NEW ZEALAND POLICE
Ngā Pirihimana o Aotearoa

Tactical Options
2019 Annual Report

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RESPONSE AND OPERATIONS

The TOR Annual Report series provides transparency and accountability to the New Zealand public about use of force by NZ Police, examining and reporting tactical option use over the preceding year.

The TOR Annual Report has evolved substantially over the last few years, moving away from simply reporting data to provide contextualised descriptions and explanations of what the data shows. This 2019 report is the first to make direct links with NZ Police strategic objectives, drawing conclusions and making recommendations about use of force.

When citing information from this report, please provide this link to the full report:
https://www.police.govt.nz/sites/default/files/publications/annual-tactical-options-research-report-8.pdf

Previous reports can be found here:

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Or see http://www.police.govt.nz/about-us/publication/tactical-options-research-reports for a list of links to all reports.

Foreword

Statement from Assistant Commissioner Response and Operations, Tusha Penny

In an ever changing and dynamic operating environment it is imperative that a country has a well-trained, community-minded and transparent Police Service. New Zealand is no different.

Each and every day our frontline staff head out into the communities they serve to respond and ultimately prevent incidents of family harm, disorder, violence and a broad and varied range of events. In fact, every week our Emergency Centres receive on average 20,000 calls on 111 asking for help.

This annual report provides an overview of the incidents in 2019 when our staff used force in the execution of their duties to protect our communities. It again shows that the use of force by our staff continues to be a rare occurrence, with the vast majority of interactions with members of the public not resulting in any force.

However our staff are often dealing with people at the worst times of their life. Events can be complex and escalate rapidly. Accordingly, there are occasions when use of force is unavoidable and it is necessary to take steps to resolve situations before there is further risk of serious harm or worse to our staff, the parties involved and the wider public. In such situations our staff have access to a variety of tools which can be utilised depending on the nature of the threat they face.

Police recognise that the use of force is a significant power granted to us and should always be proportional to a person's threatening, violent and/or life-endangering behaviour. Policing in Aotearoa is by the consent of our community – a fact that is not taken for granted.

We proactively release this information and acknowledge that there is further work to do in partnership with our communities across the country to gain the necessary insights and understanding of the environment we are privileged to police.

"Me mahi tahi tātou mō te oranga o te katoa." Let us all work together for the wellbeing of everyone.

Police must use physical force only when the exercise of persuasion, advice, and warning is found to be insufficient to obtain public co-operation to the extent necessary to maintain law and order, and to use only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective.

NZ Police Instructions

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Key Findings

Police rarely used tactical options.

Only 0.16% of recorded interactions with the public resulted in police using force.^

Police used **6355** tactics at **4860** TOR events.

There were more TOR events in 2019 than in previous years.

Empty Hand techniques were the most used tactical option.

Empty hand techniques were used at 39% of TOR events, followed by OC Spray and TASER (26% each) and Handcuffs-Restraints (15%).

Tactical option usage rates remain relatively stable over the past four years.

Spit hoods accounted for one-third of Handcuffs-Restraints usage (n = 257), but there were also over 200 TOR events where subjects who were spitting blood and/or saliva at police were **not** fitted with a spit hood.

Laser Painting was the most common TASER deployment method.

At two-thirds of TASER TOR events, the highest level of TASER deployment was laser painting.

20% of TASER deployments involved a discharge; 80% involved only a TASER show.

The TASER show-to-discharge ratio remained stable with an average of four shows per discharge.

Baton use was extremely rare.

There were fewer TOR events with baton use (37) than baton training injuries (38) in 2019.

Firearms were very rarely discharged.

98% of firearms deployments involved only a presentation.

Of the eight firearms discharges in 2019, three resulted in fatal injuries, three in non-fatal injuries, and two missed.

Injuries were associated with Empty Hand techniques.

Empty hand techniques caused the majority (44%) of subject injuries, with one subject injury occurring for every five Empty Hand technique uses.

Fewer injuries were caused by TASER (3%), which had a rate of one injury per 39 uses. OC Spray accounted for 4% of subject injuries, with injuries occurring at a rate of one injury per 37 uses.

There was a high rate of Empty Hand technique use at TOR events where staff were injured.

Most staff and subject injuries were mild, but subjects sustained a higher proportion of moderate and serious injuries than staff.

Most complaints were about Empty Hand techniques.

Empty hand techniques accounted for 73% of complaints, with one complaint for every seven uses (on average).

TASER accounted for only 2% of complaints, with one complaint for every 142 uses.

OC Spray accounted for 7% of complaints with one complaint for every 44 uses.

Subjects were armed at 1 out of every 5 TOR events.

Subjects who were armed were most likely to have cutting/ stabbing weapons (48%) followed by bludgeoning weapons (27%).

1 in 10 TOR events occurred at a mental health incident or attempted suicide.

Of these, 21% involved only Handcuffs-Restraints.

Māori were overrepresented in use of force events.

Māori males aged between 17 and 40 years make up less than 3% of the general population but accounted for 35% of all TOR events and 22% of all offender proceedings.

^ Based on data about recorded occurrences: see page 14 for a full description.

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Tactical Options Framework

Police are trained to use the Tactical Options Framework (TOF) to inform their decision-making about use of force. The TOF guides police to use force that is necessary and proportionate, given all the circumstances known at the time.

Threat Assessment

NZ Police's threat assessment methodology 'TENR' (Threat Exposure Necessity Response) is a decision-making framework that supports the timely and accurate assessment of information directly relevant to the safety of police and members of the public. The response to any situation must be considered, timely, proportionate and appropriate. The overriding principle when applying TENR is that 'safety is success'. Victim, public, and police safety are paramount, and every effort must be made to minimise harm and maximise safety.

Perceived Cumulative Assessment (PCA)

The PCA is represented by the inner grey ring of the TOF diagram, and refers to an officer's subjective assessment, and continuous reassessment, of an incident, based on information known about the situation and the subject's behaviour. The PCA may escalate and/or de-escalate more than once during an incident. As such, police officers must continually reassess their PCA to ensure they choose the most reasonable response, including—if required—the most appropriate tactical option for the circumstances.

The Tactical Options Framework



Communication

Ask-Why-Options-Confirm-Action (AWOCA) is the five-step tactical communications process that underpins the TOF. Tactical communication is represented by the green 'officer presence and communication' ring in the TOF diagram. This ring encircles the entire range of PCA (inner grey circle), and all tactical options in the TOF (outer green–yellow–orange circle), emphasising the importance of using tactical communication throughout an incident, where possible.

Tactical communication is crucial to safely de-escalating an incident with uncooperative subjects, and should be attempted in every incident where police action is necessary in response to uncooperative subjects.

Tactical Options Reporting

NZ Police has established one of the most rigorous and robust processes in the world for reporting and review of use of force. Every use of force report undergoes at least two levels of scrutiny to ensure that the force used was necessary, proportionate and reasonable in the circumstances.

The Tactical Options Reporting Database

Most data in this Annual Report is derived from the Tactical Options Reporting (TOR) database. Police use the TOR database to report details about events where they have used force, capturing information about the broader context and sequence of the event, the people involved, the behaviours encountered and the tactical options used in response, as well as the officer's own thinking and decision-making leading up to and during the event. Every TOR report is reviewed first by the officer's immediate supervisor, and then by another District staff member at Inspector level or above.

TOR Review Process

At each stage of the review process, the reviewer determines whether or not they support the officer's actions as being necessary, proportionate and reasonable in the circumstances, or whether they require further information. If the reviewer does not support the officer's actions, they must outline their view of the incident, and if relevant discuss with the officer and note any remedial training required. If there

are concerns specifically about excessive force, deliberate misrepresentation of the incident or other perceived inappropriate action, the Inspector-level reviewer must refer the incident to the Police Professional Conduct Manager, the relevant Human Resources Manager and the District Commander or National Manager for further investigation.

TASER Discharges

After completing the two-stage review process, records from events involving TASER discharge are further reviewed by the *TASER Assurance Forum*, a panel of representatives from workgroups including Police Professional Conduct, Continuous Improvement, RNZPC Training, and Capability. The panel considers the TASER footage and the TASER discharge and connectivity data in combination with the relevant TOR report/s and reviewers' comments. If any concerns are identified, the panel refers the report to the appropriate people/groups for follow-up.

Firearms Discharges

All intentional firearms discharges (as well as any unintentional discharges that result in an injury or fatality) are classified as *Critical Incidents*, and involve a number of further internal and external investigations.

IPCA Notifications

Events involving serious injury or fatality are notified to the IPCA to conduct an independent investigation of the event.

TOR Data Overview

Analysis of tactical options use is conducted at the level of "TOR events." A "TOR event" is the reportable use of one or more tactical options by one officer against one individual.

Data Extraction

Data was extracted on 31 March 2020. In total, 4860 TOR reports had completed the two-stage review process; these reports form the basis of the analyses reported here. A further 141 reports (2.8% of total) had not completed the two-stage review process as of that date and were excluded from further analysis.



Total TOR Events

In total there were 5001 TOR events in 2019, an increase from 4472 TOR events in 2018 (148 incomplete reports; 3.3%).

Offender Proceedings

The number of TOR events (completed reports only) also increased relative to the number of proceedings against offenders, with 332 TOR events per 10 000 offender proceedings in 2019, compared to 287 per 10 000 offender proceedings in 2018. This increase was caused by an increase in the number of TOR events as well as a decrease in the number of proceedings.

Offender proceedings data (reported here and throughout this report) is based on Recorded Crime Offender Statistics (RCOS) data for 2019, available at policedata.nz

Changes to the Analysis and Reporting of TOR data

As part of our commitment to continuous improvement, this year we have made several important changes to the way we analyse and report on TOR data. As a result, some values in this report are not directly comparable with values in previous years' Annual TOR Reports.

2018 Data update

The 2018 Annual TOR Report included 74 TOR events where the only tactical option used was handcuffs without pain compliance. Because these events had no reportable use of force, including them in the analyses inflated the total number of TOR events. The data has now been updated and comparisons to 2018 data use the updated values. The updated values differ from the 2018 report, but improve data accuracy and consistency with other years' reports.

Complaints reporting

In previous years, Annual TOR Reports focused on the number and type of complaints **received** each year; we now focus on the date that the incident **occurred.** In addition, previous reporting combined complaints and IPCA notifications data; we now focus only on complaints. Both changes enable clearer focus on the data that is most relevant to understanding the outcomes of the year's tactical option use.

Handcuffs-Restraints criteria

Previously, any handcuff use recorded as part of a TOR event was counted as a *Handcuffs-Restraint tactical option use*. Handcuff use is now only counted as a tactical option use if used in combination with pain compliance. This criterion is more consistent with NZ Police policy, which only requires reporting of handcuffs when used with pain compliance or when used alongside another tactical option. There are many handcuffs uses that do not meet this reporting criterion. For instance, policy recommends that officers consider using restraints when transporting arrested or detained people in a police vehicle to prevent them from interfering with the driver or escaping; routine handcuff uses such as these are not captured in the TOR database. In addition, because a TOR event is about one officer's actions against one individual, if a second officer at a TOR event handcuffed a subject without using pain compliance, and without using any other tactical options, this handcuff use would not be captured in the TOR database. Handcuffs use reported in the TOR database captures important information at the incident level—providing key details to fully understand the circumstances and sequence of a TOR event—but does not provide a complete picture of handcuffs use on a broad scale. As such, excluding handcuffs use without pain compliance from counts of *Handcuffs-Restraint tactical option use* enables more meaningful broad scale analysis about the use of handcuffs with pain compliance and the use of other restraints, which are all captured in the TOR database.

Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix provide detailed summary of Handcuffs-Restraint tactical option use over the past five years using the revised criteria.

Preventing Crime and Victimisation

In some situations, NZ Police must intervene directly to prevent crime and victimisation. This duty is never more apparent than when police are called to attend Family Harm events. In these—and many other—events, staff must ensure that their actions prevent any further harm to victims and prevent any further crimes from being committed in what is often a very heated and complex situation.

TOR Incident Types

Police measure demand and activity through recorded occurrences: a recorded occurrence is any call for service or police activity (offences, incidents, service or tasks) that is recorded by police after their initial attendance is complete. As Table 1 illustrates, on average one TOR event occurred for every 625 recorded occurrences. Put another way, force was used at 0.16% of police-public interactions.

However the likelihood of police using force varied depending on the type of incident. Table 1 shows the ten most common incident types in which TOR events occurred, accounting for 81% of TOR events in total. Of these, TOR events were least likely to occur at Turnovers (vehicle stops; 3T) with one TOR event occurring for every 2784 recorded occurrences. In contrast, TOR events were most likely to occur at Drunk/Detoxification (1K) incidents, with one TOR event occurring for every 56 recorded occurrences. However Turnovers and Drunk/Detoxifications each accounted for the same proportion of TORs overall: 5%. Turnovers are much more common than Drunk/Detoxification incidents in general, increasing the overall number of TORs that occur at Turnovers, despite the low likelihood of force being used.

Likewise, Family Harm (5F) episodes account for the second highest proportion of TOR events, but TOR events occurred on average at only one of every 179 Family Harm episodes attended, again emphasising the large number of family harm episodes that police are called to. The vast majority of these incidents—178 out of every 179 (99.4%)—were resolved without any use of force.

Table 1. Where Do TOR Events Occur?

Incident Type	*Total TOR events*	*Percent of all TOR events*	*Occurrences per 1 TOR event* (on average)
Breach of peace (1R)	756	16%	73 to 1
Family harm episode (5F)	743	15%	179 to 1
Traffic incident (1U, 1V)	491	10%	608 to 1
Suspicious car/person (1C)	393	8%	292 to 1
Arrest warrant (2T,2W)	355	7%	113 to 1
Suicide attempt (1X)	283	6%	91 to 1
Drunk/detoxification (1K)	239	5%	56 to 1
Bail check/breach (3A, 5K, 6D, 6E)	235	5%	245 to 1
Turnover (3T)	251	5%	2784 to 1
Mental health (1M)	212	4%	159 to 1
Other	902	19%	1738 to 1
Overall	**4860**	**100%**	**625 to 1**

Target and Catch Offenders

In our efforts to target and catch offenders, officers sometimes encounter resistant or assaultive behaviour that either prevents them from fulfilling their duty to maintain law and order, or puts themselves or others at risk of harm. In situations such as these, where police are required to use force, the end result is often that offenders are caught and charged.

Figure 1. Percent TOR Event Outcomes



TOR Event Outcomes

Over two-thirds of TOR events ended with the offender being charged with either single (n = 1809) or multiple offences (n = 1603). The remaining TOR events (n = 1448) ended with no charges being laid. Outcomes for these TOR events include situations where [1] alternative resolutions were used, [2] a subject escaped before his or her identity was confirmed, [3] the decision to lay a charge was still pending at the time the TOR report was submitted, [4] a decision was made not to charge the subject, such as in a mental health incident, or [5] the police intervention successfully prevented an offence from being committed and the TOR event was resolved without a chargeable offence occurring.

Figure 2. Offence Charges Laid



Charges Laid

Figure 2 illustrates the percentage of TOR events that resulted in a charge (or multiple charges) in each offence category. Consistent with 2018, in 2019 the most common charges laid were for violence offences, followed by drugs and anti-social offences. Some subjects faced charges from multiple categories, so the total percentage exceeds 100%.

Armed Offenders Squad (AOS) deployments—whether emergency or pre-planned—are focused on **targeting and catching offenders** who are likely to be armed. Whereas emergency callouts require AOS intervention in an ongoing dangerous situation, pre-planned callouts are typically focused on search and seizure of illegal weapons and drugs.

Table 2. AOS Deployments

District	*Emergency Callouts*	*Percent of Deployments*	*Pre-planned Callouts*	*Percent of Deployments*	*Total Deployments*
Northland	22	44%	28	56%	50
Waitematā	6	35%	11	65%	17
Auckland City	3	9%	32	91%	35
Counties Manukau	6	19%	26	81%	32
Waikato	55	30%	131	70%	186
Bay of Plenty	47	28%	123	72%	170
Eastern	31	51%	30	49%	61
Central	40	55%	33	45%	73
Wellington	28	23%	93	77%	121
Tasman	14	40%	21	60%	35
Canterbury	58	46%	67	54%	125
Southern	47	34%	92	66%	139
National	**357**	**34%**	**687**	**66%**	**1044**

AOS Deployments

There were 120 more AOS deployments in 2019 than 2018. At a national level, pre-planned deployments increased from 325 in 2018 to 357 in 2019. Emergency deployments increased from 599 in 2018 to 687 in 2019. The relative proportions of each deployment type remained similar to previous years, with about one third of deployments being pre-planned, and two-thirds emergency callouts.

At district level, there was a lot of variation from the previous year, with some districts' deployments increasing and others decreasing—in some districts by a small amount and in others, substantially. A high level of variation is both expected and typical due to the unique drivers of AOS deployments. Emergency deployments are highly dependant on demand and activity, with staff intervening to prevent harm in an immediate critical situation. On the other hand, pre-planned deployments typically involve searches to seize illegal weapons or drugs and may be the culmination of many months or years of preliminary investigations.

Our Staff are Equipped and Enabled

In fulfilling their duties, frontline police encounter a wide range of behaviours, ranging from cooperative, to resistant, to assaultive, to behaviour that could cause grievous bodily harm or death. Staff are equipped and enabled through training in a suite of tactical options and through the tactical appointments made available to them, ensuring that they are always prepared and able to respond appropriately in any situation.

Figure 3. Tactical Option Use



Note that officers may use more than one tactical option (e.g. handcuffs and OC spray) at a TOR event, so the total percentage exceeds 100%.

Tactical Option Use

Police used 6355 tactical options at 4860 TOR events, an average of 1.3 tactics per TOR event. In comparison, in 2018 police used 5636 tactical options at 4324 TOR events, also an average of 1.3 tactics per TOR event.

Empty Hand Techniques

As Figure 3 shows, Empty Hand techniques are consistently the most used tactical option, used at around 40% of TOR events over the last four years (39% in 2019; see also Table 4). Although the proportion of TOR events where Empty Hand techniques used was similar to previous years, the total number of Empty Hand techniques used was higher, with 2182 uses (compared to 1984 uses in 2018).

Baton

Baton use has been consistently low over the last five years and dropped even further in 2019—used at only 37 TOR events, compared to 54 in 2018.

Of interest, 38 staff members reported injuries resulting from baton training during 2019. Given it's low use, the required training time and associated injury risk, and the requirement that all staff carry a baton on their duty belt, it may be time for NZ Police to re-evaluate the costs and benefits of this tactical option to ensure that staff are equipped and enabled with the most appropriate equipment.

Handcuffs-Restraints

This category refers to handcuff use only when combined with pain compliance, as well as use of other restraints such as a restraint chair or spit hood. Handcuffs-Restraints were used at 15% of TOR events, a slight increase from 12% of TOR events in 2018.

Spit hoods

Spit hoods were used 257 times in 2019, accounting for 33% of all Handcuffs-Restraints use. In 250 usages, the subject was reported to be spitting blood/saliva, biting, or licking police. In four further cases—although not deliberately spitting at police—saliva and/or blood was coming from the subjects' mouth/face, such as from yelling or thrashing around. One subject was placed in a spit hood because he was known to have AIDs and known to bite and spit at police. Finally there were two uses where officers deemed a spit hood necessary on the basis of the subjects' other behaviour.

In contrast, at 219 TOR events, subjects were reported to be spitting blood/saliva at police, but were not fitted with spit hoods. Further investigation is required to fully understand the circumstances in which spit hoods are (and are not) used.

Of the subjects who were fitted with a spit hood, 13 had been exposed to OC Spray.

OC Spray; Dogs; TASER; Firearm

As shown on Figure 3, use of these remaining tactical options has been relatively stable over the last few years, with no significant changes observed (see also Table 4 for detailed 2019 data).

Firearms use prior to 2018 does not include incidents where an injury/fatality occurred because these were not included in previous years' TOR reporting.

Figure 4. TASER Use at TOR Events by Highest Mode of Deployment



TASER Deployment

Figure 4 illustrates TASER TOR events by the highest mode of deployment only (see also Table A4). Blue-toned segments represent TASER shows and red-toned segments represent TASER discharges. The legend displays TASER deployment types in order of increasing intensity from *Presentation only* (lowest) to *Discharge with probes* (highest). There were 1267 TASER TOR events in 2019 (see also Table 4), an increase from 1075 in 2018. Laser painting was the highest mode of deployment at 66% of all TASER TOR events (n = 837). Other TASER shows were made up of presentations (n = 154; 12%) and arcing (n = 24; 2%). For 252 TASER TOR events (20%) the highest level of deployment was discharge, either with probes (n = 222; 18%) or as a contact stun (n= 30, 2%).

After consistent yearly decreases, 2019 is the first year where the TASER show-to-discharge ratio has held steady at 4:1. In other words, on average there was one TASER discharge for every four TASER presentations.

There were three operational unintentional discharges. None of these discharges hit anyone and no property was damaged.

Table 3. Firearm Use at TOR Events by Highest Mode of Deployment

District	Presentation	Discharge	Unintentional Discharge
Northland	11		
Waitematā	32		
Auckland City	16		
Counties Manukau	89	1	
Waikato	25	1	
Bay of Plenty	36	2	
Eastern	8	1	1
Central	27		
Wellington	42		
Tasman	3	1	
Canterbury	32	1	
Southern	22	1	
National	**343**	**8**	**1**

Firearms Deployment

Table 3 shows the number of TOR events where police used firearms by the highest mode of deployment. The vast majority of times that police used firearms (98%) the highest mode of deployment was presentation only.

Police discharged firearms during eight TOR events. Three subjects sustained fatal gunshot wounds (Bay of Plenty; Southern) and three subjects sustained non-fatal gunshot wounds (Eastern; Tasman; Canterbury). At two TOR events, the firearm discharge missed the subject (Counties Manukau; Waikato).

There was one operational unintentional discharge; no one was hit and no property was damaged.

Table 4. Tactical Option Use by District

District	Empty Hand Techniques	OC Spray	TASER	Handcuffs-Restraints	Firearm	Dog	Baton	Other Tactic	Total
Northland	82	100	37	32	11	24	2		288
Waitematā	206	69	77	91	34	21	5		503
Auckland City	163	80	101	76	16	20	5	3	464
Counties Manukau	431	123	135	118	93	40	6	7	953
Waikato	106	95	110	35	26	30	1	4	407
Bay of Plenty	265	147	194	82	38	28	1	2	757
Eastern	156	150	75	54	9	21	4		469
Central	179	156	113	54	28	31	7	1	569
Wellington	243	143	143	86	42	66	2	6	731
Tasman	57	75	52	18	4	14	1		221
Canterbury	184	120	174	90	33	59	3	4	667
Southern	110	62	69	34	23	26	2		326
Total Uses	**2182**	**1320**	**1280**	**770**	**357**	**380**	**39**	**27**	**6355**
TOR Events	**1902**	**1287**	**1267**	**718**	**351**	**375**	**37**	**26**	**4860**

Table 4 shows the total number of uses of each tactical option in each District (see Table A1 in the Appendix for a District breakdown of the number of TOR events where each tactic was used).

Because an officer may use a given tactical option multiple times at the same TOR event, total use of each tactical option is higher than the total number of TOR events where a given tactical option was used. Because multiple tactics may be used at the same TOR event, the total number of TOR events where each tactic was used is greater than the total number of TOR events.

Taking Every Opportunity to Prevent Harm

Tactical options support frontline police to prevent harm by enabling them to intervene effectively when someone's behaviour puts either themselves or other people at risk of harm. Staff also have the opportunity to minimise harm by selecting the safest and most effective tactical option for the circumstances, to reduce the risk of injuries to both members of the public and themselves.

Table 5. Subject Injury Frequency and Injury Rates for Each Tactical Option

Tactic	*Total Injuries*	*Percent of all TOR Injuries*	*Tactic Uses per 1 Injury* (on average)
Empty Hand	440	44%	5 to 1
OC Spray	36	4%	37 to 1
TASER	33	3%	39 to 1
Handcuffs-Restraints	55	6%	14 to 1
Handcuffs without pain compliance	*33*	*3%*	*40 to 1^*
Firearm	6	1%	60 to 1
Dog	321	32%	1 to 1
Baton	7	1%	6 to 1
Other tactic	8	1%	3 to 1
Other cause—not tactic	58	6%	NA
Overall	**997**	**100%**	**6 to 1**

^ Because not all uses of handcuffs without pain compliance are recorded, the number of usages per injury is likely to be much higher than what is reported here. See page 13 for full explanation.

Tactical Option Injury Frequency: Subjects

Overall, subjects sustained 997 injuries at 939 TOR events,[^] a substantial increase from 826 TOR events with subject injuries in 2018. As Table 5 shows, most injuries were caused by Empty Hand techniques and Dog deployment, a finding that is consistent with 2018.

Table 5 also shows the injury rate for each tactical option. Dog deployment had the highest injury rate, with an average of one injury resulting from every use. However, dog deployment is only reported as a tactical option if the dog bites or injures someone (dogs are often used for tracking, which is not a use of force). Put another way—on average—for every dog bite (or injury), subjects sustained one injury.

Empty Hand techniques had the next highest injury rate, with one injury for every five uses. Empty Hand techniques were also the most used tactical option (used at 39% of TOR events), and account for nearly half (44%) of all injuries. Taken together, these findings highlight a potential opportunity for police to reduce harm through reduced use of Empty Hand techniques. Empty Hand techniques are very often the most appropriate tactical option for the situation, but this may be an opportunity for improvement to ensure that staff have the most appropriate tactics available to minimise harm.

In terms of subject injuries, TASER and OC Spray were the two safest tactical options available, with one injury occurring for an average of 39 and 37 uses respectively (superficial TASER probe injuries are not included).

Both of these tactical options are subject to usage restrictions that do not apply to Empty Hand techniques. OC Spray may only be used if a person's behaviour is within or beyond *active resistant,* and it is not advisable to use in confined spaces due to the risk of cross-contamination. TASER may only be used when a person's behaviour has the potential to escalate within or beyond *assaultive*. In short, these tactical options are less available than Empty Hand techniques. Typically Empty Hand techniques are perceived to be a less extreme use of force than TASER or OC Spray, but the injury data raises questions around this assumption. Reconsideration of the appropriate situations for the different tactics may be warranted.

[^] More than one subject injury may be reported at a TOR event.

Table 6. Subject Injury Frequency and Causes by District

District	Empty Hand Techniques	OC Spray	TASER	Handcuffs-Restraints	Handcuffs without pain compliance	Firearm	Dog	Baton	Other Tactic	Other cause: Not tactic	Total
Northland	11	3	0	2	2	0	23	0	0	3	**44**
Waitematā	32	2	1	3	4	0	14	1	0	5	**62**
Auckland City	38	1	5	4	1	0	15	0	2	8	**74**
Counties Manukau	82	5	3	7	11	0	31	0	1	4	**144**
Waikato	18	1	3	3	2	0	26	1	1	4	**59**
Bay of Plenty	58	6	5	10	4	2	26	1	0	9	**121**
Eastern	41	3	3	5	1	1	18	1	0	7	**80**
Central	48	2	2	6	0	0	28	2	0	3	**91**
Wellington	48	6	3	2	2	0	57	0	1	4	**123**
Tasman	7	1	2	6	1	1	13	0	0	1	**32**
Canterbury	44	2	5	6	4	1	47	0	3	10	**122**
Southern	13	4	1	1	1	1	23	1	0	0	**45**
Total	**440**	**36**	**33**	**55**	**33**	**6**	**321**	**7**	**8**	**58**	**997**

Figure 5. Injury Severity for Each Tactical Option: Subjects



Tactical Option Injury Severity: Subjects

Figure 5 illustrates the severity of injuries caused by each tactical option. Minor injuries were those that required no treatment or self treatment only; moderate injuries required medical treatment but not hospitalisation, and serious injuries required hospitalisation. Note that the treatment received is sometimes determined by what is most accessible; for example a moderate injury may be checked at hospital if it is closer than an afterhours clinic. Everyone who is subject to TASER discharge undergoes a medical check.

Although TASER had one of the lowest injury rates, when injuries did occur they were more likely to be moderate or severe, rather than minor. In contrast, Empty Hand techniques caused the most injuries, but injuries were more likely to be minor. OC Spray balanced the best of both outcomes: there was a low injury rate, and when injuries occurred, they were most likely to be minor. Firearms caused six injuries (<1% of all injuries), but these injuries were by far the most severe, with three serious injuries requiring hospital treatment and three fatalities.

This data gives a deeper understanding of the risk from the different tactical options, emphasising that we cannot rely on injury frequency alone to inform decisions intended to reduce harm. It is beyond the scope of this report, but a more thorough analysis of these issues and the circumstances for using the big three tactical options—Empty Hand techniques, OC Spray, and TASER—may be beneficial.

Staff Injury Frequency

Staff injuries are not easily comparable to subject injuries because of reporting differences. Each separate injury that a subject sustains is recorded, but staff are recorded as either being injured or not: it is not discernible from the data whether injured staff sustained one or multiple injuries. Staff were injured at 547 TOR events (11%), equivalent to one staff member injured for every nine TOR events; this rate is consistent with 2018. The vast majority of staff injuries were caused by the subject (85%); a further 5% were ascribed to police—whether accidental, or due to the officer's own or another officer's actions; just under 1% were caused by equipment, and 9% were reported as being due to "other" causes.

Records of staff injuries are not directly attributed to specific tactical options. However, by comparing the tactical options used during TOR events where staff were injured (staff-injury TOR events) against those where staff were not injured (non-injury TOR events), we can get an idea about the possible risks to staff. To make this comparison, the usage rate^ of each tactical option was calculated for both staff-injury and non-injury TOR events. Next the usage rate for non-injury TOR events was subtracted from the usage rate for staff-injury TOR events. Figure 6 illustrates the resulting difference for each tactical option. A difference of zero indicates that the tactic was used equally often during staff-injury and non-injury TOR events. More **positive differences** indicate that the tactic was used more during staff-injury TOR events than non-injury TOR events, and more **negative differences** show the opposite.



Over two-thirds of staff injuries occurred at TOR events where the staff member had used Empty Hand techniques (n = 381, 70%), and this was double the rate of Empty Hand techniques in TOR events where no staff injury occurred (35%). Although we do not know whether Empty Hand techniques directly caused these injuries, these figures suggest that TOR events where Empty Hand techniques are used are a higher risk for staff injuries—— either because of the tactic itself, or because of other features that are also likely to occur in these events (for example, staff being in close proximity to the subject). Handcuffs-Restraints were also used more often in staff-injury TOR events (23%) compared to non-injury TOR events (14%). In contrast, TASER, Firearm, and Dogs—which can all be deployed from a distance—were used less often in staff-injury TOR events compared to non-injury TOR events. OC Spray was used equally often, regardless of staff injury (i.e. a zero difference).

These findings highlight a possible area for improvement in Empty Hand techniques and other tactical options, potentially creating an opportunity to reduce harm to both subjects and officers, by identifying which tactics are the least risky and ensuring that they are the also most accessible.

^ The percentage of TOR events where a given tactic was used.

Figure 6. Differences in Tactical Option Usage Rates for TOR Events where Staff Were and Were Not Injured



Figure 7. Injured Subjects and Officers: Primary Injury Severity



Injury Severity: Staff and Subjects

Figure 7 displays the number of TOR events where subjects and staff sustained at least one injury, based on the severity of the primary injury.

Injured subjects and staff were most likely to sustain mild injuries. Staff sustained fewer injuries at higher levels of injury severity. Although this pattern was also broadly true for subject injuries, subjects were equally likely to sustain injuries at each of the two lower levels of severity—mild and moderate.

As noted earlier, we cannot distinguish whether injured staff sustained one or multiple injuries. However, as shown in Table 7, injured subjects sustained between one and four injuries. The primary injury for each TOR event is displayed on Figure 7; for the multiple injury TOR events (i.e. 2 to 4 injuries sustained), between 1 and 3 additional injuries are not captured on the figure. Table 8 provides a breakdown of severity for these additional 58 subject injuries.

Note that because a TOR event is about the tactical options used by one officer against one individual—rather than the incident as a whole—in some cases the same injury may be recorded at more than one TOR event.

***Table 7. Multiple Injuries** (subjects)*

Injuries Sustained	*TOR Events*
1	889
2	43
3	6
4	1

***Table 8. Additional Injury Severity** (subjects)*

Injury Severity	*Injuries*
Mild	25
Moderate	28
Serious	5

Whether a TOR event results in injuries or other harm depends at least in part on the unique characteristics of the situation and people involved. One important factor is whether a subject is armed and the type of weapon. Officers must respond appropriately to this elevated risk, minimising harm by selecting the safest and most effective tactical option for the circumstances, and reducing the risk of injuries to both members of the public and themselves.

Table 9. Subject-Armed TOR Events by Weapon Type

Weapon Type	Number of TOR Events	Percent of Subject-Armed TOR Events	Percent of All TOR Events
Cutting/stabbing weapon	466	48%	10%
Bludgeoning weapon	265	27%	5%
Firearm	122	12%	3%
Air/BB/Pellet gun	46	5%	1%
Vehicle	28	3%	1%
Other	53	5%	1%
TOTAL	**980**	**100%**	**20%**

Figure 8. Staff and Subject Injury Rates at Subject-Armed and Subject-Unarmed TOR Events



Injuries at Subject-Armed TOR events

As shown in Figure 8, staff were less likely to be injured at subject-armed TOR events than subject-unarmed TOR events. In contrast, subject injury rates were consistent regardless of whether subjects were armed. This pattern is different from 2018, which showed lower injury rates for both subjects and staff at subject-armed TOR events (compared to subject-unarmed TOR events).

At first glance, this result contradicts what we might expect—common sense dictates that weapons increase the risk of harm. However, when subjects were armed, police were much less likely to use Empty Hand techniques: Empty Hand techniques were used at 23% of subject-armed TOR events compared to 43% of subject-unarmed TOR events. Given the association between Empty Hand techniques and staff injury, it is likely that the reduced use also contributed to reduced injuries.

Keeping People Safe

Approximately 1 in 10 TOR events occurred at either a 1M mental illness incident or a 1X suicide/suicide attempt, and at approximately 1 in 5 TOR events either mental illness or suicidal behaviour (or both) were flagged as relevant factors. These events present unique challenges and—as with any other type of event—police must tailor their response to the specific personal and situational factors to prevent harm and keep people safe.

Table 10. TOR Events at Mental Health Incidents

District	Mental Illness (1M)	Percent TOR Events	Suicide Attempt (1X)	Percent TOR Events
Northland	10	5%	9	4%
Waitematā	21	5%	34	9%
Auckland City	18	5%	16	5%
Counties Manukau	18	3%	34	5%
Waikato	25	8%	11	3%
Bay of Plenty	36	6%	26	4%
Eastern	13	4%	23	7%
Central	15	3%	31	7%
Wellington	21	4%	24	4%
Tasman	13	8%	5	3%
Canterbury	13	3%	51	10%
Southern	9	4%	19	8%
National	**212**	**4%**	**283**	**6%**

1M & 1X Incidents

Officers select an incident type that best describes the nature of the incident at which tactical options were used. Selection of 1M (mental illness) and 1X (suicide attempt) incident types does not constitute a formal diagnosis of the subject's mental state. 1M and 1X incidents accounted for 10% (495) of all TOR events in 2019 (see also Table 1), a higher overall number but similar proportion to 2018 TOR events (n = 427; 10%).

Table 11. Mental Health Relevant Factors at TOR Events

District	*Mental Illness (1M)*	*Percent TOR Events*	*Suicide Attempt (1X)*	*Percent TOR Events*
Northland	30	14%	25	11%
Waitematā	85	22%	56	14%
Auckland City	60	17%	21	6%
Counties Manukau	80	11%	55	8%
Waikato	64	20%	32	10%
Bay of Plenty	109	19%	48	8%
Eastern	49	14%	31	9%
Central	64	15%	55	12%
Wellington	91	16%	42	7%
Tasman	26	15%	15	9%
Canterbury	103	20%	75	15%
Southern	41	17%	36	15%
National	**802**	**17%**	**491**	**10%**



1M & 1X Relevant Factors

Regardless of the overall incident type, the reporting officer also makes a subjective assessment of relevant factors observed at the TOR event. These factors do not reflect a formal diagnosis of the subject's mental state. As shown in Table 11, mental illness was deemed a relevant factor in 802 TOR events (17%), an increase from 688 TOR events reported in 2018 (16%). In 491 TOR events (10%), the reporting officer deemed that the subject was suicidal, also an increase from 386 TOR events in 2018 (9%). Although only one incident type may be assigned, multiple relevant factors may be reported. In 2019, 271 TOR events had both 1M and 1X flagged as relevant factors. In total, there were 1022 TOR events where either one or both factors were flagged as relevant, equivalent to 21% of TOR events, or approximately one TOR event out of every five.

Figure 9. Tactical Option Usage Rates at 1M, 1X, and all other TOR Events



Note that officers may use more than one tactical option (e.g. handcuffs and TASER) at a TOR event, so the total percentage exceeds 100%.

Tactical Option Use at 1M and 1X TOR Events

Police tactical option use at 1M and 1X TOR events comes under section 41 of the Crimes Act, which provides justification for any person to use reasonable force to prevent suicide or other acts which are likely to cause injury.

Although rates of tactical option use were broadly similar across the three groups, some key differences were apparent. Specifically, 1M and 1X TOR events had noticeably lower rates of OC Spray, Dog, Firearm, and to some extent Empty Hand techniques use. In contrast, the Handcuffs-Restraints usage rate was more than double the typical rate for both 1M and 1X TOR events. In addition, TASER was used at substantially higher rate at 1X TOR events. These differences may be due to the increased likelihood of subjects engaging in self-harming behaviour, necessitating the use of additional restraints and of intervening from a distance to prevent harm (e.g. TASER). Subjects at 1M and 1X TOR events were much more likely to be armed with cutting/stabbing weapons (29% of all 1M/1X TORs) than other subjects were (7% of all other TORs), another reason for officers to intervene while maintaining physical distance.

Further analysis reveals that 1M and 1X TOR events account for a disproportionate amount of Handcuff-Restraints use: 22% of all Handcuffs-Restraints use occurred in 1M and 1X TOR events, although these event types made up only 10% of all TOR events. In addition, 1M and 1X TORs were four times more likely than other TORs to use only Handcuffs-Restraints: at 21% (106) of 1M and 1X TORs, Handcuffs-Restraints were the only tactical option used. In contrast, Handcuffs-Restraints were the only tactical option used in only 5% (209) of other TORs.

Many of the restraint options available are designed specifically to prevent self-harm (e.g. restraint chair, arm/leg restraint), explaining their high rate of use in this subset of TOR events.

One out of every five 1M and 1X TOR events only used Handcuffs-Restraints

To Have The Trust and Confidence of All

Complaints about NZ Police provide an indicator of trust and confidence—the more that the public trust police to treat them and others with fairness and respect, the less they should feel the need to complain about how police respond in a given situation. A breakdown in trust should lead to an increase in complaints^.

Table 12. Complaint Frequency and Rate for Each Tactical Option

Tactic	Total Complaints	Percent of all Force Complaints	Tactic Uses per 1 Complaint (on average)
Empty Hand	317	73%	7 to 1
OC Spray	30	7%	44 to 1
TASER	9	2%	142 to 1
Handcuffs-Restraints	47	11%	16 to 1
Firearm	10	2%	36 to 1
Dog	15	3%	25 to 1
Baton	1	0.2%	39 to 1
Other tactic	4	1%	7 to 1
Overall	**433**	**100%**	**15 to 1**

Tactical Option Complaint Rates

Consistent with previous years, Empty Hand techniques accounted for the vast majority of force complaints (73%). Empty Hand techniques also had the highest complaint rate, with one complaint received for every 7 usages (on average). “Other” tactics had the same complaint rate but because these tactics were so rarely used (27 usages total; <1% TORs) these complaints made up only a small proportion of force complaints (1%). At the other end of the scale from Empty Hand techniques, TASER had the lowest complaint rate, with only one complaint for every 142 uses; OC Spray fell partway between the two.

These findings provide more support for a review of tactical options and the situations in which they can be used, to ensure that staff are equipped and enabled with tactical options that minimise harm and are most acceptable to the public.

Table 13 provides a breakdown of complaint frequency for each tactical option by District.

Note that the IPCA is notified of all firearms discharges that cause an injury or fatality, regardless of whether there is a complaint.

^ Note that having a robust complaints process where people trust that their complaints will be taken seriously and addressed may also encourage a higher level of complaint reporting.

Table 13. Complaint Frequency of Each Tactical Option by District

District	Empty Hand Techniques	OC Spray	TASER	Handcuffs-Restraints	Firearm	Dog	Baton	Other Tactic	Total
Northland	9	2	1	2	1	1		1	17
Waitematā	27	1	2	3	6	1			40
Auckland City	36	3		4	1	1	1	2	48
Counties Manukau	38	2		7					47
Waikato	34	2	4		1	6			47
Bay of Plenty	25	2		5		1		1	34
Eastern	15	2		5					22
Central	30	3	1	1		1			36
Wellington	30	5		10		2			47
Tasman	7								7
Canterbury	41	7	1	7	1	2			59
Southern	20			2					22
Service Centres	5	1		1					7
National	**317**	**30**	**9**	**47**	**10**	**15**	**1**	**4**	433

Complaints upheld provide a clear indicator of whether police are doing all they can to earn the trust and confidence of all. To the extent that complaints are upheld, NZ Police is falling short of where we should be.

Table 14. Complaint Outcomes for Each Tactical Option

Tactic	Upheld	Ongoing	Not Upheld	Total
Empty Hand	4	78	235	**317**
OC Spray		5	25	**30**
TASER		5	4	**9**
Handcuffs-Restraints	2	8	37	**47**
Firearm		2	8	**10**
Dog		4	11	**15**
Baton		1	0	**1**
Other tactic		1	3	**4**
Overall	**6**	**104**	**323**	**433**

Complaint Outcomes

Table 14 shows the outcomes of investigations for each tactical option. At the point that the data was extracted, 76% of complaints investigations were complete, with 2% of these complaints upheld. Investigations for the remaining 24% were still ongoing. *Upheld* refers to any finding that has some form of disciplinary or corrective action taken, or a change to NZ Police policy and procedure. *Not Upheld* refers to all other findings such as complaints that were not upheld, conciliated, or withdrawn.

Complaints Over Time

In this year's Annual TOR Report, we have changed the way we report on use of force complaints. Specifically, we now use the date the incident occurred rather than the date the complaint was received. For example, a complaint received in January 2020 for an incident that occurred in December 2019 is now counted as a complaint for the 2019 year. In previous TOR reports, this example would have counted as a complaint for the 2020 year. In addition, the analyses now focus only on complaints, whereas previous reports combined complaints with IPCA notifications. These changes are intended to provide more meaningful and transparent information about complaints. However, as a result of the updates, complaints numbers in this Annual TOR report (and future reports) are not directly comparable to previous years' reports. To provide equivalent comparison numbers, Table 15 gives a summary of complaints over the past five years using the revised reporting criteria. As the table shows, the number of complaints received about incidents in 2019 is very similar to the number of complaints received about incidents in 2018, though both these years showed an increase on the previous three years. However, considered as a percentage of TOR events, increases in the number of complaints are less apparent.

Table 15. Complaints and Outcomes 2015 – 2019

Year	Upheld	Ongoing	Not Upheld	Total	Percent of TOR events
2015	29	0	337	366	7%
2016	13	2	310	325	6%
2017	27	7	332	366	8%
2018	26	28	384	438	10%
2019	6	104	323	433	9%

Focus on Subject Factors

Complex interactions between systemic, social, cultural, and behavioural factors drive the overrepresentation of particular groups in the criminal justice system and the associated overrepresentation of these groups in use of force events. This section examines some of the specific subject factors associated with higher rates of use of force, and where possible identifies opportunities for further consideration and potential improvements.

When taking the Constables' Oath, every police officer swears to "…*faithfully and diligently serve… without favour or affection*…," in doing so committing to treat all people fairly, without prejudice or discrimination.

The primary determining factor in an officer's decision to use force is the subject's behaviour: force is used **only** in response to behaviour that is resistant, assaultive, or that is intended or likely to cause serious harm. There is no place for any police use of force in any other circumstances in Aotearoa New Zealand. Yet, some groups have a disproportionately high level of contact with the criminal justice system, and are involved in a disproportionately high proportion of TOR events.

Males were the most highly represented group in TOR events: males accounted for 86% of TOR events in 2019, yet make up only 49% of the general population. However, evidence regarding proceedings against offenders supports that this difference is due in large part to differences in behaviour: males account for 76% of all offender proceedings, including 78% of proceedings for violence offences, consistent with the point that police use of force is primarily a response to violent behaviour.

Māori and people aged between 17 and 40 years were also disproportionately represented in TOR events. Māori accounted for 54% of TOR events but make up only 17% of the general population. However, Māori also accounted for 44% of all offender proceedings, including 48% of violence offences. Similarly, people aged between 17 and 40 years accounted for 72% of TOR events but also 70% of offender proceedings.

In fact, these three factors—sex, ethnicity, and age—are not necessarily independent: Māori males aged between 17 and 40 years make up a very large proportion of offending and of TOR events relative to their population numbers. This cohort makes up less than 3% of the general population, but accounts for 22% of all offender proceedings, and 35% of all TOR events. In addition, this group accounts for 37% of TOR events that result in a charge being laid for violence offence/s.

It is likely there are a multitude of factors that contribute to the overrepresentation of this cohort in use of force events, and it will take substantial research and investigation to disentangle the underlying causes and fully understand the interactions between them.

At the most basic level, police use force in response to a subject's behaviour. However, NZ Police should also look for opportunities to help change the behaviour that leads to use of force. For instance, it may be that NZ Police tactical communication strategies are less successful in de-escalation for Māori males aged between 17 and 40 years old. If so, de-escalation strategies could be adapted and more effectively targeted to better avoid officers needing to use force. In addition, it is important to continue to build strong community relationships and to improve public trust and confidence in NZ Police; doing so should lead to improvements in the way members of the public respond to police and may also help to reduce the need for police to use force during interactions with the public.

Ethnicity terms and classifications are based on the Statistics New Zealand Statistical Standard for ethnicity (ETHNIC05 v2). Population numbers are taken from the NZ.Stat 2018 Census dataset: Ethnic group for usually resident population. See: http://nzdotstat.stats.govt.nz/wbos/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLECODE8320

Focus on Subject Factors: Ethnicity

Māori were overrepresented in use of force events, especially in relation to population numbers, with Māori subjects accounting for over half of all TOR events, more than all other ethnicities combined. NZ Police needs to continue working with Māori communities—through strategies such as *Te Huringa o Te Tai—t*o improve criminal justice outcomes for Māori.

Table 16. TOR Events by Subject Ethnicity

Ethnicity	*TOR Events*	*Per 10 000 Offender Proceedings*	*Per 100 000 Population*
Māori	2633	412	339
Pacific peoples	517	415	135
Asian	87	178	12
MELAA	45	304	64
European	1538	296	47
Other/Unknown	40	34	-
TOTAL	**4860**	**332**	**103**

Table 17. TASER Usage by Subject Ethnicity

Ethnicity	*Shows*	*Discharges*	*Total TASER TOR events*	*Per 10 000 Offender Proceedings*	*Per 100 000 Population*	*Shows per Discharge*
Māori	582	138	720	113	93	4
Pacific peoples	101	37	138	111	36	3
Asian	15	5	20	41	3	3
MELAA	9	3	12	81	17	3
European	301	69	370	71	11	4
Other/Unknown	7	0	7	6	-	-
TOTAL	**1015**	**252**	**1267**	**87**	**27**	**4**

MELAA refers to Middle Eastern, Latin American and African as per the Statistics New Zealand Statistical Standard for ethnicity (ETHNIC05 v2).

TOR Events: Ethnicity

TOR subjects were more likely to be Māori than any other ethnicity (Table 16). Māori subjects accounted for over half of all TOR events (64% of these TOR events involved male subjects aged between 17 and 40 years). Māori also accounted for a high proportion of offender proceedings (44%), but TOR events with Māori subjects were still disproportionately high in relation to number of offender proceedings, and especially in relation to population numbers.

TOR events with Pacific peoples were also disproportionately high in relation to offender proceedings and population, although the latter was less extreme than for Māori.

TASER Deployment

Over half of all TASER deployments were directed at Māori subjects (Table 17): the majority of these (71%) were directed at males aged between 17 and 40 years. Māori subjects also had a disproportionately high number of TASER TOR events in relation to offender proceedings and especially in relation to population. However, the TASER show-to-discharge ratio was consistent with the overall ratio (4:1), and the TASER usage rate was only slightly higher (3%) than for European subjects (Figure 10). Taken together, these results suggest that the high number of TASER TOR events is due to the overall high numbers of TOR events for Māori subjects, rather than police being more likely to respond with a TASER.
Pacific peoples were also overrepresented in TASER TORs, but to a lesser extent than Māori. However, the show-to-discharge ratio was lower for Pacific peoples, with one discharge for every three shows.

Tactic Usage Rates

Although tactic usage rates were broadly similar across the three largest ethnic groups—Māori, Pacific peoples, and European—there were several clear differences (Figure 10). TOR events with Māori and Pacific subjects had a lower rate of Empty Hand techniques, and a slightly lower rate of Handcuffs-Restraints use. In contrast, OC Spray had a higher usage rate at TOR events with Māori and Pacific subjects. It is not readily apparent what might be driving these differences. Factors such as the subjects' build and behaviour, as well as the environmental conditions may contribute. For instance, perhaps TOR events with Māori and Pacific subjects are more likely to occur in open spaces which are more appropriate for OC Spray use. Preliminary data supports this possibility: more TOR events were reported as occurring either in an outdoor public area or a street/highway/motorway for Māori (55%) and Pacific (60%) subjects than for European subjects (48%).

Of interest, there were lower injury rates for Māori and Pacific subjects compared to European: European subjects sustained injuries at 22% of TOR events, Maori at 19%, and Pacific people at 12%, perhaps as a result of lower use of Empty Hand techniques. Further examination of these differences may help to identify underlying causes and contributing factors, including any factors that may be affecting tactical option deployment decisions.

Figure 10. Tactical Option Usage Rates by Subject Ethnicity



Focus on Subject Factors: Age

Another important characteristic associated with use of force is the subject's age. The vast majority of TOR events—seven out of every ten—involve subjects aged between 17 and 40 years.

TOR Events: Age

As shown in Figure 11, subjects aged 21-30 years accounted for the largest proportion of TOR events (38% of all TORs), and 72% of TOR events involved subjects aged between 17 and 40 years old (48% of these TOR events involved Māori males).

Because there are very few offender proceedings for children under 10 years old (n = 1), the rate of TOR events relative to offender proceedings looks high for this group; however in reality there are far fewer than 10 000 proceedings for this group (n = 187). For all other age groups, there is a consistent pattern between the overall number of TOR events, the number of TOR events relative to offender proceedings, and TOR events relative to population numbers, with a peak in the middle age groups, and decreasing towards the extremes – younger and older people.

Figure 11. TOR Events by Subject Age



The data in Figure 11 is based on the 4678 TOR events where the subject's age was known. The remaining 182 TOR where the subject's age was not known are not included in the figure or analysis.

NEW ZEALAND POLICE
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Figure 12. TASER Deployment by Subject Age Group



TASER Deployment

TASER usage followed a similar pattern to overall number of TOR events, with the largest proportion occurring for subjects aged 21 – 30 years (38%).

TASER Shows

The youngest person who had a TASER presented was 7 years old. The subject threatened police with a knife at a family harm episode. The TASER presentation resolved the situation without further intervention.

The oldest person who had a TASER presented was 69 years old. The subject was threatening police and non-police with a large bludgeoning weapon at a family harm episode. The subject was laser painted, which resolved the situation. The subject was charged with a violence offence.

TASER Discharges

A 13-year old was the youngest subject of a TASER discharge. The subject attempted to decamp from a stolen vehicle after a police pursuit, before threatening police with a bludgeoning weapon, which he was wielding above his head. Police discharged a TASER; one probe missed and the other became tangled in the subject's clothing, and as a result no current was delivered. The subject also had two knives in his possession. Multiple charges were laid, including violence, dishonesty and drugs/disorder offences.

The oldest subjects of a TASER discharge were three 62-year-olds (in separate incidents). One subject had broken into a house, assaulted the residents, and refused to leave or to let a child who was alone in the room with him leave. In another incident, the subject threatened his neighbours then assaulted the attending police officer, continuing to grapple until the officer withdrew far enough to deploy the TASER. Both of these subjects were charged with violence offences. In the third incident, the subject was armed with a knife, had threatened to kill a member of the public, had cut his own wrists and was holding a knife against his own throat. The TASER discharge was effective in resolving the incident, although the probes did not penetrate the subject's skin. The subject was referred to the DHB Mental Health Crisis Team.

Focus on Subject Factors: Improving Outcomes

The most striking differences in TOR events appear to be associated with more general overrepresentation of certain groups in the criminal justice system. This overrepresentation is especially apparent for one specific cohort: Māori males aged between 17 and 40 years old. NZ Police must continue to invest in high-level strategies—such as Te Huringa o Te Tai—to reduce the overrepresentation of this cohort especially, and of all overrepresented groups.

NZ Police should also look for opportunities to help change the behaviour that leads to use of force, such as through promoting continuous improvement in officers' interactions with members of the public, and in strategies for successfully de-escalating volatile situations to reduce or avoid the need to use force. Finally, it is important that NZ Police continue to build strong community relationships, which may also contribute to improved interactions between police and members of the public. As police-public interactions improve, we should see parallel reductions in the overrepresentation of certain groups in use of force events, as well as improved trust and confidence in NZ Police.

Notes

Response and Operations: Research and Evaluation

This report was compiled by Response and Operations: Research and Evaluation at NZ Police National Headquarters. A key role of this team is to undertake research, analysis, monitoring, and evaluation of police use of force, to provide accountability and assist evidence-based decision making, in support of police and public safety.

Tactical Options Reporting (TOR)

A TOR 'event' is the reportable use of one or more tactical options by one officer, against one individual. Multiple TOR events can occur at one incident.

The following deployments of tactical options are reportable: handcuffs with pain compliance, or without pain compliance when used with another reportable tactical option (but note that these uses do not form part of the analyses reported here for the reasons outlined on page 4); other restraints; OC spray bursts; empty hand techniques; baton strikes; dog bites or other dog-related deployment injuries; "other" tactics (e.g. weapons of opportunity); shows and discharges of a TASER and/or firearm (noting the exemptions below).

The Armed Offenders Squads (AOS) and Special Tactics Group (STG) are exempt from reporting shows (but not discharges) of TASER and firearms.

Tactical Options Reporting data

Percentages are rounded.

TOR data presents a quantitative overview of the deployment of tactical options. However, it does not provide a nuanced understanding of factors that influence the deployment of tactical options. Further, where the numbers in these reports are small, slight increases or decreases may result in large percentage differences. For these reasons, caution should be exercised when interpreting TOR data, including when comparing TOR data across reporting years or districts.

2019 year TOR data was extracted on 31 March 2020. In total, 141 TOR reports (2.8%) had not completed the two-stage review process at the time of data extraction and were excluded from the analyses.

Disclaimer

The TOR data reported in this publication is provisional, and is the most accurate available at the time of data extraction. Data entry errors were corrected where identified. While some data inaccuracies may remain (as with all large administrative databases), New Zealand Police is confident that the data is more than sufficiently accurate to monitor and describe the reported deployment of tactical options by police.

2019 TOR data extracted prior to 31 March 2020 and provided through the OIA process may not be consistent with the values reported here. TOR reports that completed the two-stage review process after the OIA data was extracted but before 31 March 2020 are included in this dataset but would not have been included in the earlier OIA dataset.

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Contacts

For official information requests, please use the online form:

https://forms.police.govt.nz/oiarequest

For non-OIA media enquiries, please contact the NZ Police Media Centre:

http://www.police.govt.nz/news/police-media-contacts

Appendix

Table A1. TOR Events where each Tactical Option was used by District

District	Empty Hand Techniques	OC Spray	TASER	Handcuffs-Restraints	Firearm	Dog	Baton	Other Tactic	Overall Total TOR Events
Northland	75	99	37	28	11	24	2		222
Waitematā	178	69	77	86	32	20	4		389
Auckland City	134	80	100	70	16	20	5	3	355
Counties Manukau	385	120	134	110	90	40	6	6	720
Waikato	95	87	107	33	26	29	1	4	315
Bay of Plenty	236	141	193	73	38	27	1	2	583
Eastern	135	145	74	51	9	21	4		352
Central	154	154	112	50	27	31	6	1	441
Wellington	210	141	141	82	42	65	2	6	563
Tasman	52	72	52	17	4	14	1		171
Canterbury	158	117	171	86	33	58	3	4	505
Southern	90	62	69	32	23	26	2		244
TOR Events	**1902**	**1287**	**1267**	**718**	**351**	**375**	**37**	**26**	**4860**
Percent of TOR Events	**39%**	**26%**	**26%**	**15%**	**7%**	**8%**	**1%**	**1%**	**-**
Total Uses	**2182**	**1320**	**1280**	**770**	**357**	**380**	**39**	**27**	**6355**

Because officers may use multiple tactical options or the same tactical option multiple times at the same TOR event, the number of TOR events for each tactical option and for each District sums to more than the overall total number of TOR events, and total uses of each tactical option is higher than the total number of TOR events where a given tactical option was used.

Table A2. TOR Events where Handcuffs-Restraints tactical option was used based on revised criteria, by District, 2015 – 2019

District	*2015*	*2016*	*2017*	*2018*	*2019*
Northland	26	28	27	26	28
Waitematā	77	74	59	49	86
Auckland City	128	89	71	69	70
Counties Manukau	112	101	99	80	110
Waikato	44	34	33	19	33
Bay of Plenty	74	66	54	45	73
Eastern	46	38	29	36	51
Central	45	58	41	37	50
Wellington	104	78	67	67	82
Tasman	21	20	25	20	17
Canterbury	80	78	69	60	86
Southern	74	49	36	24	32
Total TOR Events	**831**	**713**	**610**	**532**	**718**
Percent of TOR Events	**17%**	**14%**	**13%**	**12%**	**15%**

See page 13 for full explanation of revised criteria for Handcuffs-Restraints tactical option use.

Table A3. Handcuffs-Restraints tactical option uses based on revised criteria, by District, 2015 – 2019

District	*2015*	*2016*	*2017*	*2018*	*2019*
Northland	27	28	28	30	32
Waitematā	86	86	60	50	91
Auckland City	133	96	77	74	76
Counties Manukau	123	112	107	85	118
Waikato	45	35	35	20	35
Bay of Plenty	84	69	60	46	82
Eastern	51	41	30	39	54
Central	47	61	43	40	54
Wellington	122	86	82	73	86
Tasman	21	22	25	21	18
Canterbury	88	85	75	70	90
Southern	83	52	39	29	34
Total Uses	**910**	**773**	**661**	**577**	**770**

See page 13 for full explanation of revised criteria for Handcuffs-Restraints tactical option use.

Table A4. TASER TOR Events by Highest Level of Deployment and District

District	Presentation only	Laser Paint	Arc	Contact Stun	Discharge with Probes	Total TASER TOR Events
Northland	8	22		2	5	37
Waitematā	5	55	1	4	12	77
Auckland City	9	61	6	2	22	100
Counties Manukau	16	91	3	4	20	134
Waikato	8	76	3	2	18	107
Bay of Plenty	33	109	5	2	44	193
Eastern	6	56	1	1	10	74
Central	24	71		2	15	112
Wellington	11	98	3	9	20	141
Tasman	7	37	1	1	6	52
Canterbury	16	117	1		37	171
Southern	11	44		1	13	69
TOR Events	**154**	**837**	**24**	**30**	**222**	**1267**
Percent of TASER TOR Events	**12%**	**66%**	**2%**	**2%**	**18%**	**-**

NEW ZEALAND POLICE
Ngā Pirihimana o Aotearoa

Tactical Options: Supplement

Police Shootings 1916 – 2020

NEW ZEALAND POLICE
Ngā Pirihimana o Aotearoa
RESPONSE AND OPERATIONS

The purpose of this supplemental report is to provide transparency about shootings by NZ Police as far back as records allow. No police officer ever wants to be in the position of deciding whether they need to discharge a firearm at a member of the public, but it is a responsibility they bear in fulfilling their duty to maintain law and order and to keep people safe.

A substantial number of requests for Official Information focus on police shootings; this list is intended to address the high level of public interest surrounding these incidents. While addressing the public interest, we must also be respectful of all the people involved in these incidents, and their right to privacy. In balance, this list includes the key details that most OIA requests focus on.

Shootings by Police

1916 – 2020

Notes

Data Accuracy
The information included in this list is the most accurate available at the time of reporting. Efforts have been made to correct any identified errors, however inaccuracies may still exist.

The Fatalities and Shooting Injuries Database
Historically, fatalities and shooting injuries have not been recorded in TOR data, primarily because these events are subject to detailed and established investigative processes. However, because the team responsible for monitoring, analysing, and reporting on TOR data are not involved in these investigations, there were implications for the prompt and ready visibility of fatalities and shooting injuries for reporting purposes. Given that these uses of force result in more serious—potentially fatal—injuries, these events are essential to a comprehensive understanding of the use of force environment. In July 2017, NZ Police made changes to its reporting policies and introduced the *Fatalities and Shooting Injuries database* to enable the prompt reporting of high-level details about these events, and to improve the quality and completeness of data in this area of reporting. From 2018 onwards, this data has been incorporated into the TOR annual report.

Incident Type Information
Officers select an incident type that best describes the nature of the incident at which tactical options were used. Because shooting incidents prior to July 2017 were not reported in a centralised database, available details have been compiled from other information sources. As a result, the type and format of information prior to 2017 is not standardised, and some information is missing. For these earlier records, information in the column “Incident Type” has been evaluated based on interpretation of the available information, and may not be consistent with how it would have been reported by the officers involved. All other records are based on the information provided by the reporting officer.

IPCA Independent Investigations: Public Reports
The IPCA is notified about any event that involves a serious injury or fatality. Where available, links to the public reports from IPCA independent investigations have been provided—these reports contain much more detail about the context and circumstances of each incident than is possible to provide in this list.

Ethnicity Classifications
Ethnicity terms and classifications are based on the Statistics New Zealand Statistical Standard for ethnicity (ETHNIC05 v2). MELAA refers to Middle Eastern, Latin American and African.

Definition
Fatal – cause unconfirmed refers to incidents that resulted in the death of the subject, however the coroner has not been able to confirm whether the fatality is attributable to shots fired by the police.

Shootings by Police

1916 – 2020

Incident Date	District	Outcome of Shots Fired	Incident Type	Subject Weapon	Subject Age	Subject Sex	Subject Ethnicity	Link to IPCA Investigation Public Report
2/04/1916	Bay of Plenty	Fatal	Arrest/Gun fight			M	Māori	
2/04/1916	Bay of Plenty	Fatal	Arrest/Gun fight			M	Māori	
2/04/1916	Bay of Plenty	Non-fatal injury	Arrest/Gun fight			M	Māori	
2/04/1916	Bay of Plenty	Non-fatal injury	Arrest/Gun fight			M	Māori	
20/10/1941	Tasman	Fatal	Homicide (multiple)			M	Unknown	
14/12/1949	Canterbury	Fatal	Discharge firearms at police and public			M	Unknown	
7/07/1969	Northland	Non-fatal injury	Kidnapping/Hostage situation; threaten/discharge firearms	Rifle Shotgun		M	Unknown	
16/04/1970	Wellington	Fatal	Hostage situation; threaten Police with firearm	Shotgun (cut down)		M	Unknown	
5/01/1971	Waikato	Non-fatal injury	Accidental; situation unknown				Unknown	
1/06/1975	Canterbury	Fatal	1M - mental health; stabbing			M	Unknown	
4/01/1976	Central	Fatal	Discharge firearms at police			M	Unknown	

Shootings by Police *(continued)*

1916 – 2020

Incident Date	District	Outcome of Shots Fired	Incident Type	Subject Weapon	Subject Age	Subject Sex	Subject Ethnicity	Link to IPCA Investigation Public Report
20/05/1979	Waitematā	Fatal	1D - domestic dispute incident			M	Unknown	
24/12/1982	Wellington	Fatal	Assault police with weapon	Bludgeoning weapon		M	Unknown	
28/01/1983	Auckland	Non-fatal injury	Hostage situation; threaten with firearm	Shotgun	18	M	Unknown	
18/04/1983	Wellington	Fatal	Execute search warrant; threaten police with weapon	Bludgeoning weapon	26	M	Māori	
6/06/1985	Southern	Fatal	Homicide	Shotgun	32	M	European	
7/04/1986	Bay of Plenty	Non-fatal injury	Homicide	Shotgun	18	M	Māori	
14/03/1986	Northland	Fatal	Robbery; hostage situation			M	Unknown	
27/10/1990	Auckland	Fatal	Threaten police with firearm	Shotgun		M	Unknown	
14/11/1990	Southern	Fatal	Homicide (multiple)	Rifle	33	M	European	
25/01/1991	Southern	Non-fatal injury	Discharge firearm at police	Rifle		M	Unknown	
30/12/1991	Central	Non-fatal injury	Armed robbery	Shotgun Rifle	36	M	European	

Shootings by Police *(continued)*

1916 – 2020

Incident Date	District	Outcome of Shots Fired	Incident Type	Subject Weapon	Subject Age	Subject Sex	Subject Ethnicity	Link to IPCA Investigation Public Report
29/07/1993	Waikato	Fatal	Hostage situation; threaten police and public with weapon	Cutting/stabbing weapon	47	M	European	
17/09/1994	Northland	Non-fatal injury	1C - car/person acting suspiciously	Cutting/stabbing weapon	22	M	Unknown	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.aspx?ID=104278
19/07/1995	Wellington	Non-fatal injury	1M - mental health incident	Rifle	57	M	Unknown	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.aspx?ID=104275
27/09/1995	Southern	Fatal	1M - mental health incident; siege; discharge firearm	Rifle	34	M	European	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.aspx?ID=104274
20/11/1995	Northland	Fatal	1M - mental health incident; discharge firearm	Rifle (cut down)		M	Unknown	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.aspx?ID=104273
6/02/1996	Tasman	Non-fatal injury	1D - domestic dispute incident	Cutting/stabbing weapon	25	M	European	
24/06/1996	Eastern	Fatal	Homicide	Rifle	43	M	Māori	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.aspx?ID=104266
29/08/1996	Auckland	Non-fatal injury	1M - mental health incident; hostage situation	Cutting/stabbing weapon	24	F	European	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.aspx?ID=104264
21/09/1996	Counties Manukau	Fatal	Threaten/discharge firearm	Rifle	46	M	Māori	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.aspx?ID=104259
26/08/1998	Canterbury	Non-fatal injury	Hostage situation; threaten/discharge firearm	Shotgun (cut down)	20	M	European	
21/12/1998	Wellington	Non-fatal injury	Robbery	Shotgun	26	M	Māori	

Shootings by Police *(continued)*

1916 – 2020

Incident Date	District	Outcome of Shots Fired	Incident Type	Subject Weapon	Subject Age	Subject Sex	Subject Ethnicity	Link to IPCA Investigation Public Report
23/04/1999	Canterbury	Non-fatal injury	Threaten police with firearm	Shotgun	60	M	Māori	
1/07/1999	Waitematā	Fatal	1S - sudden death	Replica firearm	31	M	Pacific peoples	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.aspx?ID=104251
6/08/1999	Waitematā	Non-fatal injury	1D - domestic dispute incident	Cutting/stabbing weapon	33	M	European	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.aspx?ID=105096
16/02/2000	Southern	Non-fatal injury	Threaten police with weapon	Cutting/stabbing weapon	26	M	Māori	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.aspx?ID=104250
30/04/2000	Central	Fatal	Threaten police with weapon	Bludgeoning weapon	23	M	Māori	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.aspx?ID=101402
31/05/2001	Wellington	Miss	Kidnapping aggravated robbery		31	M	Unknown	
21/11/2001	Canterbury	Non-fatal injury	Threaten police with weapon	Cutting/stabbing weapon	32	M	Unknown	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.aspx?ID=101424
1/10/2002	Counties Manukau	Non-fatal injury	Threaten police	No weapon	26	M	Pacific peoples	
20/04/2004	Waitematā	Non-fatal injury	Threaten police with weapon	Cutting/stabbing weapon	37	M	Pacific peoples	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.aspx?ID=101418
16/06/2004	Auckland	Miss	2Z - Other service request response	No weapon	27	M	European	
14/08/2004	Counties Manukau	Fatal	1D - domestic dispute incident	Cutting/stabbing weapon	37	M	MELAA	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.aspx?ID=101419

Shootings by Police *(continued)*

1916 – 2020

Incident Date	District	Outcome of Shots Fired	Incident Type	Subject Weapon	Subject Age	Subject Sex	Subject Ethnicity	Link to IPCA Investigation Public Report
28/11/2005	Waitematā	Non-fatal injury	1110 - Homicide	Cutting/stabbing weapon	34	M	European	
6/01/2007	Wellington	Non-fatal injury	6820 - Firearms offences	Shotgun	35	M	European	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.aspx?ID=101413
26/09/2007	Canterbury	Fatal	3530 – Disorder	Bludgeoning weapon	37	M	Māori	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.aspx?ID=101401
27/11/2007	Northland	Miss	2R - Recovery motor vehicle	Vehicle	17	M	Māori	
21/01/2008	Waikato	Non-fatal injury	4120 – Burglary	Rifle	19	M	European	
23/10/2008	Northland	Fatal	1S - sudden death	Airgun - Rifle	37	F	European	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.aspx?ID=108400
23/01/2009	Auckland	Non-fatal injury (offender)	2R - recovery motor vehicle	Rifle (cut down)	50	M	Māori	
23/01/2009	Auckland	Fatal (bystander)	2R - recovery motor vehicle	No weapon	17	M	Pacific peoples	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.aspx?ID=120671
23/01/2009	Auckland	Non-fatal injury (bystander)	2R - recovery motor vehicle	No weapon	30	M	European	
7/05/2009	Eastern	Miss	Execute search warrant	Shotgun; Shotgun (cut down); Rifle; Handgun – pistol	51	M	Unknown	

Shootings by Police *(continued)*

1916 – 2020

Incident Date	District	Outcome of Shots Fired	Incident Type	Subject Weapon	Subject Age	Subject Sex	Subject Ethnicity	Link to IPCA Investigation Public Report
28/06/2009	Canterbury	Fatal	1C - car/person acting suspiciously	Rifle Shotgun	42	M	European	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.aspx?ID=110272
27/07/2009	Auckland	Non-fatal injury	6820 - Firearms offences	Cutting/stabbing weapon	36	M	Māori	
18/07/2010	Auckland	Non-fatal injury	1Z - other incident	Airgun	38	M	Māori	
24/02/2011	Central	Non-fatal injury	1Z - other incident	Rifle	28	M	European	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.aspx?ID=125543
28/03/2011	Eastern	Fatal	Homicide	Shotgun	19	M	Māori	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.aspx?ID=130981
16/07/2011	Central	Fatal	Kidnapping	Cutting/stabbing weapon Airgun - handgun	46	M	Māori	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.aspx?ID=135477
20/10/2011	Eastern	Non-fatal injury	1710 - Intimidation/threats	No weapon	51	M	Māori	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.aspx?ID=133903
21/01/2012	Counties Manukau	Non-fatal injury	1D - domestic dispute incident	Bludgeoning weapon	43	M	Māori	
15/03/2012	Canterbury	Non-fatal injury	3530 – Disorder	Cutting/stabbing weapon	31	M	MELAA	
2/05/2013	Wellington	Non-fatal injury	1D - domestic dispute incident	Cutting/stabbing weapon	47	M	Māori	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.aspx?ID=130808

Shootings by Police *(continued)*

1916 – 2020

Incident Date	District	Outcome of Shots Fired	Incident Type	Subject Weapon	Subject Age	Subject Sex	Subject Ethnicity	Link to IPCA Investigation Public Report
8/06/2013	Central	Fatal	4U - arrest and follow up	Rifle (Cut down)	33	M	Māori	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.aspx?ID=138218
8/07/2013	Waitematā	Fatal	Firearms offence	Rifle	20	M	Māori	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.aspx?ID=137516
16/08/2013	Eastern	Non-fatal injury	1M - mental health	Airgun - handgun	33	M	Māori	
7/11/2013	Counties Manukau	Miss	6E - EM bail breach	Bludgeoning weapon	46	M	Māori	
21/10/2014	Waikato	Non-fatal injury	1D - domestic dispute incident	Shotgun (cut down)	50	M	European	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.ashx?ID=147565
28/04/2015	Counties Manukau	Non-fatal injury	6820 - Firearms offences	Handgun - pistol	42	M	Māori	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.ashx?ID=148260
2/05/2015	Waikato	Fatal	1110 – Homicide	Rifle	33	M	Māori	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.ashx?ID=145645
2/08/2015	Auckland	Fatal	1S - sudden death	No weapon	21	M	European	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.ashx?ID=145080
20/08/2015	Tasman	Non-fatal injury	Driving and firearms offences	Shotgun	27	M	Māori	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.ashx?ID=148544
8/09/2015	Wellington	Fatal	2M - missing person	Rifle	25	M	Māori	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.ashx?ID=145135
26/10/2015	Eastern	Non-fatal injury	1110 - Homicide	Shotgun	28	M	European	https://most0010142.expert.services/includes/download.ashx?ID=148132

Shootings by Police *(continued)*

1916 – 2020

Incident Date	*District*	*Outcome of Shots Fired*	*Incident Type*	*Subject Weapon*	*Subject Age*	*Subject Sex*	*Subject Ethnicity*	*Link to IPCA Investigation Public Report*
9/03/2016	Bay of Plenty	Miss	4O - other special/major operation	Rifle	27	M	Māori	https://most0010142.expert.services/includes/download.ashx?ID=152235
24/03/2016	Central	Non-fatal injury	1C – car/person acting suspiciously	Replica firearm	49	M	Pacific peoples	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.ashx?ID=148440
10/06/2016	Waikato	Fatal	1D - domestic dispute incident	Cutting/stabbing weapon	57	M	European	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.ashx?ID=149056
12/07/2016	Waikato	Fatal	1S - sudden death	Shotgun	36	M	European	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.ashx?ID=148172
14/07/2016	Bay of Plenty	Fatal	Assault	Cutting/stabbing weapon	35	M	Māori	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.ashx?ID=148377
6/01/2017	Central	Fatal	1S - sudden death	Shotgun (cut down)	32	M	Asian	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.ashx?ID=150082
4/02/2017	Canterbury	Non-fatal injury	1X - threaten/attempt suicide	Replica firearm	24	M	European	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.ashx?ID=149445
26/02/2017	Wellington	Fatal	2R - recovery motor vehicle	Cutting/stabbing weapon	44	M	European	https://most0010142.expert.services/includes/download.ashx?ID=150490
7/07/2017	Tasman	Non-fatal injury	3T - turnover	No weapon	34	M	Māori	
26/07/2017	Northland	Fatal-cause unconfirmed	Homicide	Rifle MSSA	56	M	European	https://most0010142.expert.services/includes/download.ashx?ID=152248

Shootings by Police *(continued)*

1916 – 2020

Incident Date	District	Outcome of Shots Fired	Incident Type	Subject Weapon	Subject Age	Subject Sex	Subject Ethnicity	Link to IPCA Investigation Public Report
13/08/2017	Waikato	Miss	3T - turnover	MSSA	36	M	Māori	https://most0010142.expert.services/includes/download.ashx?ID=153200
28/08/2017	Waikato	Miss	2W - arrest warrant (other)	Vehicle	37	M	Māori	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.ashx?ID=155889
19/12/2017	Central	Non-fatal injury	1D - domestic dispute incident	Rifle (cut down)	22	M	Māori	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.ashx?ID=155348
23/02/2018	Northland	Miss	1C – car/person acting suspiciously	Unknown	40	M	Māori	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.ashx?ID=154931
31/03/2018	Waitematā	Fatal	1M - mental health	Cutting/stabbing weapon	29	M	European	https://www.ipca.govt.nz/includes/download.ashx?ID=156239
19/10/2018	Waitematā	Non-fatal injury	1Z - other incident	Shotgun	22	M	Māori	
25/11/2018	Canterbury	Fatal-cause unconfirmed	1D - domestic dispute incident	Shotgun Vehicle	56	M	Unknown	
31/01/2019	Counties/Manukau	Miss	4U - arrest and follow up	Handgun - pistol	44	M	Māori	
21/02/2019	Bay of Plenty	Fatal	4U - arrest and follow up	Shotgun Vehicle	29	M	Māori	
26/02/2019	Canterbury	Non-fatal injury	2W - arrest warrant (other)	Shotgun	32	M	Pacific peoples	
28/07/2019	Tasman	Non-fatal injury	1Z - other incident	Cutting/stabbing weapon	27	M	European	

Shootings by Police *(continued)*

1916 – 2020

Incident Date	District	Outcome of Shots Fired	Incident Type	Subject Weapon	Subject Age	Subject Sex	Subject Ethnicity	Link to IPCA Investigation Public Report
23/11/2019	Bay of Plenty	Fatal	1E - emergency/disaster/spill	Cutting/stabbing weapon	40	M	Māori	
5/12/2019	Southern	Fatal	1X - threaten/attempt suicide	Rifle	66	M	Unknown	
17/12/2019	Eastern	Non-fatal injury	4U - arrest and follow up	Replica firearm	31	M	Māori	
6/11/2019	Waikato	Miss	1Z - other incident	Vehicle	55	M	European	
13/02/2020	Bay of Plenty	Fatal	PURSUIT	Firearm - type unconfirmed	33	M	Māori	
20/04/2020	Counties Manukau	Fatal	1C - car/person acting suspiciously	Machete	43	M	Asian	
19/05/2020	Central	Fatal	1C - car/person acting suspiciously	Firearm - type unconfirmed	54	M	European	
27/05/2020	Bay of Plenty	Miss	2W – arrest warrant (other)	Firearm – type unconfirmed	28	M	Māori	