs perform preventative duties, or provide general support to frontline officers.

With definitions in place a set of rules were derived to guide the classification process. It is possible, however, that these rules are quite conservative and will almost surely misclassify some jobs, leading to an underestimation of the number of ART Roles undertaken across trial districts (and indeed an overestimation of Assist Roles). The criteria applied is as follows:

1) All deployment records listed as blue or black **that had an associated AOS callout** report were classified more generally as an *AOS Role*;

2) All deployment records listed as blue or black that **did not have an associated AOS callout report** were reclassified as *Assist Role*;

3) All non-AOS Role deployments (see (1) for definition) where ARTs have been requested to assist[22] were reclassified as *Assist Role* [23];

4) All non-AOS Role deployments (see (1) for definition) where **Team Leader explicitly states that ART attendance prevented an AOS callout** were reclassified as an *ART Role* [24]. If the record was previously classified according to (2) or (3) the former classification was superseded;

5) All non-AOS Role deployments (see (1) for definition) where the **6800: Firearm Offences code was recorded** were classified as an *ART Role* [25]. If the record was previously classified according to (2) or (3) the former classification was superseded;

6) All non-AOS Role deployments (see (1) for definition) where **the AOS Commander was consulted** were reclassified as an *ART Role* [26]. If the record was previously classified according to (2) or (3) the former classification was superseded;

7) All non-AOS Role deployments (see (1) for definition) where a **TOR report was submitted** were reclassified as an *ART Role*. If the record was previously classified according to (2) or (3) the former classification was superseded;

[22] This was determined according to whether Deployment Type was defined as "Other" and had an accompanying comment that explicitly stated ART attendance had been requested OR where comments provided by ART Team Leaders stated that assistance was requested. Assistance may have been requested through a direct call through to Team Leaders or via Comms. No delineation is made between how requests were submitted.
[23] This is a general term and obviates the fact that ARTs may assist units other than PST. Additionally, this blanket approach will likely miss jobs that should perhaps be classified as an ART Role but did not meet definitions (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7).
[24] Additional data coding subsequently classified these jobs as *Prevent AOS* jobs.
[25] Per Deployment Definition Criteria (3) (see *Initial Reporting Issues* section). This blanket approach, however, does not discriminate between jobs where firearms were actually present and jobs where there were only flags for a history of firearms offences/use.
[26] The rationale being that consultation was sought and, though the job did not met the threshold for a full AOS deployment, it is likely that certain tactics may have approved for use that were beyond the tactical capabilities of frontline officers.

8) All non-AOS Role deployments (see (1) for definition) where **the TL explicitly stated that "blue role" tactics were used** and/or **explicitly mention that particular weapons/tactics were carried/used** (e.g., 40mm sponge round, ballistic shield, breaching equipment, etc) were reclassified as an *ART Role*. If the record was previously classified according to (2) or (3) the former classification was superseded.

Appendix I: ART Focus Group: Quick Runsheet

During the focus groups and interviews the following questions need to be answered. A guide is provided to direct the focus group or interview were the discussion does not provide the answers needed.

Welcome & Background

Q1: What challenges and problems was the ART trial trying to address and was this successful?

Participants break-off into groups and write-up their views.

Q2: What impact did the ART trial have on Trust and Confidence?

Group discussion. Whiteboard and post-it note participant's views and comments.

Q3 & 4: Did the ART trial make the public and our communities safer? Did the ART trial make 'Our People' safer?

Participants break-off into groups and write-up their views.

Q5 & 6: What activities did ART do? Did the ART trial result in any changes to how AOS or STG functioned?

Groups present their top three insights/views to the wider group.

Q7: What are you views on the equipment and vehicles used?

Group discussion. Whiteboard and post-it note participant's views and comments.

Q8: What training do you think is required for ART members?

Group discussion. Whiteboard and post-it note participant's views and comments.

Q9: What does good look like?

Get participants to write their ideas onto post-it notes and stick them onto the whiteboard or wall.

Closing

Appendix J: Community Insights Survey Full Report

Report follows on next page.

Community Insights, T&C Deep Dive: Armed Response Teams

Feb 2019



Community Insights, T&C Deep Dive - Armed Response Teams

Feb 2019
Full Report

Prepared for:
Erena MCALLUM, New Zealand Police

Table of Contents

Overview

Armed Response Teams Research – Key Findings

1

Existing trust and confidence in the New Zealand Police is the largest driver of support (or lack there of) for the ART trial.

For those who have little to no trust and confidence in the NZ Police, the ART trial amplifies their concern, ultimately reducing what trust and confidence they had in the first place.

2

One third of New Zealanders are concerned that vulnerable groups will be unfairly targeted by ARTs.

3

For 9 out of 10 New Zealanders, ART deployment is appropriate to deal with active, armed offenders.

There was significantly less support for deploying ARTs for general road policing or general frontline activities.

Infographic Summary



Main Report

Method

Context

Context

The New Zealand Police wants to better understand and measure the public level of trust and confidence in the Police, and especially in relation to the pilot of the Armed Response Teams (ARTs).

- The trial ARTs were launched in three regions, Counties Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury in October 2019.
- This survey provides on source of insight into public perception of ARTs.

Objectives

To understand public perceptions of the trial of ARTs, and how this impacts trust and confidence in the New Zealand Police by:

- Understanding general trust and confidence in the New Zealand Police.
- Understanding the public's expectations of the Police.
- Understanding the public's perception of ARTs.
- Learn about the public's views on when it is appropriate to use ARTs

Method

An online survey of New Zealanders

- Research conducted using an online survey during February 2020.
- Total sample size = 574, comprising:
  - A nationally representative sample size n=382
  - A Māori sample boost n=122
  - ART regions sample boos, total n=302

Sampling and Comparisons

Sampling

Nationally representative
Additional ART region boosts
Additional Māori boost

Nationally representative sample:

- The national population sample set quotas to ensure the achieved sample broadly matched the wider New Zealand population in terms of age, gender and regional location.
- An achieved sample of n=382 provides results with a maximum sampling error ('margin of error') +/-5% at the 95% confidence interval.

Boosts:

- In order to be able to compare particular sub-group, an additional boost was needed to reach a minimum sample size of n=100 per subgroup.
- The subgroups of interest were (i) the regions in which ART had been deployed (Counties Manukau, Waikato, and Canterbury), and (ii)
- Māori

See the demographic section (page 38) for more detail, including the proportions aimed for based upon the 2018 census.

Comparing subgroups

Pearson's chi-squared test of independence, and Independent samples t-Test
Age, Gender, ART regions vs. rest of New Zealand, Māori vs. not Maori

The tests of statistical significance used with the survey data are:

- Column comparison using Pearson's chi-squared test of independence when looking at proportions
- Column comparison using Independent samples t-Test – comparing two means with unequal variances
- Column comparison using F-Test (ANOVA) when comparing three means with a False Discovery Rate correction

Who has been compared:

- Comparisons has generally been on net' scores (e.g. support + strongly support) rather than individual scores (e.g. support)
- The nationally representative sample is used to analyse by age and gender.
- When analysing by region and ethnicity, the entire sample is used.

Comparisons have been noted in the main report when:

- Deemed as appropriate and adding to the overall understanding. As such, the comparisons made are not exhaustive.
- statistical significance is noted by highlighting a cell blue (higher) or orange (lower).

Further details on the test results can be found in the appendix, starting on page 48.

Text Analytics and Limitations

Analysing open-ended questions

Coding
Text analytics tool

The survey had several open-ended questions which were analysed in two different method depending on the question – either via manual coding or through a text analytics tool

Coding

- This was accomplished by a data team member reading the answers and placing them into similar themes, with results analysed by frequency of mention

Text analytics tool using Artificial Intelligence

- This method uses a text analytics tool which similarly tags answers from an open-ended question into themes which is partly grouped further manually.
- Measures impact of themes stemming from verbatim comments on a specific measure (e.g. reasons for trust)
- Change in frequency and impact can be measured over time
- For more details, please see the appendix (starting on page 58)

Limitations

While the survey sample is large and the projected sampling error ('margin of error') is low, the use of an online panel an online survey means the survey results include an unknown measure of selection bias to the dataset.

- This selection bias occurs because the survey sampling was not 'truly' random but drew from an online panel and quota management to ensure a representative spread of respondents along with large enough sample sizes to conduct comparisons
- The text analytics uses A.I (which is not yet perfect); is qualitative in nature and do not use statistics

Please note that this report is an analytical summary of the data and therefore not exhaustive of all results and/or all comparisons

Perceptions of NZ Police

Expectations of the NZ Police centre around protection and safety



Protection and safety

• Respondents expect NZ police to protect and keep New Zealanders safe.	Mentions	33%
• Respondents who mention this have a **slightly higher** average Trust and Confidence in the police	Impact on T&C	**+0.05**

Enforce and uphold law, order & justice

• Respondents expect NZ police to serve and help the public	Mentions	16%
• Respondents who mention this have a **slightly lower** average Trust and Confidence in the police	Impact on T&C	**-0.02**

C1. …How would you rate the level of trust and confidence you have in the New Zealand Police? / C3. What expectations do you have of the New Zealand Police in general?
Base: Total sample excluding don't know and non-answers

Expectations of the NZ Police - more details

That they keep people safe and endorse the law in a balanced and positive manner

To uphold law and order, crime prevention and to be more effective in dealing with violent repeat offenders

To be approachable and do their job consistently

Fair to all gender and race

C1. …How would you rate the level of trust and confidence you have in the New Zealand Police. /
C3. What expectations do you have of the New Zealand Police in general? (Top 15)
Base: Total sample excluding don't know and non-answers

Public safety is both an expected priority, and one that respondent's think New Zealand Police focus on Respondents believe more focus could be placed on drug and gang control

What do you think New Zealand Police priorities are?

	FREQUENCY %	AVERAGE	IMPACT
Public safety	38.5%	4.2	+0.13
Crime and criminals	27.1%	4.0	+0.03
Law and order and justice	17.3%	4.0	+0.02
Road safety	10.0%	3.9	0.00
Revenue gathering	6.1%	2.8	-0.07
Address violence and murder	4.6%	3.6	-0.01
Drug control	4.4%	4.1	+0.01
Provide general support	2.9%	4.3	+0.01
Protect property	2.4%	4.5	+0.01
Do a good job in general	2.2%	3.8	0.00

What do you think New Zealand Police priorities should be?

	FREQUENCY %	AVERAGE	IMPACT
Public safety	39.8%	3.9	+0.05
Crime and criminals	28.4%	3.7	-0.01
Law and order and justice	15.8%	3.7	-0.01
Drug control	7.3%	3.8	0.00
Road Safety	6.8%	4.0	+0.01
Protect property	5.6%	3.8	+0.00
Address violence and murder	4.1%	3.8	0.00
Gang control	4.1%	3.4	-0.01
Do a good job in general	3.4%	3.5	-0.01
Provide general support	2.9%	3.0	-0.02

C1. …How would you rate the level of trust and confidence you have in the New Zealand Police? C4a What do you think the priorities of New Zealand Police are? / C4b. What do you think their priorities (New Zealand Police) should be? (Top 10)
Base: Total sample excluding don't know and non-answers

Suggested improvements focus on building on current behaviours and being honest and transparent

More honesty & transparency & less corruption

- Respondents suggest that NZ police should be more honest and transparent, and less corrupt to increase their trust and confidence
- Respondents who mention this have a **slightly lower** average Trust and Confidence in the police

Mentions 10%

Impact on T&C -0.05

Continue doing their job / have high trust already

- Respondents suggest that NZ police continue doing their job to increase their trust and confidence
- Respondents who mention this have a **slightly higher** average Trust and Confidence in the police

Mentions 13%

Impact on T&C +0.06



C1. …How would you rate the level of trust and confidence you have in the New Zealand Police? C2. What should the New Zealand Police do to improve your level of trust and confidence in the organisation?
Base: Total sample excluding don't know and non-answers

Suggested improvements - more details

Keep up the good work

Be more active in the community, more accessible to diverse communities within the NZ community, solve more simple crimes such as burglary etc.

Follow through on cases. Provide feedback. Show compassion toward situations

Be more transparent and abide by the rules everyone else has to

C1. …How would you rate the level of trust and confidence you have in the New Zealand Police? C2. What should the New Zealand Police do to improve your level of trust and confidence in the organisation? Base: Total sample excluding don't know and non-answers

Armed Response Teams

Awareness & Initial Reaction

Awareness of ART is mixed

Less than two-thirds of New Zealanders are aware of the ART trial.

- Age was an important factor in determining awareness of ART.
  - Those who are 55-64 are significantly more likely to have awareness of ART compared to all other age groups.
  - 18-24 years old were significantly less likely to report they have heard of ART compared to all remaining groups.
- Males were also significantly more likely report having an awareness of the ART trial than females (p=<0.001)
- No statistical differences were noted between national representative sample and the three areas where ARTs have been deployed (Canterbury, Waikato and Counties Manukau).
- No differences were noted between the total sample and Māori respondents.

See appendix for more details on statistical significance testing for subgroups

Overall Awareness



By gender and age (Nat rep)	Yes	No	Don't know	n
Male	71%	15%	13%	196
Female	51%	32%	17%	185
18-24 years	43%	35%	22%	69
25-34 years	51%	35%	14%	72
35-44 years	47%	35%	18%	55
45-54 years	70%	16%	14%	74
55-64 years	84%	6%	10%	68
65+ years	75%	14%	11%	44

P1. Are you aware of the Armed Response Teams Trial?
Nationally representative sample (n=382)

Initial reaction to ART is generally positive



P3. What is your initial reaction to the Armed Response Teams?
Total sample who were aware of ART and follow the news/social media (n=359)

Initial reaction to ART - examples of concern

They are needed at times but need more training on how to react to people with mental illnesses.
Canterbury female

Fear. Fear for them. And whoever is innocent but is caught up in it.
Tasman female

Gotta be done in certain situations e.g. Napier siege.
Wellington male

Completely unnecessary as there is AOS already.
Canterbury male

It's overkill…Force will only be met with force. It's inviting trouble.
Counties Manukau female

P3. What is your initial reaction to the Armed Response Teams?
Total sample who were aware of ART and follow the news/social media (n=359)

Knowledge of ART varies

- There is a high degree of uncertainty about ARTs, as seen by the large portion of don't knows within each statement.



P4. To the best of your knowledge, which of the following statements are true regarding the deployment of Armed Response Teams?
Nationally representative sample (n=382)

Levels of Support

The majority support the new ART initiative following a brief description

Although support for the ART trial is relatively high, with 72% in favour, there is still a sizeable cohort of ambivalent (14%) and don't know (8%). Approximately 7% of New Zealand do not support the ART initiative.

> Good idea, as a means of increasing public safety.
> *Otago male*

Overall Support for ART



P5. To what extent do you support the new ART initiative as an option to increase community safety?
Nationally representative sample (n=382)

Support for ART is varied

- Females are the driving force of support for ART. They were statistically more likely to either support or strongly support the ART trial compared with males
- Anecdotally, we see support for ART increasing as respondents increase in age. However, these findings are not statistically significant, just indicative.
- Regions where ARTs had been introduced were significantly more likely than the other regions to support the introduction of ARTs.
  - No statistically significant differences were noted in between other regions.
- Respondents who identified as Māori were significantly more likely to not support the initiative, while those of all other ethnicities were more supportive.

See appendix for more details on statistical significance testing for subgroups

Support for ART by Gender and Age (Nat Rep)	Do not support at all / do not support	Ambivalent	Support / strongly support	n
Male	9%	17%	67%	196
Female	5%	10%	77%	185
18-24 years	6%	20%	61%	69
25-34 years	7%	19%	69%	72
35-44 years	13%	9%	69%	55
45-54 years	7%	12%	72%	74
55-64 years	6%	13%	79%	68
65+ years	2%	5%	84%	44

Support for ART by Region & Ethnicity (Total Sample)	Do not support at all/ do not support	Ambivalent	Support / strongly support	n
ART Regions	5%	12%	76%	302
Rest of New Zealand	7%	15%	68%	272
Māori ethnicity	11%	16%	64%	122
All other ethnicities	4%	13%	75%	452

P5. To what extent do you support the new ART initiative as an option to increase community safety?
Nationally representative sample (n=382)
Total sample (n=574)

When asked unprompted, over a third of respondents feel the ART should attend armed offender/active shooter scenarios

> Any event where an offender has a weapon or is a risk to themselves or others. Any event where police staff feel unsafe.
> *Bay of Plenty, female*

Appropriate Events for ART to Attend (Unprompted)



P6i. Which type of events incidents do you feel it would be appropriate for the Armed Response Teams to attend? Only responses 4% or over displayed.
Nationally representative sample (n=382)

9 out of 10 respondents feel it is appropriate for ART to respond to high risk events and those events involving firearms

- Three quarters of respondents felt active/urgent events where the presence of weapons is unknown was appropriate for ART to attend.
- For the remaining events, there was less support.
    - For general road policing activity and general policing duties that frontline officers attend, less than 1 in 5 felt it was appropriate for ART to attend.



P6ii. Which of these events/incidents, if any, do you feel it would be appropriate for the Armed Response Unit to attend?
Nationally representative sample (n=382)

Levels of support at a glance are high; however at least one-in-ten do not support ARTs being implemented in all cities, nor think it is a good use of Police resources

There are significant differences in support by age, ethnicity and level of existing trust.

- Those over 55 years of age are more supportive.
- Support increases by level of pre-existing trust.
- Māori are significantly less supportive than those of all other ethnicities.



P7. Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements about the Armed Response Teams?
Nationally representative sample excluding don't know (n=353-360)

See appendix for more details on statistical significance testing for subgroups

Approximately two-thirds feel safer with ARTs in New Zealand or in the community; however one-in-eight disagree

Furthermore, a third are concerned about vulnerable groups being unfairly targeted

- Māori, females, those who are younger, and those with little trust and confidence in the police are more concerned about vulnerable groups being unfairly targeted.
- Māori are also significantly more likely to disagree with feeling safer knowing ARTs are operating in New Zealand.
- Finally, the less trust the respondent has in the police, the more likely they are to disagree with feeling safer knowing ARTs are operating in their community, or in New Zealand.

See appendix for more details on statistical significance testing for subgroups



P7. Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements about the Armed Response Teams?
Nationally representative sample excluding don't know (n=350-362)

In addition, nearly half of New Zealand agree that frontline staff should not regularly carry firearms

There are no statistically significant differences between groups.



P7. Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements about the Armed Response Teams?
Nationally representative sample excluding don't know (n=347-368)

See appendix for more details on statistical significance testing for subgroups

Impact on Trust & Confidence

Impact on trust and confidence

At an overall glance, the deployment of the Armed Response Teams results in a net increase of trust and confidence in the New Zealand Police.

10%
T&C is less than before

52%
T&C is same as before

38%
T&C is more than before



> There has been more gang fighting of late and this makes me feel are little bit safer than before.
> *Manawatu-Wanganui male, more trust*

P8. Earlier, you rate your trust and confidence in the New Zealand Police as <…>. Considering everything you have heard about the Armed Response Teams, how has this impacted your levels of trust and confidence in the New Zealand Police?
Nationally representative sample excluding don't know (n=376)

Impact on trust and confidence – deep dive

However, depending on who you ask, this answer changes.

- Males are more likely to feel less trusting as a result;
- Those living in non-ART regions are also less likely to feel less trust and confidence as a result;
- Those of Māori ethnicity are also less likely to feel less trust and confidence as a result;
- Those that already had little trust and confidence in the police feel this has impacted them negatively, while those that already had high trust and confidence feel even more so now.

See appendix for more details on statistical significance testing for subgroups

Impact on T&C by Gender, Existing Trust & Region



P8. Earlier, you rate your trust and confidence in the New Zealand Police as <…>. Considering everything you have heard about the Armed Response Teams, how has this impacted your levels of trust and confidence in the New Zealand Police?
Excluding don't know

Reasons for impact on trust – based on pre-existing trust

Reasons for the impact of ART on trust and to confidence is based upon pre-existing perceptions (trust and confidence) of the police and essentially whether or not they believe that arming the police will lead to good or bad outcomes.



P8. Earlier, you rate your trust and confidence in the New Zealand Police as <…>. Considering everything you have heard about the Armed Response Teams, how has this impacted your levels of trust and confidence in the New Zealand Police?
Excluding don't know and same amount of trust

Reasons for impact on trust – top 10



P8. Earlier, you rate your trust and confidence in the New Zealand Police as <…>. Considering everything you have heard about the Armed Response Teams, how has this impacted your levels of trust and confidence in the New Zealand Police? Excluding don't know

Reasons for impact on trust – examples

As police is usually targeting minorities and I am a minority.
Less trust - Auckland male

Armed presence more of a provocation than deterrent to criminals, in my view. Escalation rather than lessening of potential violence in the community.
Less trust - Bay of Plenty male

After mosque attack in Christchurch, I feel safe knowing that ART'S is there to protect our community from any similar situation.
More trust - Counties Manukau female

I don't think there enough "serious, high-risk“ incidents in NZ to justify the expense/potential dangers of having roving armed squads; AND it'd likely be the first step towards having a fully-armed police service, which I think is almost certainly a bad idea.
Less trust - Waikato male

Knowing offenders would targeted by specialist officers.
More trust - Canterbury female

It is an extra tool that is available for the Policing in New Zealand.
More trust - Taranaki male

Demographics

Nationally Representative Sample

	Quotas based on 2018 census	Achieved
Gender		
Male	49%	51%
Female	51%	49%
Age		
15-24 years*	17%	18%
25-34 years	19%	19%
35-44 years	16%	14%
45-54 years	18%	19%
55-64 years	16%	18%
65+	14%	12%
Total	**4699755**	**382**

*Please note that we only surveyed respondents 18 or older
** ethnicities that individually had less than 1%

	Quotas based on 2018 census	Achieved
Region		
Northland Region	4%	5%
Auckland Region	33%	31%
Waikato Region	10%	10%
Bay of Plenty Region	7%	6%
Hawke's Bay Region	4%	2%
Gisborne Region	1%	1%
Taranaki Region	3%	4%
Manawatu-Wanganui Region	5%	5%
Wellington Region	11%	12%
Tasman Region	1%	1%
Nelson Region	1%	2%
Marlborough Region	1%	-
West Coast Region	1%	0.3%
Canterbury Region	13%	13%
Otago Region	5%	6%
Southland Region	2%	3%
Area Outside Region	0.0%	-
Total	**4699755**	**382**

Ethnicity	Achieved
European	3%
New Zealand European	60%
British and Irish	6%
Dutch	1%
Polish	1%
Italian	1%
German	1%
Australian	1%
Other European	2%
Māori	21%
Pacific Peoples	2%
Samoan	2%
Cook Islands Māori	1%
Tongan	1%
Niuean	1%
Fijian	1%
Other Pacific Peoples	1%
Asian	4%
Southeast Asian	1%
Filipino	2%
Chinese	3%
Indian	3%
Other Asian	1%
African	1%
Other**	1%
Decline to Answer	1%
Total	**382**

Total Sample: by Region & Māori

	Counties Manukau	Waikato	Canterbury	Rest of NZ	Māori Ethnicity	Total Sample
Gender						
Male	43%	39%	48%	59%	54%	51%
Female	57%	61%	52%	41%	47%	49%
Age						
15-24 years*	6%	9%	13%	21%	16%	15%
25-34 years	19%	21%	21%	20%	28%	20%
35-44 years	18%	17%	17%	14%	21%	16%
45-54 years	19%	14%	10%	21%	16%	18%
55-64 years	19%	15%	23%	16%	11%	18%
65+	19%	24%	18%	7%	7%	14%
Total	**100**	**100**	**102**	**272**	**122**	**574**

*Please note that we only surveyed respondents 18 or older
** ethnicities that individually had less than 1%

Ethnicity	Counties Manukau	Waikato	Canterbury	Rest of NZ	Māori Ethnicity	Total Sample
European	4%	4%	1%	4%	1%	3%
New Zealand European	52%	71%	75%	57%	45%	62%
British and Irish	8%	5%	8%	4%	1%	5%
Dutch	-	1%	1%	0.4%	1%	1%
Polish	-	1%	-	1%	1%	1%
Italian	-	2%	1%	-	1%	1%
Australian	1%	2%	1%	0.4%	1%	1%
Other European	1%	-	4%	1%	1%	1%
Māori	17%	14%	15%	28%	100%	21%
Pacific Peoples	2%	1%	-	2%	1%	1%
Samoan	2%	-	-	3%	2%	2%
Cook Islands Māori	3%	-	-	1%	-	1%
Niuean	1%	1%	-	1%	2%	1%
Fijian	2%	-	-	0.4%	-	1%
Other Pacific Peoples	1%	2%	1%	1%	2%	1%
Asian	2%	1%	1%	5%	-	3%
Southeast Asian	5%	-	1%	-	-	1%
Filipino	2%	1%	3%	2%	-	2%
Chinese	7%	1%	2%	3%	-	3%
Indian	6%	3%	-	4%	-	3%
Other Asian	4%	-	1%	0.4%	-	1%
African	2%	1%	-	0.4%	-	1%
Other**	2%	1%	3%	1%	-	1%
Decline to Answer	1%	-	-	1%	-	1%
Total	**100**	**100**	**102**	**272**	**122**	**574**

Appendix

Sources of Information

68% first learned about ART through news coverage



P1i. How did you first hear about the deployment of Armed Response Teams?
Nationally representative sample who were aware of ART (n=235)

Social media/news following is varied



P1ii. How closely have you followed the social media/news coverage of the deployment of Armed Response Teams?
Nationally representative sample who were aware of ART (n=235)

Those who do follow ART do so via news on TV or online



P2. Which channels do you use to follow the deployment of Armed Response Teams?
Nationally representative sample who were aware of ART and follow the news/social media (n=166)

Additional Information about Subgroup Comparisons

P1. Are you aware of the Armed Response Teams Trial?

Subgroup	Stance	Proportion	Null hypothesis:	P-value	Significance
Male	Yes	71%	There is no difference in the population between the proportion of 'Yes' of people in 'Male' compared to 'Female'.	$p \leq 0.0001$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Female		51%			
18-24 years	Yes	43%	There is no difference in the population between the proportion of 'Yes' of people in Not '18-24 years' compared to '18-24 years'.	$p \leq 0.001$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
NOT 18-24 years		65%			
55-64 years	Yes	84%	There is no difference in the population between the proportion of 'Yes' of people in Not '55-64 years' compared to '55-64 years'.	$p \leq 0.0001$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
NOT 55-64 years		57%			

P5. To what extent do you support the new ART initiative as an option to increase community safety?

Subgroup	Stance	Proportion	Null hypothesis:	P-value	Significance
Māori ethnicity	Do not support at all / do not support	11%	There is no difference in the population between the proportion of 'Do not support at all + Do not support' of people in 'Maori Net' compared to 'Other ethnicities'.	$p \leq 0.05$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Other ethnicities		4%			
Māori ethnicity	Support / strongly support	64%	There is no difference in the population between the proportion of 'Support + Strongly support' of people in 'Maori Net' compared to 'Other ethnicities'.	$p \leq 0.05$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Other ethnicities		75%			
Male	Ambivalent	17%	There is no difference in the population between the proportion of 'Ambivalent' of people in 'Male' compared to 'Female'.	$p \leq 0.05$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Female		10%			
Male	Support / strongly support	67%	There is no difference in the population between the proportion of 'Support + Strongly support' of people in 'Male' compared to 'Female'.	$p \leq 0.05$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Female		77%			
ART Region	Support / strongly support	76%	There is no difference in the population between the proportion of 'Support + Strongly support' of people in 'ART Region' compared to 'Not ART Region'.	$p \leq 0.05$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Not ART Region		68%			

P7. Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements about the Armed Response Teams?

Levels of support and concern by age & gender have some statistically significant differences

- Females and those aged between 18-34 are statistically more likely to be worried about vulnerable groups being unfairly targeted by ARTs.
- Those 55 years and over are significantly more likely to support ARTs being implemented in all major cities, and agree that the ART trial is a good use of Police resources. This group is significantly *less* likely to be worried about vulnerable groups being unfairly targeted by ART.

Mean score (Scale of 1-5, 1=Strongly Disagree, 5=Strongly Agree)	Nationally representative sample	Male	Female	18-34 years	35-54 years	55 years +
I support ARTs being implemented in all major cities	3.9	3.9	4	3.8	3.8	4.2
The ARTs trial is a good use of Police resources	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.7	3.7	4.1
I would/do feel safer knowing ARTs are operating in New Zealand	3.8	3.7	3.9	3.7	3.7	4.0
I would/do feel safer knowing ARTs are in my community	3.7	3.6	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.9
ARTs are probably the first step toward general arming of police in NZ	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.5	3.7	3.4
General frontline police officers should not routinely carry firearms	3.4	3.5	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.5
If ARTs are assisting with general policing activity between high risk events –they should be required to remove their firearm	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.4	3.2
I am worried about vulnerable groups being unfairly targeted by ARTs	3.0	2.8	3.1	3.2	3.0	2.7

P7. Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements about the Armed Response Teams?
Nationally representative sample excluding don't know

P7. Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements about the Armed Response Teams?

Subgroup	Statement	Mean	Null hypothesis:	P-value	Significance
55 years +	I support ARTs being implemented in all major cities	4.2	There is no difference in the population between the average of people in NOT '55-64 years + 65+' compared to '55-64 years + 65+'.	$p \leq 0.001$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
NOT 55 years +		3.8			
55 years +	The ARTs trial is a good use of Police resources	4.1	There is no difference in the population between the average of people in NOT '55-64 years + 65+' compared to '55-64 years + 65+'.	$p \leq 0.001$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
NOT 55 years +		3.7			
55 years +	I am worried about vulnerable groups being unfairly targeted by ARTs	2.7	There is no difference in the population between the average of people in NOT '55-64 years + 65+' compared to '55-64 years +	$p \leq 0.001$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
NOT 55 years +		3.1			
18-34 years	I am worried about vulnerable groups being unfairly targeted by ARTs	3.2	There is no difference in the population between the average of people in NOT '18-24 years + 25-34 years' compared to '18-24 years + 25-34 years'.	$p \leq 0.001$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
NOT 18-34 years		2.8			
Male	I am worried about vulnerable groups being unfairly targeted by ARTs	2.8	There is no difference in the population between the average of people in NOT 'Male' compared to 'Male'.	$p \leq 0.05$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Female		3.1			

P7. Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements about the Armed Response Teams?

Ethnicity impacts support for ARTs

- Looking at the averages, there are a very few attitudinal differences between ART regions vs. rest of New Zealand.
- Ethnicity impacts support for ART. Those of New Zealand European descent have higher levels of trust than all other ethnicities. This group are also significantly less likely to be worried about ARTs unfairly targeting vulnerable groups.
- Meanwhile, Māori respondents have less support for ART overall. Māori respondents were significantly less likely to feel safer knowing the ARTs are operating, while they were significantly *more* likely to be worried about vulnerable groups being targeted by ARTs.

Mean score (Scale of 1-5, 1=Strongly Disagree, 5=Strongly Agree)	Total sample average	ART Region	Not ART Region	Māori ethnicity	Asian and other ethnicities	New Zealand European excl. Māori, Pacifica and Asian
I support ARTs being implemented in all major cities	4.0	4.0	3.9	3.7	4.1	4.0
The ARTs trial is a good use of Police resources	3.9	3.9	3.8	3.6	3.9	3.9
I would/do feel safer knowing ARTs are operating in New Zealand	3.8	3.9	3.8	3.6	4.1	3.9
I would/do feel safer knowing ARTs are in my community	3.7	3.8	3.7	3.5	3.9	3.8
ARTs are probably the first step toward general arming of police in NZ	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.6
General frontline police officers should not routinely carry firearms	3.3	3.2	3.4	3.4	3.2	3.3
If ARTs are assisting with general policing activity between high risk events –they should be required to remove their firearm	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.1	3.2
I am worried about vulnerable groups being unfairly targeted by ARTs	2.9	2.8	3.1	3.4	3.1	2.7

P7. Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements about the Armed Response Teams?
Total sample excluding don't know

P7. Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements about the Armed Response Teams?

Subgroup	Statement	Mean	Null hypothesis:	P-value	Significance
ART Region	I am worried about vulnerable groups being unfairly targeted by ARTs	2.8	There is no difference in the population between the average of 'I am worried about vulnerable groups being unfairly targeted by ARTs' of people in 'ART Region' compared to 'Not ART Region'.	$p \leq 0.05$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Non ART region		3.1			
Māori ethnicity	I support ARTs being implemented in all major cities	3.7	There is no difference in the population between the average of people in NOT 'Maori Net' compared to 'Maori Net'.	$p \leq 0.05$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Other ethnicities		4.0			
Māori ethnicity	The ARTs trial is a good use of Police resources	3.6	There is no difference in the population between the average of people in NOT 'Maori Net' compared to 'Maori Net'.	$p \leq 0.05$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Other ethnicities		3.9			
Māori ethnicity	I would/do feel safer knowing ARTs are operating in New Zealand	3.6	There is no difference in the population between the average of people in NOT 'Maori Net' compared to 'Maori Net'.	$p \leq 0.05$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Other ethnicities		3.9			
Māori ethnicity	I would/do feel safer knowing ARTs are in my community	3.5	There is no difference in the population between the average of people in NOT 'Maori Net' compared to 'Maori Net'.	$p \leq 0.05$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Other ethnicities		3.8			
Māori ethnicity	I am worried about vulnerable groups being unfairly targeted by ARTs	3.4	There is no difference between the categories.	$p \leq 0.0001$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Asian and other ethnicities		3.1			
New Zealand European excl. Māori, Pacifica and Asian		2.7			

P7. Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements about the Armed Response Teams?

Pre-existing trust and confidence in NZ Police impacts support for ART.

- Support for ARTs increase when respondents have trust and confidence in NZ Police generally
- For the four support statements, those with quite a lot or full trust and confidence were significantly more likely to agree compared to those with some trust or no/not much trust.
- Those with some trust were significantly more likely to agree to those statements compared to those with no or not much trust.

Mean score (Scale of 1-5, 1=Strongly Disagree, 5=Strongly Agree)	Nationally representative average	No / Not much T&C	Some T&C	Quite a lot / Full T&C
I support ARTs being implemented in all major cities	4.0	2.9	3.6	4.2
The ARTs trial is a good use of Police resources	3.9	2.9	3.5	4.1
I would/do feel safer knowing ARTs are operating in New Zealand	3.8	2.8	3.4	4.1
I would/do feel safer knowing ARTs are in my community	3.7	2.9	3.3	4.0
ARTs are probably the first step toward general arming of police in NZ	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.6
General frontline police officers should not routinely carry firearms	3.3	3.7	3.5	3.3
If ARTs are assisting with general policing activity between high risk events –they should be required to remove their firearm	3.2	3.4	3.4	3.2
I am worried about vulnerable groups being unfairly targeted by ARTs	2.9	3.7	3.3	2.7

P7. Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements about the Armed Response Teams?
Nationally representative sample excluding don't know

P7. Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements about the Armed Response Teams?

Subgroup	Statement	Mean	Null hypothesis:	P-value	Significance
No / Not much T&C	I support ARTs being implemented in all major cities	2.9	There is no difference between the categories.	$p \leq 0.0001$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Some T&C		3.6			
Quite a lot / Full T&C		4.2			
No / Not much T&C	The ARTs trial is a good use of Police resources	2.9	There is no difference between the categories.	$p \leq 0.0001$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Some T&C		3.5			
Quite a lot / Full T&C		4.1			
No / Not much T&C	I would/do feel safer knowing ARTs are operating in New Zealand	2.8	There is no difference between the categories.	$p \leq 0.0001$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Some T&C		3.4			
Quite a lot / Full T&C		4.1			
No / Not much T&C	I would/do feel safer knowing ARTs are in my community	2.9	There is no difference between the categories.	$p \leq 0.0001$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Some T&C		3.3			
Quite a lot / Full T&C		4.0			
No / Not much T&C	I am worried about vulnerable groups being unfairly targeted by ARTs	3.7	There is no difference between the categories.	$p \leq 0.0001$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Some T&C		3.3			
Quite a lot / Full T&C		2.7			

P8. Earlier, you rate your trust and confidence in the New Zealand Police as <…>. Considering everything you have heard about the Armed Response Teams, how has this impacted your levels of trust and confidence in the New Zealand Police?

Subgroup	Stance	Proportion	Null hypothesis:	P-value	Significance
Male	A lot/little less trust and confidence	14%	There is no difference in the population between the proportion of 'A lot less trust and confidence + Little less trust and confidence' of people in 'Male' compared to 'Female'.	$p \leq 0.05$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Female		7%			
Had low T&C	A lot/little less trust and confidence	41%	There is no difference in the population between the proportion of 'A lot less trust and confidence + Little less trust and confidence' of people in Not 'Have no / not much trust and confidence in the NZ Police' compared to 'Have no / not much trust and confidence in the NZ Police'.	$p \leq 0.0001$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Had NOT low T&C		7%			
Had T&C	A little/lot more trust and confidence	43%	There is no difference in the population between the proportion of 'Little more trust and confidence + A lot more trust and confidence' of people in Not 'Have quite a lot + full trust and confidence in the NZ Police' compared to 'Have quite a lot + full trust and confidence in the NZ Police'.	$p \leq 0.05$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Had NOT T&C		27%			
ART Region	A lot/little less trust and confidence	5%	There is no difference in the population between the proportion of 'A lot less trust and confidence + Little less trust and confidence' of people in 'ART Region' compared to 'Not ART Region'.	$p \leq 0.05$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Not ART Region		13%			
Māori ethnicity	A little/lot more trust and confidence	16%	There is no difference in the population between the proportion of 'A lot less trust and confidence + Little less trust and confidence' of people in 'Maori Net' compared to 'Other ethnicities'.	$p \leq 0.05$	At the 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Other ethnicities		7%			

Detailed Text Analytics Explanation

Terms and Definitions

Research First uses a text analytics tool that analyses how topics or themes impact on a particular measure. For example,

- How particular expectations of police impact overall trust and confidence

Terms that are important to know are:

- **Frequency:** indicates how many respondents have mentioned this topic/theme in this question
- **Average:** shows the average score for a particular measure, by the respondents who have mentioned this topic (in this case out of 5)
- **Impact:** indicates how much the topic/theme pushes the selected measure up or down.

Explanation of the next chart

- In the example on the next slide, we are looking at how respondents' expectations of police impact their overall feeling of trust and confidence.
- Bubbles in the top right quadrant are themes that have a high impact on perceptions of trust and confidence **and** areas where Police performance is considered to be good; conversely those in the bottom left quadrant are where impact is low, and so is performance.
- The size of the bubble is also important, as this indicates how often that theme or topic is mentioned. The larger the bubble, the more common this theme is, the smaller bubbles, less common.
- Therefore the quadrant to be most concerned about is the bottom right – the themes that have the highest impact **and** where NZ Police performance is perceived to be poor.

Example 1

- In this example the theme to be most concerned about is ‘Keeping NZ safe and Protecting NZ’; even though it is showing ‘green’
  - This has a reasonably high impact on trust and confidence, but for some it is falling into the neutral and negative territory
  - The size of the bubble also shows that this is a commonly mentioned theme



Example 2

- This example is less visual but provides more details. It is still looking at how expectations of police impact trust and confidence.
- It shows for example that 34% mentioned their expectations of Police are to keep NZ safe. Those who mentioned this as an expectation have a higher average of Trust and Confidence because the theme has a positive impact (+0.02)
- Those who mentioned the expectation is to manage crime and criminals have a lower average (3.3), because this theme has a negative impact (-0.05). However, only 8% mentioned this theme



Research First Ltd
Level 1, 23 Carlyle Street,
Sydenham, Christchurch 8023,
PO Box 94, Christchurch 8140,
New Zealand

T 0800 101 275,
www.researchfirst.co.nz

Appendix K: External Peer Review of Evaluation

The University of Waikato provided a peer review of the evaluation framework and design. This appendix presents that review.

Professor, School of Psychology
Director, NZ Institute of Security and Crime Science | Te Puna Haumaru
The University of Waikato
Private Bag 3105
Hamilton, New Zealand, 3240

Devon Polaschek
PhD DipClinPsyc, MNZM
Professor
polascde@waikato.ac.nz
+64-837-9224
http://www.waikato.ac.nz/fass/about/staff/polascde

21 June 2020

DRAFT REPORT: NOT FOR RELEASE WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR

Independent Review of New Zealand Police Armed Response Team Trial Evaluation Report (prepared by the Evidence-Based Policing Centre; 15 June, Version 1.0)

This review is based on the draft evaluation dated 15 June. It covers the New Zealand Police Armed Response Team (ART) trial in Counties-Manukau, Waikato and Canterbury districts during the six months from November 2019 to May 2020. Although inevitably the two do overlap at times, in preparing this review I have been mindful that it is a review of the evaluation, not of the trial itself.

Project design, aims and methods

Although there is no question this evaluation could have been done better, initiatives such as the ART trial are difficult to evaluate, especially given that (a) the problem that the ART trial was to "solve" appears not to have been clearly defined beforehand (p. 26), meaning that evaluators are left guessing about how to do the evaluation; (b) the trial and evaluation were not designed in synchrony; and (c) there was insufficient lead time for baseline measures. The overall impression I gained from the report was that the evaluators had done the best to wring relevant findings from the data collected. The focus group/individual interview sample in particular, was commendably large.

The initial objectives of the evaluation were reported to be

1. How were ARTs deployed and which tactics were used;
2. Whether officers felt safer in the districts where ARTs were operating;
3. Whether external trust and confidence was impacted in districts where ARTs were operating;
4. What would a fit for purpose ART model look like nationally; and
5. What were the impacts on key business targets for NZ Police?

However, because evaluation was not built into the design of the trial, the intended objectives could not all be achieved. Revisions retained the first 3 objectives, rewording Q2 to state "what were the real or perceived impacts on officer safety in districts where ARTs were operating" and adding "What effect did the introduction of ARTs have upon general wellbeing in districts where ARTs were operating"? Objectives 4 and 5 were not able to be addressed at all, given the imposed design limitations.

Additional limitations in the data available compromised both Objective 1 (missing EoD data), and O2 (low and region-skewed ART and PST response rates for surveys). Arguably, O3 would have more robustly addressed with a larger sample from the relevant districts (to complement the national survey) and especially from a cross-section of members of the communities where ARTs were most often deployed. With regard to the second aspect of question 2, it is not clear how "***real*** impacts on officer safety" [my emphasis] were to be measured, but I did not find data reported that convincingly addressed this part of the question; it is an inherently difficult question to answer without a fairly substantial research project around a trial that is itself designed to allow the research design to be implemented.

The most glaring omission in data collection—and it is a very significant flaw—is with gathering feedback from local Māori and other key constituencies of the trial communities (e.g., representatives of ethnicity- or immigrant-based organisations). It is not clear why these sources of information were not included in the evaluation. It seems unfortunately that this missing source of data collection effectively exacerbated the even more substantial issue of NZP apparently not engaging with those same communities in the pre-trial "rollout" phase. NZP is an organisation much regarded internationally. But although they police by consent, and rate trust and confidence very highly, the trial appears to have been designed without adequate recognition of the importance of communities themselves in the "consent" process. In saying this, I do not just mean that

communities need to be consulted. I am wondering also if those instigating the trial gave adequate consideration to the inherently interactive nature of policing (i.e., as something police do in collaboration with communities rather than "to" them). The emphasis on data collected mainly within the organisation and the lack of consultation or even pre-trial education outside of police both point to this being a potential blind spot. It is sometimes forgotten that many of our most victimised members of society live in the same communities as those who are most involved in crime. Comments that suggest that ART might lead some of those people to be less likely to contact police support the importance of a wider frame for evaluating such trials.

The sources of information used for the evaluation were mainly internal to police: a mix of operational records (e.g., unit deployments, use of force), and staff surveys and interviews (i.e., operational and perceptual). The only direct form of input from outside of police was the community survey, which was supplemented with indirect information in the form of an analysis of media reports. The background to the trial, and the limitations to the design imposed by the operational timeline were clearly described, along with the various components, methods and sources of information. The use of mixed methods is a strength of the design.

The evaluators also attempted to use the data to answer additional questions that arose after the trial began (e.g., whether ART deployment reduced ART deployment).

In addition to the primary findings, the evaluation captured a number of important trends that would warrant further investigation if the trial was to have been ongoing:

- Lack of communication between management and district staff about the trial
- Some apparent disparities between what ART were intended to do, and what was implemented in practice (implementation integrity problems)
- An apparent lack of confidence, training and experience among front line staff relative to the current challenges and dangers they confront in their roles
- Insufficient awareness in some communities that police safety is a legitimate concern that we all need to be aware of
- Limited demand for the actual use of force capability (cf. the other useful skills ART members brought to challenging situations
- Difficulties with data collection compliance that would need to be reduced to enable future evidence-based evaluations to be completed. Some attempts to remedy low compliance were partially successful.

Data analysis and reporting

Parts of the report created the impression that the evaluators may see "the public" as a monolithic entity (e.g., p. 22, p. 30). I doubt this is true but this language may unhelpfully obscure growing awareness of differences both across regions and different community constituencies within regions, and may lead to design assumptions that are also not helpful. For example, it seems clear from reading the report that measures of trust and confidence need to be much more nuanced if they are to be the main route to understanding the impact of policy changes on those to be policed.

The evaluation report reads as a comprehensive reporting on the context, data collected, analysed and interpreted and recommendations. There is a strong executive summary, detailed chapters on each of the data collection streams, good use of tables, figures and other graphics, and a concluding chapter that makes a worthwhile attempt to integrate the findings from the different streams and tie them back to the objectives. Importantly, the evaluation, is self-critiquing in that it contains significant caveats throughout about the limitations, particularly of the quantitative data. This is usual practice in research reports. Despite these caveats, the limitations are substantial enough in parts to raise concerns about whether they should be reported at all. The report deals with this concern by minimising interpretation and recommendations based on these data. But there is always a risk that some audiences will ignore the caveats. Indeed, it is difficult to know if any reader knows what to do with imprecations to interpret data "with caution"!

As noted above, there were obviously some important questions that came up that were not initially in the design and where possible the evaluators came up with ways to consider these questions with the data to hand: for example, information about whether ART deployment reduced AOS deployment. Use of tactical options with people presenting with mental health issues was another (p. 63). Here the evaluators noted the importance of baserates in making sense of the numbers. Equally important in these cases is the need to attempt to determine whether other factors correlating with mental health presentations that don't necessarily relate to officer bias may justify the option. For example, was the level of risk of harm to police (perhaps from the perceived cumulative assessment, although that itself may be biased by overperceiving mentally ill people as

dangerous regardless of their behaviour) actually higher in association with people presenting as mentally unwell? Although being mentally ill per se does not appreciably increase the risk of violent behaviour, it is quite likely that in circumstances where the police have been called the behaviour has already been frightening others. And of course there is evidence that people who are actively mentally ill can be particularly frightened and defensively violent when people are trying to physically "manage" them. Similarly with ethnicity analyses, we need to know more than simply how many events featured which ethnicities. Were police involved in more events with Māori in the first place? To what extent do proactive vs. reactive contacts vary by ethnicity? Is involvement itself biased based solely on ethnicity? The interpretation on pp. 64-5 does not acknowledge this complexity, and thus runs the risk of feeding into a wider discourse about Māori overrepresentation that asserts, in the absence of evidence, that criminal justice processing bias is the only source of disproportionate numbers relative to community baserates.

This point doesn't in any way relate to the need to consult with Māori communities as part of evaluating the trial. Having high trust and confidence with Māori leaders and communities is essential to effective policing regardless of whether we can currently examine practices for ethnic bias.

Key finding 23 acknowledges that sample sizes for ART and PST officer surveys were too small and especially for the former, outside Waikato. There was also very uneven reporting of officer wellbeing surveys. The inclusion of non-trial districts and the repeated measures was an excellent design that would have led to the ability to make some fairly strong conclusions, had it been able to be executed. That said, the data for burnout at least, suggest there may be some sort of seasonal or maturaion effect in play as well: with reductions in burnout across time regardless of involvement in the trial.

Evaluators might consider reporting 95% CI error bars on graphs such as Figures 6.3 and 6.4, or in other ways showing more awareness of major criticisms of relying only or entirely on the dichotomous thinking associated with statistical significance testing alone. For the wellness-related scales, it was great to see some some interpretation of what the mean responses indicated in absolute terms (i.e., what the mean scores actually mean with regard to wellness).

The thematic analysis of the print media coverage was conducted in keeping with good methodological practice for such studies.

The ability of the data collection to pick up apparent "mission creep" and implementation integrity issues was a distinct strength, and shows the value of qualitative data within a mixed methods evaluation. A particularly useful feature of the survey data on perceived impacts on officer safety was the ability to distinguish between safety attributed to improved advice and support to frontline staff, and the effects of better tactical training and skill, vs. safety increases due to actual use of force. The interviews with staff were particularly revealing in this regard, and included some of the less positive experiences that district staff had with ART as well.

With regard to questions to ART staff: It seems questionnable whether ART officers can know whether an incident would have been conducted differently without them.

Implications for Future Research/Evaluation

There is a tendency in government to think of programme evaluations as a "soft" enterprise, and very often really important questions about whether trial interventions work are "answered" by simply asking a small number of people involved about their impressions of the intervention. For police to build a scientifically credible evidence base, evaluation needs to be thought of as a type of research, requiring just as much lead time and commitment as any other important research project. I am aware this is how current staff in the EBPC think about evaluation, but other parts of the organisation need to make a parallel commitment in order to create the potential to build a better evidence base than was possible for this trial. Evaluations are difficult enough to execute well but some of the difficulties are ameliorated if the organisation itself works together from the outset.

In other words it is of considerable importance for NZP to make a serious commitment to building evaluation design into the earliest parts of a project where there the stakes are high (e.g., police safety, public safety, trust and confidence). Both the ART and to a lesser extent, the evaluation itself, involve significant use of resources. To create a situation where an evaluation is unable to be used to make recommendations about the next policy steps, seems to be an important lost opportunity. Earlier involvement by the evaluation team in gathering data about the proposed trial itself might have resulted in better outcomes for all involved.